PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

A LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY WITH A RUNNING COMMENTARY

EDITED AND COMPLETED FROM THE PAPERS OF
THE LATE E. DE STRYCKER, S.J.

BY

S.R. SLINGS

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PREFACE

More than half a century ago, John Burnet published his *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito, with notes* (Oxford 1924), pages 63-171 of which are to this day by far the best commentary of the *Apology*. Its most remarkable features are the full and exact documentation on historical problems, the perceptive analysis of the structure of the work as a whole and the function of each of its parts, an unparalleled familiarity with Platonic usage and style, its own clear and concise language.

After having worked some twenty years on Plato and read the *Apology* several times with college students, I came to the conclusion that Burnet's work, excellent as it is, could be supplemented, partly because new data were now available, partly because its brevity did not provide room for a more detailed examination of what the text implies, and finally because Burnet's views might be challenged on several points. So about 1948 I started systematically collecting materials that could, on the one hand, contribute to a more thorough assessment of the philosophical and literary significance of the *Apology* and of its structure and composition, and on the other hand, that could lead to a better appreciation of points of language and of fact. The first kind of supplements would take the form of essays, the second that of a line-by-line commentary. It seemed, however, unthinkable to rewrite what Burnet had said excellently in his notes since his work was still available (it still is in print) and since nobody, and certainly not a foreigner, would want to improve upon the neatness and terseness of Burnet's formulations.

So I came to the idea of the present book, which is intended as a companion to Burnet's text and commentary. The analytical part is mostly new, since Burnet refrained from any detailed philosophical and literary analysis of the *Apology*. For the Running Commentary, I presuppose that the reader has Burnet's work constantly open on his desk. The reader may always gather *e silentio* that I accept Burnet's explanation unless I make it clear, explicitly or implicitly, that this is not the case. I follow this policy in matters textual, historical, grammatical, lexicological and stylistic. I can only say that in the course of this undertaking my valuation of Burnet's achievements as an interpreter of Plato grew still higher than it was at the start.

In the spring of 1958, I finished a first version of the commentary, whereas, at the same time, the analyses were less elaborate than they are now. In the autumn of that year, however, new educational tasks entrusted to me and researches in a quite different field of classical scholarship prevented me from completing my work on the *Apology*. I could not make any substantial progress until the end of 1971. From January to April 1972, I had the privilege of being a member of the School of Historical Studies at

the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (New Jersey). There I set out to write down in English the text of the book as it is here submitted to the reader. During those months I profited greatly from the advice and encouragement of Professor Harold Cherniss, Permanent Member of the Faculty of the Institute. The facilities of the very rich library of the School of Historical Studies, the readiness of all the members of the staff, and the cordial and stimulating daily intercourse with the other guests proved influential, even decisive factors in my work on this project. After that I was invited thrice, viz. in the spring of 1973 and the summers of 1975 and 1976, to stay for several weeks at the Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique at Vandoeuvres-Genève (Switzerland). Its specialised library and the idyllic setting near the world famous Lake of Geneva contributed in no small measure to the progress of my undertaking. During those years I found good opportunities at home for completing the work and for revising the whole of the text. Miss Sandra Colen was so kind as to correct my English; for this help I thank her most sincerely. All faults that remain are, of course, my own.

The overall design of my book had already taken its specific shape when Dr. Thomas Meyer's work *Platons Apologie* (Stuttgart 1962) was published. It is the most important contribution to the interpretation of the *Apology* since Burnet's. I have not, however, quoted it very frequently. When I had reached the same results independently of him, e.g. with regard to similarities or contrasts between the *Apology* and the Attic Orators, I did not mention the fact. I do this only when I borrow from Dr. Meyer either data that were not in my files or an idea which had not occurred to me before 1962. As a whole, Meyer's very well-informed work differs profoundly from mine. It does not try to interpret the *Apology* in the light of its structure, but examines two problems: the relations of the *Apology* to Attic oratory on the one hand, and to the rest of Plato's work on the other. Because the arrangement of Dr. Meyer's book is not dictated by Plato's own plan but by logical considerations, there is very little overlapping between the two books. They can be considered as complementary works. I think there is room for both.

I did not succeed in drawing a clear distinction between the topics that I deemed were best treated in the analyses of the successive sections of the *Apology*, and those were more suited to the commentary. Whenever a point was closely linked with a question examined in the analyses, I have discussed it there, except when a detailed treatment would have disturbed the balance of my exposition. Problems that are directly connected with particular words or phrases and that do not pertain to broader questions of interpretation are mostly dealt with in the commentary. Since the reader will use both parts anyhow, he will find in the second what he did not find in the first and vice versa.

St. Ignatius College, University of Antwerp

Emile de Strycker, S.J.

SECOND PREFACE

Shortly before his death on April 19, 1978, Father E. de Strycker, S.J., asked his pupil Fernand Bossier to complete his book on the *Apology* and to see it through the press. For the next eight years, Dr. Bossier, who was appointed Professor at the UFSIA (Universitary Faculties Saint-Ignatius Antwerp) shortly afterwards, spent most of what little time was left by his exacting duties as a teacher and a collaborator of the *Aristoteles Latinus* on checking and revising the manuscript, especially the footnotes to the eleven chapters of the analytical part of the work. At the same time, the late Father A. Dockx, S.J., and Father J. van Brabant, S.J., had the manuscript typed and started looking for a publisher in Belgium. This proved unsuccessful, and as Professor Bossier found that he was making very little progress, he agreed to abandon the work. His colleague, Professor J. Gijsel, contacted the late G.J. de Vries, Professor emeritus of the Free University at Amsterdam, who asked me to take over Professor Bossier's work. Having read the typescript and manuscript parts of the book as it then was, I felt that De Strycker's work was so important that I had no option but to say yes.

Efforts to find a Belgian publisher having once more proved fruitless, I was very happy when Professor C.J. Ruijgh accepted the book provisionally for the *Supplements to Mnemosyne*, and I started working on the book in 1988. The Faculty of Letters of the Free University undertook the cost of word processing the work left by De Strycker and revised by Bossier, and the Dutch Research Foundation N.W.O. afforded me a grant to work in the same Fondation Hardt which is so eloquently described by De Strycker in his Preface. During this stay, I was able to finish a first draft of what is now § 3bβ and γ of Chapter XI. After that, my duties at the Free University left me no time to do more than carrying on, slowly but steadily, the revision started by Professor Bossier.

Luckily, the Dutch Ministry of Education appointed me Netherlands Visiting Professor at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor for the year 1990-1991. In the course of that year I finally found the time to finish most of Chapter XI and the Running Commentary; moreover, I was privileged enough to read the *Apology* with a group of dedicated and critical graduate students of that splendid institution — they forced me to reformulate many points, especially in the Running Commentary. Above all, I made the acquaintance of Cynthia Bannon, who not only corrected my English, and suggested improvements on De Strycker's English as corrected by Ms. Sandra Colen, but also alerted me to vaguenesses and inconsistencies in the argument. Her sharp eyes and critical acumen have greatly improved the whole book. Of course, I am solely responsible for the deficiencies that remain. Professor Martin Ostwald graciously spent some of his valuable time in going through the first six chapters; the book has benefited from his

remarks, and I have drawn great strength from his warm approval of it. During a short stay at the University of Canterbury (Christchurch, New Zealand), I was able to complete Chapter XI.

When I returned to the Netherlands in 1991, the work was finished, but Ms. Bannon's remarks convinced me that a more thorough revision was necessary than I had realised before. This task occupied most of my spare time until the end of the summer of 1993.

I end this outline of the book's history by thanking all persons living and dead and all institutions mentioned above. I especially regret that the slow progress of my work is the cause that Professor De Vries, who died in October 1990, did not see the final result. I am grateful to him not only for his encouragement in fulfilling this task but for everything he taught me as an undergraduate, without which I would never have been able to undertake it.

With regard to my own work on this book, I have already indicated that Chapter XI § 3bβ and γ and § 4 (216-239), as well as the Commentary from the note on 40a5 onwards (381-397), were written by me. I was fortunate enough to be able to complete the work in the spirit of De Strycker, who long ago published his paper 'Socrate et l'au-delà', from which I have greatly benefited.

Of course, I have left unchanged the main lines of De Strycker's interpretation of the *Apology*. I felt able to take on the job in the first place because I found myself in agreement with him on almost all major issues. I disagree with him on the relationship between the elenctic and protreptic portraits of Socrates, which De Strycker takes as complementary — I have expressed my own views in my *Comm. Clit.* 163-167 and do not wish to repeat them in this book. More in general, I have refrained from polemising with De Strycker. In a number of passages, I have changed or omitted views which I felt were untenable; for the most part they concern points of Greek history. In some other cases, recent research prompted me to modify the wording. I have occasionally added arguments that reinforce cases made by De Strycker and discussed minor issues relevant to them but left out of consideration by him.

De Strycker was very selective in his references to secondary literature; he cited only works that he felt were especially important, even when they were no longer the latest word on the issues they treated. In dealing with the massive literature that has appeared since his death, I have tried to adopt the same policy, although I have been slightly more liberal. The recent monographs on the *Apology* are perhaps cited more often than they deserve. Although of course I have not read everything that was published during the last fifteen years, my omissions are not always due to ignorance but sometimes to criticism. I regret that I was unable to deal more than occasionally with Vlastos' important *Socrates*: on most issues, Vlastos' assumptions and results are so diametrically opposed to De Strycker's and mine that a fundamental discussion would have made it necessary to rewrite great parts of this book.

In a book of this size, which took so long in preparing, some inconsistencies and repetitions were bound to occur. The inconsistencies proved easy to remedy; repetitions I have suppressed as far as possible, but fairly often this proved impossible without harming the argument: in such cases, I have compressed and sometimes rewritten De Strycker's words. Many cross-references have been added. It was equally inevitable that some formulations seemed less clear to the intended readers of this book than they must have seemed to De Strycker, who lived with it for thirty years. Furthermore, De Strycker was more at home in continental Platonic scholarship than many readers of a book written in English may be presumed to be. I have therefore clarified the terminology and the phrasing in many cases, often adopting suggestions made by Cynthia Bannon.

In revising the Running Commentary, I had to respect De Strycker's attitude towards recent research in the area of Greek linguistics, for which he felt little sympathy. I have therefore left untouched many views and formulations with which I am not altogether comfortable, and changed or omitted only some statements that I considered untenable. But I have followed my own preferences in the part written by me. The TLG data have been an invaluable help; where they provided parallels not discussed by De Strycker, and when in the course of my own reading of Plato and other relevant texts, I found some that were relevant, I have added them and, as a consequence, rewritten some of his conclusions. Here and there, I have found it useful to insert a note of my own, but I have kept the intended users of the commentary, students and scholars with a good working knowledge of Greek, constantly in mind. A recent monograph claims, not as an incidental error but as a conscious correction of the traditional view, that 24d4 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα μέλον γέ σοι means 'it is clear that you know, or at any rate that you care'. This commentary is not written to remedy such 'conceit of knowledge', which, unfortunately, seems symptomatic of the present state of Platonic studies.

After long consideration, I have decided not to indicate my own additions, modifications and deletions by means of the various typographical conventions that are used for such purposes (except in a few cases where the reader would be puzzled otherwise). They would only draw attention to minor shortcomings of De Strycker's work and detract from its merits, which I consider enormous. I can only hope that my attempts at perfecting it convince the reader that my estimation of it was right. I take full responsibility for everything that is in the book — for what merits it has, almost all of the credit goes to Emile De Strycker, a great scholar and a great man.

Amsterdam, Free University
September 1993 Simon R. Slings

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This list is not in any way a bibliography. I list those works that are cited more than once in various parts of the book. Standard works of reference (LSJ, K.-G. etc.) are omitted, as are standard editions and commentaries, except for special reasons. Papers that are reprinted in collections are quoted from those collections.

References of the type 'see my paper " ... "' are to works by E. de Strycker unless otherwise indicated (by means of the initials S.R.S); in Chapter XI § 3bβ and γ and § 4 (216-239), and in the Commentary from the note on 40a5 onwards (381-397), they refer to works by S.R. Slings.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In this introduction, I will treat only a number of general problems. The main part of what I have to say will be presented in the analyses of the successive sections of the *Apology*. The composition of the *Apology* is highly artful and its content much more comprehensive than it first appears. Therefore the relation of each part to others and to the whole must be examined in the light of the organisation of each section and of the stylistic devices that Plato uses to link his ideas to one another and to give to each question or statement its proper emphasis. This step by step analysis will gradually reveal the overall structure and the purpose of the work better than a comprehensive but, therefore, sketchy discussion of the whole. Nevertheless, there are a few problems that are best discussed at the beginning in order to prevent misunderstandings and to make my viewpoint clear from the start.

1. *The Historicity of the Platonic* Apology

Burnet's 'Introductory Note' to his commentary of the *Apology* opens with this sentence: 'The first question we have to ask about the *Apology* is how far we may regard it as an historical document' (p.63). Many scholars have indeed considered this the basic problem. From this standpoint, the interpretation of the *Apology* is ancillary to the reconstruction of the historical Socrates. It is not evident, however, why this question should be the first one to ask about the *Apology* and not about the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium* as well. There is no a priori reason why we should not examine every work of Plato's primarily as a work of Plato's, with Plato's literary and philosophical aims, and apply a method that, taking due account of the peculiarities of each work, is essentially the same everywhere, viz. to look for the signals that the author himself gave us in order to lead us to a correct understanding of what he wrote.

Now, Burnet thinks that, in the *Apology*, Plato's statement that he was present when Socrates delivered his defence in court (34a1. 38b6-9) is a significant indication of Plato's intention. For Plato's aim was 'to defend the memory of Socrates by setting forth his character and activity in their true

light'[1]. And since many of the potential readers had attended the trial, Plato 'would have defeated his own end if he had given a fictitious account of the attitude of Socrates and of the main line of his defence' (63-64). This reasoning implies that a reader of the Platonic *Apology* would have expected to find there not simply such an account of Socrates' reaction to the indictment and of his attitude towards the possible outcome of the trial as would be consonant with his whole life and character, but an objective record of what he actually said in the courtroom, though not, of course, a verbatim report. Now, in order to determine whether the audience for which Plato intended his work entertained such expectations, we should consider the *Apology* in the context of the prose literature of the fifth and fourth centuries. Of course, there is no room here for more than a rapid survey, and much of what follows has been said many times already, but some elements of information need to be mentioned again in order to dispel unfounded presuppositions.

We shall start with the historians. With Herodotus, the critical method in history is still in its early stages; he tries to ascertain facts by testing the reliability of his sources, but in reporting speeches and conversations he still follows the model of poetry closely. Thucydides was the first to see a problem in this method: he points out that it is more difficult to remember speeches than events. His account of the former will therefore differ from his account of the latter. In his rendering of the speeches he will stick to the general trend (τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης) of what was actually said and develop it as he thinks the situation demanded from the orator (i 22,1). He does not aim at a reproduction of the speaker's own words, because this would not only be virtually impossible but would run counter to his basic manner of composition, which involves extreme compression. Thus, for example, he gives us three speeches of Pericles, one delivered before the outbreak of the war (i 140-144), another (ii 35-46) in which the Athenian leader explains what his fellow-citizens are fighting for and what spirit guides them in peace and in war, and a third (ii 60-64) about the tenacity and sang-froid they should display in difficult moments. There can be no doubt that Pericles repeatedly spoke before the Assembly on such matters; what is important is Pericles' main idea, not the question whether he actually addressed all the issues in each of the three speeches on their several occasions, nor whether, on these occasions, he spoke on some further points that Thucydides did not find worth mentioning. When even Thucydides takes these liberties, we

[1] This could seem to be a truism, on which everybody would agree. But, as will appear from § 2 of this introduction, Plato's aim was not exclusively, and perhaps not even primarily, retrospective. He was not only concerned with the *memory* of Socrates, but also with the question whether Socrates' view of life and death was the right one, and was the one that everyone should adopt to attain τὸ εὖ ζῆν (*Crito* 48b6; cf. *Gorg.* 512d8-e5). Plato's intention was not properly historical, but protreptic. — This does not imply, of course, that Plato took liberties regarding the facts of Socrates' life.

would expect Xenophon to be even more careless about a close correspondence between the actual spoken words and the speeches in the *Hellenica* and the *Anabasis*, since he takes far less trouble to discover historical truth and indulges freely in rhetoric[2].

The problem is much more complicated in the case of oratory and I cannot here examine all the different circumstances in which a speech could be written, delivered or published as a pamphlet[3]. Especially interesting are occasions when a politician wrote a speech that he intended to deliver himself, either before the Assembly or in a courtroom, or that he intended to be used in a lawsuit by one of his political allies. Not infrequently, the author published his text afterwards in the hopes of further arousing public opinion against his adversaries or in favour of his own political line. If it suited him, he could adapt it to these new purposes. It was even possible, as is the case with Demosthenes' *In Midiam* (xxi), that an orator wrote out a complete accusation, then accepted a settlement out of court, and none the less published his text some time later, after having larded it with new material[4]. The public asked no questions, as it was interested in the lively arguments, not in painstaking conformity with what had actually been said at the time by either party[5].

As for epideictic speeches, they were but loosely concerned with historical reality. Works like Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes* were the result of pure imagination. In the *Olympicus*, Gorgias himself probably addressed the crowd gathered for the Panhellenic festival, but his *Funeral Oration* he cannot have delivered at the official Athenian celebration of the men killed in action, since he was a foreigner. The speeches which Isocrates did not write at the request of a litigant are all fictitious, since, as he himself admits (xii 10), he lacked both the strong voice and the daring that were necessary for an orator. This fact, however, did not prevent him from presenting some of his works as speeches before the Assembly (vii, viii, xiv) or a jury (xv). In the *Nicocles* (iii), the Cypriot king of that name advises his subjects about

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[2] Cf. E. Delebecque *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris 1957) 56-57. 264-265. 271-272 (on the *Hellenica*); 96-98. 292 (on the *Anabasis*).

[3] The various possibilities are discussed exhaustively and very thoroughly for the whole of Athenian forensic oratory in an excellent chapter ('Client and consultant') in Dover *Lysias* 148-174.

[4] This has been doubted, most recently by D.M. MacDowell *Demosthenes, Against Meidias* (Oxford 1990) 23-28. Cf. contra Dover *Lysias* 172-174.

[5] It seems relevant here to quote a few sentences of Dover's (*Lysias* 170-172) which can be fruitfully compared with what Burnet says in his 'Introductory note' 63-64 (see above, 1-2): 'Scholars who seriously believe that the reputation of a Greek orator would be diminished by the detection of inaccuracies and distortions in his published speeches must be singularly blind to the workings of the world in which they themselves live, and in particular to the fact that in political life it is so much more important to score off an opponent than to assess his conduct judiciously ... I therefore find it difficult to see that substantial alteration of a speech before it was put into circulation would seem to either the consultant or the litigant likely to diminish his political and artistic reputation in any significant respect'.

their duties: but nobody will have imagined that this text reflected the king's own ideas, and even less his tone and style, rather than those of Isocrates himself.

This brings us at once to the various *Defences of Socrates* that were published roughly between 395 and 375 B.C. In addition to those by Plato and Xenophon, we know that there was another one by Lysias[6] (another by Theodectes of Phaselis cannot be precisely dated, but it is not improbable that it is later than 375 B.C.[7]). Now these *Apologies* were certainly not the only ones that were written in those years, as appears from Xenophon *Apol.* 1 γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου (about Socrates' attitude towards his judges and towards death) καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ πάντες ἔτυχον τῆς μεγαληγορίας αὐτοῦ. If Xenophon had had only Plato and Lysias in mind, he would not have spoken of πάντες. So we may be sure that in this period there were several *Apologies* in circulation, in each of which Socrates' tone was in some way haughty. On the other hand, they must have been different enough from one another to make it worthwhile for each author to publish a new work and for the public to read it. Manifestly, the members of the Socratic circle could not stomach Socrates' condemnation, and after a few years their protest took the form of literary polemics similar to the posthumous defences of politicians like Theramenes and Alcibiades[8].

Not only did Socrates' friends defend his person and his ideas; his adversaries attacked him in their turn. We learn from Isocrates (xi 4) that the sophist Polycrates published a Σωκράτους κατηγορία, about which we are relatively well informed[9]; it was written after, probably shortly after 394 B.C. Anytus is supposed to have been the speaker; he accused Socrates,

[6] Cicero (*De Or.* i 54,231) and Diogenes Laertius (ii 40) state that Lysias wrote this defence for Socrates to deliver in court, but that Socrates refused to make use of it because it was rhetorical rather than philosophical. This story, however, belongs to the kind of Hellenistic anecdotes in which literary data are converted into biographical facts. In the same way the ὑπόθεσις of Isocrates' *Busiris* (xi) anachronistically says that Polycrates furnished Anytus and Meletus with a speech against Socrates; cf. Diog. Laert. iii 38. Lysias' *Apology*, too, was probably a piece of epideictic oratory. Cf. Dover *Lysias* 192-193.

[7] Theodectes was a 'pupil' of Plato and Isocrates and took part in the rhetorical exercises that Aristotle lead when still in the Academy. He seems to have been born about 405-400 B.C. According to F. Stoessl *Kleine Pauly s.v.* Theodektes, he died after 334; before 334 according to E. Diehl *RE s.v. Theodektes* 1, 1725-1726. Since Theodectes' rhetorical activity falls primarily in the early period of his life, it is not impossible that the 'Απολογία was a work of his youth, but a late date is not to be excluded either. Cf. L. Radermacher 'Θεοδέκται' *AAWW* 76 (1939) 62-69. — See also Chapter VII n.51; note on 27c5.

[8] *P. Mich.* inv. 5982, cf. R. Merkelbach - H. Youtie, *ZPE* 2 (1968) 161-169 has been interpreted as a pamphlet defending Theramenes by A. Andrewes, *ZPE* 6 (1970) 35-38. The literary polemic about Alcibiades is attested for us by Isocrates' *De bigis*, by Orations xiv and xv of Lysias, by the *Against Alcibiades* of the Pseudo-Andocides and by an anonymous speech (or later declamation?) *P. Strassb.* inv. 2346, cf. N. Lewis *EPap* 3 (1936) 79-87; the *Symposium* of Plato and the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines of Sphettus are probably related to the same debate.

[9] For a short and reliable account of the available data, see Dodds *Comm. Gorg.* 28-29; Chroust *Socrates* ch. iv has many more details, but is insufficiently critical.

amongst other things, of inciting the young to contempt for the Athenian laws and to violence in order to overthrow those laws, of having had among his pupils Critias and Alcibiades, who had committed the worst crimes against the Athenian civic community, of undermining young people's respect for their fathers and for the traditional values of their class. Now, Anytus, as a leader of the moderate Athenian democrats, cannot have reproached Socrates for his connections with men who were dead when the amnesty was voted. Polycrates' Κατηγορία is in fact a fictitious speech, in which mention is made of the rebuilding of the Athenian Long Walls, an undertaking that was started only in 394/3 B.C. It was probably published two or three years after that date, and shortly after or before Plato's *Gorgias*. It is within that same polemical framework that the several *Defences of Socrates* were published. Since each author wrote according to his own conception of what kind of man Socrates had been and of the beneficial or harmful effects of his ideas, they could scarcely aim at an exact reproduction of the speeches of either Anytus or Socrates. Nor would the public have expected any of these works to keep close to the actual words that were spoken in the courtroom in 399 B.C.

As regards the accuracy with which Socrates' arguments are reproduced by Plato, some scholars postulate a basic difference between the *Apology* and the dialogues. According to such an authoritative scholar as W.K.C. Guthrie (*Hist. Gr. Phil.* iv 73), 'the dialogues of Plato are avowedly fictitious, or at least imaginative' while 'the *Apology* is an entirely different category'. It is true that 'many of the dialogues are represented as taking place when Plato was unborn or a child'. This, of course, is not the case with the *Apology*. Two passages in the *Apology* tell us that Plato was present at the trial, but exactly what do they tell us? The first time (34a1), Plato's name is mentioned in a list of seven fathers or elder brothers who, accompanied by their charges (Plato is one of the latter) appeared in the courtroom to support Socrates because they themselves had experienced his influence and believed that it was beneficial to the young. In the second passage (38b6-9), Plato is mentioned with three other men who were prepared to post bail for Socrates in the event that the jury sentenced him to a fine of 30 mnas. In neither case is there any hint that Plato's presence would especially qualify him as a witness, capable of reporting the content of Socrates' defence with the utmost accuracy.

It is instructive to compare these casual references to Plato's attendance of the proceedings with the opening of the *Phaedo*. There, Echecrates asks the question: Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνηι τῆι ἡμέραι ἧι τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῶι δεσμωτηρίωι, ἤ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας; Phaedo answers: Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες (57a1-4). After Phaedo enumerates which friends of Socrates were and were not present on that last day, Echecrates asks him to give as exact an account as possible of every particular: ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνηι ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα (58d8-9). If we are prepared to admit that the *Phaedo* is 'avowedly fictitious, or at least

imaginative', I do not see why we might not say the same about the *Apology*.

Words like 'fictitious' and 'imaginative' are, of course, ambiguous. I feel quite sure that Plato presents, both in the *Apology* and in the dialogues, an eminently truthful image of Socrates' character and activity, and especially that the biographical particulars contained in those works should be accepted as historical, unless there is (and this is hardly the case) indisputable proof to the contrary. But this introduction is not the place to reopen the 'Socratic question' as a whole, and elsewhere ('Les témoignages ...') I have given my opinion on that subject and the arguments on which it is founded. What I wish to say here is that no work of Plato's is intended to be a faithful report of the particular line of thought that Socrates followed in any individual conversation or speech. This statement will be clarified further in the next paragraphs and in § 2 of this Introduction.

The most conclusive proof that Plato, when writing his *Apology*, did not feel bound to stick as closely as possible to the main lines of what Socrates had actually said in court is, in my eyes, its exceptional literary quality. Most scholars who think that Plato aimed at reproducing, with some exactitude, Socrates' own speech will readily agree that the style is Plato's own. The problem, however, should not be considered on the level of style in the narrow sense of the word. It principally concerns the composition, and by that I mean not only the general structure, but the way in which the structure is worked out in detail: each idea gets its proper place and emphasis, and the relations of the parts to one another give the whole its articulation on the one hand, and its unity on the other.

Detailed discussions of Plato's intentions and achievements in that respect will be given in the Analyses of the various sections of the *Apology*. Here I shall restrict myself to a few illustrations. When Socrates describes his examination of the clever men of Athens, he distinguishes three classes in such a way that the account of his conversations with them will be divided into three stages. This three-stage development has an important theoretical and literary significance. Each of the three moments is treated in quite a different manner, in order to prevent monotony and to create the impression that we break new ground each time. Moreover, the distribution of the σοφοί over three groups makes it possible to suggest a chronological sequence, as is normally expected in the narration of a forensic speech, although there is no objective reason why Socrates should refrain from questioning some poets or craftsmen before he had examined all the politicians. When the conclusion about the meaning of the oracle has been drawn in 22e6-23c1, it might seem normal for the speaker to pass immediately to the Refutation of the New Accusers, but this would have led to a break in the psychological and literary continuity. At the end of the paragraph 22e6-23c1, the tone is most serious and one feels intensely the depth and sincerity of Socrates' religious sense. Before he can strike the playful note that characterises the 'interrogation' of Meletus, a transition is needed. Plato makes the transition

with some reflections about the young friends of Socrates who imitate his testing of clever men and thus aggravate the resentment against him (see Chapter V 69-70). As a whole, the Refutation of the Old Accusers, and especially the Narration, gives a description of Socrates' activity, but in fact only its negative and elenctic side is illustrated. The positive and protreptic aspect is reserved for the Digression, which will emphasise how the two sides complement one another.

Meanwhile, the cross-examination brings a diversion, first through the dialectical method, secondly through the ludicrous effect of the accuser's imprudent answers. Its two parts seem to parallel each other, yet they differ greatly in content and method. The Digression is the core of the *Apology*, the part that uncovers the hidden source of Socrates' unconquerable courage, his care for his fellow-men and his devotion to God. At the same time, although it is not immediately apparent, the Digression contains the true refutation of the indictment, but with the two charges treated in reverse order to the charges in the 'Ερώτησις. The rich content of this part, and the care with which the ideas are marshalled and illustrated by a mythological example, by humorous comparisons borrowed from daily life, by the narration of dramatic events in the life of Socrates, is treated in the Analyses. Here I break off this all too long enumeration. Jejune as it is, it will justify my claim that none but the most skillful literary artist could construct a speech such as the Platonic *Apology*, and that such a refined piece of work can only be the fruit of long deliberation and patient polishing. It would be a grievous error to think that its apparent simplicity and straightforwardness lack the conscious artistry that is at work in every section and every sentence.

A last remark on the *Apology*'s putative reliability as a historical document. Since the *Apology* is obviously not purely a product of Plato's imagination, as are e.g. Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes* and Xenophon's *Hieron*, many attempts have been made to distinguish between parts that can be considered relatively faithful renderings of what Socrates said in his defence and others that are Plato's inventions[10]. What I have said above shows that, in my eyes, all such efforts are futile. I am confident that Socrates' proposal of a fine of 30 mnas (38b6-9) was certainly made by Socrates in court, in whatever form he may have done this (see Chapter X 198-199); I am also confident that there cannot have been an opportunity for delivery before the court of the first half of the Third Speech (38c1-39d9; see Chapter XI § 1)[11]. For the rest, I would dare to assert that there is, on

[10] As far as I know, the most systematic effort along that line is to be found in chapter V (80-134) of Hackforth *Composition*.

[11] Of course, I do not wish to deny that some ideas developed in the Third Speech may have been touched upon by Socrates in another section of his defence. — See also below, n.35.

the one hand, no single sentence[12] in the Platonic *Apology* that Socrates could not have actually pronounced, and on the other, that the published work contains no passage so specifically un-Platonic that it cannot be Plato's work. Therefore, I shall, neither here nor elsewhere in this book, enter upon such discussions.

2. *The Intention of the Platonic* Apology

What Plato intended his readers to find in his *Apology* we cannot decide a priori. A careful examination of the text will show that it displays different but closely interwoven aspects. For the sake of clarity I will treat them successively; the order in which this will be done is not one of increasing or diminishing importance; it is chosen simply for the sake of convenience of exposition.

a) The Apology *as a Defence*

Socrates has been found guilty, condemned to death and executed. Plato sets himself the task of writing a speech that will have the outward appearance of a defence delivered in court to an Athenian jury. Actually, however, the audience he has in mind is the Athenian public at large, and even other Greeks, if they are interested. The plan of the speech conforms overall to that of contemporary forensic oratory. In many passages Socrates makes use of the commonplaces devised by the teachers of rhetoric; in others, he conspicuously, indeed explicitly, refuses to do so, or else he gives their practices a new turn, exactly opposite to their original and intended use[13]. He quotes the terms of the indictment and undertakes to refute, in the form of a cross-examination of Meletus, the two charges brought against him, viz. that of deviating from the official religion and that of corrupting the young. In the subsequent sections of the *Apology*, Socrates' general attitude remains the same: by describing what he actually does he tries to show that the suspicions entertained and the accusations lodged against him are unfounded. In other words, the *Defence* should make clear to the reader that the members of the jury were totally mistaken in their verdict and that Socrates was not at all guilty of the offences of which he was accused.

Plato, however, unambiguously shows in the *Apology* that he is not interested in the three official accusers and their indictment. What we know about them has to be collected from other sources. We can make reasonable guesses about what exactly their charges meant, and even about what motivated them to indict Socrates (see Chapter VI § 3 and 4), but our

[12] I say *sentence* because, as I have argued, whole paragraphs and sections are so artfully composed and stand in such complex relations to what precedes and follows them that they cannot be separated from the whole.

[13] Cf. Chapter II 32-34; Chapter VI 103; note on 35c5-6.

guesses can scarcely be based on Socrates' words[14]. Nor does he say anything significant about the content of his opponents' speeches[15].

The first idea expressed in the *Apology* is that the accusers told many lies and did not care for truth at all; they did not rely on serious argument but on the magic of rhetoric (17a1-c5). This already implies that a thorough scrutiny of what they have said is not worthwhile. It is not surprising, then, that in the Proposition Socrates declares that the official indictment rests exclusively on the prejudices spread among the masses over many years by a continuous campaign of slander. The anonymous calumniators associated Socrates to the new-fangled intellectuals who were active in Athens in the second half of the fifth century B.C., natural philosophers and sophists. The ideas disseminated by these men were considered by the traditional Athenians to amount to atheism and to the subversion of common morality[16].

If Socrates, however, denies that the rumours about him have any foundation in fact (19d4-e1), he should explain why they are so readily accepted and why he is an object of aversion to so many people. This is what he does in the Narration, the story of the oracle about him which was given to Chaerephon by the god of Delphi, and of the examination to which he decides to submit all clever people (20c4-24b2). This section is very important because it gives a detailed account of Socrates' everyday activity, although only, as I said above, 7, of its elenctic aspect. The complementary, protreptic aspect is described, with full particulars, in the Digression, especially in the first half (28b3-31c3). These two sections give us the gist of what Plato wishes to convey in his *Apology*; they are quite independent of the charges formulated by Meletus. The Refutation of the New Accusers

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[14] What we read 23e3-24a1 is just playful.

[15] In the *Exordium* (17a5-b1), he mentions that his adversaries had warned the members of the jury to be on their guard lest Socrates deceives them, since he is a clever speaker. In the Digression (29c1-5), he recalls an assertion of Anytus: now that legal proceedings have been started against Socrates, the judges have no choice but to condemn him to death, since otherwise all the young will be irretrievably corrupted. That is all, since the remark about the relation between the δαιμόνια καινά of which the indictment speaks and Socrates' δαιμόνιον σημεῖον (31d1-2) is based upon the text of the γραφή, not upon the speech of Meletus.

[16] Hackforth *Composition* 81 says that 'there is ... nowhere else in Plato's writings or elsewhere any suggestion that Socrates had long been the victim of popular misrepresentation'. He certainly was misrepresented in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. The view that Socrates was a natural philosopher and therefore despised the gods is combated in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* i 1,11-14. About half a century after Socrates' death, it is said in the *Laws* that the man in the street (οἱ πολλοί) thought that the study of astronomy and related sciences led to atheism (xii 966d6-967a8, quoted in the note on 18c2; 967c5-d2). Anytus' violent outburst against the sophists (*Meno* 91b2-92d2) aptly illustrates the bad reputation of this second group of intellectuals; in the later works of Plato (e.g. the *Sophist*) and in those of Aristotle the term σοφιστής has acquired a pejorative connotation. The orator Aeschines calls Socrates a sophist (i 173, quoted Chapter VI 94). It is no wonder that Socrates' partners in the dialogues do not identify him with the φυσιολόγοι or the sophists; they do not belong to οἱ πολλοί, but to the cultivated class, or even to the professional intellectuals.

(24b3-28a1) is sandwiched between them. As Burnet was the first to point out (100), 'this part of the speech does not contain the real defence of Socrates', precisely because Plato wishes us to realise that Meletus has not tried to ascertain what Socrates was aiming at with all his questioning and discussing and therefore Meletus' accusation and speech have no real significance and do not merit a serious refutation.

But if the common belief that Socrates is a natural philosopher and a sophist is rejected very summarily (19c2-d7. 20b9-c3), and the accusations of Meletus are treated playfully, are we still entitled to say that the *Apology* is intended as a defence? We are, for what Plato defends Socrates against is neither that popular misunderstanding nor the technical content of Meletus' indictment; it is what remained after the verdict in the mind of the man in the street: that Socrates had been condemned to death by a jury of five hundred of his fellow-citizens as irreligious and as a corruptor of the young. The average Athenian did not exactly know of what specific crimes Socrates had been found guilty, because Socrates was in every respect a very uncommon man whose behaviour and opinions were often incomprehensible. But the jury did not inflict the supreme penalty upon him only because he was an eccentric; the trial must somehow have brought to light that under the cover of eccentricity Socrates concealed a most dangerous wickedness. It was Plato's intention to show that Socrates was, on the contrary, the only truly religious man, in comparison with whom all other people were but superficially pious, and the only true educator, since he directed everybody, young and old, towards authentic ἀρετή by means of a method quite different from that of the sophists. This is the proper object of the central sections of the *Apology*, viz. the Narration and the Digression, and in both parts of the latter Plato makes it clear that Socrates' statements absolve him once and for all from the charges on which he was condemned. By portraying Socrates' conduct as a whole, rather than any particular action of his, Plato has achieved a most effective defence of his master.

b) The Apology *as a Portrait*

The *Apology* as a whole is a portrait of Socrates. This is in a sense especially true of the two sections just mentioned, the Narration and the Digression; but every page of the work contributes to the same end. It does so in a way quite different from that followed by a historian like Xenophon or a logographer like Lysias[17]. In order to draw a picture of Cyrus the Younger, Xenophon (*An.* i 9) starts with anecdotes about the childhood of his hero and then amasses details that illustrate the qualities which enabled him, as an adult, to gain the confidence of the Greek city-states of his satrapy, to restore order and safety to the countryside, to encourage efficient

[17] On the relation between Plato's technique of portrayal and that of the other prose writers of his time see Chapter V § 4.

men and to win trustworthy friends. Lysias, in writing a speech (i) for a man who revenged himself by killing the seducer of his wife, makes his client tell, in full detail, the story of his domestic life since the time of his marriage; in all of these details both his naïveté and his astuteness manifest themselves. Both authors work primarily with external actions which gradually reveal the personality that lies behind them.

In the *Apology*, Socrates seldom speaks of what he has done, but regularly of what he thinks about specific human situations and problems, and of what he says about those matters to other people. Therefore, the portrait in the *Apology* has nothing to do with a biography and does not at all strive for completeness. Little attention is paid to the chronology of his life. As we will see below (Chapter V 74-75), we cannot determine the date of the oracle given to Chaerephon; the three battles in which Socrates took part (28e2-3) are not listed in their chronological order, and the text gives no clue as to how many years elapsed between those military achievements and the manifestations of Socrates' civic courage mentioned in another context (32a9-d8). Plato is so indifferent to chronology because he records most of these events in order to acquaint us not with the person and character of Socrates, but with his ideas, and with their relation to his actual conduct.

Now, what is typical of Socrates' ideas is, first, that they do not bear on specialised and impersonal questions as those of the natural philosophers do, but on questions that arise from everyday life and on decisions we should take; second, more often than not they contradict flatly what most people would consider truisms. According to common opinion, a defendant will use any means to secure his acquittal and, more generally, an orator is a man who, by his inborn or acquired skill, will succeed in persuading an audience even when he tells lies or, as they say, in making them believe that the moon is made of green cheese. But for Socrates the orator *par excellence* and the litigant in particular is the man who speaks the truth and cares only for justice (18a3-6), regardless of the consequences. What is more, Socrates presents these paradoxes as self-evident, as if everybody would share his acceptance of them. When he comes up with them, the hearers scarcely believe their ears and they wonder whether Socrates is serious or wishes to make fools of them. Not only are they perplexed, but angry too. He always has a group of young men listening to him, but he contends that he is no teacher and cannot provide education (19d9-e1. 20c1-3. 33a5-b6). How are we to take such an assertion? How can Socrates, by asking his seemingly innocuous questions, checkmate every clever man and still pretend that he is wholly ignorant of the matter under discussion? (23a3-7). Not only will those whose incompetence he has exposed be indignant, but the bystanders as well (21e1-2. e3-4. 22c6-8. e6-23a5. c7-8. 24a7). Everybody feels that he has been fooled and that Socrates is not honest.

And still the reader can hardly help feeling that Socrates is deadly serious. In order to live up to his paradoxical principles, he has accepted a life of poverty and repeatedly sets his life at stake. In his defence he will say

nothing that is not relevant to the case, and he will refrain from flattering and beseeching his judges. There is no inconsistency between the rules he adopts for himself and proclaims for others, and his actual conduct. We come under the spell of that unparalleled consistency, that strength of purpose, that indifference towards personal advantage and disadvantage. Socrates' whole attitude offers the prospect of a more noble, full and genuine way of life. And what makes it all the more impressive is that Socrates does not consider himself important. He does no more than fulfill his duty and follow the call of God.

How will the public react to these seemingly contradictory aspects of Socrates' personality? Will they cling to the views that they have always held, that everybody should seek his own profit first, use every means to that end and take no unnecessary risks? Or will they accept Socrates' own scale of values, radically different though it is from theirs and despite the sacrifices it requires? Will it be possible for Socrates to bring them around to *his* view of life and death, and in such a short time (cf. 37a6-b2. 19a1-2)? He doubts it, and the outcome will prove that his misgivings were well-founded. But he is not disillusioned (36a2-3) and does not regret having lived and spoken as he has (38e2-5. 39b7-8. 41d6-7).

This ambiguity in the portrait of Socrates is essential to what Plato intended in the *Apology*. He had to explain how a majority of Athenian citizens, people who had met Socrates every day, could sentence to death a man who, to use Plato's own words, 'was of all people we are acquainted with the most noble and simply the most sensible and the most just'[18]. They could only do this if they totally misunderstood him, and if his conduct led them inevitably, as it were, to such a misunderstanding. Socrates' uncompromising attitude was, in reality, the result of his strong belief in the absolute character of moral duty and in the urgency of what God asked of him. But the man in the street could hardly see things in this way. When, in everything he said and did, Socrates seemed to choose deliberately to depart from the common course, what could that be but a sign of intolerable arrogance and haughtiness[19]? Jurors expected a defendant to behave with the utmost modesty. Even as proud a man as Demosthenes would be at pains, when he described his policy of resistance to Philip as the only one worthy of Athens' glorious past, to emphasise that this policy was not *his* but the city's (xviii 206). There was nothing of that kind in Socrates' attitude and the judges felt this as a provocation. This is precisely what Plato's mastery consists in, that he not only makes us understand the reaction of the jury, but makes us feel that it was unavoidable. Socrates was not found guilty because he was irreligious or a corruptor

[18] *Phaed.* 118a16-17; cf. *Epist.* vii 324e1-2.

[19] Cf. *Apol.* 34d9-e1 οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων; 37a3 ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος.

of the young, but because the judges could not admit that his lofty religious and educational ideals were genuine and sincere.

c) The Apology *as an Exhortation to Philosophy*

In drawing a portrait of Socrates in the *Apology* Plato did not simply or even principally intend to keep the memory of a great man alive. As we saw above, it is not Socrates' deeds, nor his idiosyncratic individuality to which he calls the reader's attention, but Socrates' ideas about the problems of human conduct. Socrates is convinced that the answer to such questions can only be discovered by consistent reasoning and open discussion; this discovery is the object of his dialectical activity. He does not search for the truth with an eye to himself alone. The god has entrusted him with the mission to test his fellow-men and the reliability of their views on 'the most important matters' (see note on 22d7). When it becomes apparent that their opinions cannot stand close scrutiny, they will realise their own ignorance and he will urge them not to rest until they have found a satisfactory answer.

This is what Socrates lives for and, now that he is seventy years old, he does not feel that his task is accomplished. He is perfectly aware that his examinations arouse bitter resentment in many, but he does not think of giving up. Even when threatened with death, he declares emphatically: 'As long as I live, as long as I can, I will never cease to search for the truth and to address to you my reasonings and my admonitions' (29d4-6) and he concludes: 'And now, Athenians, you can listen to Anytus or not, you can let me free or not, but this you should know, that I am not prepared to change my conduct even if I should die many deaths' (30b7-c1). When, after having been found guilty, he again examines the possibility of staying in Athens but without continuing his discussions and research, he categorically rejects the very idea, although he knows that the members of the jury will not be convinced by his motives:

> If I say that this amounts to disobedience to the god, you will not believe me and think this to be just a pretence; if, on the other hand, I say that this is the highest felicity for a man, every day to devote his conversations to virtue and to the other subjects you always hear me talking about and examining myself and others, and that a life without examination is not bearable for a man, *that* you will still less accept from me. (37e5-38a6)

In these conversations, Socrates exhorts his partners always to put the higher goods above the lower and to take their decisions exclusively in accordance with an objective scale of values (29d7-e3. 30a7-b3. 36c5-d1). Persuading others to strive for the supreme good and to examine both their opinions and their behaviour is nothing else than winning them over to philosophy (28e5-6. 29d4-e3). This was Socrates' mission, but it does not follow that the protreptic activity to which he had devoted his life should come to and end with his death. He is so convinced of the need for its continuation that, in

his very last words (41e2-7), he asks the judges to treat his sons, whom he will leave orphans, exactly as he treated them himself, exposing their ignorance if they prove to be conceited and reproaching them if they pursue money and other inferior goods more eagerly than what is truly worth-while. But he also thinks about the city as a whole; if the judges do away with him, there is still a possibility that the god, in his solicitude for the well-being of Athens, will send another man to take over the task which Socrates could not continue to perform (31a6-7). Further, there are Socrates' young friends, who may try to carry on his work, although they can by no means be compared with him (cf. 23c2-7. 39c3-d3). Indeed, what does Plato do in his dialogues, and most conspicuously in the *Apology*, but to pass on the message of Socrates to those who did not hear the master himself?

A superficial reading of the *Apology* might leave us with the impression that it is just a portrait, a vivid representation of the unique personality of Socrates. This has led not a few scholars to the conclusion that it is not a philosophical work, at least not in the sense that it 'discuss(es) impersonal philosophical problems' (Hackforth *Composition* 46 n.1). But is any of Plato's works about such impersonal problems? All the dialogues are concerned with the attitude man should adopt towards his own states of mind, his sensations, his thoughts, his joys and griefs, hopes and fears, desires and aversions, the attitude he should adopt towards the influence that his friends and foes exercise upon him, towards the civic community and the cosmos to which he belongs. The questions treated in the dialogues are of a surprising variety, but they all have a bearing on the individual and his choices. To be sure, they are not all strictly ethical, but they all have an ethical dimension.

In the *Apology*, Plato deals with the basic problems of ethics, because the essential issues could be set forth with a minimum of technical language. A defence in court is not the proper setting for specialised debate; it gives no opportunity for a systematic application of the dialectical method[20]; it does not allow the leisurely kind of talk that is necessary to prevent misunderstandings or resolve them if they arise[21]. So we should not be disturbed by the differences in approach, content and literary technique between the *Apology* and the other works of Plato, nor should we conclude from these differences that only the latter are relevant to Plato's philosophy. Actually, as Aristotle emphasises in a celebrated argument at the beginning of his *Protrepticus*[22], anyone who asks the question whether one should search for insight (φιλοσοφεῖν) is already searching for insight. Therefore the

[20] The cross-examination of Meletus (24c9-28a1) is not meant as a serious piece of dialectic.

[21] On the importance of 'leisure' in the dialectical discussions in contra-distinction to forensic oratory, see *Theaet.* 172c3-173b3, and cf. J.L. Stocks 'Σχολή' *CQ* 30 (1936) 177-187, and Gaiser *Protreptik und Paränese* 208-209. Cf. Chapter II 35 and n.26; note on 37a6.

[22] Fragment 2 (Walzer, Ross), Testim. A 2-6 (Düring).

Apology, which is an exhortation, a προτρεπτικὸς λόγος, to philosophy[23], is by that very fact a philosophical work. And as such it is the more interesting because Socrates so frankly expresses his own favourite ideas, whereas when we read the aporetic dialogues we often wonder whether what he says is an expression of his deep conviction or only a challenge to elicit a contradiction. In that respect, the *Apology* complements the early works that have so exercised the ingenuity of the interpreters[24].

Although the philosophical importance of the *Apology* lies primarily in its forceful and unambiguous formulation of the fundamental principles of ethics, it also touches on various specific tenets that are typical of Socratic philosophy. To close this section I give a list of these tenets; for their significance and impact I refer to the analyses of the sections and to the commentary.

1. An educator should possess knowledge: 20a6-c1. 25a12-c1.
2. Virtue has a civic as well as a personal aspect: 20b4-5. 30b4. 36c7-8.
3. There are three states of mind with regard to knowledge, (a) conceited ignorance (ἀμαθία), (b) consciousness of one's ignorance and striving for insight (φιλοσοφία), (c) perfect knowledge (σοφία, φρόνησις): 20d6-23b4. 29d4-6. Only God possesses perfect knowledge: 23a5-7, cf. 20d7-9.
4. Talent and inspiration are not knowledge: 22b8-c6[25].
5. Skill, as competent within the limits of a determined field and concerned with means, is different from knowledge about τὰ μέγιστα, that is, about ultimate ends: 22c9-e1.
6. Nobody harms himself knowingly and willingly: 25d3-26a1.
7. Examination of oneself is essential for virtue (insight) and for happiness: 28e5-6. 38a1-6.
8. Virtue or goodness, that is, insight[26], legitimises power: 29b6-7.
9. In virtue, the intellectual and the volitional aspect are inseparable: 29d5-6[27].
10. There is a threefold scale of values, viz. wealth, glory[28], knowledge. Virtue consists in acknowledging the superiority of the higher good to the lower one: 29d7-e3; cf. 30a8-b4. 36b6-d1. 41e4-5.
11. Inferior goods depend on superior goods: 30b1-4. 41d1-2.
12. Virtue cannot be automatically transferred from teacher to pupil and it is always the object of personal choice: 33a5-b6.

The *Apology* does not touch on the problem of the unity or multiplicity of virtues. In practical terms, ἀρετή is insight into the good, the acceptance

[23] This is not to say that the *Apology* belongs to the literary genre of protreptic: its intention is, like many Platonic dialogues, to be implicitly protreptic. See Chapter XI 217.

[24] On this see my essay 'The Unity ...'.

[25] The terms ὀρθή and ἀληθὴς δόξα do not occur in the *Apology*. Cf. Chapter V 66; Chapter XI 215-216; note on 22b8.

[26] ὁ βελτίων (29b6) is equivalent to σοφώτερος, as appears from the whole context.

[27] I may refer once more to 'The Unity...'

[28] In a variant, glory is replaced by the body (30a8). Cf. Chapter VII 137-138 and n.36.

of the right scale of values, and this is identical to σοφία or φρόνησις: compare 29e1 with e5. 30a8-b4. 31b5. 36c3-8 with 38a3-6.

It is remarkable that the terms εὐδαίμων and εὐδαιμονία are only found in contexts with little philosophical significance (36d9. 41c4 and 5). We do find, however, ὀρθῶς ζῆν (39d5), which is to be compared with the well-known εὖ ζῆν in *Crit.* 48b6.

3. *The Date of the Platonic* Apology

As is well known, analysis of style has shown that Plato's dialogues can be arranged in three chronological groups: early, mature and late. Many scholars might further divide the early dialogues into a 'Socratic' and a 'transitional' subgroup[29]. Admittedly, there is not much in the stylistic evidence to justify this division. Two fairly significant arguments, however, can be adduced. First, the 'transitional' dialogues seem to involve a more elaborate treatment of philosophical problems which have some significance in their own right and not only as a part of the comprehensive question about the 'good life'. Second, Socrates' role as a constructive thinker receives more emphasis in relation to his elenctic role. Since these two characteristics are even more conspicuous in the 'mature' works, these scholars consider the 'transitional' dialogues to be later than the 'Socratic' ones. But even if we accept this view, it cannot be decided whether the *Apology* belongs to the 'Socratic' or to the 'transitional' works. The fundamental difference in genre between a defence and a dialogue should prevent us from assessing the stylistic features of both by the same standards and, with regard to the content, the relationship of a defendant and his judges cannot be put on a par with that between participants in a dialogue.

Critics who believe that Plato's intention in the *Apology* was to give a faithful record of what Socrates had actually said in court are understandably inclined to assign it an early date, when the event was still fresh in the

[29] The mature group consists of *Republic, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Phaedrus* (not necessarily in this order, although it is the most probable one), the late group of *Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Laws* (it is disputed whether the pair *Soph. - Polit.* or the pair *Tim. - Critias* comes first in this group). Candidates for the 'transitional' subgroup include *Gorgias, Meno, Phaedo, Symposium, Cratylus.* It should be emphasised that there is no stylometric evidence whatsoever for the inclusion of any member of this transitional subgroup in a 'middle' group, despite repeated allegations to the contrary (e.g. Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* iv 50; Vlastos *Socrates* 46-47). The most recent works on the subject are G.R. Ledger *Re-counting Plato, A Computer Analysis of Plato's Style* (Oxford 1989) and L. Brandwood *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge 1990; revision of an unpublished dissertation, London 1958). Both authors maintain the tripartite division, and both betray uneasiness about the existence of a separate Socratic subgroup within the early group. From a philosophical point of view, C.H. Kahn's paper 'Did Plato write Socratic Dialogues?' *CQ* 31 (1981) 305-320, seems well on its way to be epoch-making. See the doxography in H. Thesleff 'Platonic Chronology' *Phronesis* 34 (1989) 1-26, esp. 2-3 and notes.

author's memory. Furthermore, the approach to philosophical issues in the *Apology* is more closely related to that of the early dialogues than to the later ones, so that it can be called 'the logical preface' to all the works of the early group[30]. On the basis of these two premisses, it has been concluded that the *Apology* was probably Plato's 'first work, written not long after the event'[31]. If, however, as I have argued above, § 1, Plato did not aim, in the *Apology*, at anything like documentary authenticity, there is no special reason why we should consider the work to be particularly early. Any place within the early group, including the putative 'transitional' group, is acceptable.

In recent times, Erbse ('Entstehungszeit') has made the only attempt at dating the *Apology* more precisely. His argument is very complex and not very well organised, but its main thesis is that the attitude, the method and the assertions of Socrates as depicted in the *Apology* cannot be satisfactorily understood without a knowledge of all the early dialogues, including the *Gorgias* and the *Meno*, and that Plato intended this new work for an audience that was acquainted with his earlier writings. I do not think that Erbse has succeeded in establishing this point[32] and shall show with a few examples why I am not convinced.

The *Apology* tells us, Erbse says, that Socrates engages people in discussions, asking them questions and exhorting them to take care of their souls, but 'how this questioning functions logically, how it has an educational value for the mind and what its significance is for the discovery of moral and political truths remains obscure' (350, my translation). How the questioning functions is, however, evident in the story of Callias (20a4-c1) and in the first half of the discussion with Meletus (24c9-26a7). Erbse (350 n.20) objects to an appeal to the 'Ερώτησις because its function is only to expose Meletus' levity. That is indeed its overt intent, but nevertheless it illustrates the dialectical technique with its use of induction and of the *argumentum a minore ad maius*, and, although Meletus does not perceive the fact, it leads to the important educational and ethical conclusions mentioned above, 15, under numbers 1 and 6.

With regard to Socrates' protreptic activity, Erbse thinks (350) that the *Apology* does not specify what the 'care for the soul' exactly is. He argues that this becomes clear only when it has been established (*Prot.* 354e3-357e8) that wrong action proceeds from wrong thinking, because only then do people realise that our principal concern ought to be to acquire correct

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30 A. Diès *Platon* (Paris 1930) 85-86; Diès refrains from speaking of a preface written *before* the early dialogues.

31 Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* iv 72. It should be emphasised that the author proposes this opinion with great caution and that he adds: 'but certainty is impossible'.

32 Although, of course, a knowledge of the early dialogues, and of later ones too, is of great help for a full understanding of many passages in the *Apology*, as the whole of the present book will show abundantly.

insight. That, however, is just what the *Apology* explicitly says: φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇι οὐδὲ φροντίζεις (29e1-3)[33] in a context in which Socrates characterises his activity as a 'searching for insight' (29d5 φιλοσοφῶν). Further, Erbse says (356) that the *Apology* only makes fun of Meletus and does not refute his charges. He seems not to have noticed that the Digression contains Socrates' real answer to the accusations. Finally, Socrates' refusal to beseech the judges may appear to the reader of the *Apology* to betray arrogance. From the early dialogues, however, he will have learned, according to Erbse (357), that Socrates' attitude is determined by an absolute desire for objectivity. But that is precisely what the *Apology* asserts (35b9-d5): moreover, it was certainly Plato's intention that there would be something defiant in the tone of Socrates' defence, as I said above, 12-13.

The reader probably expects me to give my own opinion now. I shall do so, although I know how risky the matter is. The first reflection I wish to submit is that, both in its content and in its structure, the Platonic *Apology* must be a work that matured over a long time. The figure of Socrates appears before our eyes with an exceptionally forceful though far from solemn compactness. There are no anecdotes, no descriptive details that are merely picturesque, amusing or moving, as those which we know from Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium*, even though these were certainly dear to Socrates' devoted admirers. Every feature is subordinate to the character as a whole and the character itself embodies the fundamental ideas that, according to Plato, modelled the whole life and thought of Socrates. These ideas are few and receive full high-lighting, although Socrates, as the early dialogues show, was interested in a great variety of topics. Here, too, one finds a simplification which gives the intellectual figure of Socrates, as it is depicted in the *Apology*, a density that surpasses all his characterisations in Plato's other works.

It seems to me that, in order to isolate in his own mind the essential core of Socrates' personality and philosophy from its many fascinating manifestations, the author must have needed a long time, but probably still more to discover how he could present it in such a literary form that the readers would at every moment experience the flexibility of life and at the same time the weight and solidity of Socrates' moral and intellectual consistency. I think that to achieve this Plato needed more than solitary meditation: he needed to try out his intentions and first tentative efforts in discussions with others, enemies of Socrates as well as friends, and see how they reacted. In this way he could gradually discover which of the many aspects of Socrates' personality to include, and which to discard, as well as how to organise the *Apology* as a defence, a portrait and an exhortation to philosophy, so that

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[33] Cf. 36c5-7 μὴ πρότερον ... τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο.

these three elements would not be merely juxtaposed but integrated with one another. This would, in my opinion, require more than a couple of years; I should rather think five to ten and it could be still more, but for stylometric reasons one should refrain from crossing the boundary into the mature period. I am well aware that this estimate, even if it might be acceptable in the case of an average author, would not therefore apply to a genius like Plato.

Of more use than such guesses, whose value is difficult to assess, will perhaps be two details in the text that have so far gone unnoticed and could be of help in dating the *Apology*. The first is found in the Narration, where Socrates, after having examined the politicians and found that they did not possess knowledge, passes on to the poets and makes a similar discovery. There is, however, a difference: thanks to a natural gift or divine inspiration the poets really have the ability to cast a spell on their audience, whereas nothing has been said about an irrational capacity in the case of the politicians. The whole argument is strongly reminiscent of a similar argument near the end of the *Meno* (99b5-e2), although in that dialogue the two groups mentioned are the politicians and the *soothsayers*, not, as in the *Apology*, the politicians and the *poets*. Yet the similarity with the *Meno* remains because what is said of the poets in the *Apology* (22c1-3) is identical with what is said of the soothsayers in the *Meno*. The sentence in *Meno* 99c2-5 repeats practically verbatim *Apol.* 22c1-3: one must depend on the other. Now, a few lines earlier in the *Apology*, Socrates had declared that he has realised *again* and with regard to the poets *too* (b8-9 ἔγνων οὖν <u>αὖ καὶ</u> περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν) how their ability is based upon an irrational force, not upon insight. Actually, however, Socrates had said nothing in the *Apology* about what politicians could achieve, whereas in the *Meno* their talents are fully acknowledged and characterised as irrational. In short, the passage in the *Apology* depends on that in the *Meno* and therefore the *Meno* must be earlier than the *Apology*[34].

The second piece of evidence occurs in the most inspiring and important passage of the *Apology*. Answering an anonymous objector Socrates begins by illustrating, through the example of Achilles, a rule that is dear to him, viz. that a man of honour will never deviate from what he sees as his duty out of fear of death. Then, supposing that the judges might be prepared to spare him on the condition that he ceases his elenctic and protreptic activity, he gives a passionate reply, the longest sentence of the whole work (it runs to twenty lines). He starts with a conditional protasis, which he reiterates twice, making the hypothesis more specific each time, and ends with a solemn statement of his adamant resolution:

> Truly, men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall listen to God rather than to you and, as long as I live, as long as I can, I shall never give up

[34] The point is discussed fully in the extensive note on *Apol.* 22b8.

> searching for the truth and addressing to everyone of you whom I may meet my reasonings and my admonitions, saying as I am accustomed to do: "My excellent man, you, an Athenian, who belong to a city, the most important for her culture and her power, are you not ashamed to care for money, of which you try to get ever more, and for fame and marks of honour; but for insight, for truth, for your soul that it may become as virtuous as can be, do you not care for that nor give it a thought?" (29d2-e3)

Socrates appeals here to the pride of the Athenian citizens, the descendants of the heroes who fought at Marathon and Salamis, and the daring and enterprising men who, under the leadership of Pericles, made Athens the first city of Greece, and he asks whether it is not a disgrace if such men entertain petty views and purposes and do not strive for the highest ideals. It is essential for the dynamism of this sweeping sentence that the reader should apply to himself every word that Socrates speaks, without being distracted by any other consideration.

But can he? And can Plato himself have felt so? He cannot, in my opinion, if he wrote this passage at any time between 399 and 394, because the words πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης εἰς ... ἰσχύν would have sounded like a sneer at that time and the reader's attention would have been diverted from Socrates' intention, and, as a result, the whole effect of his passionate exhortation would have been lost. In 404, at the end of the Peloponnesian war, the defeated Athenians were forced to tear down the Long Walls and to hand over their fleet to the Spartans. It was the end of a period of more than sixty years during which they had dominated the seas. Now Athens was reduced to the status of a second- or third-class city, while Spartan harmosts controlled the islands and many strategic points. This humiliation was bitterly resented by the citizens, as appears from what Andocides says in a defence speech delivered in 399 B.C.: his personal foes find it absurd that he wishes to come back to Athens: 'Does he not see in what a situation our city finds itself?' (i 4).

The position of Athens scarcely improved till the summer of 394. But then there was an unexpected reversal: the Athenian admiral Conon, who had been given the command of the Persian navy, crushed the Spartan fleet off Cnidos. In the shortest possible time, the harmosts were expelled from the cities of Asia Minor and from the islands. In 393, under Conon's leadership, the Long Walls were rebuilt, a new fleet came into being and soon many cities and islands again sought an alliance with Athens. This revival lasted several years[35], until it came to an abrupt end in 386 with the

[35] The momentum of the Athenian 'imperial' recovery in those years is well described by G. Glotz-R. Cohen *Histoire grecque* iii (Paris 1936) especially 87-88 and 94-95. — Recent scholarship tends to stress Athens' economic problems in the years between Cnidos and the King's Peace, as shown by the obsession with poverty in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* and *Plutus*, and certainly the revival after Cnidos did not bring back the golden days of the fifth-century empire, but politically, Athens resumed a major role. See B.S. Strauss *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1987) 121-178, esp. 163-167.

King's Peace, by which the King of Persia decreed that all Greek cities should be autonomous and were not allowed in the future to establish permanent leagues. Anyhow, from 392 or 391 until 386, Athens again felt herself as the first power of Greece and her citizens forgot the humiliating period 404-394 as if it were a dark episode, after which their city had recovered what rightfully belonged to it. I would suggest that it was during the years 392-387 that Plato wrote the long sentence which I have discussed, and the whole of the *Apology*[36].

I would, of course, be glad if I could establish the date of the *Apology* on a less narrow basis than these two details. Since, however, this is not the case, the argument above may make a significant contribution to the dating of the *Apology*.

4. *The Plan of the Platonic* Apology

It is Burnet's great merit to have seen that the first or main speech consists of five parts; he provides relatively short but important preliminary remarks for each of them. These parts are not specific to the Platonic *Apology*, but belong to the standard structure of Greek forensic oratory. So far, I fully agree with Burnet, but I think that parts III[37], IV and V should be further subdivided, not with the pedantic aim of presenting a complicated survey, but because each of the lesser sections has its proper and well-defined function and is carefully marked off from the preceding and the following ones by appropriate particles, summaries, changes of address, transitional formulas and other stylistic means. Each of these will be examined at its proper place in the analyses. Manifestly, Plato composed his *Apology* with deliberate artistry, and if one fails to notice his technique, one will not fully appreciate the coherence of the whole.

Surprisingly enough, scholars who wrote after Burnet's commentary was published paid little attention to his division of the First Speech[38]. What they say on this matter is generally speaking neither clear nor complete and

[36] For the same reason as I explained above, it would have been impossible for the historical Socrates to utter these words in his defence. And the readers of say 390 will not have remembered, when reading the *Apology*, that Socrates had spoken in a dark time.

[37] In part III Burnet himself distinguishes three sections, the first of which corresponds to my III A, the second to my III B 1 and the third to my III B 2-4. Moreover, Burnet counts 28a2-b2 as belonging to part IV, whereas I think that these lines belong as C to part III.

[38] Still more striking, perhaps, is the fact that in Hackforth's *Composition* nothing at all is said about the structure or plan of the work.

it often conflicts with the explicit indications given by the text[39]. It can therefore not be used as a basis for the interpretation of the work.

First Speech ON THE QUESTION OF GUILT

I. Exordium (προοίμιον)

Socrates contrasts the artful eloquence of his accusers, which is deceitful and aims only at persuasion, with his own artless and straightforward way of speaking, which simply tries to tell the truth (17a1-18a6).

II. Proposition (πρόθεσις)

Socrates makes a distinction between two groups of accusers; he will defend himself first against the older ones, and afterwards against the new (18a7-19a7).

III. Refutation (λύσις)

A. *Against the old accusers.*
    1. Negative part: what Socrates is not.
        a) He is not a natural philosopher (19a8-d7).
        b) He is not a sophist (19d8-20c3).
    2. Positive part: what Socrates really is, or the origin of the slander against him. NARRATION (διήγησις).
        a) The oracle (20c4-21a8).
        b) The investigation:
            i. Introduction (21b1-9).
            ii. The politicians (21b9-e2).
            iii. The poets (21e3-22c8).
            iv. The craftsmen (22c9-e5).
        c) The results of the investigation:
            i. Origin of the slander-campaign (22e6-23a5).
            ii. Socrates understands that Apollo has entrusted him with a mission (23a5-c1).

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[39] Thus e.g. the *Exordium* and the Proposition are put together by Friedländer *Platon* ii 146-147, who further adds to that part the sub-section III A 1; the same happens with the Proposition and the Refutation of the Old Accusers in Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* iv 80; with the Digression and the Peroration in Friedländer 154. — While recognising the validity of Burnet's division, Reeve (3-4) perceives a tripartite structure in the *Apol.* as a whole, which is worth mentioning: (1) the false Socrates, negative (17a1-24b2); (2) the defense against Meletus, negative, but containing the positive component of ἔλεγχος (24b3-28a1); (3) the true Socrates, positive (28b3-42a5). Cf. Chapter VI § 9.

iii. Imitators of Socrates arise, and this increases the hatred of him (23c2-e3).
iv. This leads to the indictment by Meletus (23e3-24b2).

B. *Against the new accusers.* 'INTERROGATION' (ἐρώτησις)[40].
1. Introduction (24b3-c3).
2. Meletus has never concerned himself with educational problems.
   a) First error, regarding the question who makes one better (24c4-25c4).
   b) Second error, regarding the question whether it is possible to corrupt willfully (25c5-26a7).
3. Meletus contradicts himself in his indictment.
   a) Interpretation of the indictment: Socrates corrupts the young by teaching them atheism (26a8-e7).
   b) So understood, the indictment is a joke, for it contends that Socrates both does and does not believe in gods (26e7-27e3).
4. Conclusion (27e3-28a1).

C. *General conclusion of the Refutation* (28a2-b2).

IV. DIGRESSION (παρέκβασις)

A. *First Objection*: The way of life Socrates has chosen is dangerous. The answer to this gives the proof of his piety.
1. Considerations taken from 'the honourable' (τὸ καλόν).
   a) General principle: duty should be valued above life (28b3-d10).
   b) Application to Socrates: no peril of death will prevent him from fulfilling his mission (28d10-30c1).
2. Considerations taken from the 'advantageous' (τὸ ὠφέλιμον).
   a) The accusers cannot do any harm to Socrates (30c2-d5).
   b) Socrates' mission was entrusted to him for the advantage of Athens (30d5-31c3).

[40] Since neither 'interrogation' nor 'cross-examination' is an adequate translation, I will use the Greek term throughout this book.

B. *Second Objection*: Socrates should have taken part in political life. The answer proves his influence on the young to have been salutary.

1. Socrates has been warned off by his 'divine sign' (31c4-d6).
2. Honesty in politics is impossible in Athens (31d6-32e1).
3. Therefore Socrates keeps within the bounds of individual conversation, from which he excludes nobody (32e2-33b8).
4. His influence on the young has been salutary (33b9-34b5).

V. PERORATION (ἐπίλογος)

Socrates will not address supplications to the jury.

1. This would be honourable neither for himself nor for Athens (34b6-35b8).
2. It would not be just (35b9-c7).
3. It would not be consistent with piety (35c7-d8).

SECOND SPEECH
ON THE QUESTION OF PENALTY

A. *Introduction*: Socrates has been found guilty only by a narrow majority (35e1-36b2).

B. *A proposal according to principle*: Socrates will make a proposal in accordance with what he deserves.

1. He is a benefactor of the city, and a poor one (36b3-d4).
2. Therefore he deserves to enjoy public maintenance (36d4-37a1).

C. *A proposal according to the feasible*: what sentence is the jury prepared to pronounce on him?

1. Socrates does not deserve punishment; banishment, in particular, will in his case be no solution (37a2-38b1).
2. If the jury insists on a 'punishment', Socrates proposes a fine of one mna; the proposal is changed to one of thirty mnas (38b1-9).

THIRD SPEECH
FINAL REFLECTIONS

A. *To the members of the jury who voted for a death sentence.*

1. Introduction: their responsibility (38c1-d2).
2. Comparison between Socrates and his accusers (38d2-39b8).
3. The activity of Socrates will be continued by his followers (39c1-d9).

B. *To the members who voted for acquittal*: significance of death for Socrates.

1. The 'divine sign' has not warned him of any evil (39e1-40c3).
2. Two popular views of death (40c4-41c7).
3. Socrates trusts in Providence; he begs the jury to take care of his sons (41c8-42a5).

CHAPTER TWO

THE *EXORDIUM*

1. *The Line of Thought*

The central idea of the *Exordium* is the fundamental opposition between two ways of using speech, which are characteristic of each of the parties. The accusers have been trying to capture the audience by exercising the magic art of rhetoric on them. Although they did not care about the truth and scarcely said anything but lies, the effect of their words must have been overwhelming. For even Socrates, who is always critical of what other people say no less than of what he himself says, and who in particular has the habit of making fun of the orators[1], has himself almost come under their spell. The accused, on the other hand, contends that he is quite innocent of any rhetorical skill in the usual sense of the phrase δεινὸς λέγειν[2]; his only skill as speaker, if one wants to call it that, consists in speaking the truth[3].

The opposition, which was already sharply formulated in the first sentences, is further elaborated in the whole of the *Exordium.* So total is the accusers' contempt for the truth that they have had the impudence to represent Socrates as an 'able speaker', although they know that the facts will immediately contradict their allegation, for Socrates' very first words will show him to be anything but a cunning orator. Surely, though, when the accusers warned the jury not to let themselves be deceived by Socrates' clever way of speaking, they did not mean that he would apply the same tricks as they did themselves. They rather suggested that he would use devices still more subtle and sophisticated than their own. Socrates then, in order to explain what *his* speech really will be like, contrasts it with those of his opponents, and this gives him the opportunity to describe their oratorical technique. He certainly will not enter into competition with them in that field. Once that has been made clear, he appeals to the jury not to take exception to his accustomed method of speaking and with a few rapid strokes sketches out his typical method.

As the central idea is worked out along these lines, we realise that we are confronted not with a mere factual difference between the parties of this particular lawsuit but with a basic opposition between two irreconcilable

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[1] *Menex.* 235c6 Ἀεὶ σὺ προσπαίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ῥήτορας.

[2] On the misconceived claim that Socrates is dishonest in denying any skill in speaking, see below, 32-34. 36-40 and n.16.

[3] Cf. *Ion* 532d6-e1 ἀλλὰ σοφοὶ μέν πού ἐστε ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ ..., ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τἀληθῆ λέγω, οἷον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον.

views about what is good speech, and consequently what is a good speaker. The question, however, is put here not in quite such a general form but in a forensic context, in which not only the speakers, but also the jurors are involved. Therefore the *Exordium* culminates in the definition of two ideals, that of the juror and that of the orator. Socrates' views of what a juror should be will be discussed in connection with the Peroration (cf. also below, § 3 *ad fin.*). For the orator, see § 4 of this chapter.

2. *The Gorgianic Oratory*

Socrates' description of his accusers' rhetoric shows that it possesses the main characteristics of the art of Gorgias and his pupils, as this is known to us from the dialogues of Plato and from other sources. We can distinguish its general aim, which is to *persuade*, and its technical means, the most important of which are what were later called the σχήματα λέξεως and the σχήματα διανοίας. With the adverb πιθανῶς (17a3) Socrates hints at the activity of persuading (πείθειν) and the resulting persuasion (πειθώ), which undoubtedly were key-words in the teaching of Gorgias. The evidence that they were key-words is the constant repetition of these words in the important section of the *Gorgias* concerning the object of rhetoric (452d1-454b7), the place the verb πείθειν occupies in a sentence of the *Philebus* that certainly gives us an echo of the Sophist's lectures[4], and above all the prominence of these terms in Gorgias' own description of the irresistible power of the word in his *Encomium of Helen* (8-14): in those paragraphs they occur not less than thirteen times. Most modern scholars[5] have thought that the definition of rhetoric as a πειθοῦς δημιουργός in Plato's *Gorgias* (453a2) is taken over from the Sophist himself and, in spite of Dodds' misgivings[6], that may at least seem probable.

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[4] 58a7-b3 (Protarchus is speaking) Ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις ὡς ἡ τοῦ <u>πείθειν</u> πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν — πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῆι δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῶι ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν — νῦν δ' οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνωι βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

[5] So Nestle *Vom Mythos zum Logos* 311 and 315 (cf. also 257); Nestle's exposition of Gorgias' ideas is the most suggestive we possess.

[6] *Comm. Gorg.* 203 (note on 453a2). Dodds is probably right in denying the authority of ascriptions of the definition to Corax by a late fourth or fifth-century anonymus in H. Rabe *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Lipsiae 1931) 26,20-21, cf. 171,21; to Corax and Tisias by Marcellinus (fifth century) 277,16-18 (*Art. Scr.* B II 13), cf. 296,26-27; to Gorgias by Ioannes Doxapatres (11th century) 107,8; cf. Amm. Marc. xxx 4,3 (Tisias and Gorgias) — earlier in antiquity, the definition had been ascribed to Isocrates and Xenocrates (cf. *Art. Scr. ib.*). Yet there are internal arguments for Gorgianic origin of the formula. The insistence with which Socrates in the *Gorgias* repeats the formulas (453e4-5. 454a2-3. 4-5. 454e9-455a1) is an argument in favour: it would be rather pointless to make so much out of a phrase that one has coined oneself. Dodds translates the words πειθοῦς δημιουργός with 'manufacturer of conviction'. We should not attribute this to Gorgias, he says, for 'the personification [implied by 'manufacturer'] is typically Platonic, or Socratic'; he refers to *Charm.* 174e9, 'where Socrates calls medicine

In the course of his analysis of this definition, Socrates elicits from Gorgias the admission that rhetorical persuasion relies on opinion, and not on knowledge (454e3-9), and that the distinction between the two lies in the fact that opinions can be true or false, whereas knowledge is always true (454d5-8). If we are inclined to consider this last point to be properly Socratic, we should remember two sentences of Gorgias' *Helen*. We can easily justify Helen, Gorgias says, 'if it was speech that *persuaded and deceived* her mind' (εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, *Hel.* 8). So persuasion is quite independent of truth. What is more, the almost supernatural power of words reveals itself in this independence (*Hel.* 13):

> As for the fact that persuasion added to speech moulds the mind as it wishes, we should look at the theories of the natural philosophers ..., secondly at the contests that depend on speeches (τοὺς ἀναγκαίους διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας, that is to say, at forensic debates[7]), in which one speech delights and persuades a multitude, a speech written with art, not spoken with truth.

Socrates finds in the persuasive oratory of his opponents precisely this indifference to truth combined with the ability to put the hearer exactly in whatever mood the speaker wants.

But what precisely is going on when the orator manipulates his audience? What is that state of mind to which they are brought (17a1 πεπόνθατε, see the note)? The most lively, and ironical, description of the process and its results is found in the introduction of the *Menexenus* (234c1-235c5). The passage is rather long; but, as it is closely akin in content and terminology to the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, I cannot dispense with quoting it in full. Socrates is speaking.

> In truth, Menexenus, to fall in battle seems to be a splendid thing in many ways. For a man obtains a splendid and magnificent funeral even though at his death he be but a poor man; and, though he be but a worthless fellow, he wins praise by the mouth of accomplished men who praise him not at random but in speeches prepared long beforehand. And they praise in such splendid fashion, that, what with their ascribing to each one both what he has and what he has not, and the variety and splendour of their diction, they bewitch (γοητεύουσιν) our souls; and they eulogise the State in every possible fashion, and they praise those who died in the war and all our ancestors of former times and ourselves who are living still; so that I myself, Menexenus, when thus praised by them, feel mightily ennobled, and every time I listen fascinated (κηλούμενος) I am

ὑγιείας δημιουργός', and *Symp.* 188d1, 'where μαντική is φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργός.' Actually, both these definitions had already been quoted by Nestle (*o.c.* 311 n.27), who thought they were modeled on πειθοῦς δημιουργός. The contexts neither in the *Gorgias* nor in the *Charmides* seem to suggest a vivid personification (in Isocrates xi 32 δημιουργός is no more than 'author of a deed', 'responsible for it'). The sophistic speech of Eryximachus, from which *Symp.* 188d1 was quoted, is more likely to contain a reminiscence of Gorgias than a typically Platonic, or Socratic, way of speaking.

[7] The meaning of the adjective ἀναγκαίους in this sentence is a matter of debate; cf. M. Untersteiner *Sofisti.* Testimonianze e frammenti ii² (Firenze 1961) 105; MacDowell *in loc.*

> exalted (ἐξέστηκα)[8] and imagine myself to have become all at once taller and nobler and more handsome. And as I am generally accompanied by some strangers, who listen along with me, I become in their eyes also all at once more majestic; for they also manifestly share in my feelings with regard both to me and to the rest of our City, believing it to be more marvellous than before, owing to the persuasive eloquence of the speaker. And this majestic feeling remains with me for over three days: so persistently does the speech and voice of the orator ring in my ears that it is scarcely on the fourth or fifth day that I recover myself and remember that I really am here on earth, whereas till then I almost imagined myself to be living in the Islands of the Blessed, — so expert are our orators. (R.G. Bury's translation, slightly modified).

We notice first that here, just as in the *Apology*, the skill of the orator consists precisely in his ability to make people believe what is not true: those who fell in battle they praise for qualities which they did not have as well as for those which they did (234e6-235a1); Socrates, and his companions along with him, feel themselves and the City growing instantaneously more majestic, not because any real change has taken place but simply because of the effect of persuasion upon them (235b7 ἀναπειθόμενοι). After some days, he succeeds in regaining his senses and comes back to himself and to reality. So far the description is identical to what is said in the *Apology*.

On another point the *Menexenus* is slightly more explicit: the rhetoric casts a magic spell on the hearer, so that he feels as if he were transported into another world. This, we know, was precisely what Gorgias aimed at with his new technique of 'Kunstprosa', in which non-metrical language would become as persuasive as verse. Both poetry and artistic prose will exert the same effect as incantations, which also manifest the power of the word (*Hel.* 10):

> Inspired incantations through speeches (αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαὶ) are inducers of pleasure and reducers of sorrow; by intercourse with the mind's belief, the power of the incantation enchants and persuades and moves it by sorcery (ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείαι). Two arts of sorcery and magic (γοητείας ... καὶ μαγείας) have been invented; they are deviations of mind and deceptions of belief. (MacDowell's translation).

The last sentence points to the element of deception, of illusion, which, according to Gorgias, is present in every form of artistic activity[9]. That special aspect, however, remains wholly outside of the interest that Socrates shows, in the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, for the general characteristics of Gorgianic oratory.

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[8] Of course, F's ἐξέστηκα is better than ἕστηκα. Cf. *Symp.* 198b5 (Socrates about Agathon's speech) τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; *Phaedr.* 234d1 about Lysias' speech ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι; *Clit.* 407a6 (Clitophon about Socrates' speech) πολλάκις ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων.

[9] Cf. *ib.* 9 and the other texts referred to by Nestle *Vom Mythos zum Logos* 319-326; W.J. Verdenius 'Gorgias' Doctrine of Deception' in Kerferd *The Sophists and their Legacy* 116-128.

We may find in the *Symposium* another passage closely related to those in the *Menexenus* and the *Apology*. It is particularly appropriate to our purpose here: although it refers to the sophisticated speech of Agathon, it starts with an explicit mention of Gorgias as the man who provided the model for that kind of oratory which disregards the truth.

> His (Agathon's) speech so reminded me of Gorgias that I was exactly in the plight described by Homer: I feared that Agathon in his final phrases would confront me with the eloquent Gorgias' head, and by opposing his speech to mine would turn me thus dumbfounded into stone. And so in that moment I realised what a ridiculous fool I was to fall in with your proposal that I should take a turn in your eulogies of Love, and to call myself an expert in love-matters, when really I was ignorant of the method in which eulogies of anything whatever ought to be made. For I was such a silly wretch as to think that one ought in each case to speak the truth about the person eulogised; on this assumption I hoped we might pick out the fairest of the facts and set these forth in their comeliest guise. I was quite elated with the notion of what a fine speech I should make, for I felt that I knew the truth[10]. But now, it appears that this is not what is meant by a good speech of praise; which is rather an ascription of all the highest and fairest qualities, whether the case be so or not; it is really no matter if they are untrue. (198c1-e2, Lamb's translation).

So much about Gorgianic rhetoric and truth. On the stylistic means which this kind of oratory uses, the *Menexenus* did not need to say anything, because 'Aspasia's speech' provides ample illustration. In the *Symposium*, just before the lines I quoted, Socrates had mentioned Agathon's exquisite language in terms that one finds also in the *Exordium* of the *Apology*[11]. The last passage gives much more comment on the issue of style, as will be pointed out in the Commentary. The simplicity of Socrates' own speech did certainly not result from ignorance of fashionable niceties. Although he does not himself make use of the σχήματα λέξεως and σχήματα διανοίας, he knows very well how the system functions.

3. *The Rhetorical Commonplaces*

Rhetorical teaching, however, was not concerned only with style. Rules had been laid down, first in forensic oratory, the field of accusation and defense, next in deliberative rhetoric, concerned with exhortation and discussion, and

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[10] Here the MSS read ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν (198d7). This certainly cannot be right and has been influenced by d2-3 οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἄρα πράγματος, ὡς ἔδει ἐγκωμιάζειν ὁτιοῦν. Lamb, in his text and translation, follows Badham, who excised the words τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν. In his note *in loc.*, he tentatively proposes to replace them by τοῦ πράγματος (cf. d2). I think this hits the mark; see, however, G.F. Rettig *Platons Symposium* (Halle 1875) ii 252; U. Galli *Il Simposio* (Torino 1935) 139 (note *in loc.*).

[11] 198b4-5 τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων; *Apol.* 17b9-c1 κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους ... ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν.

finally in praise and blame, which belongs to the province of epideictic rhetoric[12], for the composition of speeches and the organisation of their arguments. These rules were meant to help to construct the several μέρη τοῦ λόγου, and especially the most difficult of them, the *exordium*. This appears from the *Manual of Rhetoric* by Anaximenes of Lampsacus, the oldest treatise on the subject to have reached us (ca. 340 B.C.), a work in which much traditional material has been preserved[13]. The rules are even better documented in the surviving examples of Athenian forensic oratory[14]. Litigants and logographers alike had at their disposal collections of *passe-partout exordia*, which could, with slight alterations, be adapted to the circumstances of any particular lawsuit[15].

More than a century ago Riddell pointed out that the *Exordium* of Plato's *Apology* 'may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators' (xxi), and quoted to that effect seven passages from Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus and Aeschines. Since that time other scholars, especially Burnet (71-72, notes on 17c7 and d2) and Thomas Meyer (25-26. 38. 45-46. 51-52), have adduced supplementary material; Meyer has shown that rhetorical topoi are not confined to the *Exordium*. Nobody today would question that these correspondences are intentional in so subtle and allusive an author as Plato. Surely, we have here an element of parody and thus of play; but Plato's παιδιά is always closely connected with σπουδή.[16] And the serious intent

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[12] Fuhrmann has shown (*Untersuchungen* 150-152) that the expressions τὸ δημηγορικὸν γένος, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος and τὸ δικανικὸν γένος, which are found in the MSS of Anaximenes, were interpolated into the text under the influence of the doctrines of Aristotle and later teachers of rhetoric. See also the *praefatio* of his critical edition (Lipsiae 1966) xl-xli.

[13] One unimportant detail offers evidence for this. In the introduction to the 'Ερώτησις (24b5), Socrates calls Meletus τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι; obviously, Meletus had said this in his speech in order to win the sympathy of the court. It is a logical inference that he followed common rhetorical teaching, which is enunciated by Anaximenes (cf. note *in loc.*).

[14] To get an overall view, Navarre's *Rhétorique grecque* is still the most useful; for the *exordium* see 213-239.

[15] A well-known example is that of Andocides i 1 and 9, a text which is partly identical with Lysias xix 2 and 11, and of And. i 6 which corresponds to Lys. xix 3; the passages are printed together, with further parallels, by Radermacher *Art. scr.* C 29 and 47, p.211-212 and 220-221. — The 56 *exordia* attributed to Demosthenes belong to the deliberative genre.

[16] See note on 20d5. Failure to realise this prompts Brickhouse - Smith (48-59) to decrease the role of parody and of rhetorical topoi as much as possible. For example, their remark, 52 n.11 'there are a number of extant forensic speeches that appear to contain *none* of the common elements Riddell claims to find in Socrates' *prooimion*' overlooks the fact that there are traditional topoi of the *exordium not* used by Socrates (see below, 34-36). In one case, this bias leads to a serious distortion of the Greek: 17d3 ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως is claimed to mean that Socrates 'has never before presented a legal speech' (55-56; this goes back to Hackforth *Composition* 56; similarly Reeve 5-7), on the ground that elsewhere (35a4) Socrates says he has often witnessed trials. But (1) τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως cannot possibly refer to the presentation of a case, which is only verbal *per accidens*; (2) ξένως ἔχω (cf. below, 39) does not necessarily imply that Socrates knows nothing of forensic diction: it probably means merely that he is unable to use it himself, just as true ξένοι may understand a little Attic without being able to speak it; (3) as Riddell showed, the statement is itself a *topos*, cf. Isocr.

is, to use the words of Burnet (67), that

> just as in the *Phaedrus* Socrates improves on the current rhetorical commonplaces by giving them a deeper meaning, so he does here. We have the usual τόποι indeed, but they are all made to lead up to the genuinely Socratic paradox that the function of a good orator is to tell the truth.

In the *Apology* as a whole, and especially in its *Exordium*, we find an application of what Diès, with a felicitous phrase, has called 'la transposition platonicienne'[17].

Socratic speech always aims at truth, which is the highest good (see Chapter VII 133-135). Therefore Socrates is not primarily interested in securing his acquittal, because this is, in his opinion, not an absolute good. This explains why he does not lose his temper either when he is found guilty (35e1-36a1) or when he is sentenced to death (38e3-5. 40b6-c3. 41d5-7). At the opening of his defence, he immediately dissociates himself from the set of values that was accepted as self-evident in law courts, by jurors and litigants as well as by logographers and teachers of rhetoric. All of them conceive of lawsuits in terms of a contest, in which both adversaries, as a matter of course, are only concerned with how to win the case. These presumptions are reflected in contemporary terminology, according to which legal action is a contest (ἀγών, ἀγωνίζομαι 34c2) with the prosecutor pursuing (διώκειν) his adversary and trying to catch him (αἱρεῖν 28a6. 7. b1), while the defendant flees (φεύγειν 35d2) before him. Socrates has an entirely different set of values, which is founded on objective criteria. For him, as for the Athenian of the *Laws* (v 730c1-2), 'truth is the first of all goods, for gods as well as for men'. For this reason, he will not pursue any personal advantage[18] if it does not conform to and depend on this ultimate goal.

But that is not the whole story. Socratic speech as a rule aims at suggesting rather than at asserting the truth. For truth is discovered by insight (σοφία, φρόνησις), and this cannot be siphoned from one mind into another like water from a full vessel into an empty one[19]. Insight is a

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xv 38 ἐμὲ δ' οὐδεὶς πώποθ' ἑώρακεν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς συνεδρίοις οὔτε περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὔτε πρὸς τοῖς διαιτηταῖς, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ἁπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν — therefore it is simplistic to think that the common interpretation of these words makes Socrates a liar (cf. n.2): Plato uses the topos to show his readers that Socrates cannot both use a rhetoric aimed at persuading by deception and remain true to himself, that is, committed to the truth. See below, § 4.

[17] Cf. *Autour de Platon* ii 400-449.

[18] Wolff *Platos Apologie* 3 says that the only aim of oratorical πειθώ as a weapon in the ἀγών is the ἴδιον συμφέρον; he seems to imply that this phrase was commonly used among the teachers of rhetoric in classical Athens. Meyer 20 also quotes the phrase. I find the formula attested only in a text of the late rhetor Apsines (3rd century A.D.) 233,4-5 Spengel-Hammer, where it has no general connotation, but is contrasted with τὸ τῆς πόλεως συμφέρον.

[19] *Symp.* 175d3-7. Cf. Chapter VIII 168-169 for a more extensive treatment of this passage.

personal activity of the soul, and it implies both a perception of the truth and a commitment to it as the leading principle of one's life. Neither of these can be attained from outside. Therefore, when a person believes that he has perceived the truth (or rather something of it), he will not try to inculcate it by direct and categorical teaching (33a5-b3; see Chapter VIII § 2d), but rather by suggestions, as the god of Delphi did with Socrates himself (21b2-7; note on 21b4). In the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, the tension between the use of commonplaces and the non-commonplace aim they serve is just such a suggestion. The tension can arouse a sense of wonder and thus lead to serious reflection[20]. Rhetorical topoi that have always been familiar to the members of the jury, if used in such a special way, can open for them a view on some part of the truth that is very different from commonly accepted opinions.

We should notice, however, that, while Socrates 'transposes'[21] several topoi that he shares with the Attic Orators, others are conspicuously absent. Socrates omits, first, to praise the competence, impartiality, piety[22] and the other eminent qualities of the jurors. For this we have the explicit advice of Anaximenes of Lampsacus: 'We ought also to court the favour of the jury by praising them for their justice and competence in their office'[23]. This is rather jejune; but in the surviving speeches the tone is quite warm, as, for example, in a speech for the defence written by Lysias:

> If it were any other court that was to make a decision about me, I should be terrified by the danger, considering what strange machinations and chances occur at times to cause a variety of surprises to those who are standing trial; but, as it is before you that I appear, I hope to obtain justice (iii 2).

To illustrate variations on this topos, I quote a speech delivered the very year Socrates was tried, Andocides' *On the Mysteries*:

> To return a just verdict is already, I feel sure, your intention; indeed, it was because I relied upon you that I stood my ground. I have observed that in suits public and private the only thing to which you attach supreme importance is that your decision should accord with your oath; and it is that and that alone which keeps our city unshaken, in spite of those who would have things otherwise (i 9)[24].

With Socrates, of course, we find nothing of the kind. He praises neither the competence nor the impartiality of the members of the jury, because he is

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[20] Cf. *Theaet.* 155d2-4; *Rep.* vii 524d9-525a2.

[21] I consciously use the word in this unusual meaning as a technical term, referring to *transposition platonicienne*. See above, 32-33; Chapter VI 103; note on 35c5-6.

[22] In the Orators the εὐσέβεια of the jurors is mentioned in relation to their oath, the text of which is given by Burnet 148 (note on 35c4).

[23] 36, p.81,6-7 F.: χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνωι θεραπεῦσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοί εἰσι (H. Rackham's translation); cf. 29, p.61,10-12.

[24] For other instances of eulogy of the jurors, see Navarre *Rhétorique grecque* 134. 218-221.

convinced that few men will know what justice is and will be prepared to act according to its requirements. Therefore he never in the course of his defence addresses them as a body with the phrase ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί[25], while in the Ἐρώτησις the only time Meletus gives his answer not to Socrates but to the jury, he does it precisely with that formula (26d4). In the Third Speech Socrates uses the phrase when addressing the jurors who had voted for his acquittal (40a2-3). This is in accordance with the definition of a juror's duties that Socrates gives at the end of the *Exordium:* a juror should concern himself with one thing only, whether what the pleader says is just or not, for that is his ἀρετή, the quality that makes him truly a δικαστής. In the *Gorgias*, the Sophist had claimed that what he taught was in reality the highest of all goods and the source of freedom for individuals themselves and of the authority they will acquire over others in their own city, that is, 'the ability to persuade by speeches the jurors in a court, the councillors in the Council, the citizens in the Assembly and in every meeting that has to do with the life of the city' (452d5-e4). It is precisely because Gorgias always assumes his audience to be a group that Socrates has misgivings about the kind of persuasion that the orator uses in matters of justice and injustice. The Sophist readily concedes that his πειθώ arouses in the audience an opinion, not a reasoned knowledge. 'For, presumably', says Socrates, 'he would not be able to give a reasoned account (διδάξαι) of such important problems in a short time to such a large crowd.' And Gorgias answers: 'Of course not'[26].

I have already made a passing allusion[27] to another topic that belongs to the stock elements of forensic *exordia*: the speakers should magnify their own merits and minimise those of their opponents. For this too there is, in addition to the rules of the manuals[28], abundant illustration in Athenian forensic oratory (cf. Navarre 280-301). In the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, however, there is no trace of such praise of the defendant or of an attack on his opponents. When Socrates points to the impudent lies told by his accusers (17a3-b7; cf. 31b7-c2), he does not cast suspicion upon their moral character as such, but refers exclusively to what they have said on this

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[25] In the *Gorgias* at the end of Socrates' discussion with Callicles and just before he embarks upon the eschatological myth he speaks of the helplessness which will befall him if he is ever brought before a court; for then he will not be able to speak the truth and to say 'all these things (with which you reproach me) I say and do in conformity with justice, and to use *your* words for them, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί' (522c1-2). The passage had long been misunderstood. The true punctuation and interpretation were restored by Paul Maas *CR* 53 (1939) 58 = *Kleine Schriften* (München 1973) 68-69, and are well explained by Dodds, *in loc.*

[26] *Gorg.* 455a5-7; for the 'short time', cf. *Apol.* 18e4-19a5. 37a5-b2; see further the note on 37a6. On the need of 'leisure' for dialectical discussion, see Chapter I n.21.

[27] Above, n.13.

[28] Anaximenes 36, p.80,19-81,6 F.; similar advice is given for the other two fields of rhetoric 29, p.60,18-61,5.

particular occasion[29]. As for his own merits, he will later on mention a few moments of his life in which he showed military or civic courage (28e1-4; 32a9-d8; see the note on 32a8), but only to establish a general principle[30] and not to draw attention to himself. Meletus did not show the same modesty.

There is yet another, perhaps the most important, commonplace recommended in the schools of rhetoric, not only for the *exordium* but also for the discussion of the opponent's arguments, especially for the peroration. It was customary to appeal to the jurors for their benevolence (εὔνοια, εὐμένεια), their favour (χάρις), and their mercy (ἔλεος) on oneself and to arouse their anger (ὀργή) against the other party. On this point the manuals are very detailed[31]. Anaximenes distinguishes three different situations that determine the way the topos is used: if the audience is favourably disposed towards the speaker beforehand, or unfavourably, or neither[32]. Many examples of this topos are found in the Orators (cf. Navarre 230-239). In the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, no use is made of it, nor is there an occasion for doing so; in the Peroration, however, Socrates justifies at length his unwillingness to exploit the audience's emotions and to pressure them by begging for their favour. See Chapter IX § 2 for further remarks on the issue.

4. *Socrates' Own Conception of Oratory*

In the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, Plato does not represent Socrates' attitude towards the rhetoric of his time as purely negative. To be sure, Socrates criticises its indifference to truth with some vehemence; he feels that the refinements of Gorgianic style are rather childish and in bad taste too; he transposes the commonplaces of contemporary forensic oratory with some playfulness, and partly rejects them altogether. That is not, however, all he does, as Plato describes it. As I said in the general introduction (Chapter I § 2c), the *Apology* is a philosophical work, and that implies that it is concerned with the right conduct of life, not only in general but also with respect to the special activity with which the work is concerned, namely, rhetoric. So we might expect some hints about what rhetoric should be according to Socratic principles. If philosophy cannot replace what it attacks, it is a fruitless enterprise and will not be able to make good its claim that it is necessary for the 'good life'. On the contrary, it would remain simply

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29 This has already been noticed by Meyer 38.

30 Both passages are preceded by a γνώμη (28d6-10 and 31e2-32a3).

31 Anaximenes 36, p.80,10-81,1 F. Relatively short because, as the author says himself, the topic has already been elaborated with regard to exhortation and dissuasion, scil. 34, p.71,6-72,5. 73,9-74,13; further, 36, p.86,8-14. 90,3-6. 90,13-91,26; Aristotle *Rhet.* ii 7-9 (very copious). iii 14,1415a34-36, b25-28; cf. Plato *Phaedr.* 272a5 (ἐλεινολογίας).

32 29, p.60,18-64,5 F. (for demegories); 36, p.80,10-81,1 (for accusations).

outside of the realities of daily life and it would deserve to be disregarded[33]. Communication is a necessary part of life, and it is not enough simply to condemn the way most people communicate.

Of course, the *exordium* of a defence is not the place to *discuss* what rhetoric should properly be. Still, Socrates does give some important, if sketchy, indications. First of all, rhetoric should not be a technique of distorting the truth, but on the contrary of presenting it straightforwardly, so that the audience is actually able to perceive it. Truth, however, is a very comprehensive term. In anticipation of ideas that are suggested later in the *Apology*, we can distinguish between two fields of truth, corresponding to two ways of perceiving or knowing. The first is the truth of simple facts of experience, of things that are happening in daily life, and about which we learn through experiencing or practising them. In a broad sense and using common language, we may be said to 'know' them[34] and Socrates, who is wont to deny possessing 'knowledge', readily acknowledges that he knows a lot of them[35]. The communication of such bits of truth does not raise any special problem, and Socrates has nothing original to say about it.

The other kind of truth involves what Plato likes to call 'the most important subjects' (τὰ μέγιστα; see note on 22d7): good and evil, honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust. These very issues arise when men are in conflict with one another, because we do not have available a technique of settling them without ambiguity, such as we have for quantitative questions in pure or applied mathematical sciences (*Euthyphro* 7b6-d7). So we should search for an appropriate method. The fact that differences about this kind of truth make men angry and enemies of one another proves that they involve judgments of value. Therefore, as I have already said above, 34, recognition of the truth implies a commitment on the part of the listener to the truth that is suggested by the speaker. For this reason the speaker should not try to force his view upon the listener, but should elicit it from him in such a way that in a true sense it will be his own discovery. This is only possible if the speaker takes into account the state of mind of the listener. Therefore, awareness of the truth about 'the most important subjects' does not arise through continuous speech addressed at a large

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33 The 'unworldliness' of philosophy was a favourite topic of anti-Platonic polemics; Plato and his disciples take this criticism very much to heart, as appears i.a. from *Gorg.* 484c4-486d1; 521b4-522c8; *Rep.* vii 517 d4-e3; *Theaet.* 172c3-176a2; Aristotle *Protr.* fr. 5 (Walzer, Ross), B 41-44 Düring.

34 Examples include *Meno* 97a9-11, which speaks of 'knowing (εἰδώς) the way (from Athens) to Larissa'; see my comments on this use of εἰδέναι in *Gnomon* 35 (1963) 145; another one in Xenophon *Mem.* i 2,36 about Socrates' knowing (ἐὰν εἰδῶ) where Charicles' house is situated or where Critias is to be found. See Kraut *Socrates and the State* 273 n.45.

35 Euthydemus asks him: ἔστιν ὅτι ἐπίστασαι; Socrates answers: πάνυ γε, ... καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε (*Euthyd.* 293b7-8). This σμικρά is the opposite of τὰ μέγιστα, about which I will speak presently. — Reeve, 62, wrongly infers that Socrates 'has nonexpert humdrum knowledge of what virtue is and what it is like'. Socrates would deny that there is such a thing.

gathering but through conversation, through διαλέγεσθαι. That method not only prevents cheating through ambiguity in the use of words but guarantees to the 'answerer' his full freedom to assent or dissent.

Now, when Socrates, in the *Exordium*, appeals to the jury not to object to his customary method of argumentation (17c7-d1), it is precisely *dialectic* he has in mind. For that is what he points to when he says that they have heard him many times engaged in conversations in the market-place and elsewhere, and it is this technique of conversation that is apt to arouse protest. This appears from the Ἐρώτησις: when Socrates insists there, just as in the *Exordium*, that the jury does not protest his method, he refers to his initial request to them: 'As I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to protest if I conduct my argument in my usual way' (27a9-b2).

Two points are especially characteristic of Socrates' dialectic technique. First, the string of short and apparently innocent questions which will in due course either force his interlocutor to a conclusion that he would prefer not to admit as true, or catch him in a contradiction. Second, the inductive method[36] based on examples from everyday life. Of course, there is more to Socratic dialectic but these two points are its most immediately striking features, and most likely to arouse irritation. Still, these two aspects of the method, the question-and-answer technique and induction, are fundamental for the attainment of its ultimate goal: combined with truth these two are called in the dialogues 'the art of conversation' or διαλεκτική[37]. With regard to the *Apology* I must add that it is not only in the Ἐρώτησις (24c9-28a1) that Socrates displays his own 'way of speaking' (τρόπος τῆς λέξεως 18a2), which he contrasts so vividly with that of the Orators; in many other passages, as we will see below, he succeeds in converting continuous forensic speech into a dialogue, and this enables him to use his dialectic patterns of argumentation.

Undoubtedly, dialectic is in Socrates' view by far the best way for men to pursue the truth and to help one another discover it, or rather, some part of it. It would, however, ruin the socratic irony for Socrates to come out and say this in so many words. Accordingly, he compares his 'way of speaking' with a foreign dialect, an inferior form of language if judged by the high standards of Attic[38]; the jury would tolerate another dialect and make allowance for the ignorance of a foreign pleader. Ignorance also handicaps Socrates: arguing before courts is something quite foreign to him, and therefore he is unable to use forensic diction and present his argument as a

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[36] Vlastos *Socrates* 267-269 argues that 'induction' is a misnomer. It is certainly true that Socrates does not treat the conclusions reached by this method as probable but as certain. Dialectic is not a method of proving hypotheses beyond any doubt but of acquiring insight.

[37] It seems to me that Robinson *Dialectic* 75-84 underrates the importance of 'Socratic' dialectic for the philosophical method or methods in Plato's later dialogues.

[38] Solon, fr. 36,11 West shows how proud the Athenians were, as early as the sixth century B.C., of the quality of their Greek. For the late fifth century, the same attitude is attested indirectly by the critical remarks of Ps.-Xen. *Resp. Athen.* ii 8.

normal forensic speech. This claim, surely, we cannot take at face value, since the whole *Exordium* is full of traditional forensic commonplaces. But Socrates can hardly introduce his defence with a proof that his own method is superior; he simply begs to be allowed to use it, whether better or worse than the customary one. As the defence proceeds, it *will* appear that the Socratic method is not only preferable to others but the only right one, that is, the only one that is able to present truth in its different aspects[39] and to respect, indeed to educate, the listener. Here, as so often in Plato, problems of method are solved by applying the method.

In any event, 'speaking the truth' is essentially what makes the orator. The importance of this theme is emphasised by the repetition of the words for 'truth' (ἀληθές, ἀλήθεια; four times in the first 14 lines), but still more by the laconic and paradoxical formula that ends the *Exordium*: ῥήτορος δὲ (ἀρετή) τἀληθῆ λέγειν (18a5-6).

So, the ostensibly casual remarks of the *Exordium* outline the program of a new rhetoric. In a passage quoted above, 33, Burnet had already pointed out that the use of forensic topoi in the *Exordium* anticipates the doctrine of the *Phaedrus*[40]. The second part of that dialogue discusses explicitly the problem of philosophical rhetoric. We may summarise it in the following points:

(1) In order to speak well, the speaker must have a reasoned knowledge of the subject of the speech (259e4-6), which he can obtain through dialectic (266c1. 8. 276e5-6). Dialectic proceeds by two complementary methods: that of collecting the many into the unity of a single form, and that of dividing this unity into its natural components (265c9-266c8. 273d7-e4. 277b5-c6). These procedures make it possible to determine exactly the essence of each entity.

(2) 'Rhetorical skill is a way of leading minds by speeches' (261a7-8). So the method of division should be applied both to minds (ψυχαί) and to speeches, in order to ascertain what kind of speeches will or will not be able to persuade a particular kind of mind (270e1-271b5. c10-e2)[41].

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[39] For Socrates, truth is both objective, inasmuch as it has to be given account of, and personal, inasmuch as the truth asks for the commitment of those who grasp it.

[40] See also the remarks on true rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, especially 503d5-504e5, a passage which corrects the negative view of rhetoric outlined earlier in that dialogue in the same way as the *Apology* corrects traditional rhetorical practice. This point was made by R.E. Allen 'Irony and Rhetoric in Plato's *Apology*' *Paideia* 5 (1976) 32-42.

[41] When Plato speaks of 'kinds of mind', I do not think that he is referring to anything akin to the classifications of ancient or modern characterologists, be it the ἤθη of Aristotle and Theophrastus, the physiological temperaments of Galen or the psychological types of Klages, Jung and others. His division is not founded upon empirical criteria, but upon what is essential to souls. Every human soul is a synthesis of three parts (μέρη, εἴδη), τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, τὸ λογιστικόν (*Rep.* iv 436a8-441c3; *Phaedr.* 246a6-b3; *Tim.* 69c5-70c1). According to the predominance that any one part has over the others, we may divide men into φιλοχρήματοι (φιλοσώματοι, φιλήδονοι), φιλότιμοι and φιλόσοφοι. In the *Apology*, Socrates makes an implicit use of this division (Chapter VII 135-137). On the whole question see my

(3) The technical devices taught in the schools and manuals of rhetoric with regard to the partition of the speech, the different ways of argumentation, the commonplaces, the stylistic tricks, etc. (266c8-267d9) are only preliminaries to oratory, not oratorical skill itself (269a5-d8), since persuasion will only result from the fulfillment of the conditions formulated above.

The first and the second of these three principles appear clearly enough in the *Exordium* of the *Apology*, through Socrates' insistence on truth and through his allusions to dialectic. Of course, no technical details are given: they would have been totally out of place. The way Socrates speaks about Gorgianic oratory and uses (or refuses to use) rhetorical commonplaces is closely related to the more elaborate treatment of the same subject in the *Phaedrus*. We shall see, in the course of our study of the text, that many other sections of the *Apology* imply, though always without any technicalities, the essential elements of various Platonic doctrines, which have sometimes been considered to be later developments. The continuity between the *Apology* and the dialogues is much closer than is usually assumed. Erwin Wolff was quite right when, in the preface of his valuable dissertation, he proclaimed his intention 'to interpret the *Apology* as Plato's first philosophical work'[42] — only he should have omitted the word 'first', for which there is no support.

essay 'Platons Ansichten ...' 93-105.

[42] *Platos Apologie* Vorwort: 'die Apologie als das erste philosophische Werk Platos zu interpretieren'.

CHAPTER THREE

PROPOSITION

1. Exordium *and Proposition*

With 18a7 we have the beginning of a new section of the *Apology*. This is made clear both by the lapidary pointedness with which the preceding line of thought is concluded and by the fact that the words πρῶτον μὲν οὖν introduce an entirely different point. The sentence 18d7-e4 gives the conclusion of what had been said from 18a7 on and repeats the key-words of the first lines of the section. The next paragraph (18e4-19a7) is a transitional one. Since, on the one hand, its opening words formulate the consequence of what has just been said and, on the other, the words 'Αναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (19a8) strongly mark a new start, it will be better to consider it as part of the preceding section. Burnet calls the whole of this section πρόθεσις, a term generally translated in English by *proposition*, after Quintilian's rendering *propositio*. Although Burnet gives no justification, he seems to be right in doing so.

To be sure, the proposition does not appear among the four principal constituents of the speech which according to *Phaedr.* 266d5-e3 were mentioned ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις, viz. (1) προοίμιον, (2) διήγησις with appended μαρτυρίαι, (3) τεκμήρια, (4) εἰκότα, nor is it to be found in the series of further distinctions whose pedantic names are enumerated 266e3-267a5 (πίστωσις, ἐπιπίστωσις, ἔλεγχος, ἐπεξέλεγχος, ὑποδήλωσις, παρέπαινος, παράψογος). The very nature of these last distinctions give us a clue as to the true significance of items (2) through (4) of the main list. The first item (προοίμιον) is conspicuously singled out and stands alone in Socrates' first answer to Phaedrus; the second answer contains items (2) through (4) plus the first two of the supplementary series, while the last five of the latter are enumerated at the beginning of the third answer (267a1 ff.).

Now, all these, with the exception of *exordium*, are elements or patterns of argumentation rather than parts of a speech. The omission of peroration indicates that Socrates is not discussing the parts proper (the formal parts), since peroration can scarcely ever have been omitted in any systematic treatment of the μέρη τοῦ λόγου. I add that two traditional topics, the ἐπάνοδος and the ἐλεινολογία, are mentioned elsewhere in the same section of the *Phaedrus* (267d4; 272a5). So we cannot conclude anything from the absence of proposition in the list that I have cited.

Aristotle's approach to the partition of the speech, as to many other questions in the *Rhetoric*, is at first an abstract logical one:

> A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward; for both he who proves, proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it. The first of these parts is the statement of the case (πρόθεσις), the second the proof (πίστις), a similar division to that of thesis and demonstration. (*Rhet.* iii 13, 1414a31-37, Freese's translation)[1].

But a few lines further on he takes a more pragmatic view of things and writes:

> So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof; at the most, however, the parts are four in number: *exordium*, statement, proof, peroration (iii 13, 1414b7-9).

We may surmise that πρόθεσις was not a new term in Aristotle's time any more than προοίμιον, πίστις and ἐπίλογος are. Still, the *Rhetoric* gives no other information about the role of proposition and the way is should be modelled than the logical approach just cited, whereas Aristotle expatiates at length on other parts, and especially on *exordium* (iii 14-19).

In Anaximenes' treatise, πρόθεσις is sometimes used in a less technical sense, to denote not a part of a speech but its subject-matter[2]; but we also find a definitely technical usage both of the noun πρόθεσις[3] and of the verb προτιθέναι[4]. In his discussion of deliberative oratory, he states explicitly that the πρόθεσις should be placed at the very beginning of the speech and be followed by the appeal to attention and goodwill[5]. Similar advice is given also with reference to epideictic and to forensic speeches[6].

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[1] I have, however, substituted 'thesis' for Freese's 'problem' as a rendering for πρόβλημα. The comparison is not with geometry, but with dialectic. Strictly speaking, a διαλεκτικὸν πρόβλημα (*Top.* i 11, 104b1) has the form of a disjunctive question, e.g. πότερον τὸ ζῶιον πεζὸν δίπουν ὁρισμός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου ἢ οὔ; (i 4, 101b32-33); actually, though, the position taken by the defendant, whether it is *yes* or *no*, is called πρόβλημα too, and therefore is also a θέσις (i 11, 104b34-36). Such is the case with statements like ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν or ὅτι οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν (ii 1, 108b34-36). Cf. P. Moraux *Aristotle on Dialectic* (Oxford 1968) 278-280.

[2] So 2, p.11,11. 17. 18 Fuhrmann; in that sense, other authors, e.g. Isocrates, prefer ὑπόθεσις.

[3] 29, p.65,2; 35, p.74,16. 77,17 F.

[4] In the active: 29, p.65,8; 36, p.80,6; in the middle: 35, p.74,14. 16; 36, p.86,20. The form προεκτιθέναι, which the MSS. give with the same sense 29, p.59,21 seems to be a corruption due to later usage (cf. below, n.12); see Fuhrmann *Untersuchungen* 163-164.

[5] The order is mentioned as such (τάξομεν δὲ πῶς;) in the recapitulation of chapter 29 (p.65,1-4) τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν ἀρχῆι εὐθέως ἐκθήσομεν, at least when one does not need to remove first the bad effects of previous διαβολή. Cf. 29, p.59,21ff. compared with 60,5ff. and 18ff.

[6] 35, p.74,15-75,8 and 36, p.80,6-19 F.

Earlier in the work, before starting to make distinctions between the rules appropriate to each genre, Anaximenes had sketched the nature and functions of the *exordium* in the following terms:

> Speaking generally[7], the *exordium* is a preparation of the hearers and a summary formulation of the case to persons not informed, in order that they may know what the speech is about and may follow the argument. It should further incite them to pay attention and, so far as can be done by way of speech, make them well-disposed towards us (29, p.59,13-18 F.).

In other words, the *exordium* should make the hearer εὐμαθής, προσεκτικός and εὔνους[8]. Εὐμάθεια (the term is not used by Anaximenes) will be attained by the πρόθεσις. Here is how Anaximenes defines the function of the πρόθεσις in the case of exhortation and dissuasion:

> To set out one's case to the audience and to make it clear is as follows: 'I stand here to recommend that we ought to go to war on behalf of Syracuse' or 'I stand here to prove that we ought not to assist Syracuse'. To formulate one's case in outline is such as has just been said. (29, p.59,21-60,5)[9].

So, according to Anaximenes, the πρόθεσις makes the case clear (δήλωσις, p.59,15; φανερὸν ποιεῖν, p.60,1) and does so succinctly (ἐν κεφαλαίωι, p.59,14. 60,4). The examples given seem to suggest that it will not consist of more than a few sentences. Anyhow, the essential function of the πρόθεσις is the same both in Anaximenes and in Aristotle: it states the case the speaker attempts to prove[10].

Anaximenes' concept of the proposition as the first element of the *exordium* is to be found in a few later rhetoricians[11], but most of them, perhaps under the influence of the classical models they studied, take a different and broader view of the nature and function of proposition[12]. Some-

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[7] καθόλου, that is, independent from the rhetorical genre.

[8] For this triad, cf. Ar. *Rhet.* iii 14, 1415a34-38.

[9] If προεκτιθέναι is the true reading (but see above, n.4), it is an equivalent of προτιθέναι, as is shown by the parallels quoted in n.12.

[10] There might seem to be disagreement about the place the proposition should occupy in the plan of the speech. For Aristotle, *if* there is an *exordium*, it should precede the πρόθεσις; for Anaximenes, the πρόθεσις is the very first part of the *exordium*. The difference, however, is not very significant. Aristotle's quadripartite plan was obtained only by adding the *exordium* before and the peroration after the essential core of the speech, which consists of πρόθεσις and πίστις. On the other hand, Anaximenes admits (see above, n.5) that if the orator meets with prejudices, he should begin by removing them, in order to secure the goodwill of the audience. Now, since the winning of goodwill is the most important of the three elements of the *exordium*, and in general the most elaborate, the πρόθεσις will, in that case, follow upon the bulk of the *exordium*.

[11] Cicero *Part. or.* 8,29; Anonymus Seguerianus, p.354,5-13 Spengel - Hammer.

[12] The Greek words used are πρόθεσις (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 17, p.28,15. 20 Usener-Radermacher; Nicocles *apud* Anon. Segu. p.380,20; Anon. Segu. p.381,1-26 Sp.-H.), προέκθεσις (id. p.354,10-13) or προκατασκευή, i.e. 'preparation of the proof' (Hermogenes *De Inv.* iii 2, p.126,16-128,1 Rabe); in Latin *expositio* (*Ad Her.* i 10,17; Cicero *De inv.* i 22,32) or *propo-*

times they present it as a statement of the issues on which the speaker agrees with his opponent and of those on which he disagrees[13]. As this practically amounts to an enumeration of what he himself will try to prove[14], some authors simply identify proposition and partition[15], whereas others keep them separate[16]. In general, the normal place of proposition (and of partition, which follows it) is said to be between the narration and the proof, although they occasionally point out that it sometimes precedes the narration[17]. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, however, says that the order *exordium*, proposition, narration, was recommended by Isocrates and his school, and he himself finds it applied in the speeches of Lysias[18].

Actually, the structures of the extant Attic speeches are much more flexible than one would expect from the doctrine of the rhetoricians. Still, we can easily identify in them the parts described by teachers of rhetoric, although often some are omitted and the order of those which are present is not infrequently modified. In many speeches, especially forensic speeches, we find a proposition, which usually takes the form of a partition. The authors[19] who use it relatively frequently are Lysias[20], Isaeus[21] and Demosthenes in his private speeches[22]; but it is not absent from the others[23]. Generally, it is relatively short, not exceeding ten lines, but in

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sitio (Quint. iv 4).

[13] *Ad Her.* i 3,4 and 10,17; Cicero *De inv.* i 22,31; cf. Dem. xxxiv 5.

[14] Anon. Segu. p.360,15-16; p.381,1-2 Sp.-H. (where one should read κατασκευῆς with Graeven, instead of παρασκευῆς).

[15] The Greek term here is μερισμός (Rufus of Perinthus, p.401,20-24 Sp.-H.; Anon. Segu. p.354,21-355,4 Sp.-H.; in Latin either *diuisio* (*Ad Her.* i 3,4 and 10,17) or *partitio* (Cicero *De inv.* i 22,31-23,33; Quint. iv 5).

[16] The author of *ad Her.* makes a distinction between these two, but unites both under the name of *diuisio*.

[17] Anon. Segu. p.381,16-21 Sp.-H. (with instances from Demosthenes and Lycurgus).

[18] *Lys.* 16, p.27,12-15; 17, p.28,13-18 U.-R.

[19] This list does not pretend to be exhaustive, especially since in some cases the proposition is so short that perhaps it should merely be called a transitional sentence.

[20] i 4-5; ix 3; xiii 4; xvi 3 end; xxiii 1 (there is no *exordium*); xxxi 5-7; xxxii 3. In the light of this, I cannot agree with M. Delaunois *Le plan rhétorique dans l'éloquence grecque d'Homère à Démosthène* (Bruxelles 1959), who writes (p.39): 'Ne tenons pas compte de la Division. Existait-elle d'ailleurs en tant que partie intégrante et originale à cette époque? Elle manque, en tout cas, la plupart du temps'; but he cites (*ib.*) nine speeches of Lysias in which there is no narration, without suggesting that narration was not, in Lysias' time, considered a 'part' in its own right.

[21] ii 2; vii 4; viii 6; x 3.

[22] xxvii 12; xxix 5; xxx 4-5; xxxii 2; xxxiv 5, etc.

[23] Isocrates xvii 2 end; Aeschines i 8; ii 11; Demosthenes (speeches in criminal lawsuits) xviii 56-59 (here a long refutation of calumnies of Aeschines has been inserted between the *exordium* and the proposition; this is consistent with Anaximenes' doctrine, as stated above, n.5 and 10); xix 4-8.

special cases it can be more elaborate[24]. Nearly always it follows the *exordium* and leads over to the narration[25]; this is in striking contrast to the order given in later manuals.

Now we can at last turn to the *Apology*. The structure of this defence shows much more liberty than any real court-room speech that has come down to us. That is, of course, because Socrates was no common litigant and because this was no ordinary trial, even though the atmosphere of the courtroom is clearly there. In this respect, the *Apology* differs radically not only from Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes*[26] but also from Isocrates' *Antidosis*, although the form of Isocrates' work was profoundly influenced by the Platonic *Apology*. As has been pointed out in the general introduction (Chapter I § 2a), it was Plato's intention to avoid making his *Apology* look like a refutation of Meletus' indictment; it should be a defence and illustration of Socrates' ἐπιτήδευμα (28b4). Plato had to do this, however, not only within the frame-work of a forensic speech, but, more importantly, with emphasis on the fact that Socrates' life was at stake. Plato's solution is quite satisfactory: he represented Meletus' accusation as the result of a long campaign of slander. This solution not only gave Plato the opportunity to discuss the whole of Socrates' life and action, but also to frame this discussion as the rebuttal of a διαβολή, which was a traditional topic of rhetoric[27].

So the section that we are dealing with is truly a proposition: it is the statement of Socrates' view of his own case as it now comes before the court, and at the same time it is a partition: Socrates will first defend himself against the old accusation, and after this against the new one. For such a proposition / partition to follow immediately upon the *exordium* is, as I said, in full accordance with the practice of Athenian forensic oratory. Besides, Plato would certainly not have included a narration here, which, without the explanations given in the πρόθεσις, could only have been about the facts that were relevant to Meletus' indictment. This would have given his indictment the kind of importance that Plato would emphatically deny

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[24] Lysias xxxi 5-7; Demosthenes xviii 56-59 and xix 4-8 (the last two cases are particularly interesting, because the order of the topics had to be justified in the speech, as in the case of the *Apology*).

[25] A notable exception is Dem. xxvii 12 (the narration in this speech is very short, consisting of 8 sections, in comparison with the 46 sections of the proof).

[26] On the alleged influence of this fictitious judicial speech on Plato's equally fictitious *Apology*, cf. note on 38a5.

[27] Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* iii 14,1415a26-34; Anaximenes 36, p.88,3-89,8; p.81,13-83,9; 29, p.61,16-65,10 F.

it[28]. Therefore, 18a7-19a7 is a 'proposition' meeting all requirements of rhetorical theory, and besides, it is a vital part of the *Apology*.

2. *The Proposition of the* Apology

The Proposition is noticeably less subtle and sophisticated than the *Exordium*. Socrates simply claims his right to defend himself first against people who for many years have spread false rumours about him and have made his fellow-citizens suspicious of him. He insists on one single idea, that the 'old accusers' are the most dangerous ones. He illustrates this point vividly by enumerating different aspects of their campaign of slander: its duration, the great number and the variety of the calumniators, the naïveté of those listening to them, the gravity of the suspicions which have arisen as a consequence, the absence of anybody who would speak for the defence, the impossibility of identifying the accusers after all this time and of refuting them individually. The most important of these points are addressed in the conclusion of the section (18d7-e4), just before the transition.

By introducing a rebuttal of the old accusers Plato not only creates for himself the opportunity, as I have already said, to expand the subject-matter of the *Apology* to include all periods and aspects of Socrates' activity; he can also reduce the significance of Meletus' indictment proportionally. By doing this, he prepares the reader for the entirely different ways in which Socrates deals with both groups of accusers. Besides, if Meletus and his supporters are insignificant, Socrates begins to appear to stand alone and aloof. We are presented with the image of a man who, just because he is of exceptional stature, is not understood and has become the victim of the petty resentment of the crowd[29].

Plato, of course, says nothing of the kind, since it would be incompatible with Socrates' modesty. Therefore, Socrates can add a light touch of irony to the description of his quandary, when he quotes the terms in which the slander-mongers are speaking of him[30] and when he compares the situation of his calumniators with that of accusers in a lawsuit in which the accuser defaults, or his own situation with that of a shadow-boxer (18c7. d6). On the whole, however, the tone is serious and determined. In the

[28] To be sure, the λύσις of διαβολή in a defence should, according both to Aristotle and Anaximenes (see the references in the preceding note), be a part of the *exordium*, not of the refutation. But this is because they consider the refutation of the juridical indictment to be of paramount importance; for Plato, on the contrary, it is the old accusation and its rebuttal that are the more important.

[29] Compare Heraclitus, 22B121 D.-K.: 'Every grown man in Ephesus should hang himself and leave the city to the boys; for they banished Hermodorus, the best man among them, saying: "Let no one of us excel, or if he does, be it elsewhere and among others."'

[30] 18b6-c1. Note especially τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής, on which cf. Burnet's and my notes.

transitional paragraph we perceive some sadness but above all courage and confidence in God. The guiding principle of Socrates' behaviour is not success, but respect for the law and piety; and he is no less concerned with the responsibility of the jury (19a3) than with his own life.

CHAPTER FOUR

REFUTATION OF THE OLD ACCUSERS. NEGATIVE PART

1. *Refutation According to Fourth-Century Rhetoric*

The introduction, whether this is the *exordium*, as in the doctrine of Anaximenes, or the proposition, as in that of Aristotle, is followed by what is normally the principal part of the speech, proof[1]. In a defence, the proof will, as a rule, be the refutation[2] of the arguments presented by the accuser. Aristotle distinguishes two ways of countering arguments: either to oppose them with 'anti-syllogisms', which will be founded on the same kind of probabilities (ἔνδοξα) as the syllogisms of the other party[3], or to raise 'objections' (ἐνστάσεις), of which there are four main kinds (1402a34-b12). Whereas Aristotle's approach to the problem is primarily theoretical, Anaximenes, as he is wont to do, views it from a practical point of view. He suggests three 'methods' for defendants in three different situations: either he will simply deny the deeds with which he is charged; or, if he cannot do that, he will try to show that his actions were lawful, just, honourable or advantageous for the city; or finally, if even this is impossible, he will plead for forgiveness by representing his acts as an error or misfortune, or by showing that little harm has resulted from them, or by other similar arguments[4].

[1] Anaximenes' term for this part of the speech is βεβαίωσις (32, p.68,6; 36, p.83,15. 84,5 Fuhrmann), while Aristotle uses πίστις (*Rhet.* iii 13, 1414a36. b8. 9); from the beginning of the 4th century B.C., πίστις is the most common word, mostly in the plural, for the arguments adduced to prove the speaker's thesis (Isocr. xi 31. 37; iv 54; xv 280; Plato *Phaed.* 70b2; *Phil.* 50c11; *Laws* xii 966c7; Anaximenes, 7, p.30,11. 12. 17; 14, p.42,3; 17, p.45,12, etc.; Arist. *Rhet.* i 2, 1355b35. 1356a1. 21 and *passim*). As I said above (Chapter III 41), the term πίστωσις in Plato's *Phaedrus* (266e3) does not refer to a part of a speech, but rather some special kind of argumentation.

[2] The Aristotelian term is λύσις (*Rhet.* ii 22, 1397a5; 25, 1402a30, etc.; cf. λύειν 25, 1402a31. b24, etc; ἄλυτον 1403a14). Anaximenes has no technical substantive, but he freely uses the verbs λύειν (29, p.63,1; 36, p.87,7. 10 F.) and διαλύειν (36, p.86,20; cf. διάλυσις 4, p.25,5) for 'invalidating' the opponent's arguments.

[3] As a help to that end Aristotle offers an elaborate classification of 'enthymemes' (*Rhet.* ii 25, 1402b12-1403a15).

[4] 4, p.26,23-27,19 F. The same line of advice is suggested also in 36, p.86,15-87,27, but here the first 'method' is treated in more detail, principally with reference to the different kinds of proof the accusers have used to establish the facts.

2. *General Remarks about the Refutation of the Old Accusers*

Socrates intends this part of his refutation to appear more important than that against Meletus. Therefore he has to give it the formal appearance of a λύσις, and this in turn implies that the old charges will be formulated in a technical ἀντωμοσία, beginning with Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ and continuing with a statement of the wrongful acts, expressed in the present participle.

But Plato does not wish to use the same terms which he will have to quote from the indictment of Meletus in the Refutation of the New Accusers: this would involve a tedious repetition when he comes to the Refutation of the New Accusers. Besides, although the average Athenian undoubtedly felt suspicious of cosmologists and sophists, there was no law which made their activities an offence in the legal sense of the word[5]. This is why, after the verb ἀδικεῖ, Socrates adds καὶ περιεργάζεται (19b4; cf. Burnet *in loc.*): the old accusers think that, by acting as he does, Socrates

[5] The ψήφισμα of Diopeithes, which provided εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας (cf. Plut. *Per.* 32,1; Derenne *Les procès d'impiété* 19-30), if it ever existed, was abolished by 403. If it had been directed against Anaxagoras and with the intention of hitting Pericles indirectly, it is likely to have become obsolete after a relatively short time. Dover 'Freedom of the Intellectual' 146-147 gives reasons for assuming that the Diopeithes decree is a forgery: (1) μετάρσια is Ionic and Κοινή for Attic μετέωρα; (2) the decree is never mentioned in contexts where it would have been highly relevant. I agree with Ostwald *Sovereignty* 196 n.72 that (2) is not strong; Ostwald does not deal with (1). (Plutarch is quoting, not paraphrasing, since he never uses μετάρσιος himself.) A passage from Aristotle's *Rhet.* (ii 23, 1397b26-27, adduced by Kerferd *Sophistic Movement* 21-22; quoted Chapter VII n.5) implies that 'sophists' were condemned or put to death, and at any rate Socrates and Diagoras were, but the passage does not prove that there was any legislation. For Anaxagoras' trial, cf. J. Mansfeld 'Anaxagoras' Athenian Period' 80-84. Dover argues, on the basis of the wide divergence of the reports about what happened to Anaxagoras, that his prosecution was fictitious (140-142). *Pace* Brickhouse - Smith 32, *Apol.* 26d6 'Αναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν is no evidence either way. Demetrius of Phaleron in his *Apology of Socrates* (fr. 91 Wehrli = Diog. Laert. ix 57) says that Diogenes of Apollonia 'had a narrow escape', not specifying, however, whether from a trial or from condemnation; if the notice is reliable (on such matters, Demetrius may have been very well documented, but Diogenes Laertius does not, as a rule, transmit his sources reliably), the menace was probably based on the psephisma of Diopeithes. (Dover 'Freedom of the Intellectual' 145-146, is skeptical of Demetrius' trustworthiness.) Anyway, Diogenes escaped; and after him came Archelaus, whose whole activity took place in Athens, and Hippias of Elis, whose universal competence included astronomy, a part of natural philosophy; neither of them seems ever to have been disturbed in Athens. Protagoras was ridiculed on the comic stage as ἀλιτήριος περὶ τῶν μετεώρων (Eupolis fr. 146 K., 157 K.-A.); for his prosecution for ἀσέβεια, see Chapter VI n.75. As for the general education imparted by the Sophists, and even for the art of τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, there was certainly no law against it. So Socrates had good reason to represent these charges as not falling under the terms of any legislative measure, not only for the time after 403, but also for many years before that date.

is guilty not of breaking the law but of going beyond the normal bounds within which a reasonable and well-behaved citizen would keep himself[6].

The contents of the fictitious ἀντωμοσία that Socrates 'reads to' the jury ought of course to coincide with what has been said in the Proposition (18b6-c1) about the slander spread by the διαβάλλοντες; otherwise it would not provide a good starting-point for the following refutation. Now, the division of that refutation, which is marked clearly by transitional pair of sentences, one closing a paragraph (19d1-7), another opening a new one (19d8-e1), is interesting. Modern historians of Greek philosophy are accustomed to divide the so-called Presocratics[7] into two groups, the cosmologists and the Sophists. True, some Sophists, especially Hippias, were interested in mathematical and astronomical problems, which were at the time included in natural philosophy; some cosmologists may have engaged in teaching; and the more recent cosmologists, like Archelaus and Democritus, tackled problems which had been raised by Protagoras. Yet the twofold classification is still, and rightly, considered to be well-founded. Our passage seems to be the oldest one in which it is clearly present[8].

Actually, Socrates was thought by the old accusers to combine both specialisations not only in his personal interests but also in his teaching, and this is how Aristophanes had portrayed him in the *Clouds*, where his doctrine is a funny mixture of the 'aerial' cosmology of Diogenes of Apollonia and of the Ἀντιλογίαι and Ὀρθοέπεια of Protagoras. Still, in his

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[6] περιεργάζεσθαι, or περισσὰ πράσσειν (Soph. *Ant.* 68), or πολυπραγμονεῖν, betrays one's lack of σωφροσύνη, the fundamental virtue which played such an important role in everyday Greek morals. Although, as we shall see (Chapter VIII 151-152; note on 36b6), there was a fundamental disagreement between the ἐπιεικεῖς and the δῆμος about what was 'one's own business' in politics, still, for private life on the one hand and on the other (which is directly relevant for our text), for basic ideas about the nature of the gods and the universe (cf. *Laws* vii 821a2-4) and about the validity of current norms of good behaviour, there was a general consensus that to stick to ἀπραγμοσύνη was necessary for the common good.

[7] From the view-point of chronology, it would be more correct to speak of 'Pre-Platonics'.

[8] Namely, in the distinction made between the paragraphs 19a8-d7 and 19d8-20c3. It should be noted that two out of the three charges made in the fictitious ἀντωμοσία refer to the sophists, namely 'to make the weaker argument the stronger' and 'to teach others'. Following A. Sesonske (*JHPh* 6 (1968) 217-231), Brickhouse - Smith point out (67) that Socrates does not expressly defend himself against the charge of τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. This is not entirely true (the words καὶ τἄλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, 19d6-7, do refer to 'making the weaker argument the stronger', cf. Burnet *in loc.*), but certainly Socrates' argument that the judges know themselves that Socrates never spoke about these things is not an adequate defense against the charge that he made the weaker argument the stronger: many judges must have thought Socrates did just that. However, since this charge is a famous Protagorean *dictum* (Arist. *Rhet.* ii 24, 1402a24, 80B6b D.-K.), and since Protagoras was the first Greek to teach ἀρετή for money (Pl. *Prot.* 349a3-4; cf. E.L. Harrison 'Gorgias' 191 n.44), the inference is legitimate that the second half of the Negative part of the Refutation of the Old Accusers (19d8-20c3) is intended implicitly as a defence against the charge, even though Protagoras is not mentioned in the *Apol.* (cf. 54 and n.14). To be sure, Socrates *does* explain how his reputation of making the weaker argument the stronger arose, namely in the Narration, 23d6-7. See Chapter V 69.

refutation, Socrates carefully distinguishes both groups, and proves, in two different sections, that he belongs to neither of them.

The emphasis on διαβολή in the first lines of the Refutation (19b1. 2. 3) reflects contemporary theory and practice of forensic oratory. I have already mentioned that both Anaximenes and Aristotle give detailed advice on the way a speaker, and especially a defendant, should 'clear himself of misrepresentations'[9] before undertaking the main part of his defense. Both of them say explicitly that this should be done in the *exordium*[10], because it has to do with securing the goodwill of the audience.

But this is not what we actually observe in the Orators. Two speeches are of special interest in this respect. In his *De falsa legatione*, Aeschines embarks, after the *exordium*, upon a circumstantial narrative and discussion not of the second embassy sent to Philip in 346, although this was the object of the indictment, but of the first embassy (12-96), because, as he says, the two are closely connected and the διαβολαί (10. 11) of Demosthenes have made a hopeless confusion of everything: therefore he, Aeschines, has to start his narration further back. In Demosthenes' *De Corona*, the disposition is very artful. The *exordium* (1-16) is followed by a narrative of the events of the period 356-346 (17-52), concluded by this remarkable transition:

> I propose then at last to come to my defence against the actual indictment (τῆς γραφῆς αὐτῆς) and to a recital of my public acts, that Aeschines may hear from me what he knows perfectly well, the grounds on which I claim that I deserve even larger rewards than those proposed by the Council. Please take and read the indictment (τὴν γραφὴν αὐτήν; xviii 53; C.A. and J.H. Vince's translation).

So we have here a retrospective section; it does not belong to the *exordium*, but constitutes a narration of events prior to those that are at stake in the trial. This narration of past events immediately precedes the refutation of ἡ γραφὴ αὐτή. At first sight, this seems to be precisely the same disposition as in the *Apology*.

But the real purpose of the section concerning the old accusers is not the same as the background narratives in Aeschines and Demosthenes. In the latter, the 'indictment proper' is and remains the real issue; with Socrates, the opposite is the case: Meletus' accusation has no significance of its own; it depends entirely upon the διαβολή and therefore Socrates' principal aim is to refute it and to explain how it originated.

3. *Remarks about the Contents of the Paragraphs 19a8-d7 and 19d8-20c3*

Socrates flatly denies that the representation that the διαβάλλοντες have given of him contains any truth at all. So far, then, he is following the first

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[9] ἀπολύεσθαι (ἀπολύειν) τὰς διαβολάς: Anax. 35, p.74,16-17 F.; Arist. *Rhet.* iii 14, 1415b18-19. 37; 15, 1416a4-5. b9-12. The phrase is found in *Apol.* 37b2 (see Burnet *in loc.*).

[10] Anax. 36, p.81,13ff.; 29, p.61,16ff. (esp. 24-26) F. Arist. *Rhet.* iii 14, 1415b18-19.

of Anaximenes' three 'methods' of refutation. In the analysis of the *Apology* I gave Chapter I § 4, I said that Socrates claims that he is no natural philosopher and no sophist. Neither of these terms, however, is used by Plato in the *Apology*. First of all, φυσικός and φυσιολόγος are first found in Aristotle[11]. Second, σοφιστής was originally a word that referred to a man competent in a particular craft, such that of the diviner (Herod. ii 49), the poet (Pind. *Isthm.* 5, 28), the citharist (Aesch. fr. 314 Nauck^2 = Radt), etc. When Herodotus, however, calls Pythagoras Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῶι ἀσθενεστάτωι σοφιστῆι (iv 35,2) he means a more general scientific interest. In the second half of the fifth century, the word was more and more used for the itinerant intellectuals who taught young Greeks some form of higher education on a theoretical basis and whom we still call 'the Sophists'[12].

Socrates alludes to the first group with which he is identified, the natural philosophers, by referring to the scene of the *Clouds* where he was 'walking through the air', in other words by pointing to those 'things aloft' which constituted the most spectacular object of the old physicists' curiosity. He says that he has not the slightest understanding of the questions about which Aristophanes makes him say a lot of nonsense: competent or not, 'he has nothing at all to do with them' (19c8 ἐμοὶ τούτων ... οὐδὲν μέτεστιν). This does not imply that he is ignorant about the theories held by natural philosophers[13], but that such problems are not the object of the dialectical discussions that he holds everywhere in town with anybody whom he chances to meet. There can be no doubt about his truthfulness because many members of the jury have been present at such conversations. About the value of the cosmologists' science Socrates will not speak disparagingly, *if* somebody has a real competence on such a field; but the negative form of

[11] In *Phaed.* 96a8, however, περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία ('inquiry about nature') is quoted as being a traditional phrase. We may consider terms designating people interested in 'things aloft' (τὰ μετέωρα 18b7 or τὰ οὐράνια 19b5, that is, the fields of what we call astronomy and meteorology) to be near-synonymous to the adjective φυσικός, at least in fifth-century usage; these terms are, for instance, μετεωρολόγος (Gorg. *Hel.* 13; Plato *Crat.* 396c2, etc.), μετεωροσκόπος (*Rep.* vi 488e4), the humorous μετεωροσοφιστής (Aristoph. *Clouds* 360); ἀστρολόγος (Xen. *Mem.* iv 2,10) and ἀστρονόμος (*Rep.* vii 531a3, etc.).

[12] For a good survey of the history of the words σοφός and σοφιστής to the beginning of the fourth century, see Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* iii 27-34. On σοφός, see also G.B. Kerferd 'The Image of the Wise Man in Greece in the Period before Plato' in *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought*, Studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata (*Symbolae Lovanienses* A I, Louvain 1976) 17-28.

[13] See Burnet's judicious note on 19c4 (although the famous passage *Phaed.* 96a6-99c8 is too closely connected with the whole theoretical fabric of that dialogue to be considered, with Burnet, as 'autobiographical' for Socrates). — As I have tried to show elsewhere, viz. *De Kunst van het gesprek.* Wat waren de dialogen van Plato? (Antwerpen 1972) 127-134, when Socrates speaks of his ignorance, he means two things: (1) that human knowledge, including his own, is always imperfect (*Apol.* 23a5-b7; Chapter V 62-65); and (2) that the 'knowledge' some people claim to possess is, in his opinion, unreliable because methodically unsound.

his assertion and the proviso with which it is accompanied are clear hints that Socrates has his reasons to be skeptical.

The Sophists are described as people who travel from one city to another in order to educate the young, and who ask a fee in return for their lessons; Socrates lists three of them, Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias, who not only enjoyed an outstanding renown, but, as the present tense shows, were still alive in 399[14]. Socrates denies categorically that he himself 'undertakes to educate people and charges money' (19d9-e1). Certainly, if it were possible to impart human excellence, this would be the most precious service one could do to anybody, and no amount of money would be too great a cost. The Sophist Euenus should be called lucky, *if* he is truly able to achieve such a result; in that case, complacency would not be out of place.

But the question is: are the Sophists really able to impart ἀρετή? And if Euenus is not, do the more famous men whose names have just been mentioned perhaps possess the necessary competence? For a rational, accountable competence, an ἐπιστήμη or τέχνη (20b5. c1), is required indeed. In this case again, it appears from the proviso (20b9-c1) that Socrates is skeptical, not because he thinks education is impossible, but because it presupposes two conditions which in the case of the Sophists seem not to be realised: (1) they ought to have a reliable knowledge about the ἀρετή of the man and the citizen; (2) they should not try to transfer it mechanically[15], either by teaching or by training[16], but by stimulating an individual response in the 'pupil', so that he will judge and decide by himself. In the course of the *Apology*, we shall gradually discover that the only man who is really an educator, in the sense in which education is possible, is precisely the man who does not profess to educate; and he *will* not, because such a claim would imply a promise of success, which he cannot give[17].

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[14] This is the reason why Protagoras, who had died about 415 at the latest, is not mentioned.

[15] Cf. Chapter II 34 and Chapter VIII 168-169 on Socrates' view of automatic transference of knowledge.

[16] On the threefold source of ἀρετή (natural endowment, systematic teaching and practical training), a subject of much debate in the fifth and fourth centuries, the paper of P. Shorey 'Φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη' *TAPA* 40 (1909) 185-201, if somewhat desultory, is still useful; its lacunas can for a good part be supplemented by the various passages of Nestle *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, registered in the index under 'φύσις und μελέτη' and 'φύσις und παιδεία'. See also the extensive note in O'Brien *Socratic Paradoxes* 144-146; C.W. Müller *Die Kurzdialoge der Appendix Platonica* (München 1975) 220-248; S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 121-127; an inventory of passages from later authors, by no means complete, is given by C.P. Gunning *De sophistis Graeciae praeceptoribus* (Amstelodami 1915) 132-138.

[17] See on this issue *Apol.* 33a5-b6 and Chapter VIII § 2d; cf. F.M. Cornford *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1935 and repr.) 135-136 and 175.

4. *Remarks about the Literary Structure of the Same Paragraphs*

Although both paragraphs are strictly symmetrical in their intentions, their literary form is quite different. In 19a8-d7, we have no portrait of the natural philosopher. Socrates restricts himself to emphasising that it is evidently false to include him in this group. The paragraph 19d8-20c3 is more detailed: it describes with humorous vividness how the Sophists go travelling through the Greek-speaking world, everywhere attracting the young men, lightening their purses and making them grateful for the privilege. But in distancing himself from the Sophists, Socrates is far less categorical than in the case of the cosmologists. He certainly does not say that he has nothing to do with the kind of questions that fascinate the Sophists. On the contrary, there is nothing he is more interested in than ἀρετή and παιδεία, and his conversations are confined to those topics (*Apol.* 38a3-5). He does, however, point to some important differences between his educational practice and that of the Sophists: he does not 'undertake to educate people' or travel from city to city or exact a fee or show any smugness about his ability. But in calling attention to the contrast he uses a light touch, not a heavy hand: he acts as if he were a bit jealous and certainly full of admiration for what the Sophist professes to do; he, however, knows only too well that he cannot do this.

Both paragraphs are enlivened by amusing sketches. In 19a8-d7, we have the reference to one of the most amusing scenes in Aristophanes' *Clouds*; in 19d8-20c3, the unforgettable dialogue between Socrates and Callias, the most perfect jewel of Socratic dialectic in the whole of Plato's written work, because of its spontaneity, the fluency of the language, the character-drawing, and above all because it gives us in a surprisingly short space a clear view of Socrates' method and of his most fundamental tenets. Every word in the story is masterful: the way Socrates explains parenthetically that Callias has two sons, as if it had only just occurred to him (this is suggested by 20a2 ἐπεί[18]); the vocative as first word of the sentence, always a sign that what follows somehow requires an apology: the colloquial picking up of ἀνηρόμην by ἦν δ' ἐγώ; the amazing supposition that sons of the noble and wealthy Callias may be foals or calves; the way Socrates identifies himself with Callias just at the moment when he makes that supposition (notice the first person plural, 20a8 εἴχομεν ἄν); the application of the aristocratic phrase καλώ τε κἀγαθώ to the young animals; the return to reality; the pun with ἐπιστάτης and ἐπιστήμων. And then, Socrates' eager question, emphasised by ἔφην ἐγώ: 'Is there somebody' who *can* give them the proper education, 'or not?' (b6). For Callias, the problem is solved; there *is* such a man. Now Socrates' eagerness reaches its climax: he fires three

[18] See the note *in loc.* Although Socrates says 'since we just mentioned that topic' (20a2 ἐπεί), the whole story is anything but a whimsical thought; structurally and for its philosophical content, it is an indispensable part of the *Apology*.

short questions at Callias, in a sentence which is a model example of the 'law of growing members' (the gradation here is: one, three, five syllables). The first question ('who is he?'), the principal one, is emphasised by a new insertion of ἦν δ' ἐγώ; the second, about the man's birthplace, is a necessary addition to the first, as so many people in Greece bore the same name; the third, about a fee, was prepared at the beginning of the second paragraph (19d9) by the reference to the Sophists' custom of charging money, by the verb μισθώσασθαι, applied to the overseers of foals and calves, and by the remark that Callias had spent more money on the Sophists than all other Athenians together. Callias' answer matches the questions perfectly: it is at the same time absolutely parallel in structure and totally different in tone. Each question is answered, but quite dispassionately, in a dry, matter-of-fact way, each in three syllables, and without the καί's that connected Socrates' questions. For Callias, the problem is over; he has found a solution, and made a good bargain at that.

Socrates' comments are no less witty: he praises Euenus in exaggerated terms (20b9 ἐμακάρισα) — provided that what Callias has said about him is indeed true. Presently, he sees himself in Euenus' enviable situation and starts (he, Socrates!) to boast and to congratulate himself. But as we are gazing at him, surprised and incredulous, he pricks the balloon with one of his delightful ἀλλὰ γάρ's: 'but, you see' (French *mais voilà*), 'I am not that clever': and at the end we have a vocative (ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι), to drive the point home.

One might wonder whether Socrates' comparison of Callias' sons with foals or calves — a comparison made for the sake of argument, of course — is not a sign of bad taste or bad manners. There are passages in Plato where Socrates' interlocutors are shocked or positively angry at the trivial comparisons or examples he uses[19], and we shall see the same happen with Meletus (27b3-9). Alcibiades' remarks in the *Symposium* (221e1-222a6) about Socrates' way of speaking explain that Socrates is apt, at first, to give a false impression of what he is aiming at, whereas what seems to be vulgar is in reality 'full of images[20] of virtue' (222a4). The listener must penetrate beneath the surface to the core of Socrates' words and not let himself be deceived by appearance:

> If you chose to listen to Socrates' discourses you would feel them at first to be quite ridiculous; on the outside they are clothed with such absurd words and phrases[21] — all, of course, the hide of a mocking satyr. His talk is of pack-

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[19] *Gorg.* 490c1-491a3; *Hipp. mai.* 288c6-d5; 290d7-e4 (in the *Hippias*, however, Socrates pretends that he is only reporting the unworthy language that he has heard from an anonymous (290d10-e2), and obviously fictitious, acquaintance).

[20] ἀγάλματα are statues of gods, and normally works of art; here this is certainly what is meant, because there is an implicit reference to *Symp.* 215b3 (ἀγάλματα ... θεῶν) and 216e6-217a1 (τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα ... θεῖα καὶ χρυσᾶ ... καὶ πάγκαλα καὶ θαυμαστά).

[21] ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα; cf. *Apol.* 17c1 (with Burnet's note and mine).

> asses, smiths, cobblers, and tanners, and he seems always to be using the same way of saying the same things[22]; so that anyone inexpert and thoughtless might laugh his speeches to scorn. But when these are opened, and you obtain a fresh view of them by getting inside, first of all you will discover that they are the only speeches which have any sense in them; and secondly, that none are more divine, so rich in images of virtue, so largely — nay, so completely — intent on all things proper for the study of such as would attain both grace and worth (τῶι μέλλοντι καλῶι κἀγαθῶι ἔσεσθαι; Lamb's translation, slightly modified).

Socrates' point in his conversation with Callias is that if, for young animals, we are not satisfied with an overseer taken at random, but ask for qualifications and competence, then much more so for young men who are in our care. Far from slighting Callias and his sons, he speaks out of a deep respect; he is convinced that most people do not realise how sublime man's calling is.

I have already said (Chapter II 38-39) that in many passages of the *Apology* Plato succeeds in demonstrating the specific methods of Socratic dialectic. This is one of the most interesting cases. It shows us that the effect of Socratic refutation is never merely negative; it already contains important positive suggestions. When Socrates refutes his old accusers by saying what he *is not*, he gives us a clue to what he *is*: a man with definite ideas about education, about the ideal man and citizen. The literary form always serves a philosophical purpose.

[22] ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν. Lamb's phrase, 'to be using the same terms for the same things', misses the point. What Alcibiades means is not that Socrates seems to have a poor vocabulary, or a definite and constant terminology, but that he always defends the same theses and argues for them with the same means, viz. induction starting with quite vulgar instances; διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν here (221e5) is equivalent to διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων of *Apol.* 17c7 (cf. *Gorg.* 490e9-491a3; Xen. *Memor.* iv 4,6).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NARRATION

1. *General Remarks*

What the two fourth-century treatises on rhetoric have to say about narration is neither very detailed nor immediately relevant to the way that part of the speech is worked out in the *Apology*.

According to Aristotle, narration has its proper place in forensic oratory, not in the other genres (*Rhet.* iii 13, 1414a37-39); still, he gives advice about how to adapt it to epideictic subjects (16, 1416b16-30). In the forensic field he recommends that the defendant should emphasise the interpretation of the facts rather than the facts themselves, since these will normally have been told already by the accuser (1417a8-12). Of more interest to us is the remark that

> the narrative should depict moral character (ἦθος); to which end you must know what makes it do so. One such thing is the indication of moral purpose (προαίρεσις); the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued ... This end[1] will also be gained by describing the manifestations of various kinds of character (iii 16, 1417a16-19. 22; W. Rhys Roberts' translation).

We will examine how the Narration of the *Apology* depicts moral character below in § 4.

Anaximenes treats narration in less than twenty lines in his discussion of deliberative oratory (31, p.67,16-68,5 Fuhrmann); for narrative in an accusation, he just refers (36, p.83,9-14 F.) to that rather sketchy treatment; in speaking of defence, he does not even mention narration. Neither does he refer to 'moral character' in connection with narration; this, however, does not imply that he disregards the importance of the speaker's personality and the authority that he may have over the audience. Among the ἐπίθετοι πίστεις, or elements of proof that are outside the facts at issue, he includes the 'reputation of the speaker'[2], by which he means primarily his competence and experience in the area relevant to the trial (14, p.42,6-16 F.).

[1] Viz. 'to depict moral character', as in the second part ('to which end ...') of the first sentence here quoted (in neither of these cases does Aristotle use the term τέλος, which, on the contrary, he uses when speaking about the 'end' as determining the quality of moral character). The whole passage is somewhat loose in the Greek. Aristotle means that there are two principal ways of depicting moral character: (1) by indicating moral purpose; (2) by describing typical features of outward conduct.

[2] δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος, 7, p.30,18-19; 14, p.42,6; 32, p.68,11-12 F.

Further, he devotes a few words, though only in passing, to the speaker's 'moral character' (τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος), in case some deeds have to be mentioned that 'might conflict with what is just or with the law ... or with what is probable or with the character of the speaker or with usual circumstances' (10, p.37,15-18 F.). In another context, he advises the accuser to 'beware of calling disgraceful actions of the accused by disgraceful names, so as not to bring discredit upon his own character'[3].

Much more remarkable is what he says in the last chapter of his treatise. After stating that his instructions provide abundant resources that enable us to speak appropriately in civil and criminal lawsuits and in conversation with others, he adds an edifying exhortation, which we certainly would not have expected of him:

> An orator ought to be careful not only about his words, but also about his personal behaviour (τὸν βίον τὸν αὑτοῦ), regulating it accordingly to the principles already laid down; for the manner of a man's life (ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον παρασκευή) contributes to the persuasive influence which he exercises and to the establishment of a good reputation' (δόξης ἐπιεικοῦς; 38, p.93,18-23 F., Forster's translation; cf. p.93,24-94,9).

With this βίος and its παρασκευή, we seem to be quite close to Aristotle's προαίρεσις; but actually the 'principles laid down' by Anaximenes (14, p.42,6-16 F.) spoke of the good reputation of the orator solely in terms of experience, not of moral excellence. Consistency with regard to theoretical ideas is not the strong point in Anaximenes' *Rhetoric.*

Isocrates, so far as we know, never published a τέχνη, but his doctrine of oratory was disseminated through the notes taken down and published by several of his disciples[4]. According to Syrianus, the well-known Neo-Platonist who as Scholarch at Athens had Proclus among his hearers, Isocrates taught that 'one should narrate the event (τὸ πρᾶγμα), what preceded it (τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος) and what followed it (τὰ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα), and make clear the intention with which each of the parties acted in their own way'[5]. This might seem to be a mere truism. Still, when we compare the Narration of the *Apology* with those of the Orators, we find that they have scarcely anything in common; however, the Narration in the *Apology* conforms exactly to Isocrates' advice.

Socrates introduces the narrative in the same way as he begins other important sections of the *Apology*: he introduces a fictitious objector and so

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[3] 35, p.79,17-19 F.: ἵνα μὴ διαβάλῃς τὸ ἦθος. Forster translates 'so as not to violate conventional feeling', which suits neither the meaning of διαβάλλω nor that of ἦθος. Rackham's 'in order that you may not traduce his [the accused's] character' supposes in Anaximenes a φιλανθρωπία that he does not display elsewhere. Certainly the ἦθος of p.79,19 is, as in p.37,17-18, the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος, the more so since the λέγων is here subject of διαβάλῃς: the accuser should not bring on himself the charge of αἰσχρολογία.

[4] Cf. Radermacher *Art. scr.* vii-viii.

[5] *In Hermogenis De Ideis* i p.25,1-6 Rabe (=*Art. scr.* B XXIV 31).

presents himself, as it were, as being involved in a dialectical discussion. In the two preceding chapters he had absolutely denied that he was either a cosmologist or a Sophist. So the content of the old accusation appears to be utterly unfounded. This, however raises a question: how, then, did the suspicions against Socrates originate? πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; (20c5). These words deliberately take up the formulation of 19a8-b1 ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν: Socrates repeats here, at the beginning of the Narration, the positive part of the Refutation of the Old Accusers, what he said at the start of its negative part. And for good reasons: the διαβολή was based on the entirely inconsistent old accusation — how then could it thrive?

The answer to the question is: because Socrates had got a reputation for being 'a clever man' (18b7 σοφὸς ἀνήρ), a reputation based on some form of knowledge or understanding (20d6-7 διὰ σοφίαν τινά[6]). To be sure, his 'cleverness' is of a very peculiar kind — but this is something the common man does not yet realise, and Socrates will have to explain it in detail. Meanwhile, the question is: how did people become convinced that Socrates was a clever man? It is not the oracle itself that caused his reputation[7]; but the oracle sent Socrates on a quite peculiar errand: to go around and examine people, thus discovering that their knowledge existed only in their own opinion and in that of other people, but not in reality.

This result of Socrates' systematic questioning led people to suppose that he was himself well-informed about the issues in which he had exposed other people's ignorance. Here we have precisely the origin of his reputation for being σοφός and of the διαβολή: ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι· οἴονται γάρ με

[6] Although σοφός and σοφία are mostly rendered in English by 'wise' and 'wisdom', these translations will consistently be avoided in the present book. In common speech, *wisdom* mostly denotes a form of knowledge that is the ripe fruit of experience and is coupled with a lenient view of human affairs, generosity, equanimity and understanding others. Socrates, to be sure, possesses all these qualities. But they are not expressed by the words σοφός and σοφία as such. These terms simply point to correct understanding either with regard to a particular kind of activity (in which case σοφία is 'skill' or 'competence') or, in the perspective of Socrates, with regard to life as a whole. In the second case, the object of σοφία is the Good, and the Good is 'that which every soul strives for and for the sake of which she does everything that she does' (*Rep.* vi 505d11-e1 ὃ δὴ διώκει ... ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἅπαντα πράττει). Therefore its knowledge implies the recognition of what the Good means for the individual, the perception of its exigencies and an active acceptance of them (For this, see my paper 'The Unity ...'). When Plato is writing about Socratic views he does not, in principle, make a distinction between σοφία, φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη and νοῦς, although there are slight differences of emphasis. Whereas σοφία can be used with reference to particular skills, as we see in the section about the χειροτέχναι (22c9-e5; even there, though, Plato uses φρονίμως ἔχειν (22a6), although this phrase does not pertain to their specialised skills, but to the possession of understanding in general), φρόνησις is often related to τὰ μέγιστα (22d7; see the note), and it is used in this way at the most solemn moment (29e1) of the Digression.

[7] The oracle was certainly not a matter of common knowledge, and Socrates manifestly did not expect any substantial number of the jurors ever to have heard about it (see below, 75-76).

ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω (23a2-5). Further, when he closes the account of the oracle with an appeal to Chaerephon's brother's testimony, Socrates once more indicates the role that this account plays in the narrative as a whole: he says, 'Why did I tell you this? *Because I am now going to explain to you* how the διαβολή originated', μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν (21b1-2).

So the oracle *is not* the origin; rather, Socrates is about to make clear what the origin was: it was the investigation he undertook in response to the oracle, as he attempted to discover men more clever than himself. To use Isocrates' terms, as reported by Syrianus, the oracle is τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος; the investigation is τὸ πρᾶγμα; the διαβολή, as result of the investigation, is τὰ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. The oracle was independent of the will both of Socrates and of his future enemies; for the subsequent events, however, Socrates describes in what spirit he acted, and in what spirit the others reacted, in other words he will explain the διάνοια of each of the parties, as the Isocratean rule said the orator should do.

2. *Philosophical Significance of the Narration*

The central theme of the whole section is that man should become conscious of his ignorance. Socrates had already learned that lesson for himself before hearing about the oracle, since his first reaction is utter disbelief. Most people, however, have not; on the contrary, they are convinced that they possess knowledge (σοφία). This 'conceit of knowledge' is what the Narration is all about. The Refutation of the Old Accusers showed what Socrates *is not*; the Narration shows what he truly *is*, but it discloses only one of the two aspects of his activity, the 'elenctic' one. By questioning people who think they know, although they do not, he makes them discover that their knowledge exists solely in human opinion[8], not in reality. This ἔλεγχος is applied to many fields of alleged excellence in the so-called early or Socratic dialogues[9]. Again and again we see there, as in the Narration of the *Apology*, men of repute unable to stand their ground. They simply do not *know* what they and their fellows thought they knew[10]. Or, if they do know

[8] Although it is well-known that δοκεῖν and δόξα refer to opinion or the conceit of knowledge as contrasted with knowledge or truth, not to appearance as contrasted with reality, still such erroneous translations are regrettably common and they spread false ideas about what Plato meant. See e.g. *Phaedr.* 275a6-7 σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις, 'and you offer your pupils the *appearance* of wisdom, not true wisdom' (H.N. Fowler); 'und von Weisheit gibst du deinen Lehrlingen einen *Schein*, nicht die Wahrheit' (C. Ritter), etc.; the meaning is 'a pretence of knowledge, not true knowledge'.

[9] Many of them are therefore labeled πειραστικός or ἀνατρεπτικός in Thrasyllus' tetralogical classification; cf. Diog. Laert. iii 58-60.

[10] As Hippias was convinced he could easily explain in unobjectionable terms what beauty is: *Hipp. mai.* 286e5-287b3; 287e2-4; 289d6-e4; 295a3-6.

something, as in the case of the artisans, it is about things which are not relevant for the conduct of human life. Consequently, perfect knowledge is not accessible to man[11]; it is a privilege of God alone[12]. By exposing in this way the insufficiency of human understanding and by contrasting it with divine, absolute knowledge, Socrates gives a new and typically philosophical[13] interpretation to the Delphic maxim Γνῶθι σεαυτόν[14]. This maxim advises man to 'know himself', that is, to realise that he is a man, not a god, that he should not extol himself but avoid every form of ὕβρις[15].

The Socratic doctrine about ignorance and knowledge is not primarily concerned with epistemology, but with the conduct of life. It rests on the distinction between three possible states and attitudes of the mind:

(1) ἀμαθία, which is no simple lack of knowledge[16], but ignorance combined with conceit or, as Socrates puts it below, ἀμαθία ... ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν (29b1-2);

(2) σοφία or perfect knowledge, which, as we just saw, is only found in the gods[17];

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[11] *Apol.* 23a6-7. b2-4; cf. 20d8. — In the *Phaedo* it is specified that the human mind cannot attain this goal in its *incarnate* state: 65a9-68b4.

[12] *Apol.* 23a5-6; compare the famous passages *Symp.* 204a1-2 (on which see below) and *Phaedr.* 278d3-4; G.J. de Vries, in his note to the last passage, aptly refers further to *Parm.* 134c10-11.

[13] And religious too. For Socrates and Plato, philosophy and religion are not opposite to each other, nor is religion the popular 'clothing' of philosophical truth. Both philosophy and religion are concerned with the transcendence of the Divine, philosophy with a method that is always threatened by abstraction and therefore by irreality; religion through concrete images and rites, which are always threatened by literalism.

[14] It is certainly striking that Plato does not, either in this passage or elsewhere in the *Apology*, point explicitly to the agreement between Socrates' conclusion and the Delphic maxim. Personally, I cannot explain why he did not, especially since the context seems to call for such a connection. Most other allusions to the Delphic maxim in the dialogues are of slight interest, with the exception of *Phil.* 48c6-49a3. There Socrates, after quoting τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα (48c8-9), says that the most common form of 'ignorance of oneself' is to be found in people ἀρετῆι δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες (e9-10). Since the ἀρετή in question is σοφία (49a1), that kind is μεστὸν ... δοξοσοφίας ... ψευδοῦς. The whole passage is strongly reminiscent of the *Apology* but we miss the very important comparison between God and man.

[15] Cf. Nilsson *Gesch. gr. Religion* i 736.

[16] Plato sometimes calls this simple lack of knowledge ἄγνοια (*Euthyphro* 16a2; *Lach.* 197a7. b1; *Lys.* 218a7; *Rep.* iii 406c2; ix 586c5; *Polit.* 291b6), although in other passages ἄγνοια is identified with ἀμαθία (*Prot.* 360b7; *Rep.* ii 382b8; *Soph.* 228d10. e4; *Phil.* 48c2, etc.). He gives a more elaborate formulation in *Laws* ix 863c1-d4, examining how ἄγνοια is responsible for our mistakes or faults; he distinguishes between a simple form of ignorance (τὸ ἁπλοῦν) and the double one (τὸ διπλοῦν), viz. ὅταν ἀμαθαίνηι τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίαι συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξηι σοφίας (c4-5). Cf. O'Brien *Socratic Paradoxes* 190-193.

[17] And perhaps in the best of disembodied souls too, as seems to be hinted at in *Phaed.* 66e2-4 and 68b3-4, although the formulation in both passages is very cautious; perhaps also *Symp.* 204a2.

(3) between both, as a μεταξύ[18], the striving for understanding, or φιλοσοφία. What this state entails is made clear in *Lys.* 218a2-b3 and *Symp.* 204a1-b2. Of these two texts, which are closely related to each other, the second will be quoted here, because it makes an explicit use of the notion of ἔνδεια, which is found in the *Apology* too (22a4), and because it illustrates the interchangeability of σοφός and φρόνιμος in Plato; Diotima's words are reported by Socrates:

> No god strives for wisdom (φιλοσοφεῖ) or desires to become wise (σοφός); such they are already; nor does anyone else that is wise strive for wisdom. Neither do the ignorant strive for wisdom, nor desire to be made wise: in this very point is ignorance distressing, when a person who is not noble or wise (φρόνιμος) is satisfied with himself. The man who does not feel himself defective (ἐνδεής) has no desire for that whereof he feels no defect. — Who then, Diotima, I asked, are the followers of wisdom (οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες), if they are neither the wise (σοφοί) nor the ignorant? — Why, a child could tell by this time, she answered, that they are the intermediate sort (οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων; Lamb's translation, slightly modified).

Two qualities are characteristic of the φιλόσοφοι: (a) they realise that they are lacking (ἐνδεεῖς) in knowledge; (b) they strive for what they know they lack and start to search for truth. The engine of this restless search is called ἔρως in the *Symposium*, but it is the same drive that is expressed by the element φιλο- in the compound word φιλόσοφος[19]. To be sure, neither the word φιλόσοφος nor its derivatives appear in the Narration, because in this part of the *Apology* Plato restricts himself to describing the refuting or elenctic side of Socrates' mission. Therefore he characterises Socrates' state of mind tentatively as ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. That this is no perfect or divine knowledge is evident; but it is not ἀμαθία either. It is instead an intermediate stage between what I called (1) and (2) above, and so a μεταξύ according to the terminology of the *Symposium*.

The other aspect of Socrates' philosophising, his stimulating and encouraging those who, once freed from their conceit, begin to experience the desire for truth, is portrayed in the Answer to the First Objection, which is a counterpart to the Narration. There the verb φιλοσοφέω occurs in three crucial passages in which Socrates describes his way of life (28e5; 29c8. d5). In the Narration, however, whose immediate purpose is to explain the

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[18] On the notion of μεταξύ, cf. J. Souilhé *La notion platonicienne d'intermédiaire dans la philosophie des dialogues* (Paris 1919).

[19] Therefore the φιλόσοφοι are also called ἐρασταὶ φρονήσεως: *Phaed.* 66e3; 68a2. 7; cf. *Rep.* vi 485a10-b3. 501d1-2; *Tim.* 46d7-8. In dialectical terminology, the verbs ἐρᾶν, ἐπιθυμεῖν and φιλεῖν are interchangeable; cf. *Lys.* 222a1 οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐπεθύμει οὐδὲ ἤρα οὐδὲ ἐφίλει. W. Burkert 'Platon oder Pythagoras?' *Hermes* 88 (1960) 159-177, esp. 173-177, argues that 'striving for wisdom' is Plato's re-etymology of the compound φιλόσοφος, which Burkert claims originally meant 'practising σοφία'.

origin of the διαβολή, Socrates can only speak about what in his behaviour was likely to arouse anger in his interlocutors and their supporters.

Although the phrasing is less technical in the Narration than in *Lysis* and *Symposium*, the doctrine is strictly the same, and it is only the exceptional simplicity of the language that prevents scholars from perceiving how closely the *Apology* is related to dialogues which are thought to represent a more mature form of Plato's philosophical ideas. It seems apposite to quote here a few sentences of the *Meno*, taken from a passage in which Socrates argues for the theory of ἀνάμνησις by setting a young slave the task of solving a geometrical problem. After the slave, who first thought he knew the answer, discovers that he does not (84a1-2 ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα), Socrates turns to Meno and comments on what has happened, in a way that is strongly reminiscent of the *Apology*:

> Do you see, Meno, what point this boy has now reached on the path to recollection? For at first he didn't *know* what is the side of the eight-square-foot figure, just as he doesn't yet know either; but even so he *thought* that he knew then, and answered confidently supposing that he knew, and didn't think that he was perplexed; *now* he realises that he *is* now at a loss, and just as he doesn't in fact know, so also he doesn't even *think* he knows. — You are right. — Then isn't he now in a better state with regard to the thing he didn't know? — Yes, this too seems so to me. — So in causing him to be at a loss and to be numb, as the electric ray does[20], surely we haven't done him any harm? — No, I don't think so. — Indeed, we have done something useful, as it seems, for his finding out how the matter is; for now he might actually inquire into it gladly, as he doesn't know it, whereas then he thought that he could easily speak well to many people and on many occasions about the figure twice the size, saying that it must have a side twice the length[21]. — It seems so. — Then do you think he would have tried to enquire into or learn what he *thought* he knew, though he didn't, before he was plunged into perplexity[22], realising that he didn't know, and felt the need for knowledge? — I don't think so, Socrates. — Then he has benefited by being numbed? — Yes, I think so. (84a3-c9, Sharples' translation).

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[20] Above, 80a4-b2, Meno has compared Socrates to an electric ray; just as this animal numbs everything that approaches it, so Socrates brings torpor and perplexity (ἀπορία 80a2. 4) on everybody with whom he enters into conversation.

[21] After having drawn a square with a side of two feet and an area of four square feet (82c5-d4), Socrates asked the boy how long the side of a square with an area of eight square feet would be (d5-e2). The boy replied that it was obvious (δῆλον δή) that that side would be the double of the side of the drawn square (e2-3).

[22] It may be interesting to notice that the notion of ἀπορία, which plays such an important role in this passage (84a7. b6. c5) and elsewhere in the *Meno* (e.g. 80a1. 2. 4. c8. 9. d1. 84c10), and is far from infrequent in the elenctic dialogues (e.g *Lach.* 194c3. 4. 5; *Charm.* 169c3. 5. 6; *Lys.* 216c5; *Prot.* 348c6), does not occur in our passage; the word is used only to describe Socrates' own perplexity about the precise meaning of the oracle (21b7). Still, the whole trend of thought is precisely the same as in the *Meno*. This shows how dangerous it would be to argue from the absence of some term in the *Apology* that Plato had not, at that time, developed the corresponding notion.

This, then, is the main idea of the Narration. When we examine the details, we see Socrates discussing the nature of the 'knowledge' commonly attributed to three classes of people who enjoy a reputation for cleverness. About the first group, the politicians, we learn very little. If we look only at the section that concerns them directly (21b9-e2), we might get the impression that they lack not only reasoned knowledge, but any form of ability whatsoever. Still, this is not the whole of Plato's intention, as the next section (22a8-c8) shows. There we read that the poets, when asked about the meaning of their most elaborate works, were much less able than the bystanders to explain them. After this report, Socrates adds: ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν κτἑ. (22b8-9), 'so, I came *again*, in the case of the poets *too*, to the conclusion' that, although their accomplishments were many and remarkable, they did not do so through σοφία. The words αὖ καί imply that both the positive evaluation of what the poets are able to do, and the kind of explanation that Socrates gives for what they can do, apply also to the case of politicians. I shall discuss why Plato did not say this explicitly in the note on 22b8 (cf. Chapter I 19).

About the poets we are told that they have a real skill, which is not, however, founded upon knowledge, but upon some natural, irrational talent, upon a kind of divine possession, that can be compared with that of inspired diviners and soothsayers. Both classes are capable of saying highly valuable things, but they have no insight into what they say (ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν, 22c3). It was remarked long ago that this passage about the poets is closely akin to an utterance of Socrates' in the *Ion* (533e6-8), and *Apol.* 22b8-c3 is nearly identical in phrasing with a sentence in the *Meno* (99c2-5), which, however, is about the politicians[23]. Now, in the *Meno* (96e7-99e1), absence of reasoned knowledge combined with accomplishments of results is precisely the definition of ὀρθὴ δόξα. The theory of ὀρθὴ δόξα as opposed to ἐπιστήμη[24] is, for obvious reasons, not expounded in the Narration, but seems definitely to underlie it; this would become certain if, as I believe, the *Apology* was written after the *Meno* (see note on 22b8).

In a study of the *Apology* it is neither possible nor necessary to discuss Plato's views on poetry, still less those on art in general[25], but four basic points might be mentioned as they are often overlooked. From this short passage in the *Apology*, and still more from the *Ion*, the modern reader gets the impression that Plato criticises poetry (and art as well) because it is not scientific, and thus ignores what precisely is characteristic of poetry and art

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[23] Both passages are quoted in Burnet's note on 22c1; in the second quotation the participle ἐνθουσιῶντες (F, *om.* BTWΛ), which corresponds to ἐνθουσιάζοντες of *Apol.* 22c1, has been omitted.

[24] The best treatment of the question within a reasonable compass is still that by Diès *Autour de Platon* ii 459-469.

[25] Cf. W.J. Verdenius 'L'Ion de Platon' *Mnemos.* ser. iii, 11 (1943) 233-262; id. 'Platon et la poésie'; id. *Mimesis.* Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its meaning to us (Leiden 1949; repr. 1972).

and cannot be replaced by any rational activity of the mind. But (a) Plato was, on the contrary, the first to point out the uniqueness of artistic creation, which achieves amazing effects independent of rationality; most of his contemporaries considered poets, and all of his contemporaries painters, sculptors, and the like, as σοφοί, as craftsmen having their own technique. (b) Plato was well aware that no skill can communicate emotion as true art can; this he says about poetry in a magnificent sentence of the *Phaedrus* (245a5-8): 'But he who without the madness of the Muses comes to the doors of poetry, confident that he will be a good poet by art, being imperfect, vanishes into nothingness, together with his sane poetry, before that of the inspired madman'. (c) Just as rationality cannot replace art, so art cannot replace rationality, nor that special and most important form of 'accounting' (λόγον διδόναι) which, produced through dialectic, aims at the Good and points the way to εὐδαιμονία or τὸ εὖ ζῆν. (d) Dialectic, or philosophy, alone makes it possible to integrate art into life as a whole and to open its highest possibilities; what poetry and art can be when cultivated in the context of philosophy, is best shown by Plato's dialogues themselves.

About the third class, that of the craftsmen, Socrates says that they possess genuine knowledge[26]. To be sure, they do not enjoy as high a reputation for cleverness as the preceding two groups (22a5-6), but actually they are more clever; for the others have no rational skill at all, whereas they have. This, however, does not save them from ἀμαθία. To understand how this is possible, we should notice that there are two fundamentally different kinds of σοφία or ἐπιστήμη. One kind involves the skills that have a well-defined area and provide us with means to achieve specific aims. About those aims, however, it is not the province of those specialised craftsmen to make decisions. So, for instance, the carpenter makes the shuttle (κερκίς); and he should know what different kinds of textiles are to be produced in order to make different types and sizes of shuttles, each of which will correspond to one specific product (*Crat.* 387d10-388a12; 389a6-d3). But he is not qualified to prescribe what functions the textiles will serve. As means to an end, the textiles as well as the shuttle remain ambiguous, for they can be used for bad as well as for good purposes. And since the different purposes are subordinated to one another[27], there is a knowledge that prescribes and achieves those ends to which all other ends are subordinate. This is the knowledge about 'the most important things' (τὰ μέγιστα 22d7; see the note *in loc.*) or about the Good, the knowledge which in the *Euthydemus* (291b4-292d4) is called 'the royal art' (βασιλικὴ τέ-

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[26] That this is not a theoretical but a practical knowledge is unobtrusively suggested by the shift from εἰδέναι (21d4. 5. 7; 22a1. c3) to ἐπίστασθαι (22d1. 2. 3); cf. the note on 22d1.

[27] Cf. *Lys.* 219c1-220b5; *Euthyd.* 290b1-d8.

χνη)[28]. Now, the remarkable thing is this: whereas an honest craftsman, for instance a carpenter, does not claim competence in the field of the smith, still every craftsman thinks he 'knows' about the most important problems. So they too are guilty of ἀμαθία with regard to these things. And since the subject about which they possess only the conceit of knowledge is far more significant than those areas in which they possess a genuine ability, their state of mind is not preferable to Socrates', who has no pretension to knowledge about the fundamentals of life.

3. *Literary Technique of the Narration*

Philosophically speaking, the Narration conveys with great emphasis the necessity for man to become conscious of his ignorance. Although it is entirely different from narratives in forensic speeches in that the main idea is repeated again and again, and the facts are exceedingly few in number, still this section is full of life and variety. First, there is the story of the oracle, whose paradoxical character is emphasised by the elaborate precautions the speaker takes before telling it. After that, Socrates' perplexity at the oracle is put vividly before our eyes: we see him first discussing it with himself (21b2-7), then addressing the oracle (c1-2). Then follows the extensive description of the investigation Socrates pursues with the politicians, the poets and the craftsmen. Each of the three groups of people is treated in a different way, and in the text, we find elements in each of the three sections that are absent from the other two. In relation to the politicians, we hear about Socrates' efforts to bring them to recognise their own ignorance and about the anger of the victims and their supporters (21c7-d1). In the introduction to the section that deals with the poets, there are some general remarks on Socrates' intention to examine all people reputed to be clever and on the inverse proportionality of reputation and reality in each of the three groups (21e3-22a8). When passing to the third group, Socrates says that he had started with better expectations of the craftsmen, and actually these were not disappointed by his findings (22c9-d4). At the end, he again discusses with himself, whether he does or does not wish to participate in the knowledge *and* in the ignorance of the craftsmen (22e1-5).

Of course, the division of the people enjoying a reputation for cleverness into three classes, and still more the way in which Socrates describes how he addressed each of these groups in turn, is only a literary device. We

[28] If I am not mistaken, the distinction between the particular crafts and the 'knowledge about the most important things' (or the 'royal art') is basically the same as that between διάνοια and νοῦς in *Rep.* vi-vii; on the latter, see 'La distinction entre l'entendement (dianoia) et l'intellect (nous) dans la République de Platon' *Estudios de historia de la filosofia en homenaje al Professor Rodolfo Mondolfo* i (Tucumán 1957) 209-226, especially 217-220.

should assume that from the beginning[29] Socrates used to examine without distinction anyone whom he had reasons to think possessed some kind of cleverness; that he would have refrained from examining a poet until he had exhausted the list of politicians is utterly improbable. But it is an essential feature of the narrative to present a *succession* of facts, and that is exactly what Plato does: he creates the impression of a chronological sequence, whereas in Socrates' actual investigations there is only *one* basic fact, multiplied in many instances. And this device provides the additional advantage of giving opportunities for reiterating the main idea of becoming conscious of one's ignorance, an idea whose importance is paramount in Socrates' eyes. Lastly, the division into three groups corresponds to a difference I already pointed to, that of the knowledge in particular fields and that about 'the most important matters'. With reference to this distinction, the three stages of Socrates' investigation form a climax, in which the group whose reputation is the least high proves to be the only one to possess any real knowledge[30].

The narrative passages themselves and the frequent references both to the conclusións Socrates drew for himself from his successive experiences and to the resentment of those whose ignorance was exposed (and of their supporters) make the Narration very lively. This vividness induces the reader to accept more readily both the interpretation of the oracle (although, as we shall see below, § 5, this interpretation is contrived enough) and Plato's explanation of the origin of the διαβολή, although this too is certainly not adequate[31].

In the structure of the Narration there is a feature that may not be apparent on a first reading but cannot fail to cause surprise when the text is submitted to closer scrutiny. The passage 22e6-23c1 presents the conclusion of the narrative and with that, we would expect, also the end of the Refutation of the Old Accusers. On the one hand, it asserts that the origin of the slanderous campaign is to be found in Socrates' elenctic conversations and in the anger they aroused. On the other, it interprets the oracle as a mission with which Socrates is entrusted and so paves the way for the description of the positive aspect of his activity, which is the subject of 28d10-34b5. Now, to achieve this last result, the moral tenor of Socrates' words has to rise. Therefore he speaks about God, who is the only one who *knows* and about His wish that every man should find out how much he falls short of true knowledge. But after the God has proclaimed his intention

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[29] According to other passages of the *Apology*, it was Socrates' common practice to examine people simply as he met them, and he declares his intention to continue in that way (29d4-6. 30a2-4. 7-8. e7-31a1. 31b4. c4-5. 36c3-5. 41b5-c4).

[30] The desire to work out this progression may have led Plato to represent the politicians as the least able of the three groups, and to neglect the element of ὀρθὴ δόξα that, according to the *Meno*, they may possess; see above, 66.

[31] Undoubtedly, the ill-will towards Socrates had partly, perhaps even mainly, resulted from his opinions about politics; this point will be examined in Chapter VI 92-94.

through the mouth of the Pythia, he still needs someone to convey his message to all men. Socrates perceives that the God has designated him as his agent by mentioning his name, that *he* should assume the task, 'help the God' (βοηθεῖν τῶι θεῶι 23b7; see the note) and be his servant (ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ λατρεία 23c1). From that moment, this has been the sole purpose of Socrates' life, and so he is now a poor man, because he has time only to carry out his mission.

However simple the phrasing, these are very lofty ideas indeed, and they have taken us away from the pettiness of the men whose pride had been wounded and from the ill-will that engendered the slander about Socrates. Still, Socrates need to come back to these less lofty topics in order to round off the Narration and to make an appropriate transition to the Refutation of the New Accusers. Plato, of course, does not fail to find a solution, and it is such an easy one that only a close examination of the text reveals that there was any problem at all. To end the Narration Socrates mentions the young people who always accompany him and start to follow his example. This leads quite naturally to another reference to Socrates' examinations and to the anger they aroused. Automatically, the mood changes. The content as well as the sentences themselves are strongly reminiscent of the Proposition. Still, we have more than a mere repetition of what was already said: for the first time we hear about Socrates' followers. This is indispensable, since Meletus' indictment involved two offences: deviation from the city's religion and corruption of the young. In order to show that *both* offences are derived from the διαβολή, Plato has to give the young a place in the picture of Socrates' activities. So he succeeds in depriving Meletus' indictment of any substantial power, and as we have seen before (Chapter III 46-47), this, according to Plato's design, was the basic conception of Socrates' Refutation.

4. *Character Painting in the Narration*

In § 1 of this chapter, we saw that both Aristotle and Anaximenes considered it crucial for the persuasiveness of a speech that the orator should have the reputation of being a man of good 'moral character' (ἦθος). Aristotle specifies (*Rhet.* i 2, 1356a4-13) that, although the public's favourable opinion may be already there, the speech itself should normally establish it. This is, according to a passage already quoted (59), one of the effects which narration should achieve, and it should do this by 'depicting the moral character' of the speaker. Later authors introduced the technical terms ἠθοποιία[32] and προσωποποιία[33] to refer to character painting.

[32] Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 8, p.15,7-16,16 (repeated in 13, p.22,21-22). 19, p.31,2. 8-21; *Isocr.* 11, p.71,5 Usener-Radermacher; Hermog. *Progymn.* 9, p.20,6-22,5 Rabe, etc.

About ἠθοποιία, the most instructive and perceptive texts are chapters 8 and 9 of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Essay on Lysias*. Some modern scholars, especially German ones, see ἠθοποιία as an exact equivalent of our 'character drawing', and thereby deny that it has any moral connotation. F. Zucker[34] argued to the contrary that the ancient rhetoricians always speak about the good ἦθος. Actually, there is some variation in terminology. What Dionysius praises in Lysias is, in most cases, his skill in making each litigant portray himself as an honest and reasonable man *and* in doing so in such a direct way that the common listener or reader will not perceive the sophistication of the rhetorical devices. It is the vividness of the portrait that leads one unconsciously to sympathise with the man who seemingly reveals the truth about himself. Normally, the litigant describes himself as virtuous and honourable, and so ἠθοποιία is normally the portrait of a *good* character; but this is not always the case and in several authors there are passages which lack ethical connotations[35]. What ancient literary critics found so remarkable in such speeches as Lysias' *On the Invalid* and *On the murder of Eratosthenes* was his ability to present litigants speaking in bold frankness and apparent naïveté about their intentions and their acts, even if these were in some respects blameworthy, because this would gain the spontaneous sympathy of the audience who recognised them as people like themselves.

It is in the very first decades of the fourth century B.C. that the 'literary portrait'[36] makes its appearance in the Greek world[37]. In Thucydides, we do not yet find any interest in the individual as such. What is often called his 'portrait of Pericles' (ii 65,5-9) is, to be sure, a masterly characterisation of the statesman; but what Pericles was like as a *man*, how he dealt with

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[33] Many ancient rhetoricians, however, distinguished προσωποποιία from ἠθοποιία, although not all in the same way: τὴν δὲ προσωποποιίαν καλουμένην, οὖσαν σχεδὸν τὴν αὐτὴν τῆι ἠθοποιίαι, ἕτεροι ἑτέρως διαφέρειν αὐτῆς ἐνόμισαν (Nicolaus *Progymn.* p.64,20-65.1 Felten). They generally defined the προσωποποιία as a personification of lifeless things, a '*personae confectio*'; cf. Hermog. *Progymn.* 9, p.20,9-10. 14 R.: προσωποποιία δέ, ὅταν πράγματι περιτιθῶμεν πρόσωπον ... οὐκ ὂν πρόσωπον πλάττομεν. Cf. Martin *Ant. Rhet.* 292.

[34] In his essay ''Ἀνηθοποίητος, Eine semasiologische Untersuchung aus der antiken Rhetorik und Ethik' *SDAW* 1953 Nr.4 = *Semantica, rhetorica, ethica* (Berlin 1963) 33-47.

[35] See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 8, p.15,8-10 U.-R.; Aristid. Quintil. *De Musica* ii 10, p.74,10 Winnington-Ingram; Diog. Laert. iii 48 (there are in the Platonic dialogues several persons whose character is not praiseworthy, e.g. Polus, Callicles, Thrasymachus, and even Ion and Hippias); Hermog. *Progymn.* 9, p.20,6-22,5 R.; Aphthonius *Progymn.* p.34,1-36,20 Rabe; Nicolaus *Progymn.* p.63,10-67,15 Felten.

[36] For a general assessment of the *Apology* as a portrait of Socrates see Chapter I § 2b. Here I look at the problem mainly from the viewpoint of the Narration.

[37] In the title of Ivo Bruns' suggestive book *Das literarische Porträt des Griechen im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt* (Berlin 1896) the fifth century is mentioned too, but what it has to say about that period is only concerned with Aristophanes, whose method of characterisation is, in harmony with the basic principles of Old Comedy, focused on the external appearance of a person and so lacks the synthetic element without which there is no true portrayal.

Aspasia, with his sons, with his friends, with Protagoras, Anaxagoras and Sophocles; whether he was taciturn or talkative, friendly or haughty, straightforward or secretive, Thucydides does not tell; nor did this fall within the limits of his aims. The first historian to try his hand at a literary portrait is Xenophon: there is the encomiastic portrait in the *Agesilaus*, and then in the *Anabasis* there are much better, because much shorter portraits, first of Cyrus (i 9), then of the Greek generals (ii 6). In these sketches Xenophon certainly tries to convey an appreciation both of their moral character and of how they fulfilled their public roles; but he is also interested in their personal qualities, and in this his portraits are an innovation in the field of history[38].

The case of Socrates is rather unusual. If Xenophon wished to draw a picture of Cyrus or Clearchus, it was because these men had achieved, or at least had tried and were on their way to achieving, some remarkable aims in public life. Some, at least, of their achievements had been spectacular. With Socrates, however, things were different. He was just a common man who had done no outstanding public deeds. Although later sections of the *Apology* mention circumstances in which he displayed exceptional military and civic courage, these did not attract his fellow-citizens' attention. The important thing about Socrates was not what he *did*, but what he *was*. And his unique human qualities did not principally result from some innate disposition, but from an ἐπιτήδευμα (28b4)[39], a style of life Socrates had freely chosen and with which he was able to live so consistently and so naturally that it seemed to constitute the heart of his personality. By being such a man, Socrates brought about the belief among his contemporaries and the following generations that personal qualities are a suitable topic for literary portraits in their own right, even when spectacular deeds are wanting. And in Plato he found an incomparable painter.

Of course, the whole of the *Apology* gives a portrait of Socrates. But in respect to Socrates' ἐπιτήδευμα, the Narration and the section which is complementary to it, namely the Answer to the First Objection (28a2-31c3), are crucial. Since it would be tiresome to analyze the text to argue this point in detail[40], I will point to a few main traits. Although Socrates speaks to everybody in everyday language, his conversation does not resemble anyone else's. Although he is so different from the average citizen, the principles

[38] Eur. *Suppl.* 860-908, where five character sketches are incorporated into Adrastus' ἐπιτάφιος, is a forerunner. Xenophon may have borrowed the idea of giving portraits of protagonists after their deaths from this passage, on which cf. Collard *in loc.*; A. Momigliano *The development of Greek biography;* four lectures (Cambridge, MA 1971) 49. 51-52.

[39] This word is comparable to the Aristotelian προαίρεσις (cf. above, 59, the translation of *Rhet.* iii 16, 1417a16-19).

[40] In addition to Bruns' book (above, n.37), one can get some profit from Emma Edelstein's industrious, if rather drab dissertation *Xenophontisches und platonisches Bild des Sokrates* (Berlin 1935); its main merit is her emphasis on the significance of ἀτοπία for Plato's portrayal of Socrates; of course, she does not restrict herself to the *Apology*.

on which he acts apply to all men. He seems to make fun of his interlocutors and to play cat and mouse with them, yet he cares for their main interests as a father or an older brother (31b1-5). He has a keen mind and a glib tongue, but he keeps away from politics and, although he lives in a thriving city he who had an average income[41] as a young man, and has many wealthy friends, is now a poor man. Truly, he is an ἄτοπος, a weird person for whom there is no right place in our usual categories. One is never sure whether one has understood him; not, however, because he conceals anything: on the contrary, he always says what he means, at the risk of offending influential people. His most characteristic feature is εἰρωνεία, that curious blending of σπουδή and παιδιά, of assurance and self-depreciation, of exquisite manners and a delight in almost vulgar illustrations of his ideas. This trait prevents other people from controlling him and leaves him a free and independent man, although he claims nothing for himself and has no other power than his fascinating personality. As Th. Gomperz put it, Socrates has 'a warm heart beneath a cool head'[42]. With all these formulas we try to express the *coincidentia oppositorum* in Socrates' extraordinary personality. Plato does not *say* anything of the kind; he simply *shows* the opposites coinciding, and it is precisely this that makes the *Apology* such a masterpiece.

What comes mainly to the fore in the Narration are the disturbing and apparently aggressive aspects of Socrates' character, just as it depicts the negative or elenctic side of Socrates' φιλοσοφία (above, 62-64). Still, for all its one-sidedness this part of the portrait gives sufficient indications that Socrates never seeks success for its own sake or wishes to triumph over others. His devotion to the well-being of his fellow-citizens, indeed of all people he meets, will be depicted from 28a2 on; here Plato already shows his devotion to God and his willingness to sacrifice all his personal interests in order to fulfill his mission. He is perfectly satisfied with being nothing but a sign-post by which the God points the way every man should go to reach true understanding and εὐδαιμονία. This earnest and unobtrusive religious devotion gives the personality of Socrates, through the whole of the *Apology*[43], its depth and its mystery. This quality attracts us as we feel sure that what he stands for not only gives *his* life a fuller meaning, but will do the same for ours, if we are prepared to follow the lead given by him.

So, as Thomas Meyer (20-25)[44] has argued, the *Apology* does not, either in the Narration or in its other parts, give a personal picture of Socrates

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[41] See Burnet's note on 23c1.

[42] *Griechische Denker*^{4} ii (Berlin 1925) 34; quoted by Burnet *Comm. Phaedo* lvi n.1.

[43] 19a5-7. 21e4-5. 23a5-c1. 28e4-29a4. 29b6-7. d3-4. 30a5-7. e5-6. 31a7-b1. c7-d4. 33c4-7. 35c7-d8. 37e5-38a1. 40a4-c3. 41c8-d5. 42a3-5.

[44] I would not, however, agree with him on all points; Plato's portrayal of Socrates can hardly be interpreted wholly as an 'Auseinandersetzung mit der Ethopoiie' as this was practised by Orators.

along Lysianic lines. This is because Socrates is not trying primarily, as I have shown in Chapter II § 3, to secure his acquittal. The *Apology* has none of the 'agonistic' features that characterise ordinary forensic speeches. Although Socrates' personality is unique, what Plato emphasises is not its uniqueness as such, but rather what is typical of man who is a being inferior to God, but capable of discovering his own deficiencies and of striving to improve himself.

5. *The Oracle*[45]

First of all, there is no reason to doubt the historicity of Chaerephon's question and of the response given by the Pythia. As a rule, definite statements in Plato's works concerning the biography of Socrates ought to be considered reliable, since where verification is possible they are supported by independent evidence[46]. Furthermore, the prominence which the *Apology* gives to this story makes it utterly improbable that Plato simply invented it. If that were the case, we should reject as fictitious not only the oracle itself, but also the background to it, namely the statements that Chaerephon was a democrat, that he fled from Athens under the regime of the Thirty and that he came back with his political friends in 403; further that he had died between 403 and 399 and that he had a brother still alive at the time of the trial and who was able to testify in court. There was no pressing need for Plato to include all these precise details which, if false and publicly exposed by some adversary[47], would have damaged the credibility of the *Apology* as a whole. We should not forget that Chaerephon was a well-known person in Athens and that his eccentric character and appearance are not only mentioned in the *Apology* (20e8. 21a3), but also made fun of in many passages of Attic Comedy[48]. So we have no other choice than to accept as true the story told in 20e5-21a8.

The *Apology* does not give any clue as to the oracle's date. Many scholars[49] have argued that, since the answer of the Pythia was the starting-

[45] This section already appeared in print as a contribution to *Kephalaion*, Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation offered to Professor C.J. de Vogel (Assen 1975) 39-49.

[46] See 'Les témoignages ...', especially 224-227.

[47] We have good reasons to assume that the personality of Socrates was an object of literary polemics about 390 B.C., see Chapter I 4-5.

[48] Eupolis fr. 165 Kock, 180 Kassel - Austin. 239 K., 253 K.-A.; Aristoph. fr. 291. 377. 539. 573 K., 295. 393. 552. 584 K.-A.; among the preserved plays of Aristophanes, Chaerephon has a prominent place in the *Clouds* (see below, n.51), and he is further mocked in the *Birds* (414 B.C.), 1296. 1564, and in the *Frogs* (405 B.C.), 1335.

[49] I shall quote just two of them, since they discuss the chronological question at some length. E. Horneffer *Der junge Platon* (Giessen 1922) 98-101, would date it shortly after the first *Clouds* (423 B.C.); Parke - Wormell *Delph. Or.* i 401-402, think that the conditions of war would have precluded Chaerephon from going to Delphi from 431 to 422 and from 413 to 404 and that 'on the whole it is much more likely that the oracle was given before 431, and so

point of Socrates' philosophical career, it should be dated many years, at least some two decades, before the trial. As will be explained below, I think that the oracle is so prominent in the Narration chiefly as a literary device[50]. If this assumption is correct, we are left with only two pieces of chronological evidence. The first is that in the first version of the *Clouds* (423 B.C.), Chaerephon was already represented as a pupil of Socrates, and in the second *Clouds*, he appears as his associate in the management of the φροντιστήριον[51]; at that time he would have considered Socrates a man of outstanding ability and probably would have held this opinion already for several years. So there is no objection to an early date for the oracle. The second piece of evidence is this: if the oracle had been very recent, that is, if it dated from the last years of the Peloponnesian war, it would not have provided Plato with an appropriate starting-point for his narrative, since Socrates' elenctic activity is depicted as following upon the oracle and as thus having indirectly caused the campaign of slander, which, in its turn, has lasted 'already many years' (18b2). I do not mean, of course, that the phrase 'already many years' was meant by Plato to indicate the date of Chaerephon's visit to Delphi, but simply that he places that visit in an undefined but certainly not very recent past. So we may reasonably exclude the period after the blockade of Athens by Lysander in 405. I do not think we can say more.

Nor is the question really so important, since the oracle was not widely known. This is evident from the long introduction that precedes Plato's account of it: this introduction fills no less than sixteen lines and a half (20d4-21a3), whereas three lines and a half (21a4-7) are all that is needed to narrate Chaerephon's journey to Delphi, his question and the Pythia's answer. If the oracle had been a matter of common knowledge, most judges would probably at once have recognised the allusion in the words ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα (that of being a σοφός) ἔσχηκα (20d6-7). And surely nobody could fail to understand the sentence μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς (e7-8). Still Socrates assumes that the audience is not aware of what he is about to say, for in 21a5, just before at last reporting Chaerephon's question, he gives a last warning: καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες. So he kept the audience in suspense until that very moment. He could not have

influenced Socrates from about the age of thirty-five'.

[50] For this reason, the dramatic date of some dialogues, especially *Charmides* (Taylor *Socrates* 78-79), cannot be used to date the oracle before 430; the same goes for Reeve's argument (21), based on *Lach.* 187d6-188c3, that Socrates must have started his dialectic activity 'in early adulthood' and that therefore the oracle must be dated in the thirties.

[51] On the role of Chaerephon in the *Clouds*, see K.J. Dover *Comm. Clouds* xxxiii and xxxv; on the two versions of the comedy, the second of which cannot be dated with certainty (it was dated to 419/8 by H. Emonds *Zweite Auflage im Altertum* (Leipzig 1941) 277-290 and must predate the ostracism of Hyperbolus in 416 in any case), *ib.* lxxx-xcviii (about Chaerephon, especially xcv-xcvii).

built up such suspense if a substantial part of the audience had heard about the oracle. Also, there would have been no need for him to appeal to the testimony of Chaerephon's brother.

As for the precise wording of Chaerephon's question and of the Pythia's answer, it will be wise to accept the version given in the *Apology*. Chaerephon asks whether somebody is more clever than Socrates, and the answer is that nobody is more clever. The verse form of the oracle, which was traditional in the imperial period, ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος[52], gives the answer in positive instead of negative form. This is actually not a significant difference, since a few lines below in the *Apology*, Socrates acts as if both forms were equivalent in meaning: τί οὖν ποτε λέγει (ὁ θεὸς) φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι (21b5-6; cf. 23b2).

Xenophon too in his *Apology* (§ 14) mentions the response given to Chaerephon (he does not give the content of the question), but in his version it concerns not cleverness, but three other forms of human excellence: Χαιρεφῶντος γάρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον. It is not the place here to discuss the whole problem of Xenophon's authority with regard to facts concerning Socrates. My opinion on this question is that, when a passage in Xenophon is closely similar to one in Plato, Xenophon, as a rule, is the borrower and that he has no objection to deviating from his source in order to make the idea conform better to his own views. Now, for the Platonic Socrates, all 'virtues' are fundamentally one, either simply φρόνησις (= σοφία), or a particular form of it applied to some special field. In Xenophon's characterisation, Socrates has a multiplicity of practical virtues, each of which is illustrated by some passages of the *Memorabilia*. We can also find in that work lists of these virtues, thus in i 2,1-6 σωφροσύνη, εὐσέβεια, ἐγκράτεια, καρτερία, αὐτάρκεια, ἐλευθερία, or in the concluding sentence of the whole work iv 8,11 εὐσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, φρονήσις, αὐτάρκεια. It is reasonable to assume that § 14 of the Xenophontic *Apology* is a correction of the Platonic formulation. To say, with Burnet[53], that Xenophon here gives 'a garbled version of the matter, prudently substituting' his own words 'for the more compromising response

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[52] Parke - Wormell *Delph. Or.* ii, nr. 420 (p. 170) gives, as the oldest form, two iambic trimeters σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης, ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. This is found only in two late witnesses, the Scholiast on Aristoph. *Clouds* 144 and Arethas' scholion on *Apol.* 21a. To be sure, the former, after having quoted the two lines, adds that Apollonius Molon (the well-known master of Cicero, *flor.* ca. 100 B.C.) declared that the oracle was fictitious on the ground that the Pythian oracles were in hexameters; this, however, does not imply that Molon knew the version in *two* trimeters. (The anapest in the second foot of the first line is no argument: even in tragedy, this is allowed in proper names.) The monostich, on the other hand, is already found in Lucian, and further in Galen, Origen, Diogenes Laertius, Libanius and such a learned antiquarian as Porphyry (*Vita Plot.* 22,11).

[53] Note on 21a5, followed by Parke - Wormell *Delph. Or.* i 403.

given' by Plato, and marked by the mention of σοφία, seems to miss the point: in § 16, in order to prove that what the oracle said was the plain truth, the Xenophontic Socrates asks the judges, in a series of rhetorical questions, whether they know anybody who surpasses him either as a σώφρων, as an ἐλευθέριος or as a δίκαιος, and in addition he claims to be a σοφός. So when Xenophon modifies Plato's formulation, it is not because, out of prudence, he wants to avoid the mention of σοφία but because, according to his views, σοφία is just one among the virtues of Socrates, and not even the most important one.

Another problem is: how did Chaerephon get the idea to ask the oracle such a question. In a substantial essay[54], R. Herzog put this question in its proper context, by pointing to similar inquiries which were answered by the Pythia in the period from the sixth to the fourth centuries B.C. One group of stories about Delphi involves the question who is the most pious man. This group is found in Porphyry (*De abstinentia* ii 15-17), who tells about three cases, one dating to the sixth century (the poor husbandman Clearchus of Methydrion is preferred to a wealthy citizen of Magnesia on the Maeander), one to the fifth (Docimus of Delphi's offering of barley groats is more appreciated than the magnificent votive monuments dedicated by Gelon, Hieron and Polyzelus after the battle of Himera), and one to the fourth (the sacrificial beasts with gilded horns and the hecatombs which Jason of Pherae intends to offer to the god of Delphi arouse his displeasure). In a second group of stories, the question to be decided is who has achieved the greatest εὐδαιμονία, the most successful or most preferable life[55]: king Gyges of Lydia is contrasted with Aglaus of Psophis in Arcadia, and his fourth successor Croesus with the Athenian Tellus and the Argives Cleobis and Biton[56]. A third set of texts speaks about Myson, of Chenae in Malis, a peasant who was judged by Apollo to be σοφώτερος than the famous Anacharsis or than Chilon, one of the Seven Sages. The story is already mentioned by Hipponax[57]; it is on the strength of it that Socrates, in Plato's

[54] 'Das delphische Orakel als ethischer Preisrichter', an appendix to E. Horneffer *o.c.* (above, n.49) 149-170, summarised without new materials by Nilsson *Gesch. gr. Religion* i 648-650.

[55] Purposely, I avoid the word 'happiness', because this English word describes, in the first instance, a state of mind, whereas in Greek τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν is equivalent to τὸ εὖ ζῆν or to τὸ εὖ πράττειν. Thus εὐδαιμονία will be ascribed to a man whose life an objective observer will judge to be most desirable. The Greeks would say that nobody can be declared εὐδαίμων until after his death (Herod. i 32; Soph. *O.T.* 1528-1530), whereas, of course, 'feeling happy' can only be appreciated at specific moments by the individual concerned.

[56] To be sure, it is Solon, not Apollo, who declares (in Herod. i 32) the last three to have been most εὐδαίμων; but the story of Cleobis and Biton is beyond doubt Delphic in origin, whereas Herodotus has taken the story of Tellus from another source. See Herzog *o.c.* 158-160; Parke - Wormell *Delph. Or.* i 379-380.

[57] Fr. 63 West, 65 Degani. According to this text, Apollo called Myson ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων; this will have meant that he, as a rustic, was more sober and modest than the sophisticated and greedy town-dwellers. Later, and at least in the time of Plato, he was thought to have been proclaimed σοφώτατος; cf. F. Wehrli *Hauptrichtungen des griechischen Denkens*

Protagoras (343a4), substitutes Myson's name for that of Periander, tyrant of Corinth, in the list of the Seven Sages.

Such anecdotes might have given Chaerephon the idea of asking the god of Delphi to testify to the abilities of the master to whom he was so devoted. Perhaps he took such an audacious step precisely because Socrates emphatically disclaimed any kind of cleverness; Chaerephon could hope that the oracle's answer would convince Socrates to stop contradicting the reputation for σοφία that he had with so many people.

If we ask further why the oracle gave the response Chaerephon wished, two possible explanations which are by no means mutually exclusive, suggest themselves to the modern reader. On the one hand, Socrates was not a man of high social status, and it had always been to people of his position, and not to the noble and the wealthy, that the Pythia had attributed the highest rank of piety, εὐδαιμονία or intelligence. On the other hand, the fact that Socrates was critical of democracy might easily have been understood in Delphi as implying that he not only opposed the political regime of his city as a matter of principle, but was actually a partisan of Sparta. This would be enough for the Delphians, who after the Thirty Years' Peace (445 B.C.) had recovered control over the sanctuary and who favoured Spartan policy, to give a favourable answer to Chaerephon.

We now come to the crucial question: what role did the oracle really play in Socrates' life? Was it, as most scholars seem to assume, the first and principal motivation of Socrates' choice of the philosophical life described in the *Apology* and especially in the Narration? I have already said that, in my opinion, it was not. Two arguments lead me to this conclusion. First, the interpretation of the oracle given in the Narration is not, as a whole, an obvious one and it implies some not insignificant changes in logic and perspective, although this is effectively concealed by Plato's literary skill. Second, there is no mention of the oracle in any of the other works of Plato and in the *Apology* itself Socrates' choice and his consciousness of his divine mission are partially accounted for by other facts or motives.

As to the first point, it will be good, as a preliminary, to recognise that when trying to define more precisely the nature of the 'knowledge' attributed to him by the Pythia, Socrates is acting exactly in conformity with the oracles quoted above about people who were exceptional in piety, εὐδαιμονία or understanding. There, too, what the god principally meant was not that this or that person exceeded his fellow-men in some form of excellence; he rather wished to suggest that true piety, true success, true cleverness were not what people commonly imagined them to be. Given this, we should now notice, in relation to the role of the oracle in Socrates' life, that the interpretation of Socrates' knowledge as a knowledge of his own

(Zürich 1964) 56-57. — The authenticity of the fragment has been successfully defended by F. Pfister *RE s.v.* Myson 1, 1192-1194; see also E. Degani *Studi su Ipponatte* (Bari 1984) 46-47.

ignorance presupposes the Socratic and Platonic doctrine about φιλοσοφία and about the three possible attitudes towards the acquisition of total truth. How could Socrates, whom his close associate Chaerephon thought to be a σοφός, have become convinced of his own ignorance if not by philosophical inquiry? Now it was precisely this conviction that gave rise to a conflict between the categorical assertion of the god of Delphi and Socrates' certainty about himself. Socrates must have been quite firmly convinced of his lack of knowledge in order to undertake, as the Narration says he did, to refute[58] the oracle and to show the god that what he had said simply was not true (21b9-c2). I pointed out above that the chronological sequence of the threefold investigation cannot be taken at its face-value. There is no reason, however, to think that just *that* feature, and no more, has been introduced by Plato, and to take the rest without criticism.

The whole Narration is built up with the most exquisite skill. Gradually a change takes place in the attitude which Socrates attributes to himself as he conducted his investigation. When he begins, it is with the purpose of showing the oracle to be wrong. The examination of the first group leads to a double result: on the one hand Socrates discovers that he has some superiority when compared with the politicians, namely that he has at least no conceit; on the other hand, he perceives that he is making enemies. Since the second result is definitely dangerous, it could induce Socrates to stop his discussions. This danger is indeed mentioned by way of introduction to the section concerning the poets (21e3-4. 22a7). Socrates, however, thought he could not simply drop his whole plan, for 'it was a duty to attach more importance to τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ' (21e4-5). This vague phrasing suggests that what Socrates does is somehow a duty that has been imposed on him.

A few lines below, we hear that when Socrates investigates people, he does that 'according to the god's instruction' (κατὰ τὸν θεόν 22a4), as indicated by the words of the Pythia. So it appears that he is no longer trying to refute the oracle. He has perceived that he has a mission, and this makes him undertake an assignment that will prove to be as difficult as the twelve labours of Hercules (22a6-7). When, through his examination of the third group, the craftsmen, Socrates discovers that, although they possess a real skill, they are not only ignorant but conceited about matters of much more consequence, he considers whether it would be the better for him to partake in their knowledge *and* in their self-infatuation, or to remain as he is, lacking both their abilities and their faults. In asking himself this question he acts 'on behalf of' or 'in the name of the oracle' (ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, 22e1). So the Pythia's assertion that nobody has more understanding than Socrates is now interpreted not only as a mandate to show *other* people that their so-called cleverness has little or no value, but also as a warning to

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[58] ἐλέγξων; on the meaning of this word, see the note *in loc.*

himself, not to prefer anything to the modest and realistic acknowledgement of his own insufficiency.

The final conclusion is that the oracle is not about Socrates at all; it is a message to all mankind, and Socrates was only cited as an example, in order to give a living proof of the difference between divine knowledge, conceited ignorance, and ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία or the recognition of one's own ignorance. In addition to this first conclusion, which concerns all men, there is another concerning Socrates alone. When he resolves to spend the whole of his life in examining everybody he meets, foreigners as well as citizens, he does so κατὰ τὸν θεόν, a phrase whose meaning has now become more precise, so that we may translate it 'in obedience to God' (23b5). If it seems to him that the man he cross-examines does not possess knowledge, he undertakes to 'help the god' (b7) and to help the man realise that he deceives himself. This task absorbs the whole of Socrates' energy and so he lives in utter poverty, because he is in 'the service of God' (διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, c1).

Plato's description of Socrates' gradual discovery of the oracle's true meaning is a literary tour de force. But that should not prevent us from seeing that he himself puts into the words of the Pythia what he wants to find in them. Of course, he only attempts this because the oracular formula makes a comparison between the cleverness of Socrates and that of other people, and because, on the other hand, the Socratic doctrine about ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία as φιλο-σοφία, as a *search* for understanding, implies as a prerequisite the acknowledgement of one's own ignorance. But the oracle contains absolutely no hint that the god is entrusting a mission to Socrates. This is the very reason why Plato represents Socrates as prompted, in a first moment of his investigating campaign, by a quite different motive, that of refuting the oracle. The transition from this original motive to the other one cannot easily be justified by logical argument and Plato takes care to make the transition very gradually in order that we will not notice it. He shows how Socrates is spurred on by the oracle and how he starts to examine all people who are thought to be clever. Next, we see Socrates discovering that these people are not clever and realising that his consciousness of his own ignorance is preferable to their conceit, even when they have some special ability or even rational skill, as in the case of the craftsmen. Finally, he appears to be convinced that he should continue his endeavours in spite of dangerous hostility, because a divine mission has been entrusted to him by the oracle, and that he should devote the whole of his time to it and accept extreme poverty as a consequence. At each moment, the picture is vivid and persuasive. Still, the sequence of thought is not quite natural, because some elements are introduced that do not belong to the content of the oracle: first the distinction between true and false σοφία, second the notion of a divine mission. If these elements are Plato's inventions, the oracle does not, historically speaking, constitute the origin of Socrates' specific philosophical activity.

Nor does Plato make such an assertion explicitly anywhere in the text of the *Apology*. The Narration starts from the question: how did the διαβολή originate? If Socrates was neither a cosmologist nor a Sophist, why was it that the attention of the public was drawn to him? The answer is: because Socrates possessed some kind of σοφία, as the god of Delphi attests. Socrates' σοφία, however, is very different from the cleverness of other people, as becomes apparent when he examines them. When closely examined, they cannot live up to their reputation, and their exposure makes them angry at Socrates. It is not essential for this logical sequence that the oracle is the *starting-point* of everything. True, Plato creates that impression by giving the whole section the form of a narrative, which implies a chronological sequence. But he never *asserts* that everything started with the oracle, and that before the oracle Socrates was not interested in what constituted human σοφία.

My second argument revolves around the lack of any mention of the oracle in the rest of Plato's written work. Most facts and ideas which play a role in the *Apology* are found in one or more places in the dialogues, not infrequently in contexts or even in formulations which are closely similar to those in the *Apology*. As an instance taken from the field of religion, one may cite the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον, which is mentioned in such relatively late works as the *Republic* (vi 496c3-5), the *Phaedrus* (242b8-c3) and the *Theaetetus* (151a2-5). If Plato had been convinced that the oracle given to Chaerephon had truly been the origin of Socrates' philosophy, it is scarcely intelligible that he does not make even a passing allusion to it in other works. If, however, its prominence in the *Apology* is due primarily to considerations of literary composition, such a silence is not surprising. Even in the *Apology*, when Socrates speaks of his mission outside of the Narration, he does so in very general terms, without explicit reference to the oracle, but with emphasis on the fact that an *order* has been given to him (28e4-29a1. 29d3-4. 30a5. e2-6. 31a7-b5).

The interpretation of these passages is clarified by 33c4-7. There Socrates contrasts his personal motive for examining people with that of the young people who are accompanying him. They, he says (33c2-4), enjoy it, 'for it is not unpleasant'. For him, however, the case is different; it is not a question of enjoyment, but of fulfilling a task: ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπωι ὧιπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπωι καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν (33c4-7). With μαντεῖα, Socrates certainly alludes to the answer given to Chaerephon, though not exclusively, as the plural shows[59]. The *Phaedo* supplies us with an instance of ἐνύπνιον which is particularly appropriate because it contains an explicit order that

[59] One should pay attention to the careful phrasing of Burnet's note on 33c5: 'ἐκ μαντείων, e.g. the Delphic oracle, which, when rightly interpreted, might be construed as a command'.

was given to Socrates time and again, and which he always understood as directing him to practise philosophy:

> Often in the course of my life the same dream-figure has visited me, differing in its visible form but always saying the same words, 'Socrates, be diligent and make music (μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου)'. In the past I had supposed that it was urging and encouraging me to go on with what I was doing, just as people urge on runners to run; I was to "make music" in the sense in which I was already doing so: the highest music is philosophy, and philosophy was my business. (60e4-61a4, Hackforth's translation.)

Seen in this light, the interpretation of the oracle as given in the Narration seems much less contorted. If Socrates has gradually come, through different ways, to the conclusion that it was his task, and one entrusted to him from above, 'to practise philosophy and to examine himself and the others' (28e5-6, cf. note on 33c5), the oracle given to Chaerephon can be seen in a broader context, in connection with other, related facts.

With Socrates, outward divine signs and personal reflection always go hand in hand. We see that, in the case of his refusal to take an active part in politics, his 'divine sign' warns him against it, and that his own deliberations show that the warning is well-founded (31d5-e1). The same holds good for the way Socrates pleaded his cause in court: although, on other occasions, the sign often hindered him from saying things he was about to say, it did not do so at any moment before or during Socrates' defence. So the death sentence should not be considered as a mishap, but as leading to some blessing (40a2-c3) and, Socrates adds, this is confirmed by other arguments (40c4-41d6).

The interpretation of Socrates' mission is absolutely the same. Socrates *has* divine authority for what he is doing: but his own reflections point the same way. When asked why he could not go into exile, and stop his endless philosophising, he says it is very difficult to answer this:

> For if I say that this amounts to disobedience to God and that therefore I cannot possibly keep quiet, you will not believe me, and will think that I am trying to evade my responsibility[60]; and if I say that the highest happiness for a man consists indeed in devoting every day his conversations to human perfection and to the other subjects about which you hear me discussing and examining myself and others, still less will you accept this from me (37e5-38a6).

So there is no *single* motive and no *single* event that prompted Socrates to embrace his philosophical ἐπιτήδευμα. If the Narration of the *Apology* gives that impression, this is only because Plato uses one particular fact, the oracle given to Chaerephon, as a starting-point for his *Narration*. He does not intend us to believe that this event was in itself of paramount importance *in the life of Socrates*, nor should we accept such a view.

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[60] οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ; on the meaning of εἰρωνεύεσθαι see Burnet's note on 38a1.

CHAPTER SIX

REFUTATION OF THE NEW ACCUSERS

1. *Introductory Remarks*

As we have seen above (Chapter V 69-70), the positive part of the Refutation of the Old Accusers seems to come to an end at 23c1, but, for good reasons, the Narration does not actually stop there. As the narrative continues, Socrates speaks about the young who always accompany him and about the anger that they arouse against him among influential people; next, he again refers to the link between the old and the new accusations. He gives the names of the accusers and states that it will be a difficult task to refute them, since it is scarcely possible in a short speech to dispel the prejudices caused by many years of slander. Nevertheless, he insists that he has spoken the simple truth about his past and rounds off this part of his defence with the words: 'and whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so' (24b1-2).

The next sentence again underscores with several stylistic means (see the note on 24b3-4) the transition to a new section, the Refutation of the New Accusers. However, before starting to cross-examine Meletus, Socrates quotes the text of the indictment, and announces that he will examine each of its (two) charges separately. Actually, we find the order of these points reversed, and the charge of corrupting the young precedes that of religious innovation. Why did Plato make this change in the official text of the indictment? The main reason is that, in his view as well as in that of the accusers (see below, § 4) the second charge was the most important one. He had already indicated this in the Narration (23d1-7), and will do so again, both in the later parts of the *Apology* (29c3-5. 30a7-b7. 33c8-34b5) and in other dialogues[1]. So it is no wonder that the arguments used by Socrates in the first half of the 'Ερώτησις, which actually concerns the second point of the indictment, are philosophically more significant than those of the other half: this game of cat and mouse conceals serious doctrine[2].

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[1] *Euthyphro* 2c3-3b9; *Gorg.* 521e3-8. 522b7; *Polit.* 299b8-c4.

[2] In the following sections of this chapter, that is, the discussion of the problems related to the indictment, I did not find it possible to confine myself to supplementing or correcting the data and interpretations given by Burnet; my discussion had to be continuous and relatively full in order to be intelligible. I wish to emphasise that Burnet's introduction to this section of the *Apology* (100-101) and his notes on 24b8-c1 and on *Euthyphro* 3b2-7 are very valuable. The most thorough examination of the whole question is that by E. Derenne *Les procès d'impieté* 123-157.

2. *The Official Text of the Indictment*

The original text is probably that which is preserved in Diog. Laert. ii 40:

> ἡ δ' ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον· ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρῖνος, ἐν τῶι Μητρώιωι· "τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος."[3]

The authenticity of the introductory legal formula (τάδε ... Ἀλωπεκῆθεν) is substantiated by Burnet[4]. As to the charges themselves (ἀδικεῖ ... διαφθείρων), the wording is exactly the same in Favorinus[5] as in Xenophon (*Mem.* i 1,1), except that Xenophon has εἰσφέρων for εἰσηγούμενος.

The exact wording of the indictment proper (after the introductory formula) is an important issue, especially for the authenticity of the text preserved by Diogenes Laertius. Schanz (13-14) thinks εἰσφέρων is the authentic word, for which εἰσηγούμενος was supposedly substituted by Favorinus. Heinrich Gomperz[6], although he points out that εἰσηγοῦμαι is used with the sense required here in the famous passage of Critias' *Sisyphus* about the origin of religion[7], still follows Schanz and agrees that εἰσφέρω is more

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[3] This is fr.51 of E. Mensching *Favorin von Arelate. Der erste Teil der Fragmente: Memorabilien und Omnigena historia* (Berlin 1963); fr.34 of A. Barigazzi *Favorino di Arelate. Opere* (Firenze 1966). Mensching's commentary is much better than Barigazzi's.

[4] Note on 24b8. Mensching, who probably did not consult Burnet's commentary, in which a very close parallel is quoted (Aristoph. *Wasps* 894-897, a mock-indictment in a γραφή and leading to an ἀγὼν τιμητός), refers to Plut. *Alc.* 2,4 (Θεσσαλὸς Κίμωνος Λακιάδης Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ θεώ) as the sole preserved indictment in a public case (mentioned neither by Burnet nor by Derenne); although the text of Plutarch concerns an εἰσαγγελία, not a γραφή, and the offence is expressed in the infinitive, it adds a new confirmation to the testimony of Favorinus.

[5] Favorinus of Arles (ca.80-ca.150) was an orator with philosophical interests and the author of numerous books on numerous topics. Diogenes only quotes from two of his works, the *Memorabilia* (Ἀπομνημονεύματα) and the *Omnigena historia* (Παντοδαπὴ ἱστορία). Since both works contained historical or pseudo-historical details about the biography of philosophers, and specifically about lawsuits against them (lawsuit against Socrates: *Memor.* book i (fr.3 Mensching), *Omn. hist.* (fr.31 M.); against Plato: *Omn. hist.* (fr.33 M.); against Aristotle: *Omn. hist.* (fr.36 M.)), we cannot decide to which of the two works any given fragment belongs. It is hard to believe that the original document about the indictment of Socrates was preserved in the Metroon (the shrine of the Mother of the gods on the west side of the Agora, where the Athenian archives were kept; cf. Thompson - Wycherley *The agora of Athens* 35-38) until the times of the Emperor Hadrian (see Mensching *o.c.* 46-47). Probably the words ἀνάκειται ... ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῶι Μητρώιωι have been borrowed by Favorinus from an unknown source. Mensching *ib.* would think of the Ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή of Craterus (possibly ca. 280 B.C.), although he points with commendable honesty to the warnings of Jacoby *FGH* III b, *Kommentar* (Leiden 1955) 99 (on *FGH* 342).

[6] 'Die Anklage gegen Sokrates in ihrer Bedeutung für die Sokratesforschung' *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 53 (1924) 130 n.1.

[7] Critias fr.1,16. 25 Nauck^2 (i 43F19 *TrGF*; 88B25 D.-K.).

idiomatic than εἰσηγοῦμαι. But, according to Gomperz, this only proves that Xenophon wrote better Attic prose than Meletus. Although some recent scholars have accepted this view[8], it should definitely be rejected. It is strange indeed to take the works of Xenophon as a canon of pure Attic vocabulary, for it is well known that he uses many words that are exceptional in Attic prose or are not used at all[9].

Further, and this is much more important, the sole fourth-century passage that is strictly parallel to ours, since it too has to do with an indictment for impiety, is a fragment of the Athenian orator Euthias in his speech *Against Phryne*[10], and this text supports the reading of Favorinus. The Euthias fragment, which belongs to the recapitulation at the end of the speech, reads as follows: ἐπέδειξα τοίνυν ὑμῖν ἀσεβῆ Φρύνην, κωμάσασαν ἀναιδῶς, καινοῦ θεοῦ εἰσηγήτριαν, θιάσους ἀνδρῶν ἐκθέσμους καὶ γυναικῶν συναγαγοῦσαν[11]. As Burnet pointed out, the underlined words are very close to the phrase ἕτερα ... καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος of the indictment of Meletus, as quoted by Favorinus[12]. There can be little doubt that εἰσηγεῖσθαι was the verb used in the law on impiety which I will examine presently. This is a weighty confirmation of the authenticity of Favorinus' text, since he could find εἰσηγούμενος neither in Xenophon, who has εἰσφέρων, nor in Plato, who simply drops the participle (24c1. 26b5)[13].

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[8] Derenne *o.c.* 141 n.3; Mensching *o.c.* 143.

[9] Cf. L. Gautier *La langue de Xénophon* (Genève 1911) 66-75. 85-108.

[10] Probably about 350-345; cf. A. Raubitschek *RE s.v.* Phryne, 903-904. There is no article on our Euthias in the *RE* (including its supplements), but the references to the authors who mention him are given by Raubitschek *art. cit.* 903-905, and by Derenne *o.c.* 230-231.

[11] Anon. Segu. p.390,19-22 Spengel-Hammer. The Anonymus does not mention the name of the orator; we know it through Harpocratio, s.v. Εὐθίας, p.140,3-5 Dindorf, and through Diodorus Periegeta *apud* Athen. xiii 591e, iii p.304,3-5 Kaibel.

[12] Curiously enough, Derenne, who quotes the fragment of Euthias (*o.c.* 230), does not mention it where he discusses the variant readings εἰσηγούμενος and εἰσφέρων (*ib.* 141-142).

[13] Perhaps one could add a further witness to the use of εἰσηγεῖσθαι, viz. Craterus in *Schol. in Aristoph. Frogs* 320 (FGH 342F16) Διαγόρας μελῶν ποιητὴς ἄθεος, ὃς καὶ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγεῖτο, ὥσπερ Σωκράτης. This is not the place to discuss the intricate problems about the traditions concerning Diagoras. They have been dealt with by Derenne *o.c.* 57-70, at length by F. Jacoby *Diagoras* ὁ ἄθεος (Berlin 1959) and concisely (and most sensibly) by F. Wehrli in his review of Jacoby, *Gnomon* 33 (1961) 123-126. See also Dover 'Freedom of the Intellectual' 137-138; M. Winiarczyk *Eos* 67 (1979) 191-213. 68 (1980) 51-75; Ostwald *Sovereignty* 275-277. The ultimate sources of the Scholiast with regard to the trial against Diagoras is, as he explicitly says, Craterus' *Collection of Decrees* (see above, n.5); as a more immediate source, Jacoby (*Diagoras* 11) postulates a work of Didymus. In spite of the authority of the sources, I think that at least the words καινὰ δαιμόνια were taken over, either by the Scholiast or by some author before him, from the indictment of Socrates; the reference ὥσπερ Σωκράτης, too, cannot go back to Craterus, and scarcely to Didymus. This observation casts doubt on the authenticity of εἰσηγεῖτο, but since the verb is found neither in Plato nor in Xenophon, it must somehow be derived from an old source.

3. *The Legal Basis of the Indictment*

Our information about the provisions of the Athenian law against impiety and about their exact wording is scanty. Nevertheless the following points seem to be certain[14]. First, the Diopeithes decree[15] was invalidated, if not earlier, at least when the laws were revised in accordance with the διαλλαγή of 403[16]. From that time on there was a law proper (νόμος) about the offence of ἀσέβεια and it determined the rules of procedure that applied to these lawsuits. As the notion of impiety is very elastic, a strict legal definition was essential; the offence was probably defined by means of an enumeration of the kinds of misdemeanour that could be the basis of a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας, which would be conducted before the People's Court, whereas other religious offences were brought before other courts[17]. As there is no extant complete speech that was actually delivered in an ἀσέβεια trial before the People's Court following a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας (the trial of Andocides was the result of an ἔνδειξις, cf. Andoc. i 8), we cannot hope to com-

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[14] I leave out of account offences like disclosing the secret rites of the Eleusinian mysteries or parodying them, which do not concern us here, since the indictment against Socrates had nothing to do with them.

[15] Commonly dated to the 430's; more precisely to 433/2 by Derenne *Les procès d'impiété* 21, on the assumption that it was proposed solely to legitimate the alleged prosecution of Anaxagoras, which Derenne dates (30-38) to 432. Mansfeld 'Anaxagoras' Athenian Period' 80, arrives at a date of 438/7 for the decree. The most recent discussion of the decree and ἀσέβεια trials is Ostwald *Sovereignty* 196-198. 528-536. Dover's doubts as to the historicity of the decree, 'Freedom of the Intellectual' 146-147, should be kept in mind; cf. Chapter IV n.5.

[16] All the *decrees* that dated from before the revision of 403/2 were invalidated, as is shown by Andoc. i 71, on which see the notes of A.D.J. Makkink (Amsterdam 1932); cf. Andoc. i 8. 86. 89. (Whether or not there was a real revision of the laws — this is denied by N. Robertson 'The laws of Athens, 410-399 B.C.' *JHS* 110 (1990) 43-75 — is immaterial.) MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 202-203 argues that the decree of Isotimides (415), which dealt with a special form of ἀσέβεια, was still valid in 400. It seems to me that Dover 'Freedom of the Intellectual' 147 hits the mark with his formulation 'prosecution of a man in 399 under a decree which antedated 403 was *a vulnerable procedure*' (my italics). In any case, even if the Diopeithes decree is historical, it cannot have been the basis for Meletus' indictment, since it required εἰσαγγελία. Derenne *o.c.* 236-238 shows that there were no trials on account of impiety under the form of εἰσαγγελία since the beginning of the 4th century. Hyperides *Eux.* 7-8 quotes a law that lists the offences for which εἰσαγγελία was the proper procedure, and his argument makes sense only if the list is exhaustive — immediately before the quotation, he mentions ἀσέβεια (6). Dem. xxii 27 lists four possible procedures for a prosecution regarding ἀσέβεια: εἰσαγγελία is not among them.

[17] J.H. Lipsius *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* I (Leipzig 1905) 358-368; Derenne *o.c.* 238-242; J. Rudhardt, 'La définition du délit d'impiété d'après la législation attique', *MH* 17 (1960) 87-105. MacDowell *Law* 199 suspects that the law did not offer any definition of impiety. But since there were different procedures in an ἀσέβεια case, the law must at least have listed some kinds of ἀσέβεια. And generally speaking, lists functioning as definitions are not untypical of early Greek law.

pile an exhaustive list of the misdemeanours mentioned in the law against impiety. Our main source of information is Meletus' indictment itself[18].

The first offence is expressed in the phrase τοὺς θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων. These terms recall the first part of Diopeithes' decree, whose full text was: εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας[19]. I do not think we should understand these words as meaning 'such as do not believe in gods'[20]. As Burnet rightly observes[21], the normal Greek phrase to indicate the divine beings, without reference to some individual gods or goddesses, is τὸ δαιμόνιον or τὸ θεῖον, not τὰ δαιμόνια or τὰ θεῖα, which means rather 'things divine' or 'religion' (cf. *Euthyphro* 3b7. 5a6. 8. 16a1-3). So the correct interpretation of Diopeithes' words is probably 'such as do not conform to (contemporary) religious observances'. The phrase is purposely vague. It would seem to me that the legislator of the new code deemed it necessary to be more precise and to refer explicitly to the official cult of the civic community. Therefore the first part of Meletus' indictment should be translated '(so and so is guilty of) not acknowledging the gods whom the city acknowledges'.

Now, once the very existence of (the) gods was doubted, as was the case since Protagoras at least, there was only a small gap between the phrases μὴ νομίζειν τοὺς θεούς 'not to worship the gods', which refers to behaviour, and μὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τοὺς θεούς (or μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι (εἶναι) τοὺς θεούς) 'not to believe in the gods'. The translation 'not to acknowledge the gods' covers both Greek phrases, and the texts of Plato and Xenophon show how, to an Athenian of the first half of the fourth century, one could be substituted for the other nearly as synonyms. Nevertheless, in a law defining a criminal offence, the verb νομίζειν could only refer to external conduct; of course, a corresponding internal attitude could easily be presumed, unless there was evidence to the contrary[22].

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[18] The possibility of adding supplementary charges to the main one without changing the kind of γραφή makes it the more difficult to discern whether an offence mentioned either by the accuser or the defendant came under the law against impiety. This is the case with the first and the third of the misdemeanours with which Euthias charged Phryne (κωμάσασαν ἀναιδῶς and θιάσους ἀνδρῶν ἐκθέσμους καὶ γυναικῶν συναγαγοῦσαν respectively) in the fragment quoted above, 85.

[19] Plut. *Per.* 32,1; see Burnet, note on *Euthyphro* 3b7.

[20] Cf. my note on 18c3. — In the opinion of Fahr Θεοὺς νομίζειν 105 (see also 119 and 135), the charge θεοὺς οὐ νομίζειν corresponds exactly to the formula τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας in the Diopeithes decree. Moreover, he argues (163) that the original meaning of the formula was 'not to worship the gods', and that it was broadened easily enough in legal practice to afford a legal ground for prosecuting those who did not 'believe in gods' as well.

[21] Note on 24c1, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; note on *Euthyphro* 3b7 (where parallel texts are quoted). Cf. Chapter VIII n.6.

[22] S. Kato *CQ* 41 (1991) 359-360 goes too far in claiming that for Meletus and Anytus νομίζειν referred to observance, and that Plato distorts their charge when he makes it refer to belief. But it is certainly true that the accusers could only argue this point by adducing testi-

The purpose of the legal provision that made a person who was τοὺς θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων liable to a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας was probably not *to enforce* participation in the civic cult but rather to make it clear that participation was a basic duty of each citizen, a duty required of him in order to secure divine benevolence toward the whole community. We have no indication whatsoever that in the classical period the Athenian authorities exercised any form of control over regular attendance at the public ceremonies, or that anybody was indicted simply for failing to attend them. Only consistent failure to attend, combined with disparaging language against the gods or against traditional rites, would normally have been sufficient cause for a charge of impiety, as was the case with Diagoras[23]. Although Plato, in his *Laws*, is very strict in matters of religion, he does not suggest any form of prosecution for lack of participation in the cult of the city, but only provides sanctions for outrages committed against the gods, either in word or in deed[24].

The second form of ἀσέβεια which we know was punished by Athenian law was the unauthorised introduction of new gods or of new cults. I am inclined to think that the terms of the law were καινοὺς θεοὺς εἰσηγεῖσθαι rather than καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγεῖσθαι. First, in the accusation against Phryne Euthias spoke about <u>καινῶν θεῶν</u> εἰσηγήτριαν (see above, 85) and this is confirmed by Plato's *Euthyphro* (3b1-3) φησὶ γάρ με (Μέλητος) ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς <u>καινοὺς</u> ποιοῦντα <u>θεοὺς</u> τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο[25]. Second, the use of καινὰ δαιμόνια in Meletus' indictment is most likely to be an adaptation of the words of the law to the individual case of Socrates: he was known to speak freely about his δαιμόνιον σημεῖον[26], but it was hardly possible to charge him with the introduction of 'new gods'[27], and therefore a modification of the strict terms of the

mony that Socrates was negligent in observing the city cult and/or that he made disparaging remarks about the city's gods.

[23] See the testimonies in F. Jacoby *Diagoras* (cf. n.13), under the numbers I 5; II 1. 2. 4; III 4b. c. d. 5. 8. 9. 10.; M. Winiarczyk *Diagorae Melii et Theodori Cyrenaei reliquiae* (Lipsiae 1981), test. 6A. 7A. 8. 16. 18A. 27. 31. 68. 69.

[24] Cf. O. Reverdin *La religion dans la cité platonicienne* (Paris 1945) 208-241.

[25] Cf. Xen. *Apol.* 24 οὔτε θύων τισὶ <u>καινοῖς δαίμοσιν</u> (not δαιμονίοις, as Burnet aptly observes in his note on 24c1) οὔτε ὀμνὺς οὔτε νομίζων <u>ἄλλους θεοὺς</u> ἀναπέφηνα.

[26] On this, see Burnet on *Euthyphro* 3b5 and Chapter VIII § 2a; cf. Xen. *Mem.* i 1,2 <u>διετεθρύλητο</u> γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῶι σημαίνειν and *ib.* 4 τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν (where τὸ δαιμόνιον means 'the divine powers'; cf. above, 87). See further below, 97-98 and n.68.

[27] The plural seems to have been used in the law. In the case of Phryne, the accusation was that she had introduced the cult of the foreign god Isodaites (cf. Derenne *o.c.* 231 and n.2), not of several gods, and still Euthias speaks of καινῶν θεῶν. The same holds good for Socrates, as appears from the texts of the *Euthyphro* and the Xenophontic *Apology* quoted above. Now, if the law had spoken of καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγεῖσθαι, which means 'introduce religious innovations' or 'new religious practices', there was no reason to speak of several new gods

law would seem advisable for the ἀντωμοσία.

Some scholars have denied that the introduction of new public cults without the sanction of the authorities, that is of the Council and the Assembly, was prohibited by law[28]. However, the existence of such a prohibition has been proved beyond reasonable doubt[29]. In most cases, a new cult would be that of a 'new god', that is either a god who previously was only worshipped in a 'heroic' cult, like Asclepius in Athens, or a foreign deity who was worshipped in ceremonies which could, at least partly, be conducted by alien residents, viz. the natives of the country where the god was originally located, as for example the Thracian goddess Bendis.

We have no reason to think that the prohibition of λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκειν had been adopted from Diopeithes' decree by the new code. To be sure, people engaged in 'meteorological' research were still regarded with suspicion by many Athenians, as the Platonic *Apology* makes clear enough[30]. But at that time in Athens, astronomy was continually making advances, which are attested for the late fifth century by the works of Euctemon and Meton and for the early fourth century in a well-known passage in Plato's *Republic* (vii 527d1-528a5. 528e3-530c3). In view of this fact, it seems unlikely that a general prohibition of such studies would have been prohibited by the law. For all we know, the lawgiver may have been anxious to prevent excessive litigation and to contain sycophants[31].

A more difficult question concerns the second charge brought in by Meletus, that of corrupting the young. I do not think that this constituted an actionable offence in the legal sense of the word: in other words, there was, in my opinion, no such thing as a γραφὴ διαφθορᾶς τῶν νέων. To be sure, some scholars[32] have argued for its existence on the basis of Isocrates' *Antidosis*, and more specifically from this sentence: ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς γραφῆς πειρᾶταί με διαβάλλειν ὁ κατήγορος ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέ-

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rather than of one.

[28] See the references in Derenne *o.c.* 224 n.1.

[29] Derenne *o.c.* 224-236; cf. Reverdin *o.c.* 228-231.

[30] 18b7-c3. 19b4-c1. 26d1-9. At the end of his life, Plato still felt the need to protest against this prejudice: see *Laws* xii 966d9-967a8 (quoted in the note on 18c3).

[31] Cf. P. Cloché *La restauration démocratique à Athènes en 403 avant J.-C.* (Paris 1915) 415-419.

[32] Derenne *o.c.* 145-147 with bibliography. Burnet (note on *Apol.* 24b9) adduces Aesch. i 7, who refers to laws regarding the σωφροσύνη of children and adolescents. But Aeschines goes on to discuss and quote from them (i 8-32), and they have nothing to do with corrupting the young but with protecting them from or preventing certain undesirable homosexual activities.

ρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν[33] (xv 30). But the *Antidosis* is not only a fictitious speech (the same holds good for Plato's *Apology*), but the lawsuit itself is imaginary, and its legal context fictitious. It is a transposition, into Isocrates' own style and manner of thinking, of Plato's *Apology*. Isocrates defends himself against his literary opponents as if he were Socrates arguing against his accusers. Therefore, 'the indictment is nowhere classified ... Indeed it is evident that Isocrates purposely avoids a technical classification of the charge'[34]. When he speaks of a γραφή, he simply adopts the language of the Platonic *Apology*, since he wishes to represent himself as a new Socrates, the target of unwarranted accusations: he is not interested in legal technicalities.

We should therefore consider the 'corruption of the young' not as a legal, but as a moral offence. In the indictment of Meletus this charge plays, formally speaking, an auxiliary role, although it was, as we shall see presently, not only of paramount importance in the eyes of Anytus, but much easier to substantiate and, from Anytus' perspective as a politician, better founded and more relevant than the accusation of impiety. If Athenian law had had a γραφὴ διαφθορᾶς τῶν νέων, I cannot see why Anytus would not have preferred to indict Socrates under that provision. As it was, this offence could only be appended to the charge of impiety, from which it is clearly distinguished and to which it is technically subordinated by the formula ἀδικεῖ ... ἀδικεῖ δὲ καί[35]. By adding this second offense, the accuser could cast suspicion on the defendant and arouse the antipathy of the members of the jury against him. Athenian jurors were prone to decide a case more on the basis of a general assessment of a person's moral character than on an informed understanding of the legal arguments. Possible scruples about

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[33] It should be observed that here, as in the concluding words of § 29 (καί μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν γραφήν), γραφή does not refer to a public lawsuit as opposed to a private one (δίκη), but to the text of the (fictitious) indictment (cf. *Apol.* 27a5. 31d1).

[34] R.J. Bonner 'The legal setting of Isocrates' *Antidosis*' *CPh* 15 (1920) 195.

[35] Brickhouse - Smith 36-37 think 'corrupting youth could ... be subsumed under the law proscribing impiety', quoting 26b2-6 πῶς με φῄς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; But since this passage is part of the transition from the second point of the indictment to the first, it is hazardous to use it as an argument for διαφθορὰ τῶν νέων as an offence under the ἀσέβεια law: the passage reflects Plato's treatment of the corruption of the young as *de facto* the main charge. If 'not recognising the gods of the city' and 'introducing new δαιμόνια' are two distinct charges under this law, as they rightly claim (30 n.107), the wording ἀδικεῖ ... οὓς μὲν ... ἕτερα δὲ ... ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ ... of the indictment, and ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς ... οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ ... of Socrates' paraphrase (24b9-c1), seems to exclude corrupting the young as a third charge under the same law: rather, ἀδικεῖ ... ἀδικεῖ δὲ καί suggests presupposed guilt on two separate grounds, not covered by the same law, as does Socrates' reversal of the order of the indictment. For what it is worth, I add that all ancient authors who expressed their views on the issue are united in speaking of two distinct charges, cf. especially Quintilian iv 4,5 *nam et plura crimina coniunguntur, ut cum Socrates accusatus est quod corrumperet iuuentutem et nouas superstitiones introduceret*; Diog. Laert. ii 38.

doing this could be dismissed if the moral offence had been explicitly mentioned in the indictment; in that case a discussion of the defendant's general behaviour could not be considered 'irrelevant to the case' (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος; see note on 18a7).

4. *The Accusers and their Motives for Impeaching Socrates*

Evidence for the three accusers and their biographies can be found in several works[36]. I treat only matters relevant to the lawsuit.

As for Meletus, I agree with Burnet that he cannot be the tragic poet whom Aristophanes repeatedly makes fun of from 424 B.C.[37] on; this possibility is excluded by the fact that in *Euthyphro* 2b8 Socrates calls him νέος ... τις ... καὶ ἀγνώς. It will not do to say with Derenne that 'quand Socrate dit qu'il [Meletus] est peu connu, c'est de l'ironie pure; n'était-ce pas se moquer cruellement de Mélétos que de le faire passer pour ignoré, alors qu'il prétendait à la célébrité par ses oeuvres littéraires?'[38]. That would be a very crude form of mockery, quite different from the witty and urbane irony of the Platonic Socrates, who far from disparaging anyone who enjoys or seeks esteem in his own circle, on the contrary pays him ironic compliments for his achievements and his fame. Since we know from the text of the indictment as quoted by Diogenes Laertius that the name of the first accuser's father was Meletus too, and since Socrates says in the *Apology* (23e4-5), quite playfully of course, that the young Meletus attacked him on behalf of the poets, it is quite possible that he was the son of the tragic poet, although he can also be any youth with poetical pretensions[39]. On the question whether he was also the accuser of Andocides, see below, 94-95.

Of the three accusers, Anytus was by far the best known and had the greatest influence among the Athenian citizens. Although, according to

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[36] Especially in Burnet, notes on *Euthyphro* 2b9, and on *Apol.* 18b3, 19d8 and 23e3; Derenne *o.c.* 123-131. For Lyco, whose personality is unimportant in itself and immaterial to the understanding of the *Apology*, Derenne has collected all the available information, *o.c.* 130-131; see also my note on 24a1. On Meletus, see also P. Mazon 'Mélétos accusateur de Socrate' *REA* 44 (1942) 177-190; MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 208-210; H. Blumenthal, 'Meletus the accuser of Andocides and Meletus the accuser of Socrates: One man or two?' *Philologus* 117 (1973) 169-178 and the literature quoted p.169. See also below, 94-95 and n.59.

[37] This is now the generally accepted date for the Γεωργοί (fr. 117 Kassel-Austin), cf. Th. Gelzer *RE s.v.* Aristophanes 12, Suppl. xii 1408. Derenne (*o.c.* 125 and n.4) and Mazon (*art. cit.* 187) stand alone in distinguishing between the lover of Callias known from the Γεωργοί and the tragic poet ridiculed in the *Frogs* (1302, cf. fr. 156,10 and 453 K.-A.). If Meletus the lover of Callias and tragic poet is the father of Meletus the accuser of Socrates, and if the accuser of Socrates is also the accuser of Andocides, the son inherited the father's close ties with Callias, since Callias was the instigator of Andocides' trial. See Dover *Lysias* 79.

[38] *O.c.* 125. Cf. Mazon *art. cit.* 180.

[39] It has been supposed that the accuser of Socrates, not the tragic poet, is the author of an *Oidipodeia*, which probably belonged to the fourth century. Cf. Gelzer *o.c.* 1412; F. Stoessl *RE s.v.* Meletos 3, 852; Aristoph. fr. 438 Kock, 452 K.-A., *TGF* 47T1.

Aristotle[40], he belonged to the group of Theramenes, he was banished by the thirty together with Thrasybulus. From that time on, he cooperated with Thrasybulus as a loyal ally, although his own political tendencies were definitely more conservative[41]. That he was 'the real author of the prosecution' (Burnet, note on 18b3) is certain. He did not, however, hand in the charge to the βασιλεύς himself, but entrusted this to Meletus, who presumably belonged to the circle of young men who tried to further themselves by doing odd political jobs for him. This practice was by no means unusual in Greece[42], especially in Athens: it may suffice to refer to the case of Timarchus who, with the backing of Demosthenes, sued Aeschines before the λογισταί and the εὔθυνοι after the second embassy, sent by Athens to Philip in 346[43].

As for the reasons why Anytus may have thought legal action against Socrates advisable, Derenne gives a well-balanced account of them[44]. I shall try to give a succinct statement of my views. Since Anytus was a political leader, his motives may reasonably be supposed to be of a political nature. In the *Meno* (91b7-92e6) he is depicted as fiercely opposed to the sophists whom he considers corruptors of the young (91c1-5; cf. 92a2-4). This can scarcely mean anything other than that they induced the young to question, or even to scorn, the established ethical, political and social values. After the restoration of democracy, in which the rather conservative Anytus had played a primary role[45], he considered it imperative to consolidate 'the traditional way of civic life', that which in the last decade of the Peloponne-

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[40] *Resp. Ath.* 34,3; this is challenged, however, by some scholars: see Derenne *o.c.* 130; Hignett *Hist. Ath. Const.* 297 n.2.

[41] Cf. P. Cloché *o.c.* (n.31) 145-148 (and other passages, referred to in the index, p.478); Derenne *o.c.* 126-130.

[42] Derenne *o.c.* 126 n.1.

[43] See V. Martin - G. de Budé *Eschine. Discours* i (Paris 1927) 14-15.

[44] *O.c.* 133-139. There is, however, one point on which I find it difficult to agree with him. One of Anytus' grievances was, he thinks, that Socrates, by his philosophical discussions, diverted the young from economically productive work. I find no sufficient grounds for this opinion. To be sure, the charge of teaching his followers idleness was one of the topics of Polycrates' Κατηγορία Σωκράτους (if we may draw conclusions from Libanius' *Defence of Socrates*; cf. Chroust *Socrates* 75-78. 82-83. 100). However, this work was totally fictitious and puts charges in the mouth of Anytus which he certainly did not raise in his actual speech before the court, e.g. that Critias and Alcibiades had been among Socrates' pupils (Xen. *Mem.* i 2,12); to speak openly about that would have run counter to the fundamentals of his policy. So the authority of Polycrates is by no means decisive. Now, as appears from the *Apology* (23c2-3), one of the main grievances against Socrates was the fact that he always went about accompanied by sons of the opulent families; such young men would never have dedicated themselves to 'un travail matériel productif' (p.136), whether they listened to Socrates or not, and Anytus was enough of a realist to know that. Although the Platonic Socrates playfully suggests (23e5) that Anytus attacked him 'on behalf of the craftsmen' whose ignorance he had opposed, he had also emphasised that of the three groups he had examined the artisans were the only ones to have any real knowledge and therefore were superior to the other two groups, the politicians and the poets (22d1-4; cf. a5-6).

[45] Cf. Cloché *o.c.* 405-411; 475-476.

sian war was called πάτριος πολιτεία by the Theramenists[46], and to protect it against destructive criticism.

Now, according to Plato[47], Socrates had always been very critical of the democratic system as such, and of the famous leaders of the popular majority in Athens[48], while he was wont to speak of the constitutions of Sparta and Crete with great respect[49]. The master-mind of the aristocratic 'party' in the years 415-403 was Critias; he violently attacked all the forms of democracy, especially that of Athens, and praised the laws of Sparta[50]. Critias had belonged to Socrates circle of friends[51]. The anonymous κατήγορος whom Xenophon repeatedly quotes and tries to refute in a lengthy chapter of his *Memorabilia*[52] links Critias' name to that of Alcibiades. Although Alcibiades had enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the democratic 'party', he could say, with characteristic cynicism, 'that it was impossible to say anything new about democracy, which was an admitted folly'[53].

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[46] On this slogan cf. Fuks *Ancestral Constitution*; S.A. Cecchin Πάτριος πολιτεία. *Un tentativo propagandistico durante la guerra del Peloponneso* (Turin 1971); M.I. Finley *The Ancestral Constitution* (Cambridge 1971), repr. in: *The Use and Abuse of History* (London 1975) 34-59. 217-224; Ostwald *Sovereignty*, see Index s.v. *Patrios politeia*.

[47] And to Xenophon as well, as appears from *Mem.* i 2,9. There Xenophon quotes the charges that ὁ κατήγορος (Polycrates; see below, n.52) brought against Socrates, viz. that he called the democratic way of appointing officers by drawing lots absurd, and by such talk induced the young to scorn the established constitution and to resort to violence. Xenophon answers (10-11) that Socrates certainly did not teach the use of violence; he does not deny that Socrates criticised democracy. On Socrates' views of democracy, cf. G. Vlastos 'The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy' *Political Theory* 11 (1983) 495-516; Kraut *Socrates and the State* 194-244; Reeve 100-105; Brickhouse - Smith 69-87. Brickhouse - Smith (77) quite rightly point out that Socrates' anti-democratic views and his association with Critias and Alcibiades are two separate issues, but they need not have been for Anytus. They are also right when they contend, 79-80, that there is no evidence that Socrates favoured oligarchy in Athens; however, that does not make his political views any more democratic. Cf. Chapter VIII 165.

[48] Cf. *Gorg.* 503c1-6. 515c4-517a6. It should be kept in mind that the harsh criticism of Pericles (515e4-9) is not Socrates' own but that of unknown people whom he quotes. Callicles points out that Pericles' critics are the most aggressive Laconophiles, and Socrates does not dispute this (cf. Dodds *Comm. Gorg. in loc.*).

[49] *Crit.* 52e5-6 (the Laws of Athens address Socrates) σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῄς εὐνομεῖσθαι. For Socrates to admire those laws, while not actually having exact information about them is one of the most astonishing effects of the 'Spartan mirage' whose history has been studied by F. Ollier *Le mirage spartiate* (Paris 1933-1943). One could assume, in order to defend him, that he viewed those laws not as they existed *in concreto* and were carried out in the practice of everyday life (cf. *Laws* i 636a4-5), but according to their principle, as a philosopher would (cf. *ib.* 630d9-632d7, and see Ollier *o.c.* i 252-257. 261-263. 276-281); but there is no evidence that Socrates made this distinction.

[50] Ollier *o.c.* i 168-174.

[51] Xenophon *Mem.* i 2,13-16; Critias is one of the characters in Plato's *Charmides*.

[52] i 2,9 ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη; 12 ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος; 49 ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος; 56 ἔφη δὲ ... ὁ κατήγορος. It is generally agreed that this κατήγορος is Polycrates (cf. Chapter I 4-5).

[53] Thuc. vi 89,6 περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο (the whole section is highly instructive).

More than half a century after the trial, in 345 B.C., the orator Aeschines could say to an Athenian jury as a matter of course: 'You put Socrates the Sophist to death, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty, who put down the democracy' (i 173). Undoubtedly Anytus too counted Socrates among the Sophists, whom he so intensely loathed, and he held him partly responsible for the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades. Since he observed the amnesty strictly[54], he may have been prepared to let bygones be bygones; but he was anxious about the future and wished to ensure that nobody would be allowed to engender in the young an aversion to the democratic regime. Therefore it was, in his eyes, necessary to stop Socrates. As Burnet rightly argues (note on 29c1), the words 'if I escape conviction, then your sons will practise what Socrates teaches and will all be totally corrupted' (29c3-5) are a quotation from Anytus' speech as a συνήγορος. We have seen above that the concept of a γραφὴ διαφθορᾶς τῶν νέων was, as far as we know, unknown in Athenian criminal law. So Anytus had to follow another legal procedure. Since, in the course of the last generation, Diagoras (and perhaps Anaxagoras and Protagoras as well) had been tried for ἀσέβεια, that would be the most convenient way in Socrates' case too.

There is no direct evidence about why Anytus chose Meletus to bring in the indictment. Burnet plausibly suggests[55] that Meletus the accuser of Socrates is the same person as Meletus who, in association with Cephisius and Epichares, indicted Andocides for impiety in the same year 400/399[56], and whose speech has been preserved as *Or.* vi of the *Corpus Lysiacum*[57]. This Meletus was driven by an almost fanatical zeal to defend traditional religion. His zeal would have made him perfectly suited for the role which Anytus did not wish to play himself but wanted to entrust to some ally. Since the name Meletus is anything but common, it would be very curious

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[54] This appears from Isocr. xviii 23 (pronounced 402/1): 'Thrasybulus and Anytus are the most powerful men in the city and have been robbed of great sums of money, yet although they know who are responsible for the confiscation of their wealth, they cannot bring themselves to sue them and thus to violate the amnesty (μνησικακεῖν). In other matters, they can achieve more than anyone else, but in matters pertaining to the reconciliation (περί γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθηκαῖς) their only claim is to be on equal footing with the other citizens.'

[55] Note on *Euthyphro* 2b9; cf. A.E. Taylor *Socrates* 103-104.

[56] Makkink *o.c.* (n.16) 32-35 and MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 204-205 date Andocides' trial to the autumn of 400. Socrates' trial probably took place in early spring, cf. Wilamowitz *Platon* ii 49. The year of Socrates' trial is given by the *Marmor Parium*, FGH 239A66, by Diog. Laert. ii 44, citing Demetrius of Phaleron (228F10) and Apollodorus (244F34), and by Diod. Sic. xiv 37,6.

[57] Surprisingly enough, whereas Derenne (*o.c.* 123-126) discusses at length the question of the identity between Meletus the accuser and Meletus the tragic poet, he says absolutely nothing about the Meletus who indicted Andocides. Fahr Θεοὺς νομίζειν devotes five pages (102-107) to the examination of six passages of the speech, but is content with saying (102-103) that it is generally considered not to be a work of Lysias. — It is not quite certain that Ps.-Lys. vi is actually by Meletus; it could be by one of his co-accusers, cf. MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 14.

if, in 399 B.C., two different Meletoi had each brought a charge of impiety. It seems to me that Burnet has effectively refuted the possible objections to his thesis[58]. After a careful examination such a cautious scholar as Sir Kenneth Dover[59] comes to the conclusion that there are 'stronger arguments for the identity of the two Meletoi than any argument which has been adduced to the contrary'.

It is not easy to ascertain exactly what in Socrates' attitude toward religion aroused Meletus' anger, because the terms of the indictment are very vague. Before stating my opinion about the question I shall first discuss Burnet's, with which I strongly disagree. After he has quoted what Socrates says about the meaning of the indictment in the *Apology*, what is said by Euthyphro in the dialogue of that name, what Xenophon says in the *Memorabilia* and his informant Hermogenes in Xenophon's *Apology*, Burnet remarks: 'Everyone speculates about the meaning of the charge, and the one fact that stands out clearly is that no one — not even the prosecutor — seems to know it. It surely follows that the charge of introducing new

[58] Notes on *Euthyphro* 2b9 and *Apol.* 32d6.

[59] *Lysias* 78-80. Cf. H. Blumenthal *art. cit.* (n.36); J.J. Keaney 'Plato *Apology* 32c8-d3' *CQ* 30 (1980) 296-298. Meletus the co-accuser of Andocides was one of the group that was ordered to arrest Leon of Salamis (Andoc. i 94), and since Socrates belonged to the same group it can hardly be true that Socrates did not know his accuser Meletus before his trial, as has been inferred from *Euthyphro* 2b7-8 οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω ὦ Εὐθύφρων τὸν ἄνδρα (MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 209). However, these words do not exclude a slight acquaintance, and this is proved by b10-11. One may ask why Plato makes Socrates omit Meletus' name in the report of Leon's arrest (32c4-e1): what is perhaps the most obvious answer, that Plato may not have known, seems to be ruled out by Andoc. i 94 ὡς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴστε (but see Dover's caution *Lysias* 80 'ὡς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴστε, as observed by the speaker of Dem. xl.53, is the worst of credentials for any allegation'). What lies at the bottom, I think, is Plato's lack of interest in the accusers (cf. Chapter I 8-10), and especially in Meletus; also, the omission of Meletus' involvement in Leon's arrest accords with Socrates' avoidance of those rhetorical topoi that would conflict with his dignity; cf. Chapter II 34-36. I cannot accept, therefore, Keaney's suggestion (*art. cit.* 296 n.1) that 24c6 ῥαιδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους is a direct hint at Andocides' trial. For a similar reason Plato does not mention that Theozotides, the father of one of Socrates' followers, was an important member of the democratic party, cf. Chapter VIII 174-175. See Burnet on 32d6; Dover *Lysias* 80 n.30. Brickhouse - Smith 28 adduce a number of new arguments, none of them cogent: (1) even if Plato omitted Meletus' name in the Leon affair for the reasons given above, these reasons do not apply to Xenophon, who should have mentioned Meletus in his report *Mem.* iv 4,3 (but Xenophon is not writing an *Apology*); (2) Meletus' involvement in the affair makes it impossible for him to be called 'unknown' Pl. *Euthyphro* 2b8 (but see Dover as quoted above: the affair may have been less of a 'notorious scandal' than Brickhouse - Smith think); (3) if Andocides' trial predated Socrates', again it is not plausible that Meletus should be called 'unknown' (but Meletus was not the main accuser in Andocides' trial). The argument that Meletus the accuser of Andocides cannot be the accuser of Socrates since in Andocides' trial Anytus was a witness for the defence has been dealt with by Burnet (9, note on *Euthyphro* 2b9 'that was no doubt because the accusation was a flagrant violation of the Amnesty, to which Anytus was conspicuously loyal').

divinities[60], although stated in the indictment, was neither explained nor justified at the trial. Such things were possible in an Athenian dikastery, which was more like a public meeting than a court of justice.'[61].

But certainly even in an Athenian law-court it was not possible for a prosecutor to keep *entirely* silent about his main charge. To be sure, he could interpret it very broadly and use arguments that were apt to put the accused in a dubious light concerning the issue of the lawsuit, rather than to prove that the defendant was technically guilty of the crime named in the indictment. But Meletus must have had *some* idea about the way Socrates, in his opinion, 'did not acknowledge the gods whom the city acknowledges, but instead of that introduced religious innovations', and about how he could persuade the jurors that Socrates was guilty of this twofold offence.

Now the use of καινὰ δαιμόνια and not of καινοὶ θεοί in the second part of the charge shows, on the one hand, that Meletus did not dare to accuse Socrates of introducing a new cult, which was the proper object of the law on ἀσέβεια (see above, 87-89), but rather of promoting 'religious innovations' which still was suspicious enough in the eyes of a community as conservative in matters of religion as the Athenians were. On the other hand, this wording recalls at once the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον or δαιμόνιόν τι[62] that was so typical of Socrates. The 'divine sign' was well-known in Athens, as appears from the words which Socrates uses when introducing a reference to it in the *Apology*, 'what you have heard me mention often and on many occasions' (31c7-8)[63]. Although people had frequently heard about it, most of them would not have known precisely what it amounted to, and this is the reason why Socrates goes to some lengths to describe the phenomenon in detail. It was a peculiar quality of his own, of which he says in the *Republic* (vi 496c4-5): 'In the past it has scarcely happened to anybody but to me'.

Nothing, therefore, was more natural than that the audience would at once think of that divine 'sign' when the indictment mentioned Socrates' religious innovations and used the phrase καινὰ δαιμόνια to refer to them. In the sentence from the *Apology* quoted just now Socrates says explicitly that the indictment aimed at the divine sign: '(if I refrain from political activity) it is because there happens to me something divine and supernatural, to which Meletus made a mocking allusion in his indictment' (31c7-d2 τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ... ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῆι γραφῆι ἐπικωμωιδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο). Socrates calls it a 'mocking allusion' (ἐπικωμωιδῶν) because he claims that Meletus' indictment has it

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[60] Later, in his commentary on the *Apology* (note on 24c1), Burnet rightly rejects this translation of the phrase καινὰ δαιμόνια and substitutes for it 'a strange religion'.

[61] *Greek Philosophy I* 185; we find the same idea expressed in his notes on *Euthyphro* 3b5 and *Apol.* 31c7. Cf. A.E. Taylor *Varia Socratica* (Oxford 1911) 10-11; *Socrates* 114-115.

[62] On the terminology, see Chapter VIII 154.

[63] That it was a matter of common knowledge is confirmed by Xenophon (see above, n.26).

in mind without mentioning it explicitly; 'mocking' in so far as Meletus pretends to treat as a public matter something that for Socrates was a quite private one.

Burnet, however, interprets Socrates' remark differently: 'Socrates ironically suggests that *at last*[64] he has discovered what Meletus meant by his grotesque charge. It is quite an afterthought. Unfortunately the Socratic irony has here as elsewhere been taken *au pied de la lettre*' (note on 31d1). Actually there is nothing ironical either in the form of the relative clause ὃ δὴ καὶ κτλ.[65] or in its content. Socrates simply states a fact that helps to explain what Meletus meant when formulating his charge in this specific way; if somebody is joking, it is Meletus who brings accusations against Socrates which he can only substantiate by distorting Socrates' acts and words[66]. That it was quite natural for the phrase καινὰ δαιμόνια to recall the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον appears also from Euthyphro's reaction when Socrates tells him what charge was brought against him: 'I see, Socrates; it is no doubt because you say that the divine something happens to you again and again'[67]. Xenophon interprets the charge in the same way, *Mem.* i 1,2 διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῶι σημαίνειν,

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[64] By these words, which he italicises, Burnet means 'quite some time after the conclusion of the 'Ερώτησις', which has not shed any light upon the meaning of the indictment.

[65] Burnet errs when he takes δή to be ironical here; see my note on 31d1.

[66] That is what ἐπικωμωιδῶν comes down to. The idea is akin to that of 24c5-8 σπουδῆι χαριεντίζεται, ῥαιδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτωι πώποτε ἐμέλησεν.

[67] *Euthyphro* 3b5-6 Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῶι ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. On γίγνεσθαι, see below, Chapter VIII 154. According to Burnet (*in loc.*) 'we are not entitled to infer that Plato accepted or meant us to accept this explanation. Socrates takes no notice of it here, and a little farther on (6 a 6 sqq.) he puts forward an altogether different suggestion himself'. But if Socrates does not say what he thinks about Euthyphro's reaction, it is because Euthyphro has not yet finished expressing his idea and continues uninterrupted: 'So it is because you innovate in matters of religion that he (Meletus) brought that charge against you, and he goes into court with the manifest intention of misrepresenting you; he knows very well that such things are very easy to misrepresent to the masses' (3b6-9), and he goes still further (b9-c5) describing the reactions of the Athenian Assembly, where people do not appreciate his own activity as a soothsayer and make him a laughing-stock, out of mere jealousy. With this remark, the conversation takes a new turn. Surely, Socrates does not confirm Euthyphro's interpretation of the indictment, but still less does he dispute it; and what Euthyphro says about the possible misrepresentation of such things as the divine sign is obviously something that Plato expects us to agree with. Now, as for the 'altogether different suggestion' which Socrates offers (6a6ff.), we should notice that it does not concern the second part of the charge (the religious innovations) but the allegation that he does not acknowledge the traditional gods. Socrates asks Euthyphro whether the reason why he is suspect might be the fact that he shrinks from accepting stories about the gods which he thinks are incompatible with their moral perfection. Of course, since this explanation bears on another point of the indictment, it does not contradict Euthyphro's interpretation of the other one.

ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν[68].

The real reason why Burnet refuses to see in the second part of the indictment an allusion to the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον is that, according to him, 'if the accusation had referred in any way to the 'divine sign', Socrates would have been bound to reply to it'[69]. This, however, runs counter to Burnet's own (and excellent) introductory remark to the Refutation of the New Accusers: 'It need hardly to be said that this part of the speech does not contain the real defence of Socrates. That is reserved for the next section (28 d 6 sqq.), after Meletus has been finally disposed of' (p.100)[70]. Actually, for the very reason that Burnet gives here, the Ἐρώτησις is not concerned with the *content* of the charge; Socrates simply shows that Meletus is unable to say anything reasonable and consistent about education and about belief in and skepticism about the gods. When he gives his real defence in the Digression (28b3-34b5), he finds an occasion to explain the extraordinary phenomenon which gave rise to misunderstanding and suspicion, and then he gives all the essential details[71], from which it clearly appears that the 'divine sign' had nothing to do with such religious innovations as would justify a condemnation for impiety.

To be sure, we may guess that not even Meletus attached decisive importance to the divine sign. When he alluded to it, he did so because it was a well-known fact and a clear manifestation of Socrates' idiosyncracy in matters of religion. Probably, as Plato suggests in the Proposition and elsewhere, Meletus was primarily influenced by his conviction that Socrates was one of those free-thinkers, whether natural philosophers or sophists, who were commonly believed not to 'acknowledge' (νομίζειν) the gods, at least not in the way the normal Athenians did. That was how Aristophanes had portrayed Socrates in the *Clouds*, where Strepsiades calls him Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος (v. 830), that is, a man as surely an ἄθεος as Diagoras of Melos was[72]. Aristophanes makes Socrates himself say to his stupid new pupil: 'By what gods will you swear? First of all, gods are not admitted currency among us' (vv. 247-48); 'What Zeus? Stop talking nonsense! There is no

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[68] In his note on *Euthyphro* 3b5 (p. 15), Burnet points out that this is only Xenophon's 'conjecture' and thinks that its source is precisely the passage in *Euthyphro*. He may be right, but the connection is such an obvious one that in my opinion he could have arrived at it without a written source.

[69] Note on 31c7 (p. 127). The idea was first proposed by Taylor *Var. Socr.* 11 and 13-14.

[70] Taylor's opinion on this point is the exact opposite (*o.c.* 11): 'Plato is absolutely silent about the sign in that part of the work which deals with the accusation of impiety, *that is, in the real* ἀγών' (italics mine). Since Burnet had realised that the Ἐρώτησις was not the 'real defence', he should have dropped Taylor's conclusion (see previous note).

[71] 31c7-d6. In the Third Speech, when addressing the jurors who voted for acquittal, he returns to the same topic and adds further particulars (40a2-c3).

[72] On Diagoras see above, n.13. In his accusation against Andocides, Meletus represents his adversary as even worse than Diagoras; the text is quoted below, n.79.

Zeus at all!' (367). The divine powers which he addresses himself are 'Mighty king, infinite Air, who keeps earth floating; radiant Ether, and you, venerable goddesses, Clouds who thunder and lighten' (264-65); and he swears by Respiration, Void, Air (627).

Of course, all this is caricature. But in the *Apology* (18c3; cf. 23d6) Socrates says quite earnestly that, to the man in the street, natural philosophers are people who do not 'acknowledge' any gods at all[73]. In the course of the 'Ερώτησις, Meletus asserts that Socrates cannot believe in the gods because he accepts theories of physics which turn out to be those of Anaxagoras (26c7-d6). Suspicion clung to some of the sophists as well: Protagoras' skepticism about the gods is attested for us by the celebrated fragment 80B4 D.-K.[74], and he was perhaps prosecuted in Athens for impiety[75]. Such people, taken as a group and irrespective of their particular doctrines, Meletus must have considered threats to traditional religion. What they called divine, if anything, was wholly different from the gods who were worshipped in Athens since time immemorial, which they did not accept anymore. A celebrated passage of Euripides gives a good idea of what contemporary theological innovations amounted to and why many people could regard such views as a disguise for open atheism:

ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν,
ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
προσηυξάμην σε; πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου
βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις (*Tro.* 884-888)[76].

From this perspective, 'atheism', that is to say, the rejection of gods as they were generally believed to be, is not incompatible with an interest in new forms of the divine. So the whole intellectual outlook of these innovators could be regarded, in Meletus' eyes, as proof that they did not 'acknowledge' the gods whom the city 'acknowledged' but that they replaced them with new concepts relating to things divine. That their beliefs and activities

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[73] At the end of his life, Plato still asserts that cosmologists are commonly regarded as ἄθεοι (*Laws* xii 967c5-d1; the text is quoted in the note on 23d4).

[74] Among the atheistic doctrines impugned in *Laws* x there is one according to which the gods do not exist by nature but only by some conventions, which differ from place to place, depending on the legislation established by agreement here and there (889e3-6); This sounds typically Protagorean; the caution of W. de Mahieu 'La doctrine des athées au Xe livre des Lois de Platon' *RBPh* 42 (1964) 37 is excessive.

[75] See Derenne *o.c.* 45-55. Here Dover's doubts deserve once more to be noted ('Freedom of the Intellectual' 142-145); in any case he has established beyond doubt that Pl. *Meno* 91e3-9 proves that Protagoras was never convicted — I would go further and say that the words ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους (91e3-4) exclude even prosecution. See also Ostwald *Sovereignty* 532-533.

[76] On these lines, see Nestle *Vom Mythos zum Logos* 500-501; M.R. Lefkowitz, in a sensible paper on '"Impiety" and "Atheism" in Euripides' *CQ* 39 (1989) 70-82, esp. 72-74.

did not amount technically to the introduction of unauthorised cults was, to Meletus, probably unimportant.

In the *Euthyphro* (6a6-8) Socrates suggests the possibility that Meletus has indicted him because Socrates was unwilling to accept the truth of myths incompatible with the dignity and sanctity of the gods. Burnet (*Greek Philosophy I* 183) and Taylor[77] contend that this idea should be discarded, since Greek religion had neither theological dogmas nor sacred books. However, criticism of the traditional sacred tales *could* be considered disrespectful to the gods, as well as to such parts of the official cult that were closely connected with these myths[78]. Since Diagoras of Melos was condemned for 'impious words with regard to sacred ceremonies and festivals of another city' than his own[79], we should not exclude the possibility that Meletus took offence at Socrates' criticism of certain myths; on the other hand, this is not likely to have been his primary motive.

Several members of Socrates' circle (Alcibiades, Phaedrus, Eryximachus and perhaps Damon) had been compromised in the great religious scandals of 415 B.C., the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the mysteries. Burnet and Taylor argue[80] that the accusers thought this would support their accusation about religious innovations. To be sure, the facts were relatively old and, moreover, were covered by the amnesty; but the incident had been revived by Meletus a couple of months previously, in the lawsuit against Andocides mentioned above. Although this hypothesis should not be rejected out of hand, it is important to notice that it is not confirmed anywhere in Socratic literature.

We cannot know how Meletus actually tried in his speech to make his audience share his aversion to Socrates and to substantiate both the negative and the positive parts of his charge of impiety. The one sure thing is that he said at least a few words about the 'divine sign', however he understood it. Plato's aim in the Refutation of the New Accusers is to show that Meletus had not given serious consideration to the questions implicit in his indictment and was content with conveying a general impression of the unusual and in his eyes abnormal character of Socrates' attitude toward things divine. That was enough for him to feel entitled to indict him and to arouse hostility by associating him with the free-thinkers of the past decades. Plato did not put us on the wrong track by representing the new accusation as fundamentally depending upon the old one.

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[77] *Varia Socratica* (see n.61) 15-16; *Socrates* 113-14.

[78] So *e.g.* the mysteries of Eleusis would loose their whole sense if one rejected the myth of Demeter and Core.

[79] Ps.-Lys. vi 17 τοσοῦτον δ' οὗτος (Andocides) Διαγόρου τοῦ Μηλίου ἀσεβέστερος γεγένηται· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ λόγωι περὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἱερὰ καὶ ἑορτὰς ἠσέβει, οὗτος δὲ ἔργωι περὶ τὰ ἐν τῆι αὑτοῦ πόλει.

[80] Burnet *Greek Philosophy* I 189-190; Taylor *Socrates* 116-17; *Plato* 159 and 163 n.1.

5. *The 'Interrogation' of Meletus*

a) Cross-Examination in the Treatises on Rhetoric and in the Orators

The technique of questioning the other party and of answering questions asked by the other party[81] is mentioned in Anaximenes, Aristotle and Quintilian. Anaximenes discusses the issue very briefly[82] and does not actually speak about questioning, but only about answering, in which he distinguishes assent (ὁμολογία) and denial (ἄρνησις). Since he considers only how the defendant should answer when cross-examined by the accuser, what he says is not relevant to the *Apology*, in which it is the defendant Socrates who questions Meletus the accuser. Aristotle's treatment is fuller and more elaborate[83]. He recommends questioning in four cases: (a) when the opponent has already admitted a point and one further question will suffice to elicit an absurd answer; (b) when a first point is evident and it is clear to the questioner that his opponent will concede the next step; (c) when the questioner can show that the opponent's argument is either contradictory or paradoxical; (d) when the opponent will not be able to do anything else than to answer the question with sophistry, which will provoke an adverse reaction in the audience. For (a), (b) and (d) Aristotle gives examples. *Apol.* 27d9-10 is cited (1419a10-12) to illustrate (b), from memory and without the name of the work or the author[84]; as a matter of fact, this passage would have been more suitable as an illustration of (c)[85], and it is probably because Aristotle realises that the whole context (27a4-28a1) drives Meletus to contradict himself that he does not find it necessary to give an example of case (c). To close the section, Aristotle gives the questioner the important advice that 'he should compress as much as possible the arguments' he uses in his questioning (1419a18-19). As in the case of Anaximenes, I will not comment upon what Aristotle says about answering, since Plato portrays Meletus as not even able to avoid falling into Socrates' traps, much less capable of answering competently, in accordance with rhetoricians' precepts.

In the later Greek rhetoricians there is nothing to be found about ἐρώτησις and ἀπόκρισις[86]. Among the Romans neither the author of *Ad Heren-*

[81] περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις (Anaximenes 36, p.89,9 Fuhrmann).

[82] p.89,9-22 F. It does not seem improbable that the treatise originally comprised a section on questioning, which was later lost through ὁμοιοτέλευτον or some other cause.

[83] *Rhet.* iii 18, 1418b40-1419b2, the first part of which (through 1419a19) treats of questioning, the other of answering. E.M. Cope *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary* (Cambridge 1877) iii 210-215 shows that some suggestions made in this passage recall advice given in *Top.* viii and in the *Soph. El.*

[84] This is by no means unusual in Aristotle; cf. Bonitz, *Index arist.* 598a9-599a3. See note on 27c5.

[85] Cf. Burnet's remark in his note on *Apol.* 27d9.

[86] The anonymous treatise Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως is only a paraphrase of the passage in Aristotle discussed above; the most recent edition is that by H. Rabe in *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, xxi 2 (Berlin 1896) 330-334.

nium nor Cicero in his *De inventione* say anything about *altercatio*. Quintilian, who has an extensive chapter on *altercatio* (vi 4), mentions the silence of his predecessors and explains it as follows: 'Other writers have omitted to deal with it (the *altercatio*) on the grounds, perhaps, that they thought the subject had been sufficiently covered by their precepts on other topics' (vi 4,1), especially on invention. What he says himself is not very instructive, since he is more concerned with the difficulty of the task and the intellectual ability and personal qualities that make a *bonus altercator*, than with distinguishing the kinds of questions appropriate to the various situations in which a lawyer may find himself. For more details, the author refers (vi 4,2) to his treatment of how to deal with witnesses (v 7). But there, too, the viewpoint is psychological rather than technical. In neither passage does Quintilian deal with the difference between questioning and answering; actually he is more interested in questions than in answers. In short, he cannot help us in interpreting the Ἐρώτησις in the *Apology*.

There is, however, still one point that is interesting for us: in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the discussion of τὸ γελοῖον follows immediately upon that of questioning and answering (iii 18, 1419b3-9); similarly, Quintilian's discussion of *risus* precedes immediately that of *altercatio* (vi 3), and in the latter he says that the statements of the opponent 'are often best treated with contempt, made light of or held up to ridicule, and there is no part of oratory which affords more opportunity for wit' (vi 4,10). So we are not suprised if Socrates in his questioning makes fun of Meletus as well.

As is well-known, Athenian litigants were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, but they were entitled, in the course of their own speech, that is in the time allotted to them (as measured by the water-clock), to question their opponents, who were required by law to answer. We have several instances of such ἐρωτήσεις in the preserved works of the Attic Orators; in addition to those mentioned by Burnet (in his valuable note on 24c9) there is Andocides i 14 (cf. i 101), Isaeus xi 5[87] and Dinarchus i 83. All these ἐρωτήσεις are very short: three to five questions in some five to eight lines[88], all bearing directly on matters of fact. The brunt of the litigant's effort is borne by his continuous speech, in which he both argues his own thesis and tries to refute the assertions of his opponent. But we should remember that a published oration is not identical with the speech actually delivered in court; in the latter, the ἐρώτησις could hardly be so concise and the answers so to the point. What we read has been remodelled to suit the

[87] Here, although the question (there is really but one) is introduced by ἐρωτήσω σε and concluded by φράσον οὖν τουτοισί (οὑτοιί are the members of the jury, as in *Apol.* 26b9-c1 and 27b8-9), it is actually built into the fabric of his continuous speech, and therefore the speaker explains why he formulates his question precisely in that particular form.

[88] The longest ἐρώτησις (11 lines), that of Isaeus, consists of only one question, as stated in the preceding note. This question takes up four lines, the remaining lines form its context.

speaker's intention as perfectly as possible and to strengthen his own argument with his opponent's admissions.

b) The Questioning in the Apology

The 'Ερώτησις of the *Apology* is very different from questioning in the Greek Orators. As often in this work, Plato 'transposes'[89] what was a common practice in trials and gives it a new form as well as a new purpose. What was only a secondary device for other litigants, and was totally integrated into their arguments, is, in Socrates' defence, not just the principal but the sole technique he uses against Meletus.

Why does Plato do something so unusual? First because he wishes to insert in the *Apology* an example of Socratic dialectic, as he indicates already in the *Exordium* (17c7-d1; cf. Chapter II 38-39), and not just a small sample, as in the story about Callias (20a5-b9), but a sufficiently lengthy illustration of Socrates' method and of its spellbinding effect upon the person interrogated. Second, because he wants to show that Meletus had not given serious attention to the charges that he had brought against Socrates; as the Proposition asserts with great emphasis, Meletus' case relied entirely on the longstanding slanders against Socrates, in other words upon the 'indictment' of the Old Accusers. In order to show that the official γραφή has no significance of its own, Plato makes Socrates show how superficial and uncritical Meletus is; this will become apparent if the young man is lured into making absurd statements and contradictions. Plato can achieve this effect much better through a dialectical game than by a continuous argument. The practice of ἐρώτησις, familiar in forensic oratory, gave Plato the opportunity for inserting in his *Apology* a rather extensive dialectical discussion without destroying the general forensic framework that he was anxious to maintain. Where the technique of questioning is applied not, as in the speeches of normal litigants, to matters of fact, but to fundamental ideas, it becomes a formidable instrument to expose an opponent's ignorance, as we learn from many Platonic dialogues.

This is not the place for an exhaustive examination of Socrates' dialectical technique; I will therefore content myself with discussing a few passages that state its distinctive features explicitly and that show the unfavourable reactions that it arouses in the opponent. One of the best known, but also one of the longest passages of this kind is found in the *Protagoras*; it will suffice to quote just a few sentences from the beginning and the end of the passage. The great Sophist has given a rather lengthy enumeration of things that are beneficial to some living beings and not to others, and for each of them in one respect and not in another or in such and such circumstances and not in other ones. Socrates answers:

[89] For this term, cf. Chapter II 32-34.

> Protagoras, I find I am a forgetful sort of person, and if one addresses me at any length I forget the subject on which he is talking. So, just as you, in entering on a discussion with me, would think fit to speak louder to me than to others if I happened to be hard of hearing, please bear in mind now that you have to deal with a forgetful person, and therefore cut up your answers into shorter pieces, that I may be able to follow you. — Well, what do you mean by short answers? he asked: do you want me to make them shorter than they should be? — Not at all, I said. — As long as they should be? he asked. — Yes, I said. — Then are my answers to be as long as I think they should be, or as you think they should be? — Well, I have heard, I said, that you yourself are able, in treating one and the same subject, to instruct another person in it both at length if you choose, without even being at a loss for matter, or again briefly, so as to yield to no one in brevity of expression. So, if you are going to argue with me, employ with me the latter method, that of brevity. — Socrates, he said, I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech, and if I were to do what you demand and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks. — Then, as I saw that he had not been quite satisfied with himself in making his former answers, and that he would not readily accept the part of answerer in debate, I considered it was not my business to attend the meetings further. (334c8-335b3, Lamb's translation, slightly modified).

Socrates rises to take his leave, but all the members of the company insist that he should remain, first Callias, the host, then Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and finally Hippias. At the end of his intervention, Hippias says:

> Now let me beg and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms, arranged, as it were, under our arbitration: you, Socrates, must not require that precise form of discussion with its extreme brevity, if it is disagreeable to Protagoras, but let the speeches have their head with a loose rein, that they may give us a more splendid and elegant impression; nor must you, Protagoras, let out full sail, as you run before the breeze, and so escape into the ocean of speech leaving the land nowhere in sight: rather, both of you must take a middle course. (337e2-338a7)

Socrates' strings of short questions seem to drive his interlocutors against their will to concede points that run counter to their most cherished convictions; they find themselves totally baffled and unable to speak rationally about topics on which they thought they were well informed. The *Meno* gives a vivid picture of their predicament.

> Socrates, I heard before I met you that you never do anything but puzzle yourself and others too; and now it seems to me that you are bewitching and drugging and completely spellbinding me, so that I have become saturated with puzzlement. In fact, if I may make a little joke, you are absolutely like the broad electric ray of the sea, both in appearance and otherwise. That fish benumbs anyone who comes near and touches it, and that is what you seem to have done to me now; for really I am numb in mind and mouth, and I do not know how to answer you. Yet I have discoursed on virtue thousands of times and to many people; and done it very well too, as I thought at the time. But

> now I cannot even say what it is. I think it is a wise decision of yours never to leave Athens; for, if you did such things in another city where you were a stranger, you might be arrested as a wizard. (79e7-80b7, Robinson's translation, *Dialectic* 9-10).

Although Meno is not truly irate, his last words imply a threat[90]. Other interlocutors are not so easy-going. In the *Gorgias*, Callicles speaks with scorn of Socrates' 'sophistry' (497a6 οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες). A few moments later he rebukes him haughtily:

> Let me tell you, Socrates, all the time that I have been listening to you and yielding you agreement, I have been remarking the schoolboy's delight with which you cling to any concession one may make to you, even in jest. (499b4-6, Lamb's translation, slightly modified).

In book i of the *Republic* we see the Sophist Thrasymachus getting quite angry with Socrates: Socrates feels it and says:

> So then, Thrasymachus, said I, my manner of argument seems to you dishonest? — It does, he said. — You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question? — I don't think it, I know it, he said, and you won't make anything by it, for you won't get the better of me by stealth and, failing stealth, you are not of the force to beat me in debate. — Bless your soul, said I, I wouldn't even attempt such a thing ... — ... Now bring on against this[91] your cavils and your shyster's tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you'll find yourself unable. — Why, do you suppose, I said, that I am so mad as to try to lay a trap for Thrasymachus? — You did try it just now, he said, paltry fellow though you be. (341a5-b3. b8-c3, Shorey's translation, slightly modified).

What makes the interlocutors feel that Socrates is intent on cheating them is his custom of starting an argument with questions about quite trivial or even ludicrous points that seem to bear no relation to the main issue of the debate. 'I believe, on my soul,' says Callicles, 'you can literally never stop talking about cobblers and fullers, cooks and doctors, as if our discussion had to do with them.'[92] Often, though not always, Socrates begins by stating the thesis that he wants to discuss. But even so, the questions that he asks at the outset do not appear relevant at once. It is only after a while that his interlocutor discovers the consequences of what he has unwillingly admitted. At that moment, he feels entrapped and suspects Socrates of dishonesty. The suspicion originates precisely from that apparent lack of proportion and correlation between the trivial initial questions to which the interlocutor has thoughtlessly agreed and the weighty conclusions which Socrates draws from them and which he has aimed at from the start. Some-

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[90] Cf. *Apol.* 37c4-e2.

[91] A more rigorous definition of the ruler suggested by Socrates and accepted by Thrasymachus.

[92] *Gorg.* 491a1-3; the whole passage, from 490c1 on, is most illuminating.

how he must have smuggled the decisive link into a seemingly unbroken, simple chain of argument. Callicles understands this all too well and gets quite angry indeed:

> SOC. Does not each of us cease at the same moment from thirst and from the pleasure he gets by drinking? — CALL. I cannot tell what you mean. — GORG. No no, Callicles, you must answer him, for our sakes also, that the arguments may be brought to a conclusion. — CALL. But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias; he keeps on asking petty, unimportant questions and so he refutes one. — GORG. Why, why does that matter to you? In any case it is not your credit that is at stake, Callicles; just permit Socrates to refute you in such manner as he chooses. — CALL. Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours, since Gorgias is so minded (497b1-c2).

But Socrates does not really want to fool anybody. If his interlocutor is a serious man, more intent upon finding out the truth than upon winning the argument, Socrates will invite him to revise his first statements and to retract assent given previously or, as he is wont to say, 'to take back an earlier move on the board'[93]. He does not, however, do so with Meletus, because he does not take him seriously — or rather because Meletus himself shows a shocking lack of seriousness by bringing a capital charge against Socrates (24c4-9) which is based on pure slander: the new indictment depends on the old one, as Socrates explains in the Proposition and at the end of the Narration (18a7-b4. 23c7-24b2).

For these reasons, and still more on account of both the incomparable superiority of the arguments developed in other sections of the *Apology*, and the discreet, but unmistakable pathos of several passages[94], I fully agree with Burnet (note on 24c9) that the Ἐρώτησις is not meant by Plato to be the real defence of Socrates. It is disappointing to see how many modern scholars have been led astray on this point and have failed thereby to arrive at a real understanding of the structure and the significance of the *Apology*[95]. Below, in § 9 of this chapter, I will come back to the literary and the philosophical significance of the Ἐρώτησις as a whole. Before that, it is necessary to examine closely the content and method of its several parts.

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[93] ἀνατίθεσθαι (*Charm.* 164d1; *Prot.* 354e8; *Gorg.* 461d3. 462a3; *Men.* 89d4; *Phaed.* 87a2).

[94] 23b9-c1. 24a4-b2. 28b3-30c1. 31b5-c3, etc.

[95] Even to the extent of maintaining that Socrates is guilty as charged, so recently T.G. West *Plato's "Apology of Socrates"*. An Interpretation with a New Translation (Ithaca 1979). The only sensible way of dealing with the question is by phrasing it as follows: Does the Socrates depicted in the *Apology* not acknowledge the gods whom the city acknowledges but δαιμόνια καινά and does he corrupt the young? The Answer to a First Objection shows that Socrates acknowledges gods, so much so that his whole conduct of life was instigated by them, and among them is at least Apollo. The Answer to a Second Objection proves that Socrates does not corrupt the young.

6. *The Refutation of the First Charge*

a) First Problem: Who Makes the Young Better?

In order to show that Meletus has never given serious thought to problems of education, Socrates asks him two questions which are not only of paramount importance for the practice of education, but also touch on fundamental points of Socratic theory. The first is: who makes the young better or, what amounts to the same thing (see note on 24e4), who is able to educate them? Socrates considers this question relevant to the first charge brought against him, because Meletus contends that Socrates corrupts the young. But Meletus can only make good on this claim if he knows what corruption is and can therefore detect a corruptor. Now, according to a basic Socratic principle, 'contraries are object of the same knowledge'[96]. Therefore Meletus should know who is able to educate the young; if he cannot, his charge against Socrates will prove to be groundless.

Meletus is portrayed as being at first baffled by Socrates' question because he is unaware of the elementary principles of methodical reasoning. Then he pulls himself together and replies that the laws make the young better. I will examine his reasons presently. Anyhow, it is clear, at least in Socrates' eyes, that the laws do not act in a vacuum. Every educational influence reaches the young through a human medium. Since Meletus has no set of criteria defining a true educator, he can only point to an easily recognisable class of men. Moreover (as Plato wishes us to understand Meletus' answer) he thinks he has found an excellent means of flattering the members of the jury and he says boldly: Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί (24e3). Socrates, however, refuses to accept this answer: since the jurors are appointed by lot[97], they do not necessarily have any special qualifications and it is impossible that everyone of them should posses knowledge of the laws (αὐτὸ τοῦτο <u>οἶδε</u>, τοὺς νόμους, 24e2). Therefore he persists and asks whether Meletus thinks that all the jurors are endowed with this knowledge or only some of them. If Meletus has the courage to choose the second alternative, his attempt at flattery will have failed. So he opts for the first.

But Socrates will not acquiesce. How could the jurors, who are just a sample of all Athenian citizens, claim the monopoly of educational ability? What about the people attending the trial? Since Meletus does not want to

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[96] Arist. *Top.* ii 3, 110b20 τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ... ἐπιστήμη. The principle *contrariorum eadem scientia* is used time and again in the dialogues. It applies to contraries (wise : not-wise) as well as to opposites (wise : foolish); both are called ἐναντία in Plato and Aristotle. The most explicit formulation is to be found *Phaed.* 97d2-5, where Socrates speaks about the knowledge of the good as a universal cause: (ἔδοξέ μοι) οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπωι ... ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.

[97] Busolt-Swoboda *Griechische Staatskunde* ii 1153 and 898; Harrison *Law of Athens* ii 44-46. 239-241.

offend them, he cannot but concede that they, too, are capable of educating the young. Socrates, however, does not stop even here: he mentions still other Athenians, who are not present, viz. first the Councillors (βουλευταί) and, since Meletus cannot exclude them outright nor introduce a discrimination which he has not applied to the jurors, all of them. Then, there is no reason why the same should not be said of the whole of the body politic, since the People's Court and the Council are just a random representation of that body. This progression[98] produces a comic effect which reaches its climax when Socrates leads Meletus to admit that every Athenian makes the young better and that he, Socrates, is the only one who corrupts them. The enormity of this statement, to which Meletus commits himself with absolute sureness (25a11 πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω), makes him and all his answers appear utterly ridiculous.

Actually, however, Meletus' contention that everybody in the community is capable of contributing to the education of the young is not trivial, since it was the basic tenet of the Athenian democrats[99]. As far as we can see, the first theoretical elaboration of this notion was provided by Protagoras. I do not see why we should not accept the myth told by the Sophist in Plato's *Protagoras* (320c8-323a4) as a trustworthy record of his doctrines, as well as the conclusions he draws from it (323a5-324d1) and the systematical exposition[100] which he gives afterwards (324d2-328c2) about the role of the social and political community in the process of education[101].

Compared with animals, man could seem to be poorly equipped for life. But he is endowed with two faculties which enable him to overcome all his difficulties, technical skill (321d1 ἔντεχνος σοφία) and the faculty of social and political life; this second ability consists in 'mutual consideration and a sense of a standard of conduct' (322c2 αἰδώς and δίκη). As for skills, one craftsman, for example a shipbuilder or a physician, can satisfy the needs of a whole group of men; when it comes to 'political skill', however, it is

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[98] Which is highlighted stylistically by the use of four nouns terminating in -ταί; see the note on 24e3ff.

[99] The following sketch of the political and educational views of Protagoras and of the Athenian democrats has to be kept brief so as not to exceed the limits of a commentary on the *Apology*.

[100] λόγος, as distinguished from μῦθος (324d6-7; 328c3).

[101] I consider Nestle *Vom Mythos zum Logos* 283-289 the best account; see also D. Loenen *Protagoras and the Greek Community* (Amsterdam 1941) esp. 1-24 and 74-89. The caution of K. von Fritz *RE s.v.* Protagoras, 917-918, seems to me excessive. — K. Döring 'Die politische Theorie des Protagoras' in Kerferd *The Sophists and their Legacy* 109-115 voices the prevailing opinion in modern scholarship when he concludes (115) that 'hinter dem was Platon Protagoras in den beiden Dialogen [*Prot.*, *Theaet.*] zum Zwecke der Selbstverteidigung sagen lässt, dieselbe Theorie zu stehen scheint. Wenn dem aber so ist, liegt es dann nicht nahe in ihr die Theorie des historischen Protagoras zu sehen?' But Dodds' doubt about the existence of a book Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῆι καταστάσεως seems fully justified: 'I cannot quite dismiss the gnawing suspicion ... that this title has been merely inferred from Plato's myth', *The Ancient Concept of Progress and other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief* (Oxford 1973) 9 n.4.

essential that the fundamental abilities which make communal life possible should be fully developed in every member of the community. Young people are like shoots: they are able to grow, but they need to be cultivated and, if necessary, straightened out. This is done by all kinds of social pressure, especially by praise and blame. Whereas we do not reprove a neighbour who is ugly or puny, but only pity him, we use criticism, anger and punishment against those who indulge in injustice, impiety or any other attitude incompatible with 'civic virtue', because, apparently, we think that virtue is not an automatic product of nature, but can be acquired by teaching and training (323e1-324a3).

The whole civic community is involved with educating the young. This process starts during early childhood in the bosom of the family, where everyone is eager to impress on the little one the rules of right living. It continues at school in the same spirit, for what the parents expect their children to learn from the elementary teacher, the music-master and the physical trainer is not some particular skills, but good conduct. When the children leave school, it is the city itself that takes over their education and 'compels them to learn the laws and to live according to them as the pattern of their conduct, that they may not yield to their own light fancies'. It 'sketches out for them the laws devised by good lawgivers of yore, and constrains them to govern and be governed according to these' (326c7-d1. d5-7)[102].

In this process of collective education, every member of the community is both actively and passively involved. Since all of us expect to profit by our neighbours' justice and virtue 'we all make every effort to tell and teach one another what is just and lawful' (327b3-4). We do not treat virtue as a specialised skill, whose secrets we try to keep for ourselves. If anybody wonders whether there are teachers of civic virtue as there are of flute-playing, he might as well ask who is a teacher of Greek; there is none because actually everybody is. So 'everyone is a teacher of virtue to the extent of his power' (327e1-2). He does so by impressing on the young and his fellow-citizens the rules of conduct as 'laws' that prevail in this community. As we know from Plato's *Theaetetus*[103] such standards are not, according to Protagoras, a product of nature, but of culture (that is, they exist νόμωι, not φύσει).

Protagoras' doctrine is diametrically opposed to that of the Platonic Socrates, who holds that the standards of morality are the object of a special, higher kind of knowledge. According to Socrates, most people only have opinions (δόξαι) about what is right or wrong, just or unjust, and therefore they cannot be sure whether their judgments about values are correct or not and whether what they try to teach the others will be beneficial to them or not.

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[102] Here and below, I use Lamb's translation, sometimes with a slight alteration.

[103] 167c2-d1. One should especially note the similarity of c2-4 with *Prot.* 326d5.

It is easily shown that Protagoras' line of thought is that of the democrats. We see indeed that several of Protagoras' basic ideas, if not their theoretical framework, are found in the 'Funeral Oration' of Pericles[104], the man who appointed Protagoras to draw up a code of laws for the panhellenic colony at Thurii. I quote a few sentences:

> Our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands not of the few but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred for public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has in him to do the state a service (ii 37,1, C.F. Smith's translation).
>
> In our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws ... which, though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognise (37,3)[105].
>
> You will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and public affairs, and though each of us gives attention to different kinds of business[106], you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business[107], but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves or at least endeavour to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action (40,2).

Of course, in the Funeral Speech Pericles focuses on those values and ideals in which the Athenians felt themselves to be different from the Spartans, and he is more concerned with the defence of those ideals against domestic and foreign attacks than with how they take root in the souls of the citizens. *Pericles* thinks more in terms of πολιτεία, *Protagoras* more in terms of παιδεία. Yet they share the same basic belief: *every* citizen has in himself the fundamental ability to serve the common good and therefore has the right as well as the duty to take an active part in political, social and educational life.

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[104] With the following, cf. Chapter VIII 151-153.

[105] Such unwritten laws are general rules of conduct, or rather a system of values, according to which the members of the Athenian community measured their esteem or contempt for one another. The notion of 'disgrace' corresponds with that of 'blame, criticism' (νουθέτησις) which we met in the doctrines of Protagoras. On the various values of the phrase ἄγραφος νόμος, see MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 125-126.

[106] Reading ἑτέροις <ἕτερα> with Richards.

[107] ἀπράγμονα; cf. Chapter VIII 151-152.

The democrats of ca. 400 B.C. were still true to Pericles' ideas. This is reflected in an interesting passage in the *Meno*. In that dialogue, whose dramatic date seems to be the very beginning of the year 402 B.C.[108], Meno is the principal interlocutor of Socrates. Yet Anytus, who was the principal leader of the Athenian moderate democrats since 403 (see above, 91-92), is also a participant. In 89e9-10 we hear that he has just come to sit down near both speakers. At this point, the discussion has come to a deadlock. On the one hand it has been agreed that virtue can be taught; on the other hand, it seems that there are no masters who teach nor pupils who learn it. At that moment, Socrates turns to Anytus and, after a short inductive argument about the teaching and learning of skills, asks him to whom Meno could go to learn political and social virtue. Perhaps to the so-called Sophists? (91b7-8). Mention of the word makes Anytus very angry:

> For heavens' sake, hold your tongue, Socrates. May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or of another, be seized by such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them (91c1-5, Lamb's translation).

But Socrates is not satisfied with this negative answer; he wants Anytus to name at least one person in Athens from whom one could learn virtue. Anytus replies: 'Why mention a particular one? Any Athenian gentleman we come across, without exception, will do him more good, if he will do as he is bid, than the sophists' (92e3-6).

Burnet has already cited this passage (note on 24d11) and pointed out that 'every Athenian democrat would naturally ... say that the goodness of the man and the citizen was to be learnt from one's fellow-citizens'; he does not, however, call attention to the similarity of this answer with the doctrine of Protagoras[109]. In Anytus' mouth, the phrase τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν does not have aristocratic connotations (Bluck, note on 92e5); it simply refers to men who conduct their lives according to traditional standards. Anytus' devotion to tradition shows that his attitude is fundamentally the same as that of Protagoras, the champion of νόμος, although, as Bluck rightly remarks (note on 92e4), there is no need to assume that Anytus had any knowledge of Protagoras' teachings. Protagoras' last visit to Athens probably took place shortly after the 'Peace of Nicias'[110], when Anytus would have been a schoolboy; and since Anytus was a practical statesman and not a theoretician, he would not have been interested in Protagoras' doctrines.

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[108] See Bluck *Comm. Meno* 120, who refers to J.S. Morrison 'Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias' *CQ* 36 (1942) 57-78, esp. 57-58.

[109] This similarity is noted by Bluck in his note on 92e4 and in p.25-30 of his Introduction. However, he concerns himself almost exclusively with a problem that is not mentioned in the *Apology*, viz. that of the evil sons of virtuous fathers.

[110] Cf. J. Morrison 'The place of Protagoras in Athenian public life (460-415 B.C.)' *CQ* 35 (1941) 1-16, esp. 5-7; J.A. Davison, 'Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras', *CQ* 3 (1953) 33-45, esp. 37-38; K. v. Fritz *RE s.v.* Protagoras, 909-911.

When he speaks about sophists with so much contempt, he must have had in mind the more recent ones who, contrary to the views of Protagoras, radicalised Hippias' and Antiphon's criticism of νόμος and exaltation of φύσις and preached a revolutionary immorality like that attributed to Thrasymachus in *Republic* i and to Callicles in the *Gorgias*.

When writing this passage of the *Apology*, Plato seems to have been thinking of Anytus' firm belief in the democratic view that civic virtue is not taught by specialists but by every earnest member of the civic body, as 25b6-7 suggests. There Socrates makes an argument about education of men based on the training of horses (cf. 20a6-b5). He asks whether everyone can train horses or 'just one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they are dealing with horses and use them, injure them? Certainly it is so, whether you *and Anytus* say so or not' (25b2-7). The explicit mention of Anytus is significant. There is no other passage in the 'Ερώτησις where Socrates invokes Anytus' opinion. In the rest of the *Apology*, Socrates mentions him in only two passages (29c1. 30b8. c9. 31a5; 34b1); in both of these, he refers to his care for the young, which reflects his democratic views. Here too, it is because he is a leader of the democrats that Socrates mentions him. He does so because the democrats rejected the Socratic view according to which civic virtue depends on a *knowledge* of absolute standards, a knowledge that cannot be found among οἱ πολλοί, and therefore Anytus likewise can be expected to reject Socrates' argument.

When asked who could make the young better, Meletus' first answer was: οἱ νόμοι. Actually, law was revered everywhere in Greece, not only among Athenian democrats. It may suffice to refer to the famous speech which, in Herodotus (vii 104,4-5), the exiled king of Sparta, Demaratus, makes to Xerxes about the supreme authority which law enjoys in his city, an authority that motivates Spartan soldiers to face death without hesitation if the law requires it. But it is especially in a democracy like that of Athens that the laws are felt to express the consensus and the common ideals of the community, and that every citizen is expected to cooperate to make them effective in everyday life.

We might ask whether Plato, when he portrays Socrates ridiculing Meletus and his answers, gives a fair treatment to Protagoras' theory on law and education, a theory which many of us would consider better founded than that of the Platonic Socrates. Several responses can be made. I have already pointed out that Socrates does not take Meletus seriously and that he has good reason for dismissing him in this way. In this particular passage, Socrates shows that Meletus, while accepting the democratic slogans, does not understand their implications or the theoretical presuppositions on which they rest. Socrates' main thesis is that standards of conduct cannot be based entirely on convention, in other words that they should be based on some absolute principles which can be known with certainty by man.

Of course, the 'Ερώτησις was not a suitable place to explain what those principles are nor how the true scale of values is grounded 'in nature'.

Actually Plato thinks that relatively few men will even be able to reach a full understanding of the superiority of the soul to the body or of the difference between opinion and knowledge. This does not imply, in his mind, that the common man cannot be educated. True, he will not reach the level of 'true virtue', which is inseparable from insight (ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, *Phaed.* 69b3), but only what he calls, according to the context, either 'social'[111] or 'popular virtue'[112]. Such virtues, he thinks, can be acquired precisely through the methods described by Protagoras: education in the family, at school and in the gymnasium, civic festivals, poetry, religion. He gives a summary description of that kind of education in *Republic* iii-iv, a more detailed discussion in the *Laws*. We should not expect a few lines of the Ἐρώτησις to solve all the problems raised by Protagoras' sociological approach to morality and education.

b) Second Problem: Is it Possible to Corrupt Wilfully?

The way in which Socrates launches his argument about this second question is designed to disconcert Meletus. The normal order of the propositions would have been this: (a) whoever corrupts his associates will in the long run harm himself; now (b) nobody harms himself deliberately; therefore (c) either Socrates does not corrupt other people or, if he does, he corrupts them unwittingly. As the text runs, the term 'corrupting' does not appear until 25d5. So Meletus cannot immediately see what Socrates is driving at; the first question seems to be quite irrelevant to the charge which is now under examination. Therefore he refuses to answer at first.

Socrates' next question brings us closer to the topic of corruption. He asks, in quite general terms, whether men normally exert an influence upon their associates, a bad influence if they are bad, good if they are good. The very notion of education implies the possibility of such an influence. Taking for granted the axiom *agere sequitur esse*, Socrates postulates that the quality of the influence reflects that of the person who exerts the influence (25c7-9. d9-e1). This is a thesis to which Plato adhered until the end of his life, as appears e.g. from *Laws* x 904b2-3, where it is stated that the King (i.e. the providential God) 'considered that what is good in soul is by nature always beneficial, and what is bad is by nature harmful'[113].

The dialogues have a lot to say about both good and bad influence. First, we hear that a good agent cannot possibly do any harm. This is argued at length in *Republic* i 335b2-336a8. Polemarchus has asserted, on the authority of Simonides, that justice consists in doing good to one's friends and harming one's enemies (332a9-10. b5-8. 334b8-9). Socrates cannot agree

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[111] πολιτικὴ ἀρετή (*Phaed.* 82a11-b3). Cf. note on 20b4.

[112] δημοτικὴ ἀρετή (*Phaed.* 82a11; *Rep.* vi 500d8; cf. *Laws* iv 710a5). There is little scholarly literature about the lower forms of virtue in Plato and it is mostly disappointing.

[113] τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν (cf. *Apol.* 25d1-2 βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι).

with this. Since harming one's enemies is equivalent to making them worse, i.e. more unjust (335c2. 7)[114], justice would make somebody unjust. That, however, is impossible. The virtuous and just man does nobody any harm, and Polemarchus' definition of justice should be rejected. In the discussion about θεολογία in book ii, the same argument is applied to God. Here we find not only that God, since he is good, will never harm, but also the positive statement, that he is by nature beneficent (379b1-c1). From that passage it is only a step to the famous statement that opens the account of 'creation' in the *Timaeus*:

> He (the divine Craftsman or Demiurge) was good; and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever arise. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself ... Desiring, then, that all things should be good and, so far as might be, nothing imperfect, the god took over all that is visible — not at rest, but in discordant and unordered motion — and brought it from disorder into order (29e1-30a5)[115].

To return now to the problem of education, it cannot, in our passage of the *Apology*, have been Plato's intention to assert that moral conduct is necessarily determined by the influence of one's associates, or of other people in general. Socrates will say below: 'Neither Meletus nor Anytus will harm me; they would not even be able to do so. There can be no question of a better man being injured by one inferior to him' (30c8-d1). Similarly Socrates, with all his devotion, cannot guarantee that any of his young friends will achieve virtue and persevere in it, as we shall see apropos of 33b3-6 (Chapter VIII § 2d) In all cases, goodness and wickedness result from a personal decision; 'the responsibility is with him that chooses' (*Rep.* x 617e4). Still, Plato does not question the reality and the importance of the influence of people on one another. All of Socrates' life and actions would become meaningless if a man could not help another to find his way to the good life, although this help will not diminish the other's freedom and responsibility in the least. On the other hand, true freedom requires that many conditions are met[116]. In the case of those people that are only able

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[114] Cf. *Apol.* 25e2-3 ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων.

[115] Cornford's translation. One should, of course, render ὁ θεός not by 'the god', but by 'God', as does Shorey in *Rep.* ii 379b1 and c2. — On the passage of the *Timaeus*, see W.J. Verdenius' masterly paper 'Platons Gottesbegriff' *La notion du divin depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* i (Vandoeuvres 1952) 239-293. I do, however, have reservations about the following lines: 'Der göttliche Künstler tut seine Arbeit mit ganzem Herzen und will ein möglichst gutes Produkt abliefern (29e). Seine Güte besteht in seiner technischen Meisterschaft und in dem unbeschränkten Eifer, womit er sich seiner Arbeit hingibt. Aber diese Liebe gilt seinem Werkstück ausschliesslich als einem Beweis seiner eigenen Meisterschaft' (p. 248). This, I think, goes too far. The text does not say that the god was *a good craftsman*, but, more radically, that he was *good*. Freedom from jealousy is a moral, not a technical ἀρετή.

[116] Compare the list of qualities which the φιλόσοφος should possess, *Rep.* vi 485a10-487a6. 503b7-d12; *Theaet.* 144a1-b7.

to reach 'social' and 'popular' virtue, the influence of their associates will be much stronger and often determinant. They will experience what Socrates describes in 25c7-e3: when somebody does them harm, they will react and in their turn do the evil-doer evil.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates treats a similar topic at length, though from a different perspective. The aim of the true statesman, he says, is 'to make his fellow citizens better' (515a4-5. b8-c3). Now we find that Pericles was at first popular, but at the end of his political career, when the Athenians ought to have been transformed into decent men (καλοὶ κἀγαθοί) by him, they convicted him of embezzlement, and all but condemned him to death (515e11-516a3). A similar fate befell Cimon, Themistocles and Miltiades. This proves that they did not, actually, make their fellow citizens more gentle and just, in short better men. The case of the sophists is still more conclusive: they profess that they are able to educate their pupils and to make them virtuous and honorable men, but 'often they accuse them (their pupils) of doing them injury by cheating them of their fees and otherwise showing no recognition of the good that they have done them' (519c5-d1). To be sure, the main point in the *Gorgias* is not the same as in the *Apology*: it is to show that men who consider themselves educators, either of the whole civic body or of a limited group of pupils, do not effectively bring the people they educate to a life of virtue. Still, the whole passage gives good illustrations of the backlash against a corruptor from those whom he has made not better but worse.

It may be objected that Socrates himself does not regard the punishment of these Athenian statesmen as evil: this follows from his emphatic statements about punishment in general (30d1-4; cf. 38b1-2). But we should notice that, in the contexts both of the *Gorgias* and of the 'Ερώτησις (25e2-3), he uses words like 'to harm' and 'to injure' in their popular sense, without the connotation that they have according to the Socratic scale of values. Furthermore, even the Platonic Socrates would not flatly deny that a death-sentence, imprisonment or exile are evils. They are not μεγάλα κακά (30d3) and therefore should not be taken into account when compared with moral evil[117]. In this respect, Socrates' position is unambiguous. When Polus asks him: 'Would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it?', he answers: '*I should wish neither*; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than to do it' (*Gorg.* 469b12-c2).

Granted, then, that whoever harms his associates will harm himself, Socrates asks whether anyone wants to be injured rather than benefited (25d1-3). Meletus admits that nobody does. Still, he insists that Socrates corrupts the young and that he does so wilfully. Socrates asserts that this is utterly

[117] Note the use of πολὺ μᾶλλον in 30d4.

impossible (e5-6), since wrong-doing can never be deliberate and is always rooted in ignorance. Here we have the famous Socratic paradox οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει. I have no intention of discussing its precise meaning here[118], although I am sure that it is quite misleading to speak about 'Socratic intellectualism'[119]. Anyhow, this was a fundamental thesis for Plato and there is no doubt that he adhered to it firmly to the end of his life. Now we may think that the way in which he uses it in *this* argument is not very satisfying. Since no distinction whatsoever is made between the different degrees of harm that one might suffer at the hand of others, it is by no means evident that Socrates should at any price eschew each and every kind of harm. As we saw before, one of the principal forms of evil is a conviction by an Athenian jury, and Socrates is prepared to run this risk. For it is not the specific nature of an impending threat which is decisive in his eyes, but the relative harm in comparison with other evils, in this case forsaking his mission (29a4-b7). So the argument is only valid if we accept that 'corrupting the young' is not, according to Socrates, something for which it is worth risking a condemnation. However, the rapidity with which the argument is conducted does not allow us to notice right away that it conceals a trick. Plato intends to introduce one of the main principles of Socratic ethics, and to do it in such a way as to leave Meletus bewildered.

The last sentence of the paragraph raises a question that seems to have escaped the attention of commentators. Socrates reproves Meletus for 'bringing him before a court, where the law prescribes to summon those who need punishment, not instruction' (26a6-7). Of course, Athenian law makes no such distinction, but here, as often, Socrates presents his own paradoxical views as if they are shared by everybody. The real problem, however, is this: if nobody does wrong wilfully, every wrongdoer simply needs instruction and there seems to be no place for punishment. In books ix-xii of the *Laws* Plato must face this issue, since he sets out to draw up a detailed code of criminal law. Before starting it, he emphatically reasserts his fundamental principle: οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί (860d1) and: σύμφημι γὰρ ἄκοντας ἀδικεῖν πάντας (d9). The possibility of criminal law and of a whole range of sanctions depends mainly on a distinction between the external 'damage' (βλάβη), which is done be either

[118] Let it suffice to mention a few recent works in which the reader will find references to the relevant texts of Plato and to modern literature on the subject: K.A. Neuhausen *De voluntarii notione platonica et aristotelea* (Wiesbaden 1967) 7-92; O'Brien *Socratic Paradoxes* 83-107; N. Gulley *The Philosophy of Socrates* (London 1968) 91-126; T.J. Saunders 'The Socratic Paradoxes in Plato's Laws. A commentary on 859c-864b' *Hermes* 96 (1968) 421-434; Vlastos *Socrates* 148-154.

[119] On this, see 'The Unity ...'.

voluntarily or involuntarily, and the 'injustice' (ἀδικία), a state of mind, which always occurs involuntarily[120].

This distinction, however, does not help to explain Socrates' argument in the *Apology*, and an explanation is needed even more since there are several such passages in the dialogues, for example those which say that the best thing that can happen to a wrongdoer is to be punished and the worst to escape punishment[121]. In his valuable essay on Plato's theory of punishment[122], Apelt's comments indicate that he is aware of the problem (if not quite clearly), and he suggests a possible answer: 'Zu dieser Bekehrung genügt nicht die blosse Belehrung. Es bedarf eines gewaltsamen Eingriffes. Nur durch eine gründliche Erschütterung ihrer Seele von aussen kann in ihnen die Stimmung erweckt werden, die sie der Besserung fähig macht. Eben darin nun besteht das Wesen der Strafe' (p.190). Perhaps something more can be said.

Plato does not deny that for man in his mortal condition, in other words, for an imperfect soul attached to an imperfect body, we cannot expect that the reasonable force or 'part' of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν) will be in absolute command of all human activities, since the other psychological forces, τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν can to some extent distort the natural inclination of the rational part to true good. Under the influence of illusions which originate in θυμός and ἡδονή, the clarity of insight is blurred and ἄγνοια arises; this leads to erroneous judgments when man decides to what act he will commit himself. This is not only the doctrine of the *Laws*[123]; we find it already in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates says: 'The body fills us with passions and desires, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as the phrase goes, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all' (66c2-5, Fowler's translation, slightly modified). Another passage is still more explicit: 'The soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not'[124].

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[120] See Neuhausen *o.c.* (above, n.118) 55-67; Saunders *art. cit.* (ibid.); id. 'Plato on killing in anger. A reply to Professor Woozley' *PhilosQ* 23 (1973) 350-356; id., translation *Laws* 367-369.

[121] *Gorg.* 476a7-478e5; cf. *Rep.* ii 380a5-b6.

[122] 'Straftheorie', chapter X (189-202) of *Platonische Aufsätze* (Leipzig 1912). See also T.J. Saunders 'Protagoras and Plato on punishment' in Kerferd *The Sophists and their Legacy* 129-141; id. *Plato's Penal Code*. Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology (Oxford 1991); M.M. Mackenzie *Plato on Punishment* (Berkeley 1981).

[123] See T.J. Saunders' excellent analysis in 'The Socratic Paradoxes...' (above, n.118), 425-433.

[124] 83c5-8; the passage should be read in the light of its context (viz. 83b5-d6). — When taken alone, 66c2-5 could suggest that the emotions are experienced by the *body*; but actually, as 83c5-8 shows, their 'subject' is the soul (considered in its two inferior parts, to use the terminology of the *Republic*). The body as such, i.e. considered separate from its union with the soul, is incapable of any important activity. When in *Phaedrus* and *Laws* Plato calls the soul ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, he makes more explicit what was already the doctrine of the *Phaedo*. On this

Now the normal effect of punishment is precisely to remove from the wrongdoer the very sources of his pleasure or anger, and thus to 'sober' him, as a passage from the *Gorgias* will show: 'We found that paying the penalty is a relief from the greatest wickedness?' Polus agrees and Socrates continues: 'Because, I suppose, the penalty (δίκη) recalls us to our senses (σωφρονίζει) and makes us more just, and acts as a medicine for wickedness'[125]. The best description of the way in which punishment works is found in a passage of the *Republic*:

> Is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body does when is gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body[126]? (ix 591b1-7, Shorey's translation).

So punishment removes the principal obstacles to moral progress and makes it possible for a person, according to his gifts, to acquire either true insight into the good (σοφία, φρόνησις) or at least right opinions (ὀρθὴ δόξα) and good habits (ἔθος). When, however, punishment has no effect, it has to be admitted that the ignorance (ἀμαθία) is incurable and the corruption beyond remedy (*Laws* xii 957e2-958a3; cf. ix 854e1-6).

True philosophers, however, that is to say, those who strive wholeheartedly for insight and suffer from no inordinate desire for honour, pleasure or money, do not need to be brought to their senses and therefore do not need chastening (κόλασις). This does not imply that they are never wrong; on the contrary, since they are not σοφοί, but only φιλόσοφοι, they *will* sometimes make mistakes. But they are always eager to learn and so are well prepared to accept the necessary instruction. This, I think, is what Plato intended to say in the passage *Apology* 26a1-7, although I would not assert that he says it plainly.

7. *The Refutation of the Second Charge*

We have seen above that Plato decided to focus on the charge of corruption

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continuity in Plato's psychology, see H. Cherniss *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* I (Baltimore 1944) 402. 432-454.

[125] 478d4-7. Lamb renders δίκη by 'justice of the court' and σωφρονίζει by 'reforms'. For σωφρονίζειν, cf. *Laws* ix 854d4-5 τάχα γὰρ ἂν δοὺς ταύτην τὴν δίκην γένοιτ' ἂν βελτίων σωφρονισθείς and xi 934a1 σωφρονιστύος ἕνεκα.

[126] The next lines up to 592a4 are also very interesting. In d1 σωφρονήσειν does not, as b5 σωφροσύνην, point to one of the four cardinal virtues, but to the more general 'soberness' which makes possible an harmonious cooperation of the different faculties and activities of body and soul. See further *Critias* 106b2-3 δίκη δὲ ὀρθὴ τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν ('The correct penalty is to bring into tune him who is out of tune').

of the young and to treat the charge of impiety as secondary. This was technically incorrect but corresponded, in all likelihood, to Meletus' and Anytus' own intentions. We can, therefore, understand why Socrates represents the charge of impiety here as closely linked with the charge of corruption: impiety, or rather piety, was the standard against which Socrates' influence on the young was measured, and since his influence led them away from the ancestral traditions of Athens, his activity could be considered a kind of impiety. Once again, the 'New Accusers' are depicted as wholly depending on the slander disseminated by the 'Old Accusers'. The charge of impiety is distorted; it does not have its technical meaning, which involved religious practice and especially the introduction of cultual innovations. Since Meletus never gave a serious thought to the meaning of the indictment, he is easily lured into defining Socrates' impiety as atheism, a point to which I shall return presently.

Just as in the first charge, the Ἐρώτησις is divided into two sections by an imperative directed to Meletus:

(A) (a) καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ (24c9);
(b) ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε (25c5);
(B) (a) ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν (26b2);
(b) σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε (27a9).

This parallelism, however, is purely formal; there is no comparable parallelism in the argumentation. In (A) two different topics are treated in order to show that Socrates cannot be a corrupter of the young: (a) the abundance or scarcity of people capable of making young people better, (b) the possibility of harming the young deliberately. In both topics, Socrates argues against Meletus on the strength of one of his main philosophical principles. In (B), however, there is one continuous argument, divided into two stages. First (a) Meletus is led to reformulate the first half of his charge of impiety, viz. θεοὺς ... μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει and to assert that he is accusing Socrates of radical atheism. In the second stage (b), Socrates points out the contradiction which exists between the second half of the indictment formula, viz. ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά, and the reformulated first half. — Another difference between (B) and (A) is still more important. In section (B) Socrates' tactics are purely negative: he does no more than show that Meletus contradicts himself; he does not for his own part, propose any personal view about theology or about the cult of the gods. He clearly is saving this for a more suitable context.

Let us turn first to the interpretation of the indictment as a charge of atheism. Meletus' categorical answer: ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς (26c7)[127] is exceedingly rash and thoughtless, since it

[127] Cf. e5 οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

involves him in a blatant contradiction[128], which is concealed for a time by the vagueness of the term δαιμόνια. We might ask whether such foolishness does not lack psychological verisimilitude and whether Plato, by lapsing into caricature and buffoonery, does not impair the dignity and the unity of tone of the *Apology*. I think it is possible to answer these objections in a satisfactory manner.

To begin with, Meletus' words in 26c7 should not be view in isolation but in the context of the whole picture that Socrates draws of him. He emphasises Meletus' young age (25d9 τηλικόσδε ὤν; 26e9 νεότητι)[129], his volatility (24c6 ῥαιδίως; 26e8 ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος), his immature playfulness (24c6 χαριεντίζεται; 27a2 χαριεντιζομένου; a7 παίζοντος; d6 χαριεντίζεσθαι) and the thoughtlessness with which he treats difficult problems to which he has never given a minute's attention (24c7-8 ὧν οὐδὲν τούτωι πώποτε ἐμέλησεν; cf. d9. 25c2-3. 26b1-2). These shortcomings also appear in Meletus' answers in 26c7 and e5, just as they did before in 25a9-11. Moreover, even if he had wished to, Meletus would scarcely have been able to collect reliable information about Socrates' behaviour and opinions in matters of religion. So, when closely questioned, he would have been forced to give some wild answers and, sooner of later, to reveal his ignorance.

The most important point, however, is this. Here, as throughout the *Apology*, Meletus is depicted, probably with reason, as relying entirely upon the διαβολή as a basis for his accusation. When he charges Socrates with impiety, he sees in him the reincarnation of a man who was prosecuted in Athens before on similar grounds, Anaxagoras. As we saw above, 98-99, it was generally considered self-evident that people interested in τὰ μετέωρα and τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς did not in their heart of hearts accept and revere the gods of traditional religion. Meletus follows popular opinion in identifying theological innovations and atheism. But since Socrates does not think Meletus is serious and sincere, he does not engage his accuser in a discussion of what true religion is. He will, however, set out his views on this issue in subsequent sections of the *Apology*, after dispensing with Meletus.

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[128] Brickhouse - Smith 120-121 claim that Meletus' answer is well considered: the alternative answer, that Socrates does believe in gods not acknowledged by the state, would have deprived him of the tactical advantage of the current prejudice against natural philosophers, who were generally believed to be complete atheists. But the Meletus we are studying here is not a human being with flesh and blood and thought processes which we can try and determine, but a literary character whose answers have to be read in conjunction with other signals in the text (see below). Besides, it is doubtful that traditional prejudice did not lump together complete atheists and natural philosophers who, while denying the existence of traditional gods, gave a divine or quasi-divine status to such forces as Nous, Ananke or even Dinos. See above, 98-100.

[129] Cf. *Euthyphro* 2b8 νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς.

Before concluding this part of the analysis, I shall try to clear up a point of religious history which, in my opinion, has not been interpreted correctly[130]. At this point, Meletus has just reformulated the terms of his indictment and asserted that Socrates not only does not acknowledge the gods whom the city acknowledges, but that he absolutely rejects all gods (26b8-c7). Socrates expresses his astonishment at this with the words Ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; (d1). He thinks that Meletus can hardly mean what he says, and to show that his presumption of Socrates' radical atheism is utterly improbable, he mentions gods whose existence is generally accepted, even though they were not the object of an official cult in Athens. As a quite evident example he refers to 'Sun and Moon, which the rest of mankind[131] believe to be gods' (26d1-3). In his note, Burnet quotes Aristophanes *Peace* 406-411, where Trygaeus says that Helios and Selene are betraying Hellas because the Greeks sacrifice to the Olympian gods, whereas the barbarians sacrifice to Sun and Moon. Now, it is true that the public worship of Helios and Selene was far less prominent among the Greeks than among many 'barbarians', about whose religion the Greeks of ca. 400 B.C. were fairly well-informed by Herodotus and others, for example among the Persians (Her. i 131,2), the Massagetans (i 216,4), the Egyptians (ii 59,3. 73,3. 111,4), the Libyans (iv 188), to say nothing about the cults of Shamash and Astarte among the Western Semites and the Babylonians. In the *Cratylus*, Socrates proposes the following etymology of θεοί:

> I think the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe to-day — sun, moon, earth, stars and sky. They saw that all these were always moving in their course and running, and so they called them gods (θεούς) from this running (θεῖν) nature' (397c8-d4, Fowler's translation; 'foreigners' renders the Greek βάρβαροι).

There is, however, no doubt that the Greeks of the classical era generally acknowledged Sun and Moon as gods, although there were very few cities in which they were worshiped in a public cult. In Sophocles *O.T.* 1424-1426, 'the all-nurturing flame of Lord Helios' (τὴν ... πάντα βόσκουσαν φλόγα ... ἄνακτος Ἡλίου) is contrasted with the 'children of mortals' (τὰ θνητῶν ... γένεθλα)[132]. More explicit is a passage of Aristophanes' *Clouds* which we have seen quoted in *Apol.* 19c2-4. Socrates addresses himself to his new pupil Strepsiades with the words: ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον, to which Strepsiades answers: ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ ταρροῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ; (225-227). This would be pointless

[130] Burnet's note on 26d1 οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην goes astray because he sees in Socrates' words the rebuke of an alleged allusion to the Diopeithes decree and a play upon the difference between the phrases νομίζειν θεούς and νομίζειν εἶναι θεούς. See above, 87-88.

[131] οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, not οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι nor οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες.

[132] In many other texts sun, moon and earth are taken as divine witnesses either of oaths or of shameful actions of men; e.g. Dem. xix 267.

if τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς did not take up περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον, that is, if ἥλιος was not considered to be a god.

But by far the most important texts are to be found in the works of Plato himself. First of all, we have Alcibiades' story about Socrates' night-long meditation during the siege of Potidaea; it ends as follows: ὁ δὲ (scil. Socrates) εἱστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἔπειτ' ᾤχετ' ἀπιὼν προσευξάμενος τῶι ἡλίωι (*Symp.* 220d3-5). Socrates' prayer not only takes place at sunrise, it is addressed to the sun. In the celebrated allegory of the Sun in *Rep.* vi, the sun is called τοῦτον τὸν θεόν (508a9) as a matter of course. A similar *obiter dictum* we read in the *Laws*: 'it is in fact pretty well the day on which *the god* turns from summer to winter', meaning the summer solstice (iii 683c4-5)[133]. But another text form the *Laws* certainly reflects well-considered opinions, since it belongs to the 'theology' of Book x; furthermore it is closely related to the *Apology* since it alludes unmistakably to the theories of Anaxagoras[134]:

> When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods and adduce what you adduced[135] — sun, moon, stars and earth — and argue they are gods and divine beings, the proselytes of these clever fellows will say that these things are just earth and stones, and are incapable of caring for human affairs (886d4-e1, Saunders' translation).

A further passage of the same book x of the *Laws* is still more important for our purpose, since it does not purport to be a description of what might be a specifically Platonic innovation, namely the doctrine of the divinity of all heavenly bodies, but of what was a general practice among Greeks and 'barbarians':

> They (the children) saw their own parents praying with the utmost seriousness for themselves and their families in the firm conviction that their prayers and supplications were addressed to gods who really did exist. At the rising and setting of the sun and moon the children saw and heard Greeks and foreigners, in happiness and misery alike, all prostrate at their devotions; far from supposing the gods to be a myth, the worshippers believed their existence to be so sure as to be beyond suspicion (887d7-e7)[136].

To be sure, A.J. Festugière[137] thought that this description does not in reality reflect Greek practice, but anticipates some of Plato's proposals that are modelled on Chaldaean religion. Their main argument is that kneeling and prostration were not postures which were usual in Greek prayer.

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133 Surprisingly, both Bury and Saunders omit this clause, which mentions the Sun-god, entirely from their translations; the first speaks of midsummer, the second of the longest day of summer.

134 Cf. W. de Mahieu 'La doctrine ...' (see above, n.74), 22-23.

135 This refers to 886a2-4.

136 The Greek for 'foreigners' is βάρβαροι; about e3 προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις, see below; 'to be a myth', literally 'not to exist' (ὡς οὐκ ὄντων).

137 'Platon et l'Orient' *RPh* 73 (1947) 22-24. Cf. H. Görgemanns *Platons Nomoi* 203 n.1.

To counter this argument, we should first note the fact that Plato *explicitly* describes those attitudes as traditional among Greeks and foreigners alike and that the children could often see their parents praying in that fashion. We cannot reject his testimony out of hand. It is important to notice that he speaks about prayers to and adoration of only the sun and the moon, not the stars or the planets, whose worship was especially characteristic of the Chaldaeans[138], and in any case not Greek. The most important point, however, is that we should not judge private prayers by the rules which prevailed in the official and collective worship of the gods of the city. Socrates' morning prayer to the sun was an act of private devotion, not of public worship.

Plato uses two terms, προσκύνησις and προκύλισις. The latter unambiguously refers to complete prostration, which it may be conceded is definitely un-Greek. But προσκύνησις is vaguer: etymologically, it refers to blowing a kiss and does not imply anything as to the accompanying gesture or posture, which may be bowing, turning around, kneeling or prostrating oneself. The oldest attestation of προσκυνεῖν for a non-chthonic deity is found in Hipponax, the second in Sophocles[139], where the adoration is directed to the sun, and there are several other instances from the classical period[140]. In none of them is it necessary to assume complete prostration: kneeling, for which there is abundant archaeological evidence[141], is the likeliest posture. It looks as if Plato uses two nouns on purpose: προσκύνησις for the Greeks, προκύλισις for the βάρβαροι in a chiastic order: προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις ... Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων πάντων (887e3-4).

So the text of the *Laws* should be taken at face value and in this way it helps us to understand how Socrates could say, in *Apol.* 26d1-3, that everybody considered the sun and the moon to be gods.

8. *The Conclusion of the* Ἐρώτησις

This conclusion is very short: it covers only nine lines. Once more, Socrates comes back to the main theme of the Proposition, viz. that the new

138 The astral theology of the *Epinomis* has much to say about the stars and the planets as having the same rank as sun and moon (986a8-987d2); that the text quoted from the *Laws* does not mention them is probably not fortuitous.

139 Hipponax fr. 47 West, 51 Degani; Soph. fr. 672 Nauck², fr. 738 Pearson, Radt.

140 See H. Bolkestein *Theophrastos' Character der Deisidaimonia als religionsgeschichtliche Urkunde* (Giessen 1929) 23-39; A. Delatte 'Le baiser, l'agenouillement et le prosternement de l'adoration (προσκύνησις) chez les Grecs' *BAB* 37 (1951) 423-450; W. Fauth *Kleine Pauly s.v.* Proskynesis; H. Schlier *ThWNT s.v.* γόνυ, γονυπετεῖν; H. Greeven *ThWNT s.v.* προσκυνέω, προσκυνητής.

141 Cf. F.T. van Straten 'Did the Greeks Kneel before their Gods?' *BABesch* 49 (1974) 159-189. Van Straten casts doubt on the assumption that kneeling is reserved for chthonic deities, 176-177.

accusation rests entirely on the old one. If the jury finds him guilty, it will not be on the strength of Meletus' and Anytus' charges, but only as a result of 'the prejudice against him and the resentment of most people' (28a7-8 ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος). So the official indictment has no real importance. Socrates offered only a summary and superficial refutation, because the charges did not require more.

According to Socrates, the prospects for acquittal are rather gloomy, as he already pointed out at the end of the Proposition (18e5-19a5). By mentioning the outcome of the trial again Plato wished not only to remind us of the earlier passage and so to round off the whole section, but also to change the tone[142]: the playfulness of the Ἐρώτησις makes place for the seriousness of the main part of the *Apology*.

9. *Function and Place of the* Ἐρώτησις *in the Structure of the* Apology

By repeating time and again that the indictment rested entirely on the slander of the old accusers and on the suspicions it had aroused, Plato has made it clear that the Ἐρώτησις is not the section of the *Apology* where we should look for Socrates' real defence. So we cannot evade the question why he included that section at all.

Since he intended the *Apology* to have the outward form of a defence in court, he could hardly avoid quoting the text of the indictment and discussing in whatever way the charges contained in it. He might have done this in the form of a continuous exposition, as he does in the rest of the *Apology*. But the Athenian legal provision that allowed litigants the right to cross-examine each other gave him two interesting opportunities. First, by letting Socrates question Meletus, he was able to present graphically what he wished to convey about the ignorance and superficiality of the new accusers. Second, he could give a full illustration of Socrates' dialectical method. This was of paramount importance since, in Plato's opinion, the way in which Socrates used to discuss ethical, pedagogical and other related topics was characteristic of Socrates' personality and behaviour, while at the same time it was the main cause of the enmity and the suspicions that he aroused among his fellow citizens (cf. 23c7-e3). True, other passages of the *Apology* present us with features of Socratic dialectic[143], but those passages are relatively short, and they are confined primarily to those aspects which appeal to the reader immediately. Since Plato wanted to show in his *Apology* that Socrates' conviction was totally unjust and yet fully understandable, he had to depict in detail what it was that made Socrates' way of leading a discussion so irritating for people who did not truly understand him. He

[142] Cf. Chapter V 69-70 my remarks about the function of 23c2-24b2.

[143] See above, Chapter II 38-39; IV § 4; V 60-61; below, Chapter VII 133-134; Chapter IX 181 and n.25; Chapter XI 217.

achieved this by portraying Socrates' cross-examination of Meletus as a game of cat and mouse.

Assuming that I have correctly defined the functions of the Ἐρώτησις, we should now consider its place in the structure of the *Apology* and why Plato put it between the Refutation of the Old Accusers (19a8-24b2) and the Digression (28a2-34b5). First, it is, of course, quite normal that the Refutation of the New Accusers should follow immediately on that of the old ones. I think, however, that another factor was even more decisive. As we saw above (Chapter V 62-64. 73), the Refutation of the Old Accusers presents us with a first panel of Socrates' portrait, the one that shows the negative or elenctic side of his activities among his fellow men. The positive or protreptic panel will follow from 28a2 on. Now Plato has carefully kept the descriptions of both parts of Socrates' activity separate from one another[144], and the insertion of the Ἐρώτησις between them helps him to create as strong a contrast as possible. For the same reason, the tone of the Ἐρώτησις is quite different from that of the preceding and that of the following parts; it is a comic intermezzo between two serious sections. Both the tone and the position of the episode, therefore, indicate that it does not belong to the same line of thought. Besides, it adds variety, which is all the more welcome as Socrates is no friend of continuous speech. Since the main arguments of the defence in a forensic speech could not possibly take the form of a dialogue, the presence of the Ἐρώτησις also marks the essential difference between the *Apology* and ordinary law-court speeches.

There is an interesting similarity between the structure of the *Apology* and of Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown*. There, the technical refutation of the indictment is sandwiched between two lengthy parts in which Demosthenes describes and defends his political activity, first from 346 B.C. to 340 (xviii 18-109), then from 340 to 338 (145-255). Demosthenes had two reasons for doing so. First, his legal case (or, properly speaking, that of Ctesiphon) was a rather weak one, so that he did not want his audience to focus their attention on it. Second, it was clear to everybody that the lawsuit was really about the aims, methods and achievements of Demosthenes' policy. These were the issues on which Demosthenes concentrated all the strength of his incomparable eloquence. The discussion of the legal points is short and is inserted between the two main parts of the speech.

The analogy with the *Apology* does not stop here. There is also a significant change in tone in *On the Crown*. After dealing with the accusation of illegality (110-124), Demosthenes turns against Aeschines, vilifying and ridiculing him as a private and as a public person (125-144). After that, he comes back to the contrast of their respective foreign policies, one of which was a policy of pride and of loyalty to the glorious past and the noble ideals of Athens, the other one characterised by pettiness and submissiveness. Here

[144] At least in this sense, that the protreptic aspect is not mentioned at all in 19a8-24b2; at one place at the end of the Digression (33c2-4) we find a reminder of Socrates' ἔλεγχος.

the tone rises and reaches heights that are unique in the history of ancient oratory. Socrates, of course, will not debase himself by using λοιδορία, but his rather haughty treatment of Meletus is something like a Socratic substitute for abuse. And after that, his tone rises also, and after a few sentences we have quite forgotten about Meletus and have begun to appreciate the greatness of Socrates' personality.

Certainly, the insertion of the 'Ερώτησις between the two main parts of the First Speech is well-motivated and reflects skillful literary composition. Nevertheless, we may regret that the only developed piece of dialectic in the *Apology* is not truly serious and does not reach the depth of, for example, Socrates' discussion with Polus and Callicles in the *Gorgias*. In the *Apology*, Plato tried to give as full and as well-balanced a portrait of Socrates as possible. So there had to be a dialectic passage, and unfortunately the only interlocutor available for it was the shallow Meletus (who had to be shallow because Plato wanted to show the meaning and background of the indictment). Fortunately, the next sections will reveal the core of Socrates' message and offer us insight into his complex personality. If we read them properly, we will not overrate the significance of the 'Ερώτησις. We can only regret that many readers, past and present, have failed to understand Plato's intentions and attributed to the 'Ερώτησις a meaning which it definitely has not.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANSWER TO A FIRST OBJECTION

1. *Introductory Remarks*

The cross-examination of Meletus brings to an end the defence against the indictment, as is explicitly stated in the sentence 28a2-6 ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ... εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. Not only does Socrates break off the train of thought with ἀλλὰ γάρ, but he turns from the accusers to the jury; he declares that what he has said should be sufficient, and still more formally he adds a sense of closure with an ἐπιφώνημα[1] about the probable fatal outcome of the lawsuit (a6-b2). One could therefore expect the peroration to follow at once. But instead, Plato inserts a section (28b3-34b5) which is not only the longest of the *Apology*, but also the richest one in biographical information, in vividness of portrayal and in profoundness of thought.

The Ἐρώτησις does not contain the true defence of Socrates nor does it constitute the core of the work. Plato intended the *Apology* to present both a portrait of Socrates and a justification of his peculiar ἐπιτήδευμα (28b4). In the Narration, he has already given one side of the picture by describing the negative, elenctic aspect of Socrates' activity (cf. Chapter V 62-64. 73); the positive, protreptic aspect remains to be presented. Besides, there are several important points in which Socrates' conduct was apt to be, and was in fact, misunderstood by his fellow-citizens. Not only has he been misrepresented as a natural philosopher and a sophist, and therefore as an atheist and a corruptor of the young, but he and his activities were either judged by inappropriate standards or interpreted incorrectly. To put things right in both these respects is the object of the section which begins at 28b3.

In ancient rhetorical literature, the part of a forensic speech which follows the refutation and precedes the peroration is called digression (παρέκβασις)[2]. Neither Aristotle nor Anaximenes mention digression, although the testimony of Aeschines[3] shows that the use of excursuses was not unknown to fourth-century Orators. Form Cicero's *De inventione* (i 51,97) and still more clearly from Quintilian's detailed account (iv 3,1-17), it appears that the digression was not generally recognised as a regular part of the forensic speech; it could be inserted wherever circumstances required, e.g. to give

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[1] On this rhetorical notion see Quint. viii 5,11; Hermogenes *De inv.* iv 9, p.196,10-197,13 Rabe.

[2] Cf. Martin *Ant. Rhet.* 89-91.

[3] i. 166. iii 205 (παρεμβολή, to which ἐκτροπή is added as a synonym).

more strength to a passage full of pathos, or more vividness to a technical argument, but it was always closely related to the particular argument to which it was appended.

In the *Apology*, the digression is deployed differently, since everything pertaining to the indictment has already been said. The general content of the Digression is quite new when compared with that of the Refutation, although close examination reveals that the Digression's first section proves implicitly that Socrates is a most pious man and its second section that his influence upon the young has been eminently beneficial.

Structurally the Digression consists of two distinct ὑποφοραί, imaginary objections, each of which gets an extensive answer. The answers are not negative in form, but describe fully the inspiration that drives Socrates and the line of conduct which he follows. Through this literary device, Plato avoids putting long rhetorical and self-asserting speeches into Socrates' mouth. Instead, he makes Socrates introduce an imaginary objector and have an everyday conversation with him. So the true defence of Socrates takes the form of dialectic and not of oratory. And the lofty things that he says do not sound pathetic or pompous; they are said in a tone that suits his characteristic simplicity and self-irony.

2. *The First Objection*

The First Objection is apt to surprise the modern reader, who might consider Socrates' idealism and stubborn individuality unrealistic, yet will certainly not think them *shameful*, but rather indicative of a noble character. Not so the Greeks, for whom the most fundamental virtues of man were sound judgment (εὐβουλία), soberness of mind combined with self-control in conduct (σωφροσύνη), and a sense of the golden mean, all of which are expressed with epigrammatic elegance in the distich of Theognis (335-336):

> μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· πάντων μέσ' ἄριστα· καὶ οὕτως
> Κύρν', ἕξεις ἀρετήν, ἥν τε λαβεῖν χαλεπόν.

If, according to the objector, Socrates should be ashamed, it is because, although he is called clever, or rather the clever man *par excellence* (27a2 ὁ σοφὸς δή; 18b7 σοφὸς ἀνήρ; cf. 20d7. 38c3), he has not been able to see beyond the end of his nose and to perceive that his conduct has brought him into mortal danger.

The objection is exactly the same as what the chorus criticises in Prometheus in Aeschylus' *Prom.* 1036-1039:

> ἡμῖν μὲν Ἑρμῆς οὐκ ἄκαιρα φαίνεται
> λέγειν· ἄνωγε γάρ σε τὴν αὐθαδίαν
> μεθέντ' ἐρευνᾶν τὴν σοφὴν εὐβουλίαν.
> πείθου· σοφῶι γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

In Sophocles' *Antigone* the objections which Ismene, Creon and the chorus raise against the heroine are again prompted by the same view of life, as she perfectly well realises; they repeatedly take her to task for her foolishness and urge her to use her head and to consider the facts: vv. 49 and 67-68 ΙΣΜ. φρόνησον, ὦ κασιγνήτη ... · τὸ γὰρ περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα; 95 ΑΝΤ. τὴν ἐξ ἐμοῦ δυσβουλίαν; 99 ΙΣΜ. ἄνους μὲν ἔρχηι ...; 220 ΧΟΡ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω μῶρος ὃς θανεῖν ἐρᾶι; 469-70 ΑΝΤ. (to Creon) σοὶ δ' εἰ δοκῶ νῦν μῶρα δρῶσα τυγχάνειν, σχεδόν τι μώρωι μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνω; 561-562 ΚΡ. (after Ismene has declared her wish to die with her sister) τὼ παῖδέ φημι τώδε τὴν μὲν (Ismene) ἀρτίως ἄνουν πεφάνθαι, τὴν δ' (Antigone) ἀφ' οὗ τὰ πρῶτ' ἔφυ; etc[4]. But, like Socrates and Prometheus, she is determined not to yield to threats nor to cultivate the kind of prudence that might save her life[5].

3. *Socrates' Answer: Considerations Taken from* τὸ καλόν

a) The General Principle

In his answer Socrates does not even contradict the anonymous objector's tacit assumption that he, Socrates, has failed to recognise the risk that he was running and that his confidence is therefore the fruit not of a courageous determination but of ignorance and foolhardiness. In the *Gorgias* (521c3-d3) Callicles suspects Socrates of the same error in judgment, but there, Socrates states explicitly that he is perfectly aware of the fate that awaits him:

> CALL. It quite strikes me, Socrates, that you believe not one of these troubles[6] could befall you, as though you dwelt out of the way, and could never be dragged into a law-court by some perhaps utterly paltry rascal. — SOC. Then I am a fool, Callicles, in truth, if I do not suppose that in this city anyone, whoever he was, might find himself, as luck would have it, in any sort of plight.

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[4] When Ismene says to Antigone (540-1) ἀλλ' ἐν κακοῖς τοῖς σοῖσιν οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι ξύμπλουν ἐμαυτὴν τοῦ πάθους ποιουμένη, the *shame* of which she speaks is that of sharing the fatal effects of Antigone's alleged foolishness.

[5] Kerferd *Sophistic Movement* 21-22 draws attention to Arist. *Rhet.* ii 23, 1397b26-27 εἰ μηδ' οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι ὅτι θανατοῦνται πολλάκις, οὐδ' οἱ σοφισταί, which implies that sophists were considered φαῦλοι because they were either condemned to or put to death (θανατοῦνται can mean either; it does not mean 'be subject to the threat of death' as Kerferd says). Presumably, Aristotle means that their activities made them liable to prosecution and conviction for ἀσέβεια — if so, the parallel with the First Objection is striking. Note especially 28b9-c2 φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῶι γε σῶι λόγωι εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίαι τετελευτήκασιν. Dover's attempt, 'Freedom of the Intellectual' 148 n.23, to read the clause ὅτι θανατοῦνται πολλάκις as ground only for the generals being φαῦλοι, not the sophists, looks too much like special pleading to be acceptable. Yet even if it is accepted, the fact remains that being condemned to or put to death was apparently a good enough reason to be considered φαῦλος. See Chapter IV n.5. — Another parallel is Aesch. ii 181, quoted in the note on 39a6.

[6] Condemnation to death or confiscation of property.

> Of one thing, however, I am sure — that if ever I am brought before the court and stand in any such danger as you mention, it will be some villain who brings me there ...; and it would be no marvel if I were put to death. (Lamb's translation)

In the *Apology*, however, Plato does not let Socrates make any reply of this sort, because he wants above all to challenge the *principle* which underlies the objection, viz. that life is the highest good for man, death the greatest of evils, and that man should put saving his life ahead of every other consideration. The refutation of that view, first with a general negative statement (28b5-9), then through the example of Achilles (b9-d5), finally with the formulation of a positive general rule (d6-10), constitutes the first stage of Socrates' answer. The second stage involves the application of the general rule to his individual case (henceforth called Application) and opens characteristically with the emphatic ἐγὼ οὖν (28d10)[7]. Throughout the following section (28d10-30c1), Socrates almost continuously uses first person singular verbs and pronouns, and his defiant last sentence again has an emphatic ἐμοῦ.

Socrates answers the First Objection by giving an outline of his ethics, not in a theoretical and systematic way as he does in a series of interrelated passages of the *Euthydemus*[8], but in a looser fashion, suitable for a defence in a criminal court, before a group of hundreds of jurors, with whom it would not be feasible to conduct a dialectical discussion. His central contention is that there exists an objectively founded scale or hierarchy of values, and that therefore one should always sacrifice a lesser good to attain a greater good and never forsake the greater for fear of losing the lesser[9]. In other words, one should 'care' (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; φροντίζειν[10]) for some things and 'hold them in high esteem' (περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, 30a1-2), and 'despise' (καταφρονεῖν, 28c3; ὀλιγωρεῖν, 28c9) others or 'make small account' (περὶ ὀλίγου ποιεῖσθαι, 30a1) of them and, what amounts to the same, pursue certain aims 'before' (πρό, πρότερον)[11] or 'rather than'

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[7] The indented line should therefore be 28d10, not d6, as in Burnet's edition.

[8] 278e3-280a8. 280b1-281e5. 282a1-d3. 288d5-289c8. 289c8-290d8. 291d6-292e7.

[9] The same idea is expressed in nearly the same terms in two short passages further in the *Apology*, viz. 36c5-d1 and 41e2-7. Failure to recognise this hierarchy makes a Stoic of Socrates: it leads to the hypothesis that virtue is a sufficient condition for εὐδαιμονία, which has recently been advanced as Socratic by T. Irwin *Plato's Moral Theory*. The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford 1977) 100-101. Vlastos' 'sufficiency thesis' (*Socrates* 214-232), according to which virtue 'would of itself assure a sufficiency of happiness' (217) does respect the hierarchy (cf. esp. 231), but it still is too strong a claim, since a virtuous person may have a wretched life, for example because he has a diseased body (Brickhouse — Smith 166 compare *Crito* 47e3-5 and *Gorg*. 512b1-2; neither passage mentions virtuous men, but there is no reason why a virtuous man should be less subject to pain or grief than others; see *Rep*. x 613a4-7 as quoted n.41). Cf. Chapter XI § 3bγ, esp. 234-235.

[10] ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 29d9. e2. 3. 30b1. 31b5. 36c6 (bis). d1. 41e4. 6; φροντίζειν 28d4. 29e2.

[11] πρό 28d9. 29b7; πρότερον 30b1. 36c5. 41e4.

(μᾶλλον)[12] others or, on the contrary, consider some threat unimportant 'in comparison with' (παρά, 28c3) another. In the course of the second stage (29d8-e3), Socrates uses a more precise formulation and points to three forms of good: money, honour and knowledge (virtue), the higher of which should always be preferred to the lower (cf. below, 135-140). As some forms of good are to be pursued in preference to others, so are some evils to be feared and avoided more than others. In this way the notion of *fear* is introduced into the argument, and it continues to play a not insignificant role[13]. Since the scale of values and evils is grounded in truth, we should, in our pursuit of good and fear of evil, be guided by true insight into what is desirable and what should be rejected. Thus, our passage is consistent with the definition of courage as τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ... ἐπιστήμη, given in the *Laches* (196d1-2. 199b9-10)[14], with the proviso that, as always in Plato, 'insight' (φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, σοφία) should be understood as comprising both love and knowledge[15].

Yet although an entire, complicated ethical doctrine underlies the argument, Socrates presents it as a strict opposition between two ways of life. He starts from the notions of αἰσχύνη and αἰσχρόν and asserts that the objector is radically wrong in his judgment about values. What he, Socrates, is doing, is not shameful, for, if it were, all the national heroes of Greece, and especially the greatest of them, Achilles, would be failures, for they too chose to risk their lives in order to avoid the αἰσχρόν (28c3. d10)[16]. To be sure, we should avoid what is shameful, but, in order to distinguish what is truly base from what is honourable, we should rather look to Achilles as a model than give in to petty minds.

Three points are important here. First, by making Socrates refute two objections raised by (imaginary) members of the jury, Plato creates an opportunity to portray Socrates in his own right, that is, free from any reference to Meletus' indictment and to the old slander. Thus, Plato is able to concentrate on Socrates' personal ideals (ἐπιτήδευμα) and upon the goals which he tries to realise in his life. Secondly, Plato must do this in a manner that suits Socrates' personality, and therefore without pathos or bombast. At the same time, he wants to keep his style consistent with rhetorical conventions. This is why, in developing the Answer to the First Objection, he uses two of the main topics of deliberative oratory, the καλόν and the ὠφέλιμον, the opposites of which are the αἰσχρόν and the βλαβερόν.

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[12] μᾶλλον 28c9. 29d3. 30d4.

[13] δείσας 28d1; φοβηθείς e6; δεδιώς 29a3; δεδίασι a8; οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι b9.

[14] Therefore, when Socrates is described below (34e1-2) as fearless (θαρραλέως ἔχω) of death, this can be called σοφία as well as ἀνδρεία (35a2), since courage is nothing but insight into the objective order of evils to be 'feared' or 'avoided'.

[15] Cf. my paper 'The Unity ...'.

[16] Paraphrasing our passage of the *Apology*, Aristotle (*Rhet.* i 3, 1359a1-5) speaks of the καλόν rather than of the αἰσχρόν.

Thirdly, in order to depict Socrates as the embodiment of honour, he compares him with Achilles. This, however, must be handled delicately, since it is Socrates himself who speaks, and it would be an intolerable arrogance if he put himself on a par with such a hero. Plato solves the problem by keeping the whole of 28b3-d10 on a theoretical level: Achilles is the model of heroism, and every man of honour should act as Achilles did. Therefore at 28d6 the author reverts to the universal rule and waits until d10 (ἐγὼ οὖν) before once again focusing on Socrates.

By conjuring up the character of Achilles, Socrates immediately invokes a spirit of generosity which he hopes will be shared by his audience so that they will respond sympathetically to his explanation of his way of life. While speaking, Socrates is himself carried away by the spirit of Achilles. The whole world of epic rises before his eyes and the information and attitudes he wishes to convey cause his sentences to burst at the seams. On the anacoluthon at 28c8 Luise Reinhard writes excellently:

> Die Worte der Thetis, die nach dem Tode des Patroklos von grösster Sorge um ihren Sohn erfüllt ist, lassen den Sokrates sich ganz in die beliebte Szene versenken. Er gibt erst die Paraphrase, aber dann gerät er von selbst ins Zitieren. Man merkt, wie es ihm die Szene antut mit dem ganzen Zauber all der vielen Erinnerungen, die sich damit für ihn verknüpfen. Da empfindet man es als ganz in der Ordnung, dass er einfach den Verlauf erzählt: ὁ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀκούσας κτλ. und sich um die Anfangsformulierung ὥστε nicht weiter kümmert. So kommt es, dass auch noch Achill redend eingeführt wird: 'Αὐτίκα' φησί, 'τεθναίην' κτλ.
>
> Diese aus dem Homer allgemein bekannte Szene, die jeder auswendig wusste, war für seine Hörer sowohl wie für Sokrates selbst von besonderem Reize. Da wird also das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl stark geweckt, und das geschieht da, wo Sokrates von dem Hass der Vielen gegen ihn, der zu seiner Anklage geführt hat, vor eben diesen Anklägern redet. Das geht nun im weiteren die Komposition an, aber die sprachliche Form wirkt mit, und die Abweichung von der Grammatik, das Untergehen des Hauptgedankens in dem lebhaft hervortretenden Nebengedanken, entspricht dem Versinken des persöhnlichen Empfindens des Sokrates in dem seines Helden. Damit korrespondiert die momentane Regung eines Gefühls der Zusammengehörigkeit mit der Menge, die auch diesen Helden liebt. Vielleicht versteht sie nun eher seine Ansicht vom Leben und Tode. Es sind alles nur leise Schwingungen, die mitklingen und dem eigentlichen Ton den Wohlklang geben. (*Anakoluthe* 19-20)

Now at last, not in the witty sparring with Meletus, we have reached the core of Socrates' defence. Socrates is now shown to be a man of honour, who was at the same time, and for the same reasons, a man of duty and of devotion.

Socrates ends his answer to the anonymous objector with the rather impatient question: 'Do you really think that Achilles cared about death or about danger?' And since he feels that the man is incapable of noble ideas, he turns to the jury (d6 ὦ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι), with whom, as Luise Reinhard rightly observed, he has already, by describing Achilles' emotional

reaction, established a basis for sympathy, and formulates in powerful terms a rule to govern the whole conduct of a man of honour. Presently it will appear that this rule has been Socrates' guiding principle throughout his life and that he will not renounce it now or in the future.

b) The Application to the Case of Socrates

This section (28d10-30c1) is the central part of the *Apology*. It expresses with incomparable vigour and vividness the very substance of his message and at the same time it suggests the spirit in which he brings that message to his fellow-men, depicting the simple, straightforward and urgent manner in which he conducts his everyday conversations.

I shall first examine the content of the section and then its form. As for the *content*, the Application shows Socrates as the embodiment of the principle that was laid down in 28b3-d10: duty is of more importance than life. When giving concrete examples of Socrates' ἐπιτήδευμα, Plato's descriptions recall 20c4-24b2, where Socrates' activity was represented as the fulfillment of a task set him by the god: with his elenctic questioning he brought people to recognise their own ignorance and so liberated them from the 'conceit of knowledge' (δοξοσοφία). Now Plato gives a full picture of the positive, protreptic aspect of Socrates' mission: when people have been freed from ἀμαθία, they can turn to the true good with the full force of the ἔρως which is latent in their souls. But they need help to find the right orientation for their longing, and that, too, is part of Socrates' mission. So, while he himself 'searches for insight' and for truth, he also 'encourages' others and 'shows them the way' (29d5-6 φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος), that is, he works on both their will and their intelligence. This activity, which Plato elsewhere describes with the more technical term προτρέπειν[17], is here simply called πείθειν (30a8. e7. 31b5). This kind of 'persuasion' is quite different from that of Gorgianic oratory which is concerned only with opinion, not with truth (cf. Chapter II § 2). Socratic conversation, on the contrary, is a quest (ζήτησις 29c8) for truth and a search for insight (φιλοσοφεῖν *ib.*).

Now, turning our attention to Socrates' remarks about his own conduct, we see him arguing, as he often does, *a minore ad maius*. He uses this kind of argument for the first time in his conversation with Callias about the

[17] See especially *Euthyd.* 275a1-2 προτρέπειν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. 278c5-6 ἡ προτρεπτικὴ σοφία. d2-3 ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντε τὸ μειράκιον ὅπως χρὴ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. 282d5-6 οἱ προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι. 307a1-2 ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον εἰς φιλοσοφίαν; *Clit.* 408c2. d3. 6. 410b5. d2. 3. e5. 7. (I take the *Clitophon* to be the introduction to a protreptic dialogue which Plato left unfinished because he had realised to his satisfaction already in the *Euthydemus* the aim that he had set himself in the *Clitophon*, viz. to show the difference between Sophistic and Socratic παιδεία. Of course, Plato did not publish it himself, but it must have been found in his 'papers' after his death. [About this hypothesis, cf. S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 16-23.]) Cf. *Symp.* 181a6; *Laws* iv 711b7; *Epist.* vii 328d8.

education of his sons (20a2-c1). If competence is necessary to raise foals and calves, it will *a fortiori* be necessary to educate men, since human ἀρετή is of a higher kind. A second instance occurs in the discussion of the first charge (25a13-c1): since only a few people are able to improve horses and other animals, Socrates concludes that the ability to make men better cannot have been granted to everyone either; although in this case there is no positive hint at an *a fortiori*, it is implicit in the way in which the argument runs. Now, in our passage, the word δεινόν (28d10. 29a1) marks the contrast between the authority of the military officers and God's authority: if Socrates considered it a duty to obey the orders given him by fallible officers appointed by fallible voters, he should feel a far greater duty when the orders come from God, who is the only one who possesses insight (23a5-6). The argument *a minore a maius* is in full agreement with Socrates' views of a hierarchy of good and evil.

But what is it that the god orders Socrates to do? The answer is: φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους (28e5-6). The notion of φιλοσοφεῖν is introduced at a critical moment in the logical development of the *Apology*. We find it three times in 28d10-30c1, always applied to Socrates, and nowhere before or after it[18]. Each time it is explained by the words preceding or following it, and because of its importance we ought to examine it closely.

Let us start with the second passage, where it occurs in the imaginary offer which the jurors make to Socrates: they will let him go on one condition, viz. ἐφ' ὧι τε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτηι τῆι ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν (29c7-8). These words are intended to recall the investigation described in the Narration[19]; it was actually referred to there as a ζήτησις (21b8. 22a4. 23b5)[20]. Now, however, Socrates calls this activity φιλοσοφεῖν, a term which he did not use as long as he was describing his activity as elenctic, as merely negative. Why this difference? Because φιλοσοφεῖν implies the dynamic element that in the dialogues of the central period is called ἔρως (cf. Chapter V 63-64). With this change in terminology, Socrates suggests that the ζήτησις was not, after all, as negative as we may have thought. It was a search for truth that went further than the discovery of someone's ignorance; it was in some way the initial grasping of a truth that inspired the whole quest and without which it could not have started at all[21].

If we now go back to 28e5-6, where we learn that it is Socrates' task 'to search for insight and to examine himself and the others', we notice two significant features. First, it appears that philosophy is not a quest for a truth that can be attained by purely objective methods. It is primarily concerned

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[18] On οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες (23d4) see the note *in loc.*

[19] Observe the anaphoric (backward-pointing) pronoun ταύτηι.

[20] Further synonyms: (δια)σκοπεῖν 21c3. e6; ἐξετάζειν 22e6. 23c4. 5; ἐρευνᾶν 23b5.

[21] Cf. *Symp.* 210e5-6 τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο ... οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν.

with goodness, and goodness always makes demands of a man. Thus, man cannot arrive at a correct appreciation of these demands without setting alongside his own actual moral conduct[22]. This leads us to the second point: Socrates should first of all examine *himself*. If that was not stated explicitly before, it is because the Narration was, as a whole, focused on the origin of the διαβολή and the enmity that was aroused by Socrates' examination of so-called clever men. It is only when we discover, as we do in 28d10-30c1, the true inspiration of his activity, that we realise how exacting he is for himself and how the examination both of himself and of others is the fruit of an all-embracing love for insight and truth.

This is confirmed by the third passage: 'I shall never give up searching for insight and encouraging you and pointing the way to everyone of you whom I meet' (29d4-6). Socratic philosophy is not detached and coolly speculative but warmly protreptic. It is something profoundly different from the θεωρητικὸς βίος of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: although Socrates' ζήτησις, too, aims at absolute truth, it always sees it specifically as the good which we strive for in everything we do, and therefore it is not only much more concerned with everyday life, but it is also directed towards the well-being of others.

The first sentence of the Application said that no fear of death will induce Socrates to abandon his post (28e4-29a1). For nobody knows whether death is not a blessing rather than an evil, perhaps even the greatest blessing that can befall man. We shall see below (Chapter XI 228-235) that the Socrates of the *Apology* believes firmly in the immortality of the soul and in requital in the afterlife, at least for good men, although he does not know precisely how things are in the other world. Therefore, he will not do what is certainly evil in order to avoid something that is possibly a blessing. In short, Socrates' position here is both firmly grounded in principle and non-committal as to the details of transcendental reality and the status of the soul; in this, it is entirely consistent with what we find in other dialogues.

We have seen that philosophy is primarily concerned with goodness or, what amounts to the same thing, with the question of which goodness is to be preferred and which should be given up when one is faced with a choice. Socrates sets up a fixed scale of values consisting of three degrees when he asks (29d7-e3) whether an Athenian should not be ashamed to care about χρήματα, or for τιμή and δόξα, and to pay no attention to φρόνησις, ἀλήθεια and the best state of his ψυχή. According to Burnet (*in loc.*), 'this enumeration implies the doctrine of the "tripartite soul", for it gives the object of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ λογιστικόν. We have the authority of Posidonius that the doctrine in question was really Pythagorean.'

[22] On this see 'The Unity ...'

Actually, however, the passage is about three objects of care or of pursuit, i.e. three good things of unequal value; it does not say anything about parts of the soul. On the contrary, as far as ψυχή is concerned, it is only related to the third goodness, φρόνησις[23]. Moreover, we could say that the proper object of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν is not wealth but ἡδονή[24], although in several passages[25] Plato associates these two objects. What is more significant for an understanding of the scale of values in the *Apology* is the fact that its tripartition of the good things runs parallel to a division of men into three classes, the φιλοχρήματοι, the φιλότιμοι and the φιλόσοφοι[26], which we find in the *Phaedo* (68c1-2. 82b10-c8).

In turn, this classification is related to the doctrine of the 'Three Lives', which Burnet[27] considers Pythagorean too[28]. Actually, the oldest *ex professo* treatment of that doctrine is in Aristotle's *Eudemian*[29] and *Nicomachean Ethics*[30]. In both works the first way of life is called the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος, and its object is not wealth but ἡδονή; this, however, does not contradict Plato, as I pointed out. When Burnet claims that the theory of the Three Lives is Pythagorean, he relies on Heraclides Ponticus' dialogue Περὶ τῆς ἄπνου, which contained the record of a conversation between Pythagoras and Leon, tyrant of Phlius[31]. Hearing Pythagoras call himself φιλόσοφος, Leon asks what that means. Pythagoras answers with a parable. Of the many people going to the great Panhellenic games some want to make money by doing business, others to earn glory through victories, a third group to see the pageant. So in life there are people who seek wealth, or honour, or knowledge and truth. The story illustrates primarily the tripartition of good things, but also of classes of men and of

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[23] According to *Phaed.* 68b9-c3 the man who is angry about being confronted with death οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος· ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. So χρήματα, and even τιμή, are related to the body rather than to the soul.

[24] *Rep.* iv 439d8 and *passim.*

[25] So i.a. *Rep.* viii 553c5 (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον). ix 580e2-581a1.

[26] It is important to remember that for Plato φρόνησις and σοφία are strictly synonymous; people striving for φρόνησις are called φιλόσοφοι; cf. Chapter V 63-64 and n.6 and 19.

[27] *Early Greek Philosophy*[2] (London 1908 and repr.) 108. 109 and n.1; note on *Phaed.* 68c2.

[28] Much has been written about the Three Lives. The most important works are W. Jaeger 'On the Origin and Cycle of the Philosophic Ideal of Life' (first published *SDAW* 1928), in *Aristotle*[2] (Oxford 1948) 426-61; Robert Joly *Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique* (Bruxelles 1956) with the review by W. Spoerri *Gnomon* 30 (1958) 186-92; A.J. Festugière 'Les trois vies' *Acta Congressus Madvigiani* (Copenhagen 1958) ii 131-178. For a recent account see H.B. Gottschalk *Heraclides of Pontus* (Oxford 1980) 29-31 and notes.

[29] i 4, 1215a32-b14; the πολιτικὸς βίος has as its object 'honourable activities' (τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλάς) or 'social excellence' (ἀρετή; the same use of ἀρετή is to be found in *Protr.* fr. 15 Walzer, Ross = B95-96 Düring); that those are only other words for Plato's τίμη appears from *Eth. Nic.* i 3, 1095b22-29.

[30] i 3, 1095b14-1096a5.

[31] Fr. 87-88 Wehrli. The story is preserved in Cic. *Tusc.* v 3,8; Diog. Laert. i 12. viii 8; Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 58, p.31,20-32,10 Deubner.

life-styles. It is relatively primitive in so far as it views wealth, not pleasure, as the lowest form of goodness. Most scholars[32] now agree, however, that Heraclides' work was not intended to provide reliable information about the historical Pythagoras, or even about fifth-century Pythagoreanism, but, as often with Heraclides, to lend an aura of antiquity to Academic doctrines.

On the whole, it seems that of the four tripartitions, (1) of the good things or values, (2) of the classes of men, (3) of the lives, and (4) of the parts of the soul, the first is fundamental, and certainly the most central to Socratic philosophy and to the argument in our passage of the *Apology*. The second and the third are closely related to the first. The fourth, however, is of a different kind, since it has to do with psychology or anthropology, not directly with ethics. This orientation, however, does not imply that it is a much later development; the difference is one of perspective, not of chronology. I think the tripartition of the soul is already found in the *Gorgias*[33], a dialogue which is certainly older than *Rep.* iv-ix, in which it is formally set out. There is even the authority of Posidonius for ascribing it to the old Pythagoreans[34]; however this may be, the question is not important for us, since Socrates' question in 29d7-e3 is only concerned with a tripartition of good things.

Interestingly enough, a variant of the tripartition of values is found a little bit further on: 'I go about doing nothing but persuading you, both young and old, not to care for your bodies nor for wealth prior to, nor indeed to

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[32] However, W.K.C. Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* i 164-165 considers it probable that Heraclides here relies upon fifth-century material. Cf. also Chapter V n.19.

[33] 493a3-4 τῆς ... ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ὧι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί. This implies the existence of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; it certainly is much more definite than 'the popular distinction between reason and impulse', the only thing that Dodds (*in loc.*) would acknowledge here; cf. *Rep.* ix 572a6.

[34] The first to point this out was Burnet in his note on *Phaed.* 68c2. In two passages of Galen's *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, Posidonius is quoted as an authority for the statement that Pythagoras was the originator of the theory of the parts or faculties of the soul. In Testim. 91 = F 151 Edelstein - Kidd, F 419 Theiler; Gal. *Plac.* v 6,43, p.334,30-33 De Lacy, Galen says that we should accept the views of Plato and Hippocrates with regard to the parts of the soul, and goes on as follows: Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν, αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συγγράμματος οὐδένος εἰς ἡμᾶς διασωιζομένου, τεκμαιρόμενος δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἔνιοι τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν. — T95 = F 165,168-172 Edelstein - Kidd, F 410 Theiler; Gal. *Plac.* iv 7,39, p.290,1-5 De L.: οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης μόνον ἢ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζον οὕτως (viz. about the 'parts' of the soul), ἀλλὰ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἄλλοι τέ τινες καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐκείνου πρώτου μὲν εἶναι λέγων τὸ δόγμα, Πλάτωνα δὲ ἐξεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκευάσαι τελεώτερον αὐτό. — As Prof. I.G. Kidd was so kind as to write to me in a letter of 15.8.75 'Posidonius has an acute sense of the historical development of philosophical (and scientific) ideas ... He was certainly interested in the contributions of earlier thinkers ... One could argue that he was presenting his evidence (in T 91) with exemplary care. There was no work of Pythagoras himself (available) ..., but he consulted Pythagorean writings, which he felt he could use as evidence (τεκμαιρόμενος) that the doctrine went back to Pythagoras himself.' Cf. I.G. Kidd *Posidonius*, ii *The Commentary*, i (Cambridge 1988) 78-79, with reference to later classical authors. It is out of the question that Posidonius took authors like Speusippus or Heraclides Ponticus to be 'pupils' of Pythagoras; he certainly uses this term to describe Pythagoreans of the fifth century B.C.

the same extent as, caring four the best state of your souls' (30a7-b2). This second hierarchy is based on the differences in 'interiority'[35]; although different from the former, it is perfectly compatible with it, and the insertion of τῆς ψυχῆς at 29e1-2 helps to connect both formulas. The second scale is more frequent outside the *Apology* than the first[36], the first is more to the point here, as it occupies a central place in Socrates' answer to the objection that his way of life is shameful.

Just before the conclusion of 28a2-30c1, after stating this second hierarchy as the content of his protreptic conversations, Socrates proposes a further paradoxical maxim, which will help people to make their choices in accordance with the true hierarchy of good things: 'Not from money does the value (of men) come, but from their value money and every other good thing (will come) to men both in private and in public life' (30b2-4). The first part of the maxim is meant to contradict explicitly a proverbial verse of Hesiod: πλούτωι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ (*Op.* 313)[37]. To be sure, after Hesiod popular philosophy had often pointed out that even bad people can be wealthy and that good men should not envy their prosperity[38]. But Socrates shows himself much bolder in asserting in the second part that 'from virtue comes money'. This seems unacceptable to Burnet (*in loc.*) and therefore he construes the sentence differently and translates: 'It is goodness that makes money and everything else good for men'. For 'as Socrates was now ἐν πενίαι μυρίαι (23 b 9), he could hardly recommend ἀρετή as a good investment'[39].

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[35] As is made explicit in *Alc. I* 131b10-c2 in a way that is somewhat too clear-cut to be authentically Platonic.

[36] Of the second scale, the most condensed formulation is *Laws* iii 697b2-6 ἔστιν δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τιμιώτατα μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κεῖσθαι ..., δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα; cf. v 743e3-6 ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἁπάντων περὶ ἃ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σπουδάζει, τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή, σώματος δὲ πέρι μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς. But there are earlier instances; in addition to the *Apology* I refer to *Gorg.* 477a8-b8, a passage which ends b8-c2 with the words οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν (cf. 511d1-2); the formula is implied too in 467e4-5 ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον, as was pointed out by Dodds *in loc.* See further *Rep.* ix 591c1-d7; *Phil.* 48e1-11; *Laws* v 728c9-729a2 (this is a fourfold enumeration, with the gods in the highest place, as appears from 726a1-3). ix 870b2-6. Cf. S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 114-117.

[37] Of course, in Hesiod ἀρετή means social prestige; but Socrates is not concerned here with historical semantics.

[38] See e.g. Solon fr. 15,1-4 West = Theognis 315-318.

[39] In favour of his interpretation, desperate though it is from the stylistic point of view (see the commentary), Burnet could have invoked *Euthyd.* 279a7-281e2, where it is argued that money, honour and even virtue in the popular sense of the word, that is, virtue without φρόνησις, are not good by themselves but only under the guidance of φρόνησις. The *Meno* presents the same doctrine more concisely (87e5-89a5) and concludes as follows: τῶι ἀνθρώπωι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι (88e5-89a1; cf. *Laws* ii 661a4-d3). Burnet's interpretation is generally ignored; it is taken over, however, by Gaiser *Protreptik und Paränese* 109 n.115 and Vlastos

The more obvious interpretation, however, is proved correct by passages of the *Republic* and the *Laws* that treat the same problem. In book ii of the *Republic* Glaucon says that, according to the opinion of the multitude (οἱ πολλοί), justice belongs to 'the toilsome class of things that must be practised for the sake of rewards and repute' but not for their own sake (358a4-6; here and below I give Shorey's translation). He adds that, in order to decide whether it is good in its own right, we should assess it independent of the advantages it can bring, and similarly evaluate injustice apart from its disadvantages. He then draws the well-known portraits of the successful wicked man and of the persecuted just man (360e1-362c6). After a long, meandering discussion about the intrinsic nature of justice that fills book ii up to the middle of book x, Socrates announces that he will describe 'the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her' (608c1-2). This is the object of the final myth. Before that, and this is important for our text of the *Apology*, he speaks of the lot of the just man in his earthly life:

> We have met all the other demands of the argument and we have not invoked the rewards and repute of justice as you said that Homer and Hesiod do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself ... Then ... there can no longer be any objection ... to our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and after his death (612a8-c3).

About requital on the part of men he says to Glaucon:

> Is not this the usual outcome for the just ..., that towards the end of every action and association and of life as a whole they have honour and bear away the prizes from men? — So it is indeed. — Will you, then, bear with me if I say of them all that you said[40] of the unjust? For I am going to say that the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, marry from what families they will, and give their children to what families they please, and everything that you said of the one I now repeat of the other (613c4-d5).

When writing this, Plato knows perfectly well that honour and wealth do not always befall the virtuous during their lifetime[41]. He does not say that the portrait of the persecuted just man, which he had written with Socrates in mind, was false. But he means that Socrates' case was a borderline one and that virtue, although it is not 'a good investment', because an investment has

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Socrates 219 n.73. M. Burnyeat 'Virtues in Action' in G. Vlastos *The Philosophy of Socrates. A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City - New York 1971) 209-234 ignores Burnet's construction of the sentence but tries to dodge the issue by translating χρήματα with 'valuables' (p.210). With the following argument, cf. Th. Meyer 149-150.

[40] In book ii 362b-c (portrait of the successful wicked man).

[41] 613a4-7 'This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other thing that passes for an evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, either during his life or after his death'. Cf. Chapter XI 233-235.

no intrinsic value, 'usually' (τὸ πολύ 613c4) leads to good repute and, as a consequence of this, to the external goods that are of less value than honour in itself.

Book i of the *Laws* offers a different perspective, more akin to the statements about the scale of values in the *Apology*. Plato classifies into human and divine the benefits which sensible laws confer on those who observe them (διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα, 631b6-7; human advantages are health, beauty, strength and wealth; divine advantages φρόνησις and the three other cardinal virtues). He goes on to say ἤρτηται[42] δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται[43] καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα· εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν (631b7-c1). So here, too, the greater blessings also bring the lesser, and one could say with the *Apology* that the latter 'come from' the former, since one cannot exist without the other[44].

The dogmatic form of the maxim in the *Apology*, in which there are no such restrictions as 'usually' and 'towards the end' in *Rep.* x 613c4-5, is partly demanded by stylistic concerns, since the second part of the statement is the exact opposite of the first, but still more by its prophetic character. Socrates here heralds an inversion of traditional values, an 'Umwertung aller Werte'. He asserts that what is of paramount importance to the multitude is, in reality, of very little value. What he says is no more sweeping than Christ's words in Matthew vi 33 ζητεῖτε δὲ πρῶτον τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν. We should remember that this verse belongs to the Sermon on the Mount, in which Christ announces to his followers that they will be persecuted and slandered (v 11-12) and he declares the poor and those who weep 'blessed'. He, too, proclaims a new value, superior to all others, viz. the Kingdom, and those who attain it may be counted as possessing everything.

If we now turn to the *literary form* of the Application, that is, of 28d10-30c1, it is clearly designed to highlight the arguments and to contrast them with preceding and following passages. In no other part of the *Apology* is there so much emotion in the tone and so much confidence in Socrates' words. The confidence was already there in 28a2-d10, with sentences like οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε (28b5-6) and οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ... τῆι ἀληθείαι (d6). Now, Socrates continues in the same vein but in a warmer and more

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[42] For this verb cf. *Meno* 88e5-89a1 quoted above, n.39.

[43] πόλις κτᾶται AO Eus.: κτᾶται Theod. παρίστασθαι Stob. προσκτᾶται Hug (fortasse recte).

[44] Compare further Arist. *Pol.* vii 1, 1323a40-41 ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτός (scil. ἀγαθοῖς) ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνα ταύταις. This section is taken from τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς (a22-23) and rests upon the Academic tripartition of goods into τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι (a25-26). The work to which Aristotle refers might be the *Protrepticus*; cf. I. Düring *Aristotle's Protrepticus* (Göteborg 1961) 254-256.

expansive manner. There is, however, much variation. Socrates opens with the challenging stylistic figure of δείνωσις (28d10-29a1); then, for a short time, he reverts to a quieter way of arguing, but soon he becomes more assertive again (29b7 οἶδα) and concludes a first movement with the unflinching οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι (b9). After that, he embarks on the longest sentence of the whole *Apology* (29b9-30a2). It has two false starts and when at last Socrates reaches firm ground (d1), two themes emerge with overwhelming force: his decision not to renounce his mission, viz. philosophy, and his urgent appeal to his fellow-citizens to remember their pride as Athenians and to pursue the highest ideals. Then again the tension subsides for a while, but Socrates reverts to his protreptic appeals and finally raising the tone again he repeats that he will never yield, even if he has to die many deaths (30b7-c1).

Socrates opens this section with a δείνωσις, a literary figure that consists in making something appear δεινόν, that is to say, absurd, shocking, scandalous (see the commentary on 28d10)[45]. The δεινόν is a contrast between a fact and a hypothetical assumption. Syntactically, it is framed as a complex sentence consisting of a main clause of the type δεινὸν ἂν εἴη or a variant thereof followed by εἰ and two coordinated hypothetical clauses articulated by μέν and δέ, or by εἰ plus genitive absolute and predicate. The

[45] As far as I know, there is no treatment of δείνωσις that goes further than the scanty information given by I.Chr.Th. Ernesti in his *Lexicon technologiae Graecorum rhetoricae* (Leipzig 1795; reprint Darmstadt 1962) 70. The first author to use the term is Plato: *Phaedr.* 272a5-7 ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ... τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, a rather tantalising text. Whereas it is not found in Anaximenes, Aristotle uses it four times (*Rhet.* ii 21, 1395a9. 24, 1401b3; iii 16, 1417a13. 19, 1419b26) to refer to a way of arousing indignation (but he does not specify what this way is) and of bringing about ἔλεος and οἶκτος. Later rhetoricians use δείνωσις for any device by which the orator can stir the audience to anger and indignation towards somebody or something; the most common modern translations are 'indignation' and 'vehemence'. I claim that the original meaning of δείνωσις was the use of a sentence or group of sentences of the type δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ κτέ. My arguments are the following: (1) this σχῆμα is so common (see the next note) and stylistically so prominent in Attic oratory that it must have been the object of some rule in the τέχναι and must have borne a specific name; δείνωσις is the one word that can be considered; (2) Arist. *Rhet.* ii 21, 1395a9 appears to treat σχετλιασμός and δείνωσις as synonyins; now Lys. xxxi 31 uses σχέτλιον ἂν εἴη εἰ precisely as δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ, and in similar sentences Demosthenes says δεινὸν καὶ σχέτλιον (or σχέτλιον καὶ δεινόν): xix 146. 226; xx 156; xxi 156; xxxv 47; (3) although Cicero *De inv.* i 53,100 seems to translate δείνωσις by *indignatio*, the Greek word cannot have properly meant 'vehemence, angry outburst' (which is the meaning of *indignatio* in Roman rhetoric), at least not originally; it denotes normally 'a way of producing a δεινόν', that is, a figure used by the orator to make something appear to be δεινόν, that is, 'scandalous' or 'unacceptable'; this seems to find some support in Quintilian vi 2,24 *haec est illa quae* δείνωσις *uocatur, rebus indignis, asperis, inuidiosis addens uim oratio*. Certainly, the δείνωσις does not refer to the speaker's own emotions, but to a method of arousing emotions in the audience. — I see in De Vries *Comm. Phaedr.* 240 (on 272a5) that this interpretation is already found in Wilamowitz' *Griechisches Lesebuch* (Berlin 1902 and repr.) ii 2,231 (although, of course, in such a book he could give no proof of his statement).

figure is extremely common in Attic forensic oratory[46]. When it is used by the accuser, it aims at making the judges take a severe attitude towards the defendant: the speaker argues that it would be intolerable, when in the past good citizens were condemned to severe penalties for mere trifles or despite evident extenuating circumstances, if now the accused, whose crimes are enormous and obvious were either acquitted or condemned to some light penalty. The accused can also use a δείνωσις, although this is less common by far, and then, of course with quite the opposite aim: it would be shocking, he will say, when other persons, though scarcely deserving indulgence, have been treated leniently, if *he* should now find in the jury nothing but severity and lack of understanding.

As an instance of the first case one might compare Lys. xii 36 (at the end of the sentence, under the pressure of his emotion, the speaker allows himself a slight anacoluthon) οὐκοῦν δεινὸν εἰ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγοὺς οἳ ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες (at the battle of Arginusae in 406; cf. *Apol.* 32b1-c3), ὅτε διὰ χειμῶνα οὐχ οἷοί τ' ἔφασαν εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἀνελέσθαι, θανάτωι ἐζημιώσατε, ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι τῆι τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῆι παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν, τούτους δέ (Eratosthenes and his associates), οἳ ἰδιῶται μὲν ὄντες καθ' ὅσον ἐδύναντο ἐποίησαν ἡττηθῆναι ναυμαχοῦντας, ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν (as members of the committee of the Thirty) κατέστησαν, ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑκόντες πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκρίτους ἀποκτιννύναι, οὐκ ἄρα χρὴ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑφ' ὑμῶν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις κολάζεσθαι; In Isocr. xvi 11 we find a δείνωσις on the part of the accused son of Alcibiades: πάντων δ' ἂν εἴη δεινότατον, εἰ τοῦ πατρὸς (Alcibiades) μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν δωρεὰν λαβόντος (in 408, as a compensation for the confiscation of his estate) ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φυγὴν ζημιωθείην.

Now in all these passages, the orator tries to gain an advantage by influencing the judges' attitude, either pardon for himself or severity against his opponent. In the text of the *Apology*, however, in a typically Socratic paradox (for which see Chapter IX 183) the δείνωσις is aimed at the defendant's attitude, demanding heroism from that most unusual defendant, Socrates. If his claim is just, it is just for him to be allowed to do his duty in all circumstances and to confront the dangers that are inseparable from it.

After a relatively calm discussion of the question whether death or disobedience to the god is the greater evil (29a4-b9), the tension rises again. The irregularities of the long sentence 29b9-30a2 result from a series of conflicts that rise in Socrates' mind as he formulates the proposal that the

[46] Antiphon i 12; v 16; vi 29; Lys. vii 23; x 13; xii 36. 88; xiv 17. 18; Ps.-Lys. vi 13. 15; xx 19; Isocr. xiv 45. 52; xv 165-166; xvi 11; xviii 3. 24. 35. 68; xx 20; Isaeus i 51; x 23; xi 13; Dem. vii 1; xx 12; xxvii 28. 64; xxxix 21. 33; xl 46; lv 20; Ps.-Dem. xxxii 23; xxxiv 43; lviii 46; lix 28. 107. 117; Aesch. iii 244-245; Lyc. *Leocr.* 53; Din. i 53-54. 85; Xen. *Hell.* i 7,28.

jury might put to him and the answer that he would give[47]. This proposal does not originate with the jurors themselves; it is prompted by words spoken by Anytus. This raises a first conflict: Anytus categorically demanded the death-sentence; the jury wants to avoid so extreme a measure and seeks to find a compromise. Faced with this conflict, Socrates experiences a conflict in himself: on the one hand, he sympathises with the jury, not only because they try to save him, but much more because they embody for him his beloved Athens; on the other hand he feels obliged to reject a proposal that would entail abandoning his duty to the god. Now Socrates does not want to die a martyr, but rather to continue to fulfill his mission, and this mission by its very nature brings him into close contact with his fellow-citizens; in other words, and this is the third conflict, Socrates' mission itself calls for a *rapprochement* with the very men whom he has just rebuked. And that task in its turn comprises two aspects, one of which is positive, the other negative.

All these conflicts and oppositions are integrated into a complex syntactical unit, which in its clarity and liveliness is typical of Plato's style and shows convincingly that Socrates, though a man of principle, has nothing of the rigidity of the Stoic Sage. It is also in character that, after having worked out first the protreptic and then the elenctic side of his activity, Socrates comes back to the protreptic side, which is dearer to his heart, and describes it in a new way (see the note on 30b1-2). He still has to state his position with regard to the jury's proposal, and he does so with uncompromising clarity. The jury may think that they are offering him a fair choice; *he* has just one option and he leaves it to the jury to choose whether or not to make their proposal; either way, the outcome will be the same for him.

Still, Plato does not represent Socrates as continuously addressing the jury. Twice he lets him engage in a conversation with just one man, an Athenian in the street, so to speak, first at 29d7, again at 30b2. Since our passage is central to the portrait of Socrates, Plato wished to demonstrate his art of conversation or dialectic, which is not an art of oratory.

We might ask why Socrates, in order to express his ideas about the highest value, appeals (29d7-e3) to the national pride of the Athenian citizen. In doing so, he follows the theory presented in the *Phaedrus*[48], according to which every speaker, either in private conversation or in speeches to crowds (261a8-9), should adapt his words to the specific nature of the ψυχή of the hearer. Now 'soul' is a complex reality, just as body is (271a5-7; cf. 277b8-c7). A living body is a combination of elements

[47] On the alleged conflict between Socrates' rejection of the proposal and his obedience to the laws, see Chapter VIII 157-159.

[48] I have treated this matter more systematically in my essay 'Platons Ansichten ...', especially 93-101.

according to various 'mixtures' or 'temperaments'[49]. The elements of which the soul is composed are its three 'parts', τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ λογιστικόν. Human beings, i.e., souls, differ from one another according to the different ways in which the three constituents are interrelated; in other words, there are various kinds of souls. A speaker should know to which of those kinds his hearer belongs and should adapt his words to the hearer's special receptivity so that he will be persuaded (271b1-5). In this case, it would of course be of no use to argue that it is καλόν to strive for insight and truth and αἰσχρόν to neglect those aims, if the hearer was not interested in the honourable, if the θυμοειδές did not prevail over the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the desire for money and pleasure. Therefore, Socrates appeals to the sense of honour and the pride which he knows is present in every Athenian. I shall not contend that the whole theory of the correspondence between kinds of discourses and kinds of souls that we find in the *Phaedrus* was explicitly present in Plato's mind when he wrote the *Apology*. I mean simply that the practice of the *Apology*, here and in several other passages, is consistent with the theory of the *Phaedrus* and that reference to this theory sheds light on the *Apology*, inasmuch as it helps us to understand Socrates' way of arguing in this passage. The correspondence between these two works shows how fundamental the 'unity of Plato's thought' actually is.

In order to conclude the analysis of 28d10-30c1, I once more call attention to the fact that this passage provides an important complement to the portrait of Socrates that was drawn in 20c4-24b2. Noble and disinterested as the attitude of Socrates appeared to us there, it could leave one with an impression of sharpness or arrogance, of someone who finds pleasure in humiliating others. We might wonder whether Socrates exposes the ignorance of men for the same reason as he says that the youths do who always accompany him, 'because it is not unpleasant' (33c4). Now we can see that what inspires him is something quite different: it is the concern for the well-being of others, and quite especially of his fellow-citizens that motivates Socrates. In order that he may continue to devote himself to their advancement, he is gladly prepared to risk his life.

4. *Socrates' Answer: Considerations Taken from* τὸ ὠφέλιμον

In 28b3-30c1, Socrates had argued that to abandon his post for fear of death would be shameful (αἰσχρόν), in other words that honour (τὸ καλόν) demanded that he should continue to fulfill his mission. In 30c2-31c3 he accounts for his choice by using another common topic of deliberative oratory, τὸ ὠφέλιμον, and its opposite, τὸ βλαβερόν. What his opponents wish to happen and what they ask the jury to vote for, a death-sentence

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[49] Cf. L. Robin *Phèdre* (Paris 1933 and reprints) cl.

against him, would be gravely detrimental to Athens. Socrates does not say that the accusers are trying to harm the city; they just try to harm Socrates. This they cannot achieve, for a reason I will examine further on (see below, 147-148). For the city, however, the consequences of Socrates' death can only be catastrophic. The jury ought to realise that Socrates, by defending himself, that is by explaining why he should go on with his elenctic and protreptic activities, really speaks on behalf of all Athenians and pleads that the jury should spare him (31a3 φείσεσθέ μου) for the Athenians' sake. The god has set him a task for the sake of the city's well-being. If they neglect their self-interest and the god's gift to them, there is little hope that they will ever find someone else to take on such a demanding and dangerous task. Therefore, instead of taking any action against Socrates, the Athenians should take all possible care of him, since, as he says in the Second Speech (36c3-4. d4), he is a benefactor of the city.

Here again we have a typically Socratic paradox. Just as he claimed in the preceding section that his attitude, far from being shameful, was the very model of honour, so he will contend now that, while his adversaries try to get rid of him as a pest to the city, he is, on the contrary, its best servant. Since such an assertion can be expected to arouse adverse reactions, Socrates starts by renewing his earlier request (17d1) that the jury should refrain from protesting (cf. note on 21a5). Still, it was risky for Plato to portray Socrates pointing out his own paramount importance and value for Athens. This would sound overbearing and not at all in harmony with Socrates' characteristic irony, which is chiefly directed towards himself, or with his conviction that what he does for others is simply the fulfillment of a mission entrusted to him by divine authority. Therefore, Plato lays strong emphasis on the fact that it is the god who, through the agency of Socrates[50], confers a benefit on the Athenians (30d7-e1. e3. 31a8-b1). Secondly, the description that Socrates gives of his activity takes the form of the comic comparison with the gadfly, one of the most successful images in the whole *corpus Platonicum*, and certainly one which is not compatible with self-satisfaction or arrogance on the side of the speaker. The evident pleasure which Socrates takes in developing the image shows how far he is from considering himself a person of importance. On the other hand, his mission is demanding. It requires from him that he should neglect all personal interest in order to devote all his energy to the well-being of his fellow-citizens, for every one of whom he feels responsible like a father or an older brother.

In comparison with the preceding section, 30c2-31c3 introduces only a few new ideas; this is quite normal, since the question is the same and only the perspective differs. That Socrates' activity is a blessing for the city was

[50] Compare the conclusion of the Narration (23a7-b4) where Socrates says that the oracle given to Chaerephon is not about himself and that the god just took him as an illustration to convey a message with a universal meaning.

already indicated in the previous passage (30a5-7; cf. b5-6); of course it is treated here with much more detail, force and vividness. The idea that fulfilling his divine task does not leave Socrates any time for other pursuits and has brought him poverty was expressed once before (23b7-c1), in a similar context. There, however, no mention was made of the fact that Socrates did not accept fees from those whom he helped on the way to human σοφία, whereas here this point is brought out quite forcibly.

As a whole, 30c2-31c3 is transitional. It brings to a conclusion the Answer to the First Objection; at the same time, the emphasis it places on Socrates' educational role prepares the way for the next section, in which this is the dominant theme.

5. *Socrates as the Religious Man*

I have argued repeatedly that the Refutation of the New Accusers does not contain Plato's real defence of Socrates; more specifically, its second part, the refutation of the charge of impiety, is purely negative and gives no hint whatsoever about Socrates' personal convictions about the gods and the correct way to worship them (Chapter VI 118-120). If Plato had left it at that, the defence would be sadly incomplete. But it is not, for Plato has taken care to integrate into the Digression, which is the core of the *Apology*, the true refutation of both charges; that of impiety is given in the Answer to the First Objection, that of corrupting the young in the next section. In this way he gives Socrates the opportunity to develop his ideas on both these essential topics from his own perspective and free from any misrepresentation.

In the preceding sections of the *Apology* we have already seen several indications of Socrates' attitude towards the divine. In the second part of the Ἐρώτησις he categorically denied that he was an atheist (26d1-28a1; cf., in the Proposition, 18c2-3). Of more importance is the Narration, in which he tells about the oracle given to Chaerephon and gives his interpretation of the god's surprising words. That part of the *Apology* first outlines Socrates' activity and describes the spirit in which he acted: in his interpretation, the oracle entrusted a mission to him. It was not an easy one and it aroused much bitter enmity, but he 'thought that [he] ought to prefer the cause of the god' (21e4-5) to his own tranquillity and safety. So he continued along the same path, not only immediately after the oracle was given, but long afterwards too, and he was still doing so at the time of the lawsuit (23b4-6). The fulfillment of this mission absorbed all his time and his energies; it did not leave him any leisure for political affairs or for private business, and the consequence was that he lived 'in utter poverty because of (his) service to the god' (b9-c1).

At the end of the Proposition another aspect of Socrates' piety is hinted at, his faith in Providence. He has said that it will be difficult to defend

himself against such ingrained prejudices. ‘But let this turn out as God wishes it: I have to obey the law and present my defence’ (19a5-7).

So far, three features seem to characterise Socrates’ piety. First, he takes the oracle given by the god of Delphi very seriously[51]. Second, Socrates’ devotion to the god is not limited to specific religious acts, like those of public or private worship; it takes hold of his whole life and leads him to dedicate himself so unreservedly to the service of the god that he sacrifices all self-interest. Third, he entrusts the outcome of the lawsuit entirely to God’s providence; this does not mean that he expects God to insure his acquittal, but that whatever will happen will not do him any real harm. What this implies is explained in theoretical terms in the Digression (30c6-d4) and more concretely in the Third Speech (39e5-41e1).

The Answer to the First Objection takes up the same points and gives them stronger emphasis. The divine mission entrusted to Socrates is now compared with the posts assigned him several times by the military officers of Athens; there can be no doubt that a mandate of God has a much stronger claim to be obeyed than a human one (28d10-29a1). If he had deserted his station out of fear of death, he could justly be indicted for not acknowledging the gods (29a2-4). This duty of obedience is firmly grounded in the fact that God is better than man (29b6-7), which, for Socrates, means that he has more insight and is therefore entitled to give guidance. No human command, not even from the highest authority in the state, can overrule divine orders (29d3-4). Therefore, Socrates cannot give a more persuasive reason for his way of life than by saying that ‘God orders [him] to do so’ (30a5).

Further, he trusts that he will be taken care of by Providence. He does not, however, expect to be protected from hostile actions. He readily admits that his enemies can deprive him of his civic rights, banish him or even put him to death. But he considers none of these punishments a great harm (30d1-4). For a bad or unjust man is never able to harm a good or righteous

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[51] With regard to Socrates’ attitude towards the various forms of μαντική, the description of the Narration is in harmony with what we learn from other passages of the *Apology* and from the dialogues. The most important passages are quoted in Chapter V 81-82. In the *Memorabilia* i 1,2 Xenophon refutes Meletus’ first charge, ὡς (Σωκράτης) οὐκ ἐνομίζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, with a twofold argument: θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῆι χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν, and then, without saying any more about worship, continues to work out in detail Socrates’ attitude towards μαντική. Sacrifices are also implied by a fragment from Theodectes’ *Apology of Socrates*, Arist. *Rhet*. ii 23, 1399a9-10 εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει; It should not surprise us that the Platonic *Apology* does not mention sacrifices made by Socrates, since it does not undertake to refute the indictment directly. Still, Socrates’ last words in the *Phaedo* (118a7-8) Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῶι Ἀσκληπιῶι ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα show that on this point the Platonic Socrates followed common Athenian practice. By the way, I agree with Wilamowitz (*Platon* i 135 n.1 and ii 57-58) that these words have nothing to do with a liberation of the soul from corporeality. The words were precious in Plato’s eyes just because they were Socrates’ last, and even more because it showed how simple and straightforward the piety was of the man whom his fellow-citizens condemned for impiety because of prejudice.

one; according to his conviction, this is ruled out by the divine order of things (30c9-d1 οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι), just as it is ruled out that a god can lie (21b6-7 οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῶι)[52]. The only real harm is a moral one, like the evil which his accusers do by trying to put an innocent man to death (30d4-5). No outward agent or force can cause anybody to do wrong against his own will, since wrong-doing originates in a false judgment about what is good, and judgment is essentially a personal and free act. Hence it appears that, for the Platonic Socrates, faith in Providence and ethical responsibility are inseparable[53].

An idea that did not appear before 30c2-31c3[54] is that Socrates' mission is a special gift which the god confers on Athens (30d7-e1). The god is said to have 'attached' Socrates to the city like a gadfly to a well-sized and thorough-bred, but sluggish horse in order to stir and arouse it, so that it will react according to its noble nature (e3-6). Although Socrates takes an obvious pleasure in describing the comic situation, he is absolutely serious when he says that in doing so the god shows his concern for the city (31a6-7). But the god's care and gifts do not work automatically: they fail to have their expected results if the beneficiary refuses them. If so, he harms himself grievously (30c7-8. d5-7), for he is not free to refuse the gracious bounty of God. If he spurns it, it is possible that God may renew his offer (30e2. 31a6-7), but man should not presumptuously count on his mercy, and therefore he should beware of treating God's gift thoughtlessly (d7-e1).

The idea that the conduct of the accused is a very precious gift from God to Athens sounds so utterly paradoxical that Socrates adds a paragraph to make it more acceptable to the jury (31b1-c3). Is there some intrinsic probability that his activity stems from a divine initiative? There is, for Socrates does not pursue the things that men normally devote all their exertions to; he completely neglects his own interests in order to promote the moral advancement of his fellow-citizens. Other people who play an analogous role in the life of the community, such as teachers or physicians, accept a fee for their work. Socrates does not. So his conduct cannot be explained in terms of human psychology. Only the gods, who lack nothing, can bestow benefits without expecting any reward. When a man does the same, it must be the case that he was destined to it by the gods.

The description of Socrates' attitude towards divinity presented in the Answer to the First Objection shows that, far from being contemptuous of religion, he is on the contrary an eminently pious man, whose whole life is

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[52] In Plato, θεμιτός is used exclusively in the expression οὐ θεμιτόν (ἐστιν), which always has religious connotations; the latter holds good mostly for (οὐ) θέμις (ἐστιν); cf. the *Lexique* of E. des Places, *s.vv.*, and H. Vos Θέμις (Assen 1956) 34-35. Cf. Chapter XI n.100.

[53] This ethical concept of providence differs *toto caelo* from the naively utilitarian and anthropocentric concept which the Xenophontic Socrates works out in *Mem.* i 4 and iv 3.

[54] At 30a5-7 it was only hinted at, not explicitly formulated.

filled with devotion and obedience to the gods, who is prepared to make every possible sacrifice in order to fulfill his mission, who trusts in divine Providence and believes that the gods take care of the well-being not only of the individual, but also of the city. Later in the *Apology*, Socrates says that man should first of all take care of his self, that is, of his 'soul' or moral personality, and only afterwards see to his possessions, and likewise should take care first of the city itself and only afterwards of the city's possessions (36c5-8). Similarly, we see here that in their care for man, the gods direct our individual efforts towards the truly valuable things, justice and insight, and that they do the same for the community, through the ministry of Socrates.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ANSWER TO A SECOND OBJECTION

1. *The Second Objection*

At the end of the Answer to the First Objection Socrates twice hints at a second objection by pointing to the fact that his encouragement and criticism were always directed to individuals in private conversations (30e7 πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον; 31b4 ἰδίαι ἑκάστωι προσιόντα). For the sake of variation, the Second Objection is not introduced in the form of a quotation of the words of an anonymous objector, as was the case in 28b3 ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, but by the more neutral formula ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ κτέ. Still, the parallelism is underscored by the repeated use of ἴσως ἂν οὖν and by the particle δή, which indicates a quotation or paraphrase of someone else's words (see the note *in loc.*).

The objection is an important one. Formally, it is about the consistency of Socrates' behaviour. Why does not he take part in the common affairs of the city, while meddling in the private affairs of his fellow-citizens? What is unacceptable about his behaviour, however, is not so much his lack of logical consistency as the fact that, by acting as he does, Socrates does exactly the opposite of what is expected from him. We might say, with a reservation which I shall make presently, that, according to Pericles' *Funeral Oration*, what characterises the Athenians is that they are ἰδίαι ἀπράγμονες and δημοσίαι πολυπράγμονες (cf. Chapter VI 110). In *private* life an Athenian refrains from exercising censorship on his neighbours' way of life, either by prying into what they are doing or by showing in his looks disapproval of what they have done (ii 37,2-3). In *public* life, however, an Athenian does not avoid responsibility but takes an active part in the process of deliberation and decision; for he is convinced that even though his professional skills are limited to one field of activity, he is still able to judge for himself about state affairs (ii 40,2).

What Pericles says about the political competence of the average Athenian has a polemical ring[1]. According to the Athenian oligarchs, the common

[1] It is also clear that the democratic doctrine, as Thucydides makes Pericles expound it, is influenced by the ideas of Protagoras. According to the latter, as we saw above (Chapter VI 108-109), each young member of the civic community is educated by all the others in order to develop fully the fundamental gifts with which nature has endowed him, αἰδώς and δίκη (Plato *Prot.* 322c2. 4. 7. d5), 'mutual consideration and a sense for standards of conduct.' — 'That is the reason, Socrates [says Protagoras], why ... the Athenians, when the debate concerns excellence in the field of architecture or another technique, think that only a few are entitled

people are unable to take the broad view which is necessary for making political decisions, because their interests are restricted to their daily business. Therefore, they should be content to stick to their last. If they do so, they will be esteemed for their modesty and be called ἀπράγμονες, i.e. quiet people, who know their place. If, however, they presume to interfere in matters in which they lack competence and which they should leave to their betters, they will get the name of πολυπράγμονες, i.e. meddlesome busybodies. Since the aristocratic circles had great influence on judgments of value as reflected in language, ἀπραγμοσύνη was commonly felt to be a good quality, πολυπραγμοσύνη a bad one. It is precisely this traditional connotation of ἀπράγμων which Pericles rejects: when an Athenian citizen keeps aloof from political life, such an attitude should not be praised as a proof of modesty or pragmatism, in short as 'the quiet life': ἀπραγμοσύνη should instead be considered a refusal to accept one's civic responsibilities and it reveals a lack of public spirit; such a man is a useless (ἀχρεῖος) member of the community.

It is exactly because it is raised from the standpoint of the democrats that the Second Objection sees Socrates' interference in the private life of his fellow-citizens as meddlesomeness (31c5 πολυπραγμονεῖν); on the other hand, in order to characterise Socrates' abstention from politics, Plato does not use the word ἀπραγμοσύνη in the Second Objection, because it generally has positive, even laudatory connotations[2].

Although the texts which I cited from the *Funeral Oration* help us to perceive the background of the Second Objection, the intention of the objector differs in two respects from that of Pericles. First, we see from Socrates' answer that the main point of the objection was not his interference in other people's private affairs, but his abstention from politics. Second, the nature of the part which an Athenian citizen should play in politics is different. The objector finds fault with Socrates not because he avoids meetings of the ἐκκλησία[3], but because he does not appear on the

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to give advice and refuse to listen when somebody outside that circle attempts to do so; but when they start a deliberation about civic merit (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή), — a deliberation which, as a whole, has to do with justice and self-control — it is quite natural that they allow every man to speak, since in their opinion everybody should have his share of that virtue, or no cities at all would exist' (322d6-323a3).

[2] On πολυπραγμοσύνη and ἀπραγμοσύνη, the best study is Ehrenberg 'Polypragmosyne'; although Ehrenberg is most interested in political literature, and especially in Thucydides, he also has two good pages on Plato (488-490) in which, however, he does not say anything special about the passage in the *Apology*. See note on 36b6. L.B. Carter *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford 1986) has a dozen pages on Plato (173-186). Cf. S.R.S. 'The quiet life in Euripides' Antiope' in H. Hoffmann - A. Harder *Fragmenta dramatica* Beiträge zur Interpretation der griechischen Tragikerfragmente und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte (Göttingen 1991) 137-151.

[3] In fact, it seems that Socrates did not often attend the meetings of the Assembly: in the *Gorgias* (473e6-474a1), in order to demonstrate that he is not a politician, he tells how on one occasion when he had been designated by lot to be Chairman of the Assembly (ἐπιστάτης), he made a fool of himself by not knowing how to put a question to vote. Since there were at least

βῆμα of the Assembly to give his advice on the issues at hand. Now, Pericles did not say that giving opinions on political issues was the duty of every Athenian citizen. Not only would it have been physically impossible in as large a state as Attica, but the majority of citizens lacked the self-confidence, and also the intellectual and rhetorical gifts, that were necessary for public speaking. The role of the average citizen was to listen to the various proposals and the arguments for or against each of them, to judge their relative merits and to vote on them. Socrates' situation was different: he was an able debater, he had pondered all the aspects of ἀρετή, both for the private individual and for the citizen[4]. Since, in questions of individual virtue, he did not restrict himself to theoretical inquiries, but scrutinised other people's behaviour as well as his own (38a4-5), he should have applied his skills in questions relevant to the well-being of the city as a whole. If he refused to do so, it was clear either that he was seriously deficient in public spirit or, worse still, that he belonged to the oligarchic and pro-Spartan party, people who were unwilling to submit their political designs to the decisive judgment of an assembly of the people. The jurors were entitled to object to such an attitude, and Socrates was obliged to explain his apparent avoidance of civic responsibility.

2. *Socrates' Answer*

a) The Divine Sign

Socrates gives in fact a straightforward explanation: he has been warned against political activities by his divine sign. After having described this sign and the kind of instructions it gives him, Socrates adds an additional reason: his personal experience has shown him that, on occasions when he actually participated in public life contrary to his usual rule of conduct, his participation led to acute conflicts which in the end would make it impossible for him to accomplish his mission. I have already pointed out that, not only here but also in other passages of the *Apology*, Socrates buttresses up the directions he has received from heaven by reflections of his own (Chapter V 82).

On the divine sign I can be short, since Burnet has, to my mind, conclusively refuted many misconceptions concerning the question[5]. The

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ten sessions a year and often several proposals were to be decided by vote during each session, it is impossible that such an intellectually curious man as Socrates would not have known the procedure, if he had seen it applied regularly.

[4] See e.g. *Apol.* 20b4-5. 30b2-4. 35a1-b3. 36c5-d1. 38e5-39b1.

[5] See his commentary 15-17. 27-28. 105-106, and especially 127-129 (on *Apol.* 31c7-d5) and 165-166 (on 40a2-c3). The only point on which I disagree with Burnet is incidental. He contends that the words δαιμόνια καινά in the indictment of Meletus do not allude to the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον. The question is discussed at length in Chapter VI 95-98. See also Gundert's perceptive paper 'Platon und das Daimonion des Sokrates'; it gives a detailed

main points which he has established are the following: (a) 'There is no such noun-substantive as δαιμόνιον in classical Greek'[6]; (b) the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον 'is not a "genius" or familiar spirit of any kind, as it was supposed to have been in later days', especially by Plutarch in his Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου, but, as Plato says here and elsewhere, something that 'happens' (31d1-3 γίγνεται ... γιγνομένη ... ὅταν γένηται) and that can be described as a voice which makes itself heard; (c) when it 'happens', it always warns Socrates not to do something which he is about to do and never incites him to do anything in particular; (d) the warning does not mean that Socrates' intended course of action would be morally wrong, but that its consequences would be unfortunate[7]; (e) therefore the 'sign' has nothing to do with conscience or with the mission which is entrusted to Socrates by the god. All these points are made clear in *Apol.* 31c7-d5 and 40a4-c3, and Burnet shows that they are confirmed by the other, less detailed passages in which Plato speaks about the same phenomenon.

We have seen that the oracle given to Chaerephon was not widely known among the Athenian public (Chapter V 75-76). Socrates' 'divine sign' was, however, a well-known phenomenon. Socrates says (31c7-8) that the judges 'have heard [him] mentioning [it] many times and on many occasions'. In the dialogues he speaks about it freely to different persons, not only to his circle of close friends, but to others as well, e.g. to Theaetetus (*Theaet.* 151a2-5), whose name he did not even know before he was introduced to him by Theodorus in the beginning of that same conversation (*ib.* 144c8-d1). In the *Euthyphro*, when Socrates tells Euthyphro that Meletus has accused him of introducing new gods, Euthyphro answers: 'I see, Socrates; it is no doubt because you say that the divine thing *happens* to you from time to time' (3b5-6)[8]. All the same, in the *Apology* Socrates gives a detailed explanation of the divine sign, obviously because he assumes that the jurors do not know precisely what it is.

Later in the *Apology* (40a4-6), Socrates says that the sign manifests itself quite often (πάνυ πυκνή) and warns him against quite trivial matters (πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς). Here, however, he invokes the sign very earnestly to counter

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interpretation of all the passages of Plato that mention the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον. The author, however, did not realise that the law on ἀσέβεια, on which the accusation of Meletus rested, mentioned καινοὺς θεοὺς εἰσηγεῖσθαι (see above, Chapter VI 84-85 and 88-89), and this mars the first section of his paper (47-50).

6 From Herodotus onwards (ii 120,5 etc.), the adjective δαιμόνιος can be used substantively, to denote, like τὸ θεῖον, a divine agent whom one does not want to name. See, for Hippocrates, the abundantly documented study of W. Nestle *Griechische Studien* (Stuttgart 1948) 517-526. The notion that δαιμόνιον means 'little daemon' is erroneous.

7 This continues to be the most misunderstood aspect of the divine sign. Reeve unquestioningly assumes that it has a moral value and Brickhouse - Smith offer a futile argument against Burnet (242-245). Even Vlastos *Socrates* 280-287 is regrettably non-committal. Yet what sense can be made of 40b7-c3 on a moral interpretation of the sign?

8 Cf. Xenophon *Mem.* i 1,2, quoted in Chapter VI n.26.

a very serious objection against his way of life[9]. And despite the reference to 'quite trivial matters', the divine sign is also crucial in the argument in the later passage (40a4-c3), where Socrates explains to the jurors who voted for his acquittal that his death-sentence should not be considered a misfortune but rather a blessing. In both cases, the divine sign is Socrates' first line of defence; to be sure, its authority is immediately reinforced by arguments independent of it, but still it appears to have an overriding importance of its own.

In most passages in which the sign manifests itself or is described, it warns Socrates against a particular action. In the *Phaedrus* (242b8-c3), he is about to break off the conversation with his young friend and to cross the river and return home, but he is prevented from doing so by the voice. In the *Euthydemus* (272e3-4), the same happens when he is leaving the gymnasium. In the *Theaetetus*, he tells about people who broke off their contacts with him and later asked him earnestly to renew them; in some cases, the sign holds him back from complying with their request (151a2-5). In the second passage of the *Apology* (40a3-b6), Socrates speaks about various courses of action which his sign prevented or did not prevent him from taking; each case concerns a particular thing which he was about to do or say.

In our passage, on the other hand, the warning seems to be more general: Socrates should refrain from any political action whatever. We find the same idea expressed in *Republic* vi 496c3-5. There Socrates expounds how and why most people are prevented from devoting themselves to philosophy: often they are engaged in other pursuits, especially politics. Theages, he says, who was not involved in civic matters because of his ill health, was as a result free to devote himself to philosophy. He continues: 'As for my case, it is not worth-while to mention the divine sign; for it has happened to few or none in the past'. It is not worth-while, because the phenomenon is strictly personal and cannot be expected to happen to other people. It is not sure, however, that the sign kept Socrates out of politics by means of a *general* warning. It could just as well have done so by holding Socrates back whenever he thought about intervening in the political life of the city; after some time he would have understood from the repeated warnings that politics ought not to be his field of activity. In that case, it would be as permanent an impediment for Socrates as bad health was for Theages.

[9] In his note on *Euthyphro* 3b5 (p. 16), Burnet writes: 'It is ... to be observed that Socrates is always represented by Plato ... as speaking quite lightly, and even ironically, of the "divine sign"'. This is perhaps somewhat of an overstatement. Besides, we should remember that, for Plato, παιδιά goes hand in hand with σπουδή; on this point, see G.J. de Vries' fundamental book *Spel bij Plato*.

b) A General Principle

Socrates says that he was warned by his divine sign. He adds that, in his opinion, that warning was a very fortunate one, for, if he had taken an active part in political life, he would long ago have lost his life and thus would have been of no use either to the Athenians or to himself. What this 'use' in fact is, he has explained in the preceding section: it is the result of his exhortations 'to take care of improving oneself' (31b5 πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς). That is advantageous both to his fellow-citizens and to him, since discussions of ἀρετή are at the same time examinations of oneself and of others (28e5-6).

But why is Socrates so certain that political activity would necessarily endanger his life? Because, in the Athenian democracy, as in any other Greek democracy, if a man is determined to observe the laws and justice strictly, he will on many occasions have to resist popular sentiment, and thus come into conflict with the Assembly of the People. And when this assembly gets angry, it simply eliminates the man who dares to oppose its wishes and whims. Therefore, if one is serious in one's struggle for justice and wishes to strive for it without being eliminated in the shortest of time, one should strive for justice through private conversations and not in public activities.

In making this bold statement, Plato is thinking of democracy as it functioned in the last decades of the fifth century in Athens and in other cities that followed the Athenian model. In order to prove his assertion, Socrates appeals to his personal experience and not to theoretical arguments. The story of the trial of 406 is just an example, but the way in which it is told reveals what prompted the Athenian Assembly to act as it did. According to Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, the essential feature of a pure democracy is absolute freedom, through which both the individual citizen and the people as a whole reject any rule but their own desires[10]. They will not submit to established authorities or to law, and respectful obedience to these forms of authority is, in Plato's eyes, typical of a wholesome democracy, the kind that prevailed in Athens at the time of the Persian wars[11]. The case of the Arginusae shows that in more recent times the

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[10] *Rep.* viii 557b4-6 Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῆι ποιεῖν ὅ τι τις βούλεται; *Laws* iii 698a10-b1 ἡ παντελὴς καὶ ἀπὸ πασῶν ἀρχῶν ἐλευθερία; 699e4 ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν προτρέπουσι τὰ πλήθη.

[11] *Laws* iii 698b5-c2 δεσπότις ἐνῆν τις αἰδώς, δι' ἣν δουλεύοντες τοῖς τότε νόμοις ζῆν ἠθέλομεν· ... (now, the fear for the Persian invasion) δουλείαν ἔτι μείζονα ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς τοῖς τε ἄρχουσιν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις δουλεῦσαι. It is important to notice that Pericles, after having spoken in the Funeral Speech of the ἐλευθερία that characterises the Athenian way of life, points out that it does not lead to disorder precisely because of that double submission inspired by 'fear' or 'awe': τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῆι ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων (Thuc. ii 37,3). On this similarity and on the equivalence between Pericles' δέος and Plato's αἰδώς and φόβος, see my paper 'Vrees als

Athenian δῆμος was intolerant of any restriction on its freedom to act as it pleased, even of self-imposed restrictions. According to Xenophon, when Euryptolemus protested against the illegal action against the generals that Callixenus had proposed, 'the crowd shouted that it was intolerable that the people would be prevented from doing whatever it wished'[12].

In the *Apology* we do not find an explicit formulation of these ideas, but something of the kind is implied in the way in which, throughout the whole passage, Socrates adds law to justice as the two values which he is fighting for and which the Assembly tramples underfoot[13]. It is no surprise that the Platonic Socrates is a champion of justice[14]; more remarkable is the fact that he risks his life to defend the Athenian laws, precisely as he did when he obeyed the officers appointed by the city to command him[15]. Surely, he considered these laws to be far from perfect and, if we may trust the *Crito*, definitely inferior to those of Sparta and Crete[16]. Still, an imperfect law is, in his eyes, better than none, better than total arbitrariness, and therefore should be defended at all costs.

Several scholars have detected a contradiction between the *Apology* and the *Crito* with regard to Socrates' attitude towards the civic authorities and the laws of Athens. In proof of this, they cite the defiant words with which Socrates, at the most exalted moment of his defence, declares to the jury: 'I shall rather listen to God than to you and, so long as I live, so long as I can, I shall never cease searching for the truth and addressing to everyone of you, when I meet him, my exhortations and my arguments' (29d3-6)[17]. But

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principe van staatsburgerlijke tucht in de democratie volgens Thucydides en volgens Plato' *Handelingen der Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis* 9 (1955) 51-64.

[12] *Hell.* i 7,12 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται. The formula is the same as in *Rep.* viii 557b5-6, quoted above, n.10. In the *Laws* Plato says, more generally, that unrestricted power leads to ἄνοια, ὕβρις, ἀδικία and πλεονεξία (ii 691c5-d2. 701b5-c2; iv 713c6-8; ix 875b3-7).

[13] *Apol.* 31e3-4 διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῆι πόλει γίγνεσθαι; 32a6-7 οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον; b4 παρανόμως; b6 ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους; b8-c2 μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων. Cf. e3-4 ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις; 33a3 οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον.

[14] See *Apol.* 19a6. 35c2-4; *Crit.* 47c9-11. d4-5. e6-48a1. a7-10. b8-9. c6-d5.

[15] *Apol.* 28d6-e4. So Socrates shows the 'fear' or 'respect' for both law and appointed authorities that, according to the *Laws* and to Pericles (above, n.11), characterises wholesome democracy.

[16] *Crit.* 52e5-6; cf. 53b4-5 about the good legislations of Thebes and Megara. Chapter VI n.49.

[17] See e.g. Richard Harder *Platos Kriton* (Berlin 1934) 62 = *Kleine Schriften* (München 1960) 238: 'Vor Gericht hatte Plato den Sokrates an einem Höhepunkt seiner Rede offenen Ungehorsam gegen den Staat in feierlichen Gelübde ankündigen lassen ... Warum zeigt sich im Kriton dazu kein Weg?' The contrast has been treated at length by more recent authors, especially A.D. Woozley 'Socrates on Disobeying the Law' *The Philosophy of Socrates* ed. by G. Vlastos (Garden City - New York 1971) 299-318; id. *Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's* Crito (London 1979) 44-46. 52-55; G. Young 'Socrates on Political Disobedience'

surely, if, by asserting solemnly that he would continue his philosophical activity, Socrates had implied that he did not feel bound to obey the legitimate magistrates and the laws of the city, his attitude would conflict not only with the *Crito*, but also with the *Apology* itself, specifically where he refers to his dutiful service in the post assigned to him by the elected military officers (28e1-4), and where he tells how he fought in the Assembly in order to defend the law of Athens against a raging mob (32b1-c3)[18].

The alleged contradiction, however, hinges on a misunderstanding[19]. The proposal which the jury is supposed to make to Socrates is provided for by the law nor suggested by a legal authority acting within the limits of its competence. They propose a compromise: if he agrees to renounce philosophy, they will vote for acquittal. Socrates flatly refuses to agree to such a bargain. But he does not question the state's authority, whether manifested in the provisions of the law or in the injunctions of a magistrate; on the contrary, he has always obeyed it, even when his life was at stake. We should not press the word πείσομαι (29d3), which in this context corresponds to ἀπιστήσαντες (c1; cf. c5): just as the Athenians are prepared 'not to listen' to Anytus and so to let Socrates free, so, but for much better reasons, Socrates 'will rather listen to God' than to the jury when they try to induce him to compromise[20]. Moreover, we should remember that the jury was in no way empowered to make such a proposal to Socrates; there was no procedure by which such an agreement could be reached, much less enforced. Socrates advances the hypothesis only for the sake of argument[21].

Thus, Socrates' attitude towards the law of Athens is fundamentally the same in both the *Apology* and the *Crito*. The difference is that in the plan of the *Apology* there is no room for a discussion of the validity of imperfect

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Phronesis 19 (1974) 1-29; R.J. McLaughlin 'Socrates on Political Disobedience' *ib.* 21 (1976) 185-197 with further bibliography; R. Kraut 'Plato's *Apology* and *Crito*: Two Recent Studies' *Ethics* 91 (1981) 651-664, esp. 658-659; id. *Socrates and the State* 13-24; Brickhouse - Smith 137-153 with further references. I have not seen R.E. Allen *Socrates and Legal Obligation* (Minneapolis 1980).

[18] To these main passages should be added 19a6-7 τῶι δὲ νόμωι πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

[19] The misunderstanding is particularly blatant in Young's article, who writes (*art. cit.* 1): 'In *Apology*, Socrates asserts: I shall not give up philosophy, *even if the city commands me to do so* (*Apol.* 29d)' (my italics). What Socrates actually says is very different from that. Also, Socrates does not 'threaten to disobey' (Kraut *Socrates and the State* 130), much less to disobey a 'hypothetical court order' (Reeve 116) but tells the jury what he would do in a completely imaginary situation: he would decline to accept their offer. Athenian law did not provide for conditional sentences, so to read the jury's words as 'We will find you guilty but will suspend the death penalty, unless you continue your philosophical activities' is ahistoric.

[20] That in our context πείθομαι means 'listen to', 'do as one is asked', not specifically 'obey' (a command), is made clear by 29c6 νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτωι οὐ πεισόμεθα; 30b8-9 ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτωι ἢ μή; 31a5 πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτωι. (Similarly, S. Panagiotou *Apeiron* 20 (1987) 56; J.G. de Filippo *CQ* 40 (1990) 547 — S.R.S.)

[21] (This conclusion was reached independently by Brickhouse - Smith 137-147 — S.R.S.)

laws[22]. Nowhere does Socrates have the opportunity to speak, as he does in the *Crito*, about the tacit contract between citizen and city[23], or about the citizen's obligation to use persuasion rather that violence in order to change imperfect laws. These ideas, however, are perfectly compatible with the themes of the *Apology*; they underlie Socrates' deep respect for the law, and they alone make us understand his conduct during the Arginusae affair.

The story of the trial of 406 is meant to show how impossible it is to remain perfectly true to justice and law in a democracy. This story is immediately followed by the account of Socrates' behaviour in the affair of Leon under the regime of the Thirty. To be sure, it gives an equally impressive illustration of Socrates' moral and civic courage, but it does not prove anything *with regard to democracy*. Why, then, did Plato insert it here? Of course, it has an apologetic significance, to which I will return presently. But this is not a sufficient explanation, since the sentence that introduces the two reports states that *they* will *both* testify to the principle which the speaker has just enunciated. The inclusion of the Leon affair can be explained as follows. In Socrates' eyes, injustice in public life is not characteristic of democracy *per se*, not even of radical democracy, but of every form of government where the rulers lack true insight into what is good and let themselves be guided by πλεονεξία, that is to say, lust for power and wealth[24]. The example of the Thirty shows that excesses perpetrated by unprincipled rulers in an oligarchy are as bad as or worse than those committed in a democracy[25]. The same could be said about monarchy[26], but since there was no monarchy in Athens during Socrates' lifetime, he has no experience of its corrupt form.

There seem to be two reasons why Socrates, though formulating a principle that is valid for all regimes that are not based upon insight and justice, restricts it to democracy. First, democracy was the constitution typical of Athens and both he and the jury had known democracy in their city for all their lives, apart from the short interruptions of the Four Hundred

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[22] For this reason, to raise, let alone answer the question whether Socrates would have disobeyed a law banning his philosophical activity (so Kraut *Socrates and the State* 15-17; Brickhouse - Smith, 147-153) seems pointless, the more so since Plato does not envisage this possibility even in the *Crito*. But I find myself entirely in agreement with Kraut when he writes (17) 'Thus many jurors must have found themselves thinking, "If only we could let Socrates go this time and order him to give up philosophy, on pain of death." Socrates realizes that his audience is ambivalent, but he does not want them to vote for acquittal in the hope that he might stop philosophizing. He wants them to know just what sort of person he is'. Plato inserts the hypothetical offer by the jury in order to highlight an essential trait in Socrates' character. See Chapter VII 142.

[23] On this, see J. de Romilly *La loi dans la pensée grecque des origines à Aristote* (Paris 1971) 129-136.

[24] On the attitude see *Gorg.* 483a7-484c3. 491c6-492c8. 508a7; *Rep.* i 343d1-344c8.

[25] Cf. *Epist.* vii 324d6-8.

[26] This is evidenced by the case of Archelaus, king of Macedon, as appears from *Gorg.* 471a1-d2; cf. the portrait of the tyrannical man in *Rep.* ix 571a1-572b9.

in 411 and the Thirty in 404/3. Now, Athenian radical democracy, although constitutional[27] in theory, was not so in practice, since the laws were not scrupulously observed, not even in matters of life and death for its citizens. A second reason for focusing on democracy is suggested by the *Gorgias* and elaborated in the *Republic*. In the *Gorgias* (455a5-7) Socrates says that an orator, 'of course, would not be able to instruct a crowd in a short time about such important things' as justice and injustice, and Gorgias himself, the great master of oratory, fully agrees with him (cf. Chapter II 35). The decisive factor here, we may presume, is not the lack of time, but the fact that not everybody has the natural ability to grasp the truth about the basic principles of life. The *Republic* gives a detailed account of the many and, it would seem, mutually incompatible qualities without which insight into absolute Goodness is unattainable (vi 503b7-504d3)[28] as well as of the long and rigorous training to which future rulers should be submitted (vii 521c1-541b5). At best, we can hope that a few will truly qualify as rulers[29]. For that reason, democracy cannot be the perfect form of government, whereas oligarchy, the rule of a few, is not to be excluded a priori, although Plato readily concedes that the ideal city does not exist and 'is perhaps a model set up in heaven' (ix 592b2).

c) Two Stories Told by Socrates

After formulating his general principle, that one cannot serve justice as a politician in an unjust state, Socrates proceeds to prove it by relating events in which he was personally involved. In doing so he intends to make clear two points: First, he is not prepared to yield to anybody if this would mean a departure from the right cause, and second, in the normal run of things, his perseverance would inevitably have led to his death. Of course, only the second point proves the principle. The first one is added to illustrate the moral attitude that guides Socrates' actions; at the same time it lays the foundation for what will be said below about the relations between Socrates and his so-called pupils[30]. It will be necessary to begin with an examination of some historical problems connected with Socrates' account of his behaviour. After that I shall present some remarks on Plato's literary technique and on the apologetic function of the two reports.

A commentary on the *Apology* is not the place to discuss historical problems at length. It will suffice to examine a few major points on which

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[27] Perhaps the German word *Rechtsstaat* expresses better what I mean than the English phrase *constitutional form of government*.

[28] Cf. *Theaet*. 144a3-b7.

[29] Cf. *Apol*. 25a13-b7 about the fact that only a few people possess educational competence; cf. 20a6-b5.

[30] Note the similarity of 33a3 οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον to 32a6 οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον.

Burnet's valuable notes can be supplemented or corrected; for some other details the reader should consult the commentary *in loc.*

As for the Arginusae affair[31], we are fortunate to have the remarkably detailed account in Xenophon *Hellenica* i 7[32]. We learn from him that the case of the generals was discussed in two Assembly meetings. Although the Council had already ordered the arrest of the generals, the first meeting was merely a hearing concerning what they had done after the battle to rescue those who had been shipwrecked. The ἐκκλησία did not, on this occasion, pass judgement. When dusk fell, it was impossible to vote and it was decided that a new Assembly would determine the procedure according to which the generals would be tried. After the three days of the Apaturia, a meeting of the Council was held in the early morning. Xenophon simply mentions it, without giving any particulars, and then goes on to give the text of a motion (§§ 9-10) presented by a certain Callixenus[33], endorsed by the Council and referred to the Assembly, which met immediately afterwards. According to the motion, two urns were to be placed in the Assembly for each tribe. Those who found the generals guilty of not rescuing the shipwrecked were to cast their vote in the first urn, the others in the second one; if found guilty, the generals were to be put to death.

From § 11 on, Xenophon's narrative is exclusively concerned with the meeting of the Assembly. There can scarcely be any doubt that the scene so vividly sketched by Socrates in the *Apology* took place in the Assembly, not in the Council. Not only does the context of an Assembly better suit the words ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων (32b7-8), but Xenophon's text makes it absolutely clear that it was in the Assembly that Socrates, all alone, resisted Callixenus' motion[34]. At the beginning of the meeting, a man who contended that he had been able to save himself came forward (11 παρῆλθε δέ τις <u>εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν</u>). When Euryptolemus and others announced that they would bring a suit against Callixenus for proposing an illegal motion, the reactions described are those of the Assembly: τοῦ δὲ <u>δήμου</u> ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν, τὸ δὲ <u>πλῆθος</u> ἐβόα κτέ. (§ 12). Then another speaker, Lyciscus, intervened, and ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ <u>ὄχλος</u> (§ 13). As some of

[31] The most thorough study of the question is that by P. Cloché 'L'affaire des Arginuses' *RH* 130 (1919) 5-68. More recently: A. Andrewes 'The Arginousai Trial' *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 112-122.

[32] 'Les témoignages ...' 207-215 I have discussed the historicity of the narrative in the *Apology* and argued that Plato's testimony and that of Xenophon are mutually independent, although they supplement and corroborate one another.

[33] The several persons whose interventions on that day either in Council or in Assembly are mentioned by Xenophon (Callixenus 7,12. 16. 34; Euryptolemus 12. 16. 34; Lyciscus 13; Socrates 15; Menecles 34) are otherwise unknown to us, with the exception, of course, of Socrates.

[34] 7,15 Οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις ... πάντες ... πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου; cf. *Apol.* 32b5 μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων.

the prytaneis said that they would not submit the motion to the vote because it was illegal, Callixenus again 'mounted the βῆμα' (§ 14 ἀναβάς) — of course that of the Assembly — and threatened to have the reluctant prytaneis included in the same indictment as the generals, and the crowd supported him by their shouting (οἱ δὲ ἐβόων καλεῖν τοὺς οὐ φάσκοντας). The prytaneis, then, φοβηθέντες ὡμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὗτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ νόμον πάντα ποιήσειν (§ 15). Here προθήσειν takes up § 14 προθήσειν τὴν διαψήφισιν, and the διαψήφισις is precisely what, according to Callixenus' motion, should take place in the Assembly, namely that every citizen should cast his vote in one of the two urns placed before his tribe: διαψηφίσασθαι Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας κατὰ φυλάς (§ 9).

All this is clear enough; Burnet, however, writes in his note on *Apol.* 32b6 (p. 133): '*In the previous meeting of the* βουλή [my italics], some of the πρύτανεις had said they would not submit the illegal διαψήφισις proposed in the resolution to the Assembly (οὐ φασκόντων προθήσειν τὴν διαψήφισιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον), but Callixenus rose and intimidated them so successfully that they all agreed to do so except Socrates', and then he quotes from Xenophon's § 15 the words ὡμολόγουν ... ποιήσειν. Surely, this happened in the ἐκκλησία, not in the βουλή. Burnet's error seems to have arisen from the preference he gave to the reading ἐβουλεύσασθε over ἐβούλεσθε in *Apol.* 32b4 (see our note *in loc.*). There can be no doubt that what Socrates relates in the *Apology* concerns the same events as those treated in Xenophon's §§ 14-15 and especially that his words μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων (32b5) correspond to οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις ... πάντες ... πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου in the *Hellenica.*

When he starts to report what happened on that tragic day, Socrates uses the formula τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς. On this Burnet comments as follows in his note on 32b2 (p.132): 'This is not strictly accurate, since Conon was not accused and Archestratus was already dead'. Actually, things are somewhat more complicated. Xenophon (i 7,1-2) explicitly states that only eight generals took part in the battle of Arginusae, of whom two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, did not return to Athens, whereas the other six, viz. Pericles (the Younger), Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus and Erasinides were sentenced to death and executed. A problem arises because earlier (5,16), Xenophon gives the list of the generals elected for the year 406/5. It comprises two names, Archestratus and Leon, that do not figure among the nine named in 7,1-2, and Lysias is omitted. Diodorus (xiii 74 and 101,5) mentions Lysias and omits Leon. It would be tempting to suppose, with some scholars, that in *Hell.* i 5,16 Λέων is just a mistake for Λυσίας, but in i 6,16 Xenophon speaks of Leon and Erasinides as two of Conon's colleagues, who, together with him, were forced by the Spartan admiral Callicratidas to seek refuge in Mitylene.

The best solution to this vexed question seems to be the one proposed by W.J. McCoy in a recent and well-researched paper[35]. According to him, Archestratus originally accompanied Conon, but was killed in a fight between the forces of Callicratidas and those of Conon (we learn from Lysias xxi 7 that he died in Mitylene). Conon was blockaded, but two of his ships managed to escape; one, with Leon on board, was captured by the Spartans; Erasinides reached Athens in the other and reported how Conon had been blockaded. The Athenians decided to make every effort to rescue him; they elected Lysias to replace the deceased Archestratus, but did not replace Leon, since they did not know what had happened to him, nor of course Conon, whom it was their very intention to rescue. So the full board of generals, as far as they were available, went to the East. In the battle of Arginusae they crushed Callicratidas' fleet and were able to free Conon and his contingent. Obviously, these details are irrelevant to the story that Socrates tells and therefore he says nothing about them. The only important fact was that, in the Assembly that followed upon the Apaturia, the generals were held responsible *as a board* and so were sentenced collectively. This is what induced Socrates to speak of τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς, without specifying the exact number of those who were tried and of those who were executed.

The second episode recounted by Socrates as an illustration of the dangers which he encountered in resisting injustices perpetrated by those in power[36], is the arrest of Leon of Salamis. Here again, the testimony of Plato's *Apology* stands apart from the other sources that we have at our disposal[37]. The other sources say nothing about when Leon's arrest and execution took place. When Theramenes defends himself before the Council

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[35] 'The Identity of Leon' *AJPh* 96 (1975) 187-199. McCoy gives useful references to the many modern discussions of the problem.

[36] Did Socrates break the law by not obeying the order of the Thirty? This issue has been raised in connection with the problem whether Socrates' attitude in the *Apology* is consistent with his absolute obedience to the laws in the *Crito*, see especially Kraut *Socrates and the State* 17-24; Brickhouse - Smith, 185-193. Socrates stresses the illegality of the Arginusae trial as well as its injustice (32b4 παρανόμως; b6 παρὰ τοὺς νόμους; b8-c1 μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου; c2 μὴ δίκαια), but mentions only injustice in the report of Leon's arrest (32d2-3 μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον; d5 ἄδικόν τι). By contrast, Xenophon actually cites the illegality of the order as the reason for Socrates' disobedience (*Mem.* iv 4,3 οὐκ ἐπείσθη διὰ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῶι προστάττεσθαι); And. i 94 implies that the arrest was criminal, but since the speaker is defending himself in a trial where his life is at stake this is dubious evidence. Obviously, Plato's choice of words shows that he is aware, as Xenophon is not, that there is a legal problem; this tells against the explanation that the illegality of the arrest was so self-evident that it did not need to be mentioned explicitly (Brickhouse - Smith, 191-192). But, as was said above, 158-159, the plan of the *Apology* leaves no room for a fundamental discussion of the problem of legality (of which this is a side-issue in any case), and we must perhaps not force what is presented as φορτικὰ ... καὶ δικανικά (32a8) into a philosophically justifiable and logical argument.

[37] See 'Les témoignages ...' 217-221.

against Critias' accusation, Xenophon puts a speech into his mouth which no doubt he freely composed himself. In this speech, Theramenes mentions Leon of Salamis, Niceratus the son of Nicias and a certain Antiphon as ἄνδρας καλούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, whom the extreme oligarchs wanted to eliminate (*Hell.* ii 3,38-40). Theramenes argues that such a policy can only result in strengthening the opposition to the oligarchy. The wording used by Xenophon is carefully chosen so as not to suggest that these men had already been arrested and executed at the time when Theramenes was speaking[38]. By contrast, Plato's *Apology* provides information about the date of the affair. Here Socrates, after relating how he refused to take any part in the arrest of Leon, adds: 'Possibly I would have been put to death for that, if the regime had not fallen shortly afterwards (διὰ ταχέων). You will have many witnesses for this' (d7-e1). Since, in all probability, the trial of Theramenes took place in January-February 403[39], and the arrest of Leon was posterior to it, it can scarcely be situated before February. Perhaps it was held somewhat later, and what prevented the Thirty from taking action against Socrates was the daring coup of Thrasybulus against Phyle, presumably in March[40]; in that case, Socrates' escape would have been very narrow indeed. It is debatable, however, whether Critias would have been in a hurry to inflict harsh punishment on Socrates, who had been on cordial terms with many members of the Athenian nobility for years and had always criticised democracy, the less so since seizing his property would have yielded no profit whatsoever; the fact that Leon had been eliminated was probably what mattered most. Anyhow, both the expression used here (διὰ ταχέων) and the phrase χρόνωι ... οὐ πολλῶι in the *Seventh Letter* (325a5-6) imply that no more than a few weeks could have passed between the event related by Socrates and the fall of the Thirty in May 403.

We have no certainty about the identity of Leon of Salamis. Following other scholars, W.J. McCoy[41] thinks that he is to be identified with the general of 406/5 and gives new and compelling arguments for this identification. According to him Leon was freed in 405 when it was Lysander's policy to repatriate as many Athenians as he could in order to starve the city into submission more quickly (cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii 2,2)[42]. The

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[38] *Hell.* ii 3,39 ἀποθνήισκοντος ... Λέοντος τοῦ Σαλαμινίου ('in the eventuality of the execution of Leon of Salamis'); συλλαμβανομένου Νικηράτου τοῦ Νικίου ('in the eventuality of the arrest of Niceratus son of Nicias'); 40 'Αντιφῶντος ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀπολλυμένου ('in the eventuality that we would put Antiphon to death').

[39] Cf. Fuks *Ancestral Constitution* 77.

[40] Cf. Hignett *Hist. Ath. Const.* 386-387.

[41] *Art. cit.* (above, n.35) 193-196.

[42] As MacDowell *Andok. Myst.* 133 points out, there is a problem in that the speaker of Lys. x, who is assumed to be a son of the Leon who was executed by the Thirty, states that his father had never been captured by the Spartans (x 27). But the assumption rests on slender grounds: the speaker's father was a former Athenian general and was killed by the Thirty, and the speaker's brother is called Pantaleon.

epithet ὁ Σαλαμίνιος used both in the *Apology* (32c6) and in the *Hellenica* (ii 3,39) does not indicate that he was a descendant of the original inhabitants of the island[43]; we learn from Plato's *Seventh Letter* that he was an Athenian citizen and a political friend of the democrats (324e2-3. 325c3-5). When he was forcibly brought back from Salamis, he was there as a refugee or an exile[44]. This should probably be understood in the light of what Xenophon tells us about the measures taken by the Thirty after the execution of Theramenes (*Hell.* ii 4,1): they expelled from the city proper (τὸ ἄστυ) all those whose names were not on the κατάλογος of the three thousand citizens who were entitled to full civic rights. While most of the exiles fled to Piraeus, and many of them from there to Megara or Thebes, Leon withdrew to Salamis, where he was arrested.

Along with the story of the oracle given to Chaerephon, these two episodes — which took place not all that many years before the trial — are the sole events in Socrates' life that he tells in a straightforward narrative and that, as he points out, can be confirmed by witnesses, the first by the deceased Chaerephon's brother (21a7-8), the latter by many people (32d8-e1)[45]. They are important contributions to one of the essential aims of Plato's *Apology*, the portrait of Socrates' character. In most passages, this is effected through descriptions of Socrates' daily activities, his conversations with people of various kinds, which expose their pseudo-knowledge, and incite them to strive for 'virtue', conversations in which he is accompanied by a group of young men who try to imitate him. In these vignettes Socrates conducts the conversations and draws the conclusions. Here, in the two narratives, although it is inevitably Socrates who reports the facts, other people are in charge of events, and he must react to unforeseen challenges. Because the circumstances are so dramatic, his responses are so revealing; the two episodes complement the characterisation of Socrates in an essential way.

With the story of Leon, Plato has still another aim in view: he wishes to correct the misconception that because Socrates was an enemy of democracy he was therefore a friend of the oligarchs and a supporter of the Thirty. We have seen above that political considerations motivated his accusers (Chapter VI 92-94), and that half a century after his death it was still commonly thought that he was condemned because he had been the teacher of Critias, the leader of the Thirty (*ib.* 94). Plato was honest enough not to conceal

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[43] On the various categories of people resident in Salamis and on the meaning of οἱ Σαλαμίνιοι see the copious notes of McCoy *art. cit.* 195 n.45, Busolt - Swoboda 871 n.2 and Hignett *Hist. Ath. Const.* 391-393.

[44] *Apol.* 32c6 ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος; d6-7 ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα; *Epist.* vii 325c4 ἕνα τῶν τότε φευγόντων φίλων.

[45] The two other biographical details that we find in the *Apology* are mentioned only *en passant*: Socrates' age (17d2-3) and his military campaigns (28e2-3). The second is, of course, important; it is not, however, mentioned for its own sake, but, as is normal in a δείνωσις (see Chapter VII 140-142), to highlight what is compared with it, Socrates' service to God.

Socrates' misgivings about radical democracy (31e1-32a3), but he thought it the more necessary to show, 'not by words, but by deeds' (32a4-5), not only that Socrates had not sympathised with the crimes of the Thirty, but that he had risked his life resisting them, even when fear induced many others to collaborate[46]. One can only admire the skill with which Plato succeeded in integrating, without resorting to encomium, an irrefutable proof of Socrates' civicmindedness into the overall portrait of the man who was so grievously misunderstood by his fellow-citizens.

From the literary point of view, both episodes are narrated in a masterly way. The first is a model of conciseness. From the many dramatic incidents that occurred at the meeting of the Assembly, Socrates selects only those that have a direct bearing on his point. He does not mention the names of Euryptolemus, Lyciscus and Callixenus, nor the fact that at first several of the prytaneis objected to advising the Assembly to take a vote that was illegal; since they did not persist in their attitude but gave way to the threats of Callixenus, their opposition was not decisive and could be passed over in silence. Still, with a few suggestive details, Plato conjures up the mood of that tumultuous meeting: The demagogues utter their threats; the crowd shouts wildly; the prytaneis lose their heads; Socrates remains steady in the storm: all alone he defends law and justice. We are not told how many generals were involved and what finally happened to them, nor how and when the people came to repent what they had done. The focus is entirely and exclusively on Socrates' moral courage.

The second narrative is also short, but the atmosphere is quite different. Five men are summoned to the tholos, the seat of government. Without any further ado, they are told to arrest Leon of Salamis so that he can be executed. They are not allowed to discuss the order; they must act without asking questions. Four of them go: Socrates simply returns home. He does not speak; he resists by action. Here too, the scene is full of contrasts: the matter-of-fact brutality of the Thirty, the cowardly submissiveness of the four, Socrates' quiet resolve. This time there is no crowd, no shouting, no heroism that can be observed, just the constancy of a man who acts according to his conscience whatever the circumstances. With the most simple means Plato achieves the strongest effect. Here, if anywhere, one sees the truth of Goethe's word: 'in der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister'.

[46] The same apologetic intention is evident in what is said about Chaerephon in the story of the oracle of Delphi. Plato underscores that the man, an old and intimate friend of Socrates, was a democrat and as such was forced to go into exile under the regime of the Thirty (21a1-2). Cf. Meyer 52 and n.127 for parallels for this topos.

d) Education without a Contract

The two stories that Socrates told had an apologetic purpose. They were designed to show that Socrates' attitude towards democracy and oligarchy was not what people thought. On the one hand, Socrates was known to have been on friendly terms with young men like Alcibiades, Critias and Charmides[47], who later undermined the democratic constitution by their perilous and cynical way of conducting politics, or overthrew it with the aid of the Spartan enemy. On the other hand, and this was still more important, many people feared that in the present and the near future, when the restored democracy urgently needed to be consolidated, Socrates' influence would continue to turn young men away from supporting the traditional Athenian constitution. This was the true meaning of the charge of 'corrupting the young' (see Chapter VI 93-94). At this point in the *Apology*, when attention was focused on Socrates' political beliefs and activities, it was quite logical for Plato to return to the second point of the indictment[48]. In this respect also, the true refutation of the charges of the new accusers is given not in the 'Ερώτησις but here, in the Digression.

So the focus has to shift from Socrates' public behaviour to his private conversations. The corresponsion δημοσίαι τε ... καὶ ἰδίαι in the transitional sentence (33a1-5), which couples Socrates' behaviour in civic affairs with that in personal relationships, mark this shift of focus: in both he has always been himself, a man who would under no circumstances deviate from the path of justice, no matter what persons crossed his way. Here, Plato emphasises Socrates' integrity especially in the case of his past or present intimates. Socrates knows very well that, if they were allowed to, his accusers would hold him responsible for the crimes of the three men mentioned, simply because they were his pupils. But that is precisely what he denies. They were never his pupils since he never was a teacher. A teacher is someone who, like the Sophists, declares that he can educate the young. Protagoras' claim is unambiguous: 'Young man, if you become my pupil, it will befall you that on the day you come to me, you will go home better than you came, and the next day it will be the same; and every day you will constantly make more progress' (*Prot.* 318a6-9). Precisely because he commits himself to achieve this result, he is entitled to a fee. Socrates, on the contrary, does not present himself as a teacher. He simply conducts conversations in which everyone, old and young, is allowed to participate free of charge. Therefore, he cannot be held responsible for the results, since he has made no promises, either expressly or by implication. There is no sense in blaming him for the fact that some of his young friends have turned

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[47] See Burnet's note on 33a4 (137-138).

[48] The charge of impiety had been met in the Answer to a First Objection; see Chapter VII § 5.

out to be criminals or traitors: he has not entered into any agreement and feels perfectly innocent.

At first sight, Socrates' line of defense seems unacceptable. Can the fact that there has been no formal contract free him from responsibility for his influence on these and other young men? That is not, however, what Socrates means to say. He readily admits that one person can influence another either for good or for evil: 'Do not bad men always do some evil to those who live with them and good men some good?' (25c7-9; cf. d9-e1). In the section that follows the passage under discussion, he remarks that the fathers and relatives of some of his young associates are present in the courtroom to lend him their support, and continues: 'If I am corrupting some young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they had recognised that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me' (33c8-d4). If this is, according to Socrates, what they should do, it certainly implies that he does not deny his responsibility. But in fact they and their relatives all agree that Socrates' influence was beneficial and that Meletus' accusation is unfounded (34b2-5). Speaking more generally, Socrates says that all his activities were aimed at the well-being of his fellow-citizens and that it was the god who gave him this mission for the benefit of Athens (30d7-e1; 31a6-8). In the Second Speech, when he considers how the jury should deal with him, he claims that they should treat him as a benefactor who has devoted his whole life to rendering the city the most valuable and beneficial service (36c3-4. d4-5). Of course, Athens would have no reason to be grateful to him if he were not responsible for the influence he had exerted.

So what Socrates argues is something different; it concerns his basic view of the nature and limits of education. When he distances himself from the claims of the Sophists, it is because he believes that insight (σοφία) cannot be simply and, as it were, mechanically transferred from teacher to pupil: 'It would be a blessing', he tells Agathon in the *Symposium* (175d3-e2),

> if insight were of such a kind as to flow from one of us who is full into the empty one, if we hold on to each other, as water flows through a woollen thread from a full cup into an empty one[49]. If *that* is the case with insight, I appreciate highly to be on a couch next to yours, because I guess I shall be filled with a lot of precious insight that comes from you[50].

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[49] Of course this is just a touch of Socratic irony: if insight could be transmitted in this way, it would cease to be true insight and become mere δόξα. For this mechanical view on education, cf. *Rep.* vii 518 b6-c2.

[50] It is typical of the deplorable, but all too common underrating of the Socratic character of Plato's philosophy that this passage is not even alluded to in J. Stenzel's book *Platon der Erzieher* (Leipzig 1928; repr., with an introduction by K. Gaiser, Hamburg 1961), even though p.209-245 of it are devoted to the *Symposium*. The same should be said of W. Jaeger *Paedeia* ii, Eng. transl. (Oxford 1944 and repr.), both for the chapter on the *Symposium* (174-197 with 397-400) and for that on 'The Memory of Socrates' (13-76 with 373-382).

But, of course, insight is the inner perfection of the individual and therefore cannot arise from anywhere but the soul itself, and a soul that longs for Goodness[51]. As Lachesis' proclamation says, in the myth of Er, 'Virtue is not anybody's property. As one either values or despises it more or less, one will have more or less of it' (*Rep.* x 617e3-4). Man becomes better to the degree that he prefers the true and absolute Good to money or public honours. He has to make this choice for himself and nobody can do it for him, for virtue is essentially free and it arises from the self.

Therefore, although Socrates can 'exhort and argue' (*Apol.* 29d5-6), 'stimulate, persuade and reproach' (30e7), he cannot take someone else's place nor bear the responsibility for another person's life. Whether or not a friend whom he admonishes heeds his admonitions, no one can decide but that friend himself. Many young people will profit from Socrates' influence, but some will resist it. The best-known case of a resistent attitude is Alcibiades', who, in the *Symposium*, explains what Socrates' advice meant to him and how, after a long struggle, he wrenched himself free from Socrates in order to pursue other goals than those for which Socrates had tried to win him over:

> As for me, gentlemen, were it not that you might think me absolutely tipsy, I would tell you under oath what impression his words have made and still make upon me even now. When I listen to him, his talk makes my heart leap and my tears flow much more than is the case with Corybantic ecstatics; and I have seen that the same happens to many others. As I listened to Pericles and other good orators, I thought that they spoke well, but I did not experience anything of the kind; my innermost self was not upset, nor did I find with a shock that I was a despicable fellow. But that Marsyas here has often made me own that life was unbearable if I remained as I am. On this point, Socrates, you cannot deny that what I say is true. Even now I realise perfectly that, if I were prepared to listen to him, I would not be able to stand my ground and that the same would happen to me again. He forces me to confess that, sorely deficient as I still am, I neglect myself in order to attend to the affairs of Athens. So I have to force myself: I stop my ears for him as for the Sirens and flee away for fear I might go on sitting beside him till I have grown old. With him alone I had an experience that most people would think quite foreign to me, shame before somebody; for him alone I feel shame. I am perfectly conscious that I cannot disown that I should do as he says; but when I have left him, I yield to popularity with the crowd. So I run away from him and flee; and when I see him, I am ashamed of what I had confessed. Often I would be glad if he was not living any more; but if that happened, I am sure that I would grieve much

[51] Cf. my paper 'The unity ...' Even when the object of knowing is as unpersonal as a theorem of geometry, 'learning is nothing but remembering', as we learn from the *Meno* (81d2-3. e4; 82a1-2), that is, 'retrieving knowledge in oneself' (85d6-7) and not receiving it from another. This is certainly the case when knowledge concerns what is good, that is, when it entails a choice. — Of course, with 'advanced' interlocutors, Socrates may adopt a method that is, on the surface, hardly distinguishable from teaching. Cf. H. Gundert *Der platonische Dialog* (Heidelberg 1968) 44-49.

> more. So I don't know what my attitude should be towards that man. (215d6-216c3)[52]

Certainly, Socrates is not responsible for the evil road that Alcibiades and others took, and which caused them to break with him. Because he knew that he could not guarantee the results of his conversations and of his attempts to influence others, he refused to be considered a teacher. Plato even avoids saying that Socrates tried to 'educate' (παιδεύειν) people, because this was the very thing that the Sophists claimed they were able to do[53]. But, of course, Socrates was in Plato's eyes the only true educator, who, by his way of life no less than by his conversations, could effectively induce many of his associates to pursue the highest good, and he achieved this not by bewitching them with the magic of rhetoric or the tricks of eristics, nor by brainwashing or by appealing to traditional values, but by stimulating them to think for themselves and to make decisions for which they alone would be responsible[54]. He did this by eliciting a personal response from his interlocutors, that is, through the dialectic method, the technique of question and answer. It is logical for Plato to give here (33b1-3) the only explicit reference in the *Apology* to Socratic dialectic, for dialectic is inseparably linked to Socrates' conception of education as opposed to that of the Sophists. Besides, dialectic is the reason for Socrates' conducting personal conversations (ἰδίαι), which, in turn, differs radically from the Sophists' ἐπιδείξεις.

This difference, however, gives rise to a serious question: does the private nature of Socrates' dialectic method not imply that he was wont to speak a different language with his associates than with strangers, and that he taught them secret, suspicious doctrines (33b6-7)? Socrates had already met this objection above and flatly denied that he ever did anything but exhort to ἀρετή (30b6-7). Here again he answers with the same categorical denial (33b7-8). A little earlier (a6-b3), he had made it clear that everybody, old and young alike, was welcome to participate in his dialectic debates. The *Apology* describes time and again how he entered into discussion with

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[52] Here we find echoes of the terminology used in the *Apology* to discuss φιλοσοφία and related problems about the scale of values. With ἐνδεής (*Symp.* 216a5), compare ἐνδεεῖς (*Apol.* 22a4; see the note *in loc.* and Chapter V 64); ἀμελεῖν ἑαυτοῦ of 216a5-6 is the opposite of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ (36c6) or τῆς ψυχῆς (29e1-2. 30b1-2) or ἀρετῆς (31b5. 41e4-5) or φρονήσεως καὶ ἀληθείας (29e1), which plays such an important part in the *Apology*; we see from *Symp.* 216b5 (ἡττημένῳ τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν) that what makes Alcibiades 'attend the affairs of Athens' is φιλοτιμία, which conflicts with φιλοσοφία (*Apol.* 29e1-3; see Chapter VII 135-136).

[53] See e.g. *Apol.* 19d8-e1; *Lach.* 186d1 compared with c2-5; *Prot.* 317b4-5. 349a2-3; *Gorg.* 519e7-8 with Dodds' note; *Men.* 96d6-7; *Euthyd.* 272d3. 306e3-4.

[54] The celebrated μαιευτική passage (*Theaet.* 148e6-151d6) makes it quite clear that the ideas of which Socrates 'delivers' his interlocutors through his 'spiritual midwifery' are their own 'offspring', not his.

everyone who came his way[55] and how there were always many people who listened to his conversations[56]. So he cannot have any secret doctrine.

But this answer itself raises a new question: granted that Socrates, on his own initiative, indiscriminately engages in conversation with all kinds of people, why do certain people always attach themselves to him? Socrates does not deny the fact; he had already mentioned it before and specified that these associates are young men, the sons of the wealthiest citizens, who have the leisure to do so (23c2-5). To explain their interest, he repeats what he said earlier. He had spoken the whole truth, and the plain truth: those young men enjoy witnessing how conceited people are exposed, 'for it is not unpleasant' (33c4).

In my opinion, this is a weak explanation, especially in its context. At the end of the Narration it sounded much more appropriate, because of the light, humorous tone of the passage: we are amused when the man who considers himself ignorant appears again and again to be smarter than people who are considered highly knowledgeable and are proud of their superiority. Here, however, the context is different. Socrates continues by stating his own motives for examining other people: he does so because this task has been assigned to him by the god (33c4-7). It seems then that, whereas *he* is motivated by duty, the young men are looking only for fun. This contrast, however, is not entirely satisfactory, because the young men, too, are somehow engaged in the process of examining people; they even start to imitate Socrates and to examine others on their own (23c4-5). And when Socrates says that listening to his examining others 'is not unpleasant' (33c4), he uses words which he will repeat in 41b5, where he applies them to himself in his description of what it would mean for him in the other world to 'compare his experience with those of Palamedes, Ajax the son of Telamon and other people from the past, who lost their lives on account of an unjust sentence' (41b1-4).

Thus, the explanation that Socrates gives in our passage (33c2-4) for the fact that his followers remain with him for such a long time, although true, is scarcely adequate. The fascination he exercised on Alcibiades was, as we have seen, based on something much more profound than fun. And what of another of the gifted young men who belonged to Socrates' circle, Plato himself? Would he have devoted his whole life not only to continuing what Socrates had started, but to keeping Socrates alive in his dialogues, if he had been drawn to the conversations of the master of dialectic simply by the fun of it? Or was it the intellectual play that attracted that utterly dedicated, but not quick-witted man, Crito? Festugière hits the mark when he writes: 'Les familiers de Socrate n'admiraient pas tant sa science qu'ils ne le vénéraient

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[55] 17c8-9. 29d6. 30a2-4. e7-31a1. c7-8. 36c5. 38a3-5. 41e3 (ὑμᾶς).

[56] 21d1. e1-2. 22b6-8.

comme un saint'[57]. The profound, positive influence that Socrates exerted on these young men, and to which their fathers and elder brothers will presently testify (33d8-34a2), resulted from his unimpeachable honesty, courage and unobtrusive saintliness. And these qualities, more than anything else, attracted a group of spirited young men to him. But for Plato to elaborate upon this would have required a long exposition that would disrupt the balance of this part of the *Apology*, and would certainly have been offensive if spoken by Socrates himself.

So Socrates' answer gives to the question why his associates derived such pleasure from his company is not wholly convincing. Moreover, the way in which the argument continues is surprising. Socrates says: 'This, Athenians, is both true and easy to test' (33c7-8). But of course, neither of his two last assertions is 'easy to test': not the first one, viz. that the young people cling to him just for the fun of attending his cross-examinations — for how can people's motives be established with certainty? — and the second is still less verifiable, viz. that the order to conduct such examinations was given to Socrates by the god through oracles and dreams. Such communications are difficult to interpret, and dreams can, moreover, be known only to the person concerned. Secondly, the sentences following 33c7-8 do not have anything to do with either the associates' pleasure or the divine commands: instead, they outline in what the 'testing' consists. If Socrates' influence upon the young had been bad, some of the victims would, in course of time, have realised that he had corrupted them, and would now accuse him and make him pay for it. If they themselves failed to do this, their fathers and other relatives would be eager to exact punishment from him. Quite the contrary, they are all here in court to lend him their support. This again has nothing to do with the fun that the young men found in Socrates' conversations nor with the ways in which the god imparted his order to him.

What really is 'true and easy to verify' are the two statements that Socrates made *before* formulating the question raised at 33b9-c1, and these are, first, that he admits everybody, old and young alike, to his discussions without asking a fee, second and more importantly, that he has no secret doctrine, known only by a narrow circle of intimates. To prove these assertions, he offers the testimony of the fathers and elder brothers of his young associates. So the sentence 33c7-8 and the demonstrative with which it opens (ταῦτα γὰρ κτἑ.) do not refer to the sentences 33b9-c7, which precede it immediately, but to the more remotely preceding section 33a5-b8. One might suspect that the section 33c7-34b5 was originally intended to follow immediately upon 33b8. On this assumption, Plato would have decided, on second thought, to insert a parenthetical question with its answer, but felt compelled to keep the answer very short so as not to stray from his main line of argument. This hypothesis, which I present with all

[57] *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris 1936 and repr.) 72. The whole section p.62-73 of the book is eminently worth reading.

the necessary caution, would account both for the awkwardness of ταῦτα γάρ referring to what was said eight lines above, and for the inadequacy of the answer[58].

e) Witnesses for Socrates' Beneficial Influence on the Young

Turning now to the support which Socrates claims the fathers and elder brothers of his young followers are prepared to give him in public, we should first of all note that this is Socrates' most direct reply to the second point of Meletus' indictment, viz. that he is a corruptor of the young. Above, Chapter VII § 5, I showed that the Answer to the First Objection was intended to prove that Socrates was the religious man *par excellence*, and thus to refute Meletus' first charge. Socrates' conclusion to the Answer to a Second Objection makes it clear that it is parallel to the Answer to a First Objection and that its object is to refute the charge of corrupting the young. Since this charge was the most important one, both in the eyes of his accusers and of the jury, it is reasonable for Socrates to emphasise the significance of the testimony that the relatives of his young friends will give. What the general public believes about the nature and purpose of Socrates' conversations cannot be more well-founded than what the fathers and elder brothers are prepared to testify about Socrates' influence on their sons and wards. In this matter, everything depends on first-hand knowledge, and so Socrates names three fathers and four elder brothers, along with the names of their charges. What else can inspire these serious and responsible men to give their support to Socrates, except their honest belief that Socrates tells the truth and that the accusations of Meletus is completely unfounded? The simple fact that Meletus did not call any of these men to testify against Socrates, and that they chose to support him with their sons or younger brothers, is decisive proof that he is not a corruptor of the young, but, on the contrary, the only true educator.

In his commentary (140-143) Burnet shows that the seven young men mentioned in *Apol.* 33e1-34a2 are all known to us from other sources as members of the Socratic circle, with the sole exception of Theodotus, to whom I will return presently. Another question, not raised by Burnet, is whether their fathers and elder brothers, or at least some of them, were, at the moment of the trial, commonly associated with democratic policies; if that were the case, their testimony about the nature of Socrates' influence would carry much more weight in the eyes of the jury, since the 'corruption' consisted precisely in breeding oligarchic sentiments among the young. Actually, Burnet mentions two details that could at first appear significant

[58] I do not mean that the sentence 33c7-8 ταῦτα ... εὐέλεγκτα, as we have it now, originally continued b7-8 οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει. The adjective ἀληθῆ (c8), following so closely upon οὐκ ἀληθῆ without any direct relation to it, would be very bad style indeed. On the other hand, εὐέλεγκτα suits the context postulated by me very well; but without καὶ ἀληθῆ καί the sentence would be too short. I can submit no conjecture about the original form of the sentence.

in this respect. The first is that Demodocus (33e7), the father of Theages, might be the man who was elected to the board of στρατηγοί for the year 425/4 B.C.; but this political activity might not be recent enough to have much importance in 399 B.C. The second point concerns Adimantus (34a1), Plato's elder brother. According to *Republic* i, he was a friend of Polemarchus, the brother of Lysias, who was put to death by the Thirty. The dramatic date of *Republic* i, however, seems to be several years before 411 B.C.[59]; and the members of the jury would in any case be more likely to remember the fact that Critias was a first cousin of Adimantus' and Plato's mother Potone and that Charmides, another of the Thirty, was her brother[60].

The reference to the deceased Theozotides, father of Nicostratus and Theodotus is, I think, significant. Nicostratus is present in court as a supporter of Socrates; his younger brother Theodotus, was already dead at the time of the trial (33e5-6). As I said, the *Apology* is the only source to indicate that Theodotus had belonged to Socrates' circle[61]. But he is important because his father had a great deal of influence during the restoration of the democracy. We learn about Theozotides, first through fragments of Lysias' lost speech *Against Theozotides*[62], but chiefly from an important decree voted by the Athenian Assembly on the motion of Theozotides[63]. The object of the decree is to put the sons of those who fell βοηθοῦντες τῆι δημοκρατίαι on a par with the war orphans who were supported by the state until they came of age. Lysias' client sued Theozotides in order to prevent the decree from being voted, but it was passed by a majority vote in the ἐκκλησία and a stele with the text was erected in the Agora. As Stroud shows, both this decree and another, proposed by Theozotides about the same time (403/2, or perhaps the year after that) to reduce the daily pay for the ἱππῆς, were characteristically democratic proposals[64]. As we learn from the *Apology*, Theozotides died at some time

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[59] See Taylor *Plato* 263 and n.1.

[60] Writing about the Thirty in 353/2, Plato says (*Epist.* vii 324d1-3): 'Now, of these some were actually connections and acquaintances of mine; and indeed they invited me at once to join their administration, thinking it would be congenial'. He then explains why he adopted an expectant attitude till he was appalled by their crimes.

[61] *Apol.* 34e4-6 is our sole source of information about both Nicostratus and Theodotus; see K. von Fritz *RE s.v.* Nikostratos 24, 546; K. Fiehn *ib. s.v.* Theodotos 5, 1953. Fiehn, however, is mistaken in writing that *both* brothers were 'pupils of Socrates': the *Apology* neither says nor implies this about Nicostratus — the error is repeated by R.S. Stroud (see n.63) 297.

[62] Published in 1906 as nr. 14 of the *Hibeh Papyri* by B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt; reprinted as fr. vi 1-3 in L. Gernet - M. Bizos *Lysias, Discours*, ii (Paris 1926 and repr.) 234-236 and 257-259.

[63] The text was published with a full commentary by Ronald S. Stroud 'Greek inscriptions: Theozotides and the Athenian Orphans' *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 280-301; *SEG* 28 (1978) nr. 46. Cf. P. Krentz *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca 1982) 112-113.

[64] If Lysias' client attacked them, it was only because, in his view, they were not radical enough.

between 403/2 (or 402/1) and the spring of 399[65], but he was certainly remembered, and the jury would have considered it impossible that such a champion of the βοηθοῦντες τῆι δημοκρατίαι would have allowed his younger son to attach himself to a man of oligarchic sympathies. Typically, Plato does not even hint at the political role that Theozotides had played: he trusted that his readers would understand[66].

[65] During the same period Theodotus must have died prematurely; this may explain why there is no other mention of him in the extant Socratic literature.

[66] Cf. Chapter VI n.59 on the omission of Meletus' complicity in the arrest of Leon.

CHAPTER NINE

PERORATION

1. *The Peroration in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory*

Aristotle claims that, theoretically speaking, a speech consists of two parts only, proposition and proof; he acknowledges, however, that in actual practice there are more, which can be reduced to four: *exordium*, proposition, proof and peroration[1]. Further refinements and distinctions that had been proposed by rhetoricians of the preceding generation he considers otiose and pedantic[2]. The problems concerning the peroration are treated in the very last chapter of the *Rhetoric* and are introduced by the following sentence: 'The peroration (ἐπίλογος) consists of four elements: (1) to dispose the hearers favourably towards oneself, unfavourably towards the adversary; (2) to amplify and to depreciate[3]; (3) to arouse the emotions (τὰ πάθη); (4) recapitulation' (iii 19, 1419b10-13). These are the four goals that an orator can set himself when writing a peroration, although there is no need for him to attain all of them in every single case. Since in the course of books i and ii Aristotle had spoken at length about the many topoi that are useful for developing the first three points, he contents himself here with indicating very briefly the meaning of each of them. However, recapitulation does not make use of the topoi and therefore has not been mentioned until now, which is why Aristotle concludes the whole treatise with some suggestions on that.

Anaximenes' treatment of peroration is much less systematic. As he does in discussing the other parts of the speech, he describes the peroration appropriate to each of the three kinds of oratory (deliberative, forensic and epideictic) in turn, and he does so without trying to keep perfect parallelism. He does not even have one technical term for the peroration. Occasionally, but not in typically programmatic sentences, he calls it ἐπίλογος[4], as does Aristotle; παλιλλογία is much more frequent[5] and, as appears from some contexts, it is used not only for the recapitulation proper, as etymology

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[1] *Rhet.* iii 13, 1414b7-9. The text is translated and commented upon in Chapter III 42.

[2] *Ib.* b9-18. In the *Phaedrus* (266d2-267a5) Plato had already ridiculed these excesses (see Chapter III 41).

[3] Viz. to show either the importance or the lack of importance of the question at issue. What this implies in practical oratory is well illustrated by Navarre *Rhétorique grecque* 301-311.

[4] 36, p.91,24 (ἐπίλογοι); 38, p.95,7 Fuhrmann.

[5] 20, p.50,3; 21, p.51,20; 22, p.52,16. 53,2 F. etc.

would suggest, but also for the other tasks that Aristotle assigns to the peroration[6].

There are no traces of a synthetic theory about peroration in the fragments of pre-Aristotelian rhetoric. The word ἐπίλογος is not attested before Aristotle and Anaximenes; this, however, does not prove that it was unknown to the older rhetoricians. Navarre has shown by a careful study of the preserved Attic forensic speeches that the four elements which, according to Aristotle, make up the fabric of a peroration were familiar to and had been systematically elaborated by the Orators (*Rhétorique grecque* 277-326). Moreover, a passage in the *Phaedrus* reflects the theory on this topic:

> Further, the technical command of piteous[7] speeches that draw on old age and poverty belongs, in my eyes, to the mighty man of Chalcedon[8]; he has shown himself a master at whipping up crowds to fury and, when they are infuriated, to soothe them again by his charms, as he said; he has no rival in making people suspect on any grounds whatever and in putting an end to the suspicion. Concerning the conclusion of discourses, however, there seems to be general agreement among all, although some call it recapitulation[9], while others give it various other names. (267c7-d4)

At first sight, this text seems to indicate that the arousing of emotions belongs to the main part of the speech, viz. to the proof, whereas the recapitulation gives only the conclusion proper. But, as Navarre rightly observes (279), when one considers the words of the *Phaedrus* in the light of actual fourth-century rhetorical practice, it appears that peroration could be taken either in a broad sense, as the whole of what follows upon the proof — in which case it comprises the several points enumerated by Aristotle in *Rhet.* iii 19[10] — or in a narrow sense, that of recapitulation, which is the last item in Aristotle's series. So Plato, who did not intend to be exhaustive, mentions three of Aristotle's points here, stirring emotions, bringing about good will or ill will, and recapitulation. We shall see that in actual oratory, the first one is paid the most attention by far, just as it is the most elaborated in the passage from the *Phaedrus*.

On recapitulation as such there is little of importance to say, but all the more can be said on the three other elements of peroration. The first one, procuring the good will of the audience, is serviceable in all three kinds of

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6 E.g. 36, p.89,23-90,12 F.

7 οἰκτρογόων; this word has a definitely poetical ring and suggests that Thrasymachus in his diction depended heavily upon Gorgias. Cf. n.16.

8 τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, an epic antonomasia for Thrasymachus, who is mentioned already 261c2.

9 ἐπάνοδον; on this term, see G.J. de Vries *in loc.*

10 In Aristotle *Rhet.* iii 13, 1414b1 ἐπίλογος seems to have exactly the same reference as b2 ἐπάνοδος, in the same way as we saw above that Anaximenes could take παλιλλογία to include the first point of Aristotle's list.

oratory. Like most later rhetoricians, Anaximenes treats it in connection with the *exordium*, which is its most natural place[11], although he also refers to it briefly in his discussion of the peroration of a forensic speech[12]. Since, as both Aristotle[13] and Anaximenes[14] point out, the task of amplifying or depreciating is especially that of epideictic oratory, I can dispense with treating this issue here. The third task, however, that of arousing emotions, was always considered in antiquity, by rhetors, orators and audience alike, as typical of the peroration, and above all in the case of the forensic speech[15].

Aristotle takes great pains to show the manifold varieties of πάθη, but the detailed analyses to which he submits each of them in the lengthy chapters 2-11 of book ii of the *Rhetoric* reflect his phenomenological interest as a moralist and a psychologist; they are much less intended to meet the practical needs of the orator. Therefore I will only quote his introductory formula: 'The emotions (πάθη) are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgments, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger (ὀργή), pity (ἔλεος), fear (φόβος) and all similar emotions and their contraries' (ii 1, 1378a20-23). The first two which he mentions are precisely those that Thrasymachus of Chalcedon claimed he was able to arouse at his will, pity and anger[16]. Of course ἔλεος is the emotion which the speaker tries to awaken in a defence, ὀργή in an accusation. But both were not on the same level: it was the arousing of pity that was considered the true triumph of the orator[17], as is shown by many Attic speeches[18]. In Athenian law-courts, this led to a systematic staging that Aristophanes describes vividly in the *Wasps* (568-571):

> κἂν μὴ τούτοις ἀναπειθώμεσθα, τὰ παιδάρι' εὐθὺς ἀνέλκει
> τὰς θηλείας καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς, τῆς χειρός, ἐγὼ δ' ἀκροῶμαι,
> τὰ δὲ συγκύψανθ' ἅμα βληχᾶται, κἄπειθ' ὁ πατὴρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν

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[11] We find two extensive discussions of this topic in his treatise, first 29, p.60,18-64,7 F. in relation with deliberative oratory, second 36, p.80,10-83,11 regarding forensic speeches.

[12] 36, p.90,5-7 F.

[13] *Rhet.* i 9, 1368a27: ἡ ... αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (λόγοις).

[14] 6, p.29,21-24 F.

[15] See e.g. Aristotle *Rhet.* ii 1, 1377b28-31 τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα (this concerns the ἦθος of the speaker, as a means to win the good will of the audience) χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἐστιν (deliberative speeches), τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν (by the πάθη aroused in him) εἰς τὰς δίκας; cf. Quint. vi 1,36 (the author discusses *pathos*) *de accusatoribus et reis sum locutus, quia in periculis maxime uersatur affectus.*

[16] In *Phaedr.* 267c7 οἰκτρόγοος is a poetical synonym of ἐλ(ε)εινός, as appears e.g. from the synonymical couple ἐλεήσαντέ τε καὶ οἰκτίραντε in *Euthyd.* 288d2-3.

[17] Cf. *Phaedr.* 272a5 ἐλεινολογίας.

[18] See the many illuminating quotations in Navarre 313-320. It is typical that he gives the section of his book devoted to the πάθη the heading *Les passions et, en particulier, la pitié.* In classical Roman rhetoric the arousing of emotions is simply called *commiseratio* (*Ad. Her.* ii 30,47) and *conquestio* (Cic. *De inv.* i 52,98 and 55,106), as if there were no other affections than pity.

ὥσπερ θεὸν ἀντιβολεῖ με τρέμων τῆς εὐθύνης ἀπολῦσαι.

Socrates gives a similar picture (*Apol.* 34c2-4) and calls such scenes theatrical (35b7 τὰ ἐλεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγειν). It is clear that entreaties full of pathos and lamentation were not only in common use, even among men of high standing and reputation[19], but were accepted as a matter of course. The concluding sentence of Hyperides' *Pro Euxenippo*[20] is, in its exceptional dryness, a striking proof of the fact. And Socrates' detailed explanation of his refusal to resort to those practices implies that they could not be omitted without arousing astonishment and even displeasure.

2. *Socrates' Peroration*

As we saw above (Chapter II § 3), the *Exordium* of the *Apology* is full of topoi which were commonly used in contemporary forensic oratory. However, Socrates was not prepared to employ all of them and those he did use, he used for different purposes than normal litigants. In this way, Plato gave the *Apology* from the very outset the outward appearance of a law-court speech, but he wanted the reader (or rather hearer) to be continually surprised and puzzled by ideas and intentions that did not seem to conform to the literary form chosen by him. This is especially true of the *Exordium*, but it applies also to the subsequent parts, each of which is organised, at least in its main features, along traditional lines: thus, we have the expected proposition and a refutation including a narration. The next section, however, which I called 'digression', departs from the customary pattern, first because it presents itself as an answer to two successive imaginary objectors, second because it in fact contains the true answer to both points of the indictment. Here, at the end of the First Speech, Plato unmistakably reverts to the normal plan of a forensic defence and, in a regular peroration, he adopts the same attitude as in the *Exordium*, only with more assurance, because all that he has already said must have made it possible for the audience to understand what he means, paradoxical though it is.

The Peroration opens with a transitional sentence of a type that is extraordinarily common in actual forensic speeches. In this way, Plato underscores the fact that what follows will correspond in form and spirit to the *Exordium*. To be sure, sentences of this kind are also found at the end of a well-defined part of the proof or the refutation; in those cases the speaker points out that what he has said on that particular topic may suffice. In the *Apology*, such a formula rounds off the Refutation of the Old

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[19] *Apol.* 35a4-5 οἵουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας ... δοκοῦντας ... τι εἶναι.

[20] iv 41 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν σοί, Εὐξένιππε, βεβοήθηκα ὅσα εἶχον· λοιπὸν δ' ἐστὶ δεῖσθαι τῶν δικαστῶν καὶ τοὺς φίλους παρακαλεῖν καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀναβιβάσασθαι (quoted by Burnet 144).

Accusers[21]. But by far the most normal use of such a transition is as an introduction to the peroration. Lysias and Isaeus are particularly fond of the turn οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ πλείω λέγειν[22]. In another type we meet the adjective ἱκανός, as in *Apol.* 24b4[23]. There are other variants in the Orators, none of which is very close to *Apol.* 34b6-7. But what is important is not the wording; it is the formal conclusion of the main part of the speech and the unmistakable transition to the next traditional section of a forensic speech, the peroration.

Of the four elements of the Aristotelian ἐπίλογος, Socrates employs only the third one. That he simply ignores the first, winning the audience's good will, cannot surprise us, since he had not even tried to do anything of the kind in the *Exordium*, which was the ususal place for the *captatio beneuolentiae*[24]. Nor was there any reason to develop the second Aristotelian element, amplification or depreciation: Socrates had demonstrated these in the two parts of the Digression, where he elaborated the importance of his activity for Athens and the harm that the jurors would inflict upon themselves and the whole city by pronouncing a wrong sentence. Finally, after a speech like this one, there was no need for a recapitulation, for there was no series of material facts or of points of legal interpretation that had been mentioned, and that had to be summed up at the end. In the course of his defence, Socrates had done nothing else but give a synthetic view of his way of life and at every moment it was the whole that mattered, not a particular detail.

The only 'Aristotelian' point relevant for Plato's purposes was therefore the same one to which Athenian defendants normally attached most importance: the entreaties for pity on the part of the judges. The first feature that strikes us in the text is that Socrates does not take the initiative to state his own opinions about this practice. As so often in the *Apology*[25], he introduces an objector, who takes exception to his way of acting or speaking. The substitution of dialectic for rhetoric is the more conspicuous here since Plato takes care to put Socrates in a typical rhetorical situation. Socrates has important things to say and he wishes to express them in his own, direct way: he will show that differences in conduct are based upon differences in principle, and that ethical rules only make sense when they are translated into action.

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[21] 24b3-4 περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν, αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Meyer (55 and n.140), though lumping together different kinds of transition, gives among them references to what one might call 'provisional transitions', viz. Dem. xviii 50; xxiv 187; xxix 50.

[22] E.g. Lys. x 31 περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ πλείω λέγειν, ἐγὼ δὲ ...; xxii 22; xxiv 21; Isaeus vii 45; viii 46; Ps.-Dem. lviii 57; lxi 47.

[23] E.g. Lys. xxx 31; xxxi 34; cf. Meyer 48 n.106.

[24] See Chapter II 34-35 and above 178-179 and n.15.

[25] 20c4. 28b3. 31c4. 37e3; cf. 33b8. 37a2. See Chapter VI n.143.

The objector suspects that Socrates wishes to place himself on a higher level than his fellow-citizens. Time and again, Socrates has repeated that he does not fear death, or at any rate, that he fears it less than τὸ αἰσχρόν and τὸ ἄδικον[26]. When he refrains from appealing to the judges' pity he may do this either out of indifference to his family or, what would be much worse, out of sheer arrogance. That is the objection. Socrates answers that his attitude is not based upon anything of the kind, but upon three objective arguments, viz. that such supplications would not conform with honour or with justice or with piety. There is a climax and, remarkably enough, the more decisive the argument is, the shorter its formulation.

The first argument is concerned with τὸ καλόν, but Socrates at once makes it clear that he does not mean the absolute καλόν, which is equivalent to what we call the ethical good. The 'honourable' of which he speaks in this context is to be understood πρὸς δόξαν[27]; it depends on the opinion and the appreciation of the public at large. The argument is directed towards the φιλότιμοι, whose standards of judgment cannot, in Socrates' eyes, be the ultimate ones; still, it has its relative value, which the members of the jury will easily perceive, and to that extent it has something in common with the appeal to the καλόν / αἰσχρόν in the Answer to a First Objection (Chapter VII § 3).

The second argument is of a much more decisive character. After all, a man *can* accept the loss of his reputation if he thinks life worth more than honour (cf. 38e5-39b1). But every member of an Athenian jury has accepted a responsibility that he cannot evade: by pronouncing his sentence he has to turn the dead letter of the law into a living reality, and the criteria on which his decision should be based are not left to his subjective choice but are fixed by the laws. Still, one could view the duty of the juror as a merely human task, whose binding force is social, as it was in the opinion of Protagoras and as was implied in Pericles' *Funeral Speech*. Socrates does not leave it at that: he appeals to the oath which every member of the jury has taken and which makes this civic responsibility also a duty dictated by religion and piety. With that we reach the realm of the divine, which we know is all-important for Socrates.

I have already pointed to the links between the Peroration and the *Exordium*. The most important idea common to both sections is that Socrates refuses to be guided in his defence by his individual advantage[28], but is led by universally valid norms. This has led him in the *Exordium* to describe the task of the orator in quite different terms from those of the treatises of rhetoric and even to indicate briefly what constitutes the ἀρετή of a judge (18a3-5). Here he goes much farther. He does not ask the members of the

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[26] 28b5-d5. d6-29b9. 30b7-c1. d1-5. 32a6-8. b5-c3. c8-d8.

[27] 34e2; cf. e5-6 δεδογμένον ... ἐστι; 35a2 οἱ δοκοῦντες; a4-5 δοκοῦντας ... τι εἶναι; b4 τοὺς δοκοῦντας; b9 χωρὶς ... τῆς δόξης.

[28] This is well worked out by Meyer 32-35.

jury to tell him how he should conduct himself as a litigant; he himself gives objectively founded rules, rules which apply not only to himself but to the jurors as well. This is one more instance of the inversion that is so typical of the whole *Apology* (cf. Chapter VII 142 and the note on 29a2). The man who is accused of corruption of the young appears to be the true educator, and not only of young people, but also of adults and even of judges. The man whom his adversaries represent as impious has the deepest reverence for the gods and an absolute confidence in their providence. Still, there is no arrogance in Socrates' attitude. He does not put himself above the others[29]. The requirements of honour, justice and religion are the same for all, and all he wishes for is the opportunity for meeting them. But there is in the last sentence a personal touch that, however discreet, reveals the decisive importance of ideal values, and above all of religion, for the whole of Socrates' life.

Not only in this short finale, but in the whole of the Peroration, the tone remains plain and serene. There is nothing reminiscent of the indignant appeal to religious and familial feelings that characterises the last words of Lysias' *Against Agoratus*, no προσωποποιία as in Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, nothing of the ritual solemnity with which Demosthenes concludes his *De corona* and, of course, still less of Aeschines' bombast at the end of his speech in the same trial. But we clearly perceive the contrast between the abject pleas for mercy of other litigants and Socrates' intrepid fidelity to his conscience. The Peroration puts the finishing touch on Socrates' portrait, which has been drawn gradually through the whole of the First Speech.

[29] Note how he includes himself in the group of the average litigant: 35b5 ἂν <u>ἡμεῖς</u> ποιῶμεν; c5-7 οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε <u>ἡμᾶς</u> ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν <u>ἡμῶν</u> εὐσεβοῖεν. οὐδέτεροι ... ἡμῶν: 'neither of our two groups', i.e. neither we litigants nor you, the jurors.

CHAPTER TEN

SECOND SPEECH

1. *Introduction*

For the Second and Third Speeches, our analyses will be, if not shorter, at any rate less complicated than those of the First Speech. Leaving aside the Third Speech for the moment, one reason for this is that we cannot compare Socrates' words with the advice that ancient teachers of rhetoric gave about the way a defendant, when found guilty, should argue for his counter-proposal for the penalty. Neither Anaximenes nor Aristotle says anything about ἀντιτίμησις and, a fortiori, we find nothing of the kind in the works of later rhetors, since ἀντιτίμησις was specifically an Athenian practice which had no counterpart in other judicial systems. Among the preserved speeches or fragments of the Attic Orators there is none that can be considered an ἀντιτίμησις speech, or part of one. We have no information about the time allotted to the defendant for such a speech. I surmise, however, that less time was allowed than would be needed for delivering the Second Speech of the Platonic *Apology*; anyway, much of what Socrates is represented as saying would have been foreign to an ordinary lawsuit.

Furthermore, the Second and Third Speeches do not deal with many ideas that have not been introduced already in the First. So it will often suffice to point to the difference in perspective between the First and the later Speeches.

In the Second Speech, Socrates' very first statement, that he is not hurt by or indignant at what has happened, i.e. the verdict (35e1-36a1: τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν ... ἐπὶ τούτωι τῶι γεγονότι), sets the tone for what he says further on. Just as he remained perfectly calm in the course of the First Speech, when confronted with the threat of a death-sentence (29a1-b9. 30c6-d5), so now he remains composed and in good spirits after he has been found guilty, and is even able to indulge in a little piece of humorous arithmetic with regard to his three accusers. He takes them no more seriously here than he did the first time he mentioned all three of them (23e3-24a1). In the earlier passage, he represented them not as accusers relying on personal insight but only as representatives of the several groups of 'clever men' whose ignorance he had exposed. Likewise, in this passage, he affects to assume that the members of the jury cast their votes not on the basis of personal conviction, but out of solidarity with one of the accusers. This pretense does not, of course, reflect a serious and well-balanced view, but is intended to exclude any hint of melodrama and pathos. And therefore,

although Socrates may be firm in some of the things he says, his words never show any trace of bitterness or resentment.

2. *A Proposal According to Principle*

This section (36b3-37a1) is perhaps the most amazing, indeed the most shocking of the whole *Apology*. To be sure, Socrates is often paradoxical and he is wont to present his own convictions as if it were obvious that the audience shared them (Chapter I 11). But this time the situation is totally different: the vote count has shown that a majority, viz. 280 out of 500, are persuaded of his guilt. Nevertheless, he announces his intention to examine on its own merits the question of what he deserves, as if no vote had been taken. Of course, this stance is defiant. By reiterating what his life's work meant and still means for Athens, Socrates dismisses the verdict as insignificant, because it is not founded on objective grounds. Although this attitude is even more challenging than in earlier related passages, it is consistent with them, especially with Socrates' categorical declaration that he will under no circumstances forsake his mission for fear of death (29b9-30c1). What we find everywhere in Socrates' attitude is not a supercilious indifference towards other people's opinions or towards the jury's verdict but his absolute commitment to truth and justice.

Socrates starts from the official formula, the question τί ἄξιός ἐστιν (ὁ Σωκράτης) παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι (36b5) and with particular emphasis on the word ἄξιος, to which he gives its full force. A true answer can only be given after a consideration of Socrates' ἀξία, his merits, and therefore he embarks upon a long sentence in which he compares his own way of life with that of his fellow-citizens. In this comparison, he emphasises the fundamental difference between his choice and theirs and with the phrase ὅτι μαθών (b5-6 'that I took it into my head to', 'that I ventured to') he suggests that he is a solitary man confronted with a mass of people who do not share nor even understand his values. The sentence 36b5-d2 comprises a multiplicity of details, but its over-all perspective is different from the First Speech. There, Socrates constantly depicted his activity as the performance of a task entrusted to him by the god. Here he does not speak of a divine mission, but only of his personal reasons for not adopting a conventional lifestyle but choosing a radically different one. In the story of the oracle, we saw that Socrates corroborates divine instructions or suggestions with motivations based on his own reasoning. Which of the two types of motivation is emphasised in a particular passage depends on the context. Here the question is what benefits Socrates has conferred on the city, and as a consequence, how he deserves to be treated by the city: he should be judged by the sacrifices he made in order to live the life he did. That, and not the divine origin of his mission, is the relevant motivation in our passage.

Now, the choice made by Socrates is manifestly the same before which he said he put his fellow-citizens in the central sentence of the whole *Apology*; I mean the sentence in which he mentions the three kinds or degrees of goods, and the corresponding three classes of men and three types of life (Chapter VII 135-138). Socrates starts, just as he did earlier, from the care or neglect of some things (29d9 ἐπιμελούμενος; e2 οὐκ ἐπιμελῆι οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; 36b6 ἀμελήσας; c6 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... ἐπιμεληθείη). In the First Speech, the three kinds of goods were (a) χρήματα, (b) δόξα καὶ τιμή, (c) φρόνησις καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται (29d8-e2). Here we find the same three, two of which Socrates did not care for, viz. economic endeavours that lead to wealth (36b7 χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας) and the various political activities like holding office, advising the people in the Assembly and being active in caucuses and factions (b7-9 στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῆι πόλει γιγνομένων)[1]. Socrates is not interested in such occupations; he prefers to devote his life to bestowing on each citizen what he regards as the most precious benefit. He does this by trying to persuade each of them to care for themselves and to cultivate honesty and insight (c6-7 ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο), rather than to care about any of his possessions, and to be concerned with the state itself rather than for its possessions, and to follow the same method in their care for other things. So in this sentence, Plato not only expresses the Socratic scale of values, but also the idea that every man should give absolute priority to his improving himself, to ἀρετή and φρόνησις.

The notion of a scale of priorities which must guide our efforts is familiar to us from the exhortations reported in the First Speech. The distinction between the care one should have for oneself (or for the city itself) and that for his (or the city's) possessions has already been made there (30a8-b2; notice b4 δημοσίαι). The phrase ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτοῦ (36c6) does not really differ in meaning from ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς (29e1-2. 30b1-2) and ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς (31b5. 41e4-5). This is not to be confused with the

[1] For this, cf. above 23b7-9 καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας (that of examining every 'clever' man, citizen or foreigner) οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων. By uniting in a single list economical as well as political activities, Socrates acknowledges that Athenians often combined both. That was Pericles' ideal as formulated in the *Funeral Speech* (Thuc. ii 40,2): ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις <ἕτερα> πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι (cf. Chapter VI 110). That was what Anytus, the most influential of the three accusers, did, witness Socrates' statement 23e5-24a1, that he wished to vent his anger against him ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. Protagoras proclaims that his teaching will provide young men with εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν (*Prot.* 318e5-319a2; cf. *Men.* 91a3-4). For εὐβουλία, cf. Chapter VII 128-129.

assertion of the *First Alcibiades*[2] (130c3-7) that man (ἄνθρωπος) is nothing more than his soul (ψυχή). In our passage, the equivalence of (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) ἑαυτοῦ and τῆς ψυχῆς means simply that the ψυχή is the 'moral personality' which is more valuable than the body, as the *Crito* (47e7-48a1) neatly formulates: 'Or do we think that that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body?' (cf. 47d3-5).

This same section 36b3-37a1 contains two further points that have been treated in the First Speech. Socrates says that his protreptic activity is the most precious benefit (36c3-4 εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν; cf. d4 εὐεργέτηι) that he could possibly bestow on his fellow-citizens, whereas by other pursuits 'he would have been of no profit either for them or for himself' (c2-3 μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῶι ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι)[3]. The same idea has already been expressed briefly in the central passage of the First Speech (30a5-7 'I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god') and at more length a page further on, where Socrates works out some reflections based on the notion of τὸ ὠφέλιμον in order to vindicate his ἐπιτήδευμα (30d5-31b5). In both these passages, Socrates' activity is described as originating with the god, but it is, nevertheless, Socrates who has actually to accomplish the mission, and the painful consequences that it entails are his to endure. These consequences consist not only in the risk of imprisonment, exile or death (cf. 30d1-2); they are already present now, and have been for many years, in the form of his poverty (23b9-c1; 31b1-c3). That poverty now plays an unexpected role in shaping Socrates' paradoxical counterproposal, viz. that he should enjoy public maintenance.

The proposal is, of course, intended to strike both the jury and the readers as an enormity. Lifelong σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείωι was in Athens an exceptionally high honour, reserved for very few persons[4]. What is more, the reason that Socrates gives for his proposal sounds like open defiance of the jury, since he suggests public maintenance precisely so that he will be able to continue more freely the very activity for which he has just been condemned. On the other hand, we should not take a one-sided view of

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[2] I do not consider the *First Alcibiades* an authentic work of Plato's: I think it was written during his lifetime by a member of the Academy. Cf. 'Platonica I. L'authenticité du Premier Alcibiade' *LEC* 11 (1942) 135-151.

[3] Cf. 31d8-e1 πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν.

[4] Those enjoying this privilege were, in classical times, the Ὀλυμπιονῖκαι and the eldest direct descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton. An occasional invitation to have δεῖπνον in the Prytaneum was extended to ambassadors, new πρόξενοι for whom a laudatory decree had been voted, victorious Athenian generals and some others. Cf. Busolt - Swoboda ii 953. For a full list of all the sources concerning the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείωι see R.E. Wycherley *The Athenian Agora* iii *Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia* (Princeton 1957) 173-174.

Socrates' attitude. Of course, the proposal is not entirely serious[5]. Therefore, Socrates repeats, this time as a condition, what he has said above (36b4-5) about an ἀντιτίμησις that would correspond to what he deserves: εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείωι σιτήσεως (36e1-37a1). Only if the audience is prepared to judge Socrates on his true merits, and to put justice above prejudices in their assessment, does his proposal make sense.

Besides, there are two more points which should be taken into account to avoid misinterpreting Socrates' proposal. When he mentions σίτησις, it is not as an honour, but as practical assistance for him in the difficult circumstances in which he endeavours to carry out his mission. So the request implies no arrogance or self-assertion. Second, the comparison between the achievements of sports-heroes and those of Socrates is a literary topos. About a century before Socrates' trial Xenophanes composed an elegiac poem on this subject; he lists the various skills demonstrated in the games, and contrasts them with his own insight and competence that bestows upon the city the most precious goods: a sound balance of rights and duties in the community (εὐνομίη) and wealth. From the 22 lines of the poem I quote seven. If a champion carries the first prize in the Olympic games,

> ἀστοῖσίν κ' εἴη κυδρότερος προσορᾶν,
> καί κε προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἀγῶσιν ἄροιτο,
> καί κεν σῖτ' εἴη δημοσίων κτεάνων
> ἐκ πόλεως, καὶ δῶρον, ὅ οἱ κειμήλιον εἴη·
> εἴτε καὶ ἵπποισιν, ταῦτά κε πάντα λάχοι
> οὐκ ἐὼν ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ· ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων
> ἀνδρῶν ἠδ' ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη.[6]

Those listeners or readers who know the lines, will at once apply the last word, σοφίη, to the person of Socrates, although he himself, characteristically enough, avoids every direct reference to his wisdom. The important difference between Xenophanes' notion of σοφία and Socrates' is that Socrates' σοφία is a very modest kind of wisdom, 'human insight' (20d8), a consciousness of the limitations of one's knowledge and a desire for the truth, in a word φιλοσοφία. This φιλοσοφία is the source of every good for individuals and for cities. The man who has devoted his life to its pursuit deserves to be treated well, not because he asks for it, but because his conduct shows that he deserves it.

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[5] Of course, the jury was not authorised to accept the proposal. Lifelong public maintenance could only be granted by the Assembly, with the proviso that the meeting would be a δῆμος πληθύων, with at least 6.000 citizens attending, since this would be a case of a ψήφισμα ἐπ' ἀνδρί. Cf. Busolt - Swoboda ii 987 and n.2.

[6] 21B2,6-12 D.-K. On this poem see H. Fränkel *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*[3] (München 1969) 375-376. Cf. also Eur. fr. 282 N[2].

E. Wolff (*Platos Apologie* 49-51) contends that Socrates' attitude in the beginning of the Second Speech is 'der reinste Ausdruck der μεγαλοψυχία' as Aristotle describes it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. From Aristotle's detailed characterisation of this 'virtue', I cite the most important sentences.

> A person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much (μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν) ... If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially. 'Worthy' is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honour (ἡ τιμή) ... Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honours and disgraces ... It is honour above all else which great men (οἱ μεγάλοι) claim and deserve. (iv 7, 1123b1-2. 15-20. 21-24; Rackham's translation).

From the continuation of this description we learn that the great-souled man must be the best of men (ἄριστος) and that Greatness of Soul is, as it were, the crown of all virtues (1123b26-27. 1124a1-2). But soon Aristotle returns to his first subject:

> Honour and dishonour then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honours accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what becomes to him, or even less, for no honour can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honours, because they have no greater tribute to offer him. Honours rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise (πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει) ... He to whom even honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence great-souled men are thought to be haughty (ὑπερόπται). ... The great-souled man is justified in despising other people (δικαίως καταφρονεῖ) — his estimates are correct; but most proud men have no good ground for their pride. (iv 7, 1124a4-11. 19-20. iv 8, 1124b5-6; same translation).

After having quoted more extensively from the Aristotelian portrait, Bertrand Russell adds the terse remark: 'One shudders to think what a vain man would be like'[7].

Wolff's assertion rests on quite superficial similarities between Socrates' proposal and Aristotle's definition. We read in the *Ethics* that the great-souled man μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ; Socrates, however, does not 'claim important things for himself': he says, rather modestly, that he deserves ἀγαθόν τι, 'some good treatment', and, more precisely, such as would suit a poor man who needs leisure in order to exhort the Athenians (36d2. 4-5). He is not at all interested in τιμή: he has refused to follow the path that

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[7] *History of Western Philosophy* (London 1946 and repr.) 197-198. A.-J. Festugière, certainly a good authority on Greek philosophy and religion, agrees with Russell and writes: 'C'est aussi mon sentiment' *REG* 59-60 (1946-47) 530 n.1.

leads to such honours (b7-9). Further, the very idea of despising other people is entirely out of character for him since he does not, as the μεγαλόψυχος does, consider himself to possess all the virtues, including insight (σοφία) and φρόνησις (prudence); on the contrary, he is always searching for what he has not yet attained. Whereas the μεγαλόψυχος looks down upon imperfect men from the security of his exalted position without doing anything to help them, Socrates does all he can to help others to discover their own ignorance and to strive for true knowledge[8].

Nevertheless, Wolff's identification of Socrates with the μεγαλόψυχος of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not entirely fruitless, for it clarifies the differences between Socratic-Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. The former is oriented towards a divine and transcendent ideal and it makes one conscious of one's limitations and devoted to one's fellow-men; the latter is anthropocentric and has no such effect on man.

3. *A Proposal According to the Feasible*

a) Is Socrates' Attitude Arrogant? First Remarks

Socrates cannot but expect that the majority of the jury will be exasperated by what he has just said, because they simply did not believe him when he argued that, on the point of τίμησις, as in all the rest, he would accept no criterion but justice (36b4-5. d2-3. e1-2). As so often in the *Apology*, Socrates presents his opponents' views as an objection[9]. They believe that his last words testify to the same state of mind that inspired his refusal to beseech the jury at the end of the First Speech (34b7-e1): Socrates wilfully and defiantly deviates from the normal behaviour of a defendant, and he does so out of arrogance, which implies that he considers himself superior to his fellow-citizens and wants them to feel how he despises them.

Socrates acknowledges the similarity of the new situation with that of the Peroration of the First Speech; he only argues, precisely as he did then, that objectivity is his sole guiding principle (see Chapter IX 182-183). He does not wish to be different from the others, since they, too, should be guided by absolute truth and goodness. But now in fact there is disagreement between them. *They* are convinced that he is guilty; *he* is persuaded that he

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8 Nor can one use *Rhet.* i 9, 1366b17 μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων (quoted by Wolff 50) as a parallel for Socrates' εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν (36c3-4). The passage of the *Rhetoric* gives very short characterisations of several kinds of virtue. Μεγαλοψυχία comes between ἐλευθεριότης, which is concerned with χρήματα, and μεγαλοπρέπεια, which has to do with δαπανήματα. Therefore we must understand the εὐεργετήματα of the 'great-souled man' as generous donations which he bestows on the city for her temples, her official buildings, her navy, her religious, cultural and athletic festivals, etc., all of which Socrates was certainly unable to give.

9 37a2 ἴσως οὖν ... δοκῶ is a variant of 31c4 ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν, on which see Chapter VIII 151.

has not wronged anyone. As Socrates says in the *Euthyphro* (7c10-d5), this difference arises from their conflicting views on what is just and unjust, honourable and despicable, good and bad, and on such matters it is not easy to reach a satisfactory decision, viz. the true answer on which both parties will agree. Such an agreement can only result from a long, painstaking dialectical discussion. In this trial, the time allotted to Socrates was too short for an exhaustive debate with the jury. So all he can do is cling to his conviction that he has harmed nobody and that, if it is unjust to harm another, it is even more so to harm oneself. By thinking and saying this Socrates does not show contempt for other people, and therefore no arrogance.

Although this argument of Socrates is valid as far as it goes, we still feel somewhat uneasy. Is there any necessity for Socrates to be so defiant as to ask for public maintenance and to reject the very idea of a compromise? I will answer this question after we have examined what Socrates has to say about various proposals other than his own.

b) The Various Rejected Solutions

In order to understand the way Socrates discusses the proposals, we should first notice how he introduces them. They are all presented as answers to the question τί δείσας; (37b5). Out of fear for what would Socrates propose any evil measure against himself? Here once again, we find the theme of the scale of values, which has (Chapter VII 131) as its counterpart a scale of things to be feared.

The objectors start from the generally accepted truth that of two evils one should always choose the lesser. Since the accusers had asked for the death-sentence, which is the heaviest penalty possible, Socrates should, out of fear for death and in order to escape it, propose another penalty, which will logically be a lesser evil. But Socrates denies the premise that death is the greatest evil, indeed he had said that he does not even know whether it is not the greatest blessing to man (29a6-b1). Here he repeats this assertion and adds that he will not opt for any evil in order to escape something that may quite possibly be a blessing. It is in the light of this principle that he will now examine various alternative penalties.

The first one is life-long[10] imprisonment. Socrates rejects this off-hand with a very short justification: 'And why should I live in prison, a slave to the yearly appointed magistrates, the Eleven?' (37c1-2). The key-word in this sentence is *slave*, a man who is deprived of the capacity to make his own choices, to take the initiative, and who must always obey someone else, not out of free will (ἑκών) but under duress (ἄκων)[11]. Nowhere does Plato

[10] See the note on 37b8 δεσμοῦ, at the end.

[11] What the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. thought about freedom, as opposed to slavery, is well described in p.1-50 of A.-J. Festugière *Liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs*

discuss the problem of slavery, as Aristotle does in chapters 4 to 7 of the first book of the *Politics*. Socrates uses the term δοῦλος as every Athenian would do, without any theoretical background. Its usual connotations are reflected in a passage from a famous iambic poem of Solon: 'Those that in this very place suffered debasing servitude, trembling before the moods of their owners, these I made free men'[12]. A slave's total dependence on his master's whims ruins his moral character. To be sure, Attic comedy, Old and New, shows how smart slaves learned to read their owners' moods and could thus manage them to some degree. But Socrates is not the sort of man to use such cunning. Besides, his masters will be replaced by others every year. How could a life without the possibility of personal evaluation and decision have any meaning for him? Obviously, he does not expect to be allowed to receive his friends in prison and to continue his usual philosophical discussions with them, as he was to do later on, while he was in jail awaiting the execution. As he will express it below, 'a life in which there is no place for examination is intolerable for a man' (38a5-6), and for Socrates more than for any other man. This option is definitely out of the question.

True enough, Socrates could propose a fine, a penalty which is explicitly mentioned in the very question that must now be answered: τί ἄξιός ἐστι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι; (36b5). But Socrates is too poor to pay a fine of any reasonable amount, and so, as a debtor to the city, he would be imprisoned until he paid the sum, which he would never be able to do. So this proposal does not really differ from the preceding one. Of course, Socrates will, in the end, propose a fine. But Plato does not wish to bring this up just now. Therefore the second proposal is rejected along with the first.

The third proposal is the most important: exile. 'Perhaps you would accept that', says Socrates (37c5). All modern scholars agree that the jurors would have been glad of the suggestion and that even the accusers did not want to have Socrates put to death. What they wanted was to get him out of the way, and the more smoothly this could be done, the better. They asked for the death-penalty in order to force Socrates to propose exile himself. But he refuses to play the game. What matters to him is continuing his examinations and discussions, and he cannot expect to be able to do so in exile. If even his fellow-citizens find his conversations and probing questions so irksome that they now use every means to get him out of the way, how much less will foreigners allow him to go on with his course of action! So he will have to wander from city to city, driven out everywhere, certainly not a good life for a man of his age.

The arguments with which Socrates predicts what will happen to him in exile are perhaps not very satisfactory. Everywhere, he says, the young men

(Paris 1947).

[12] Fr. 36,13-15 West: τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα ἔχοντας, ἤθη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους, ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα.

will gather together and listen to his conversations exactly as they used to do in Athens. And then, 'if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes' (37d7-e2). Since the general trend of Socratic debates is to question traditional customs and value judgments in order to find out whether they are well-founded or not, it seems probable that in cities less broad-minded than Athens, older people will have serious misgivings about the influence Socrates might have on the young. If he happens not to attract them, their elders will be reassured and not be eager to expel him. If he does attract them, Socrates takes it for granted that their older relatives will expel him out of concern for their charges. This, however, is not readily compatible with his argument in the First Speech, that the fathers and elder brothers of young men belonging to his circle, far from being apprehensive of Socrates' influence upon their charges, came to the law-court in order to lend him their support (33d8-34b5). Why would this not happen in other cities as well as in Athens[13]?

Perhaps Plato did not wish to speak his mind about the issue in this particular context, because it would have required a long explanation. Obviously, the true reason why Socrates does not expect to be able to continue his mission in exile as he had always done is that no city but Athens provided the necessary conditions. Nowhere in Greece was the curiosity for disinterested debate so keen, and, far more importantly, there was no place where discussions were so free, because Athens was the democratic city *par excellence*, ἐλευθερίας ... μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας (*Rep.* viii 557b4-5).

In a late dialogue, the *Politicus*, Plato shows that he was aware that Socrates would not have had a chance to carry on his examinations for so many years in a city governed by strict laws. The only perfect form of government, he says, is government by the true Statesman, who is endowed with perfect knowledge of what is good for the city and her inhabitants, 'the kingly man having insight' (294a8). He will rule according to his unerring judgment, unhampered by laws that

> can never accurately encompass what is the most noble and the most just for all citizens together and so prescribe what is best. For the infinite diversity of persons and of actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs remains invariable, do not allow any technique whatever to formulate on any point a single rule for all cases and for all time. (294a10-b6)

That is just what the law tries to do, and what it necessarily fails to achieve. At best, it can set up a rough standard that will fit most people and most eventualities, but certainly not all of them. Since, however, we have ho real hope of finding the true Statesman, we shall, 'as a second course' (300c2), resort to legislation, imperfect though it may be, and forbid both individuals

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[13] In this respect I cannot agree with Burnet's note on 37d8.

and the masses to do or propose anything that deviates from the written and unchangeable norm.

> STR.EL. And then, in addition to all this, there will have to be a law that if anyone is found to be investigating the art of pilotage or navigation or the subject of health and true medical doctrine about winds and things hot or cold, contrary to the written rules, or to be indulging in any speculation whatsoever on such matters, he shall in the first place not be called a physician or a ship captain, but a star-gazer, a kind of loquacious sophist, and secondly anyone who is empowered to do so may bring an accusation against him and hale him into any court for corrupting the young and persuading them to essay the arts of navigation and medicine in opposition to the laws and to govern the ships and the sick according to their own will; and if he is found to be so persuading either young or old contrary to the laws and written rules, he shall suffer the most extreme penalties.[14] Nothing, they say, ought to know better than the laws ... Now if these regulations which I speak of were to be applied to these sciences, Socrates[15], and to strategy and every part of hunting and to painting or every kind of imitation and to carpentry ... or the whole science of numbers, whether arithmetic or plane geometry or solid geometry or problems of motion — what would you think of carrying on all these in such a way, by written rules and not by knowledge? — Y.SO. Clearly all the arts would be utterly ruined, nor could they ever rise again, through the law prohibiting investigation; and so life, which is hard enough now, would then become utterly unendurable. (299b2-c6. d1-4. e1-9; Fowler's translation, slightly modified).[16]

In writing this sharp satire about a community that would ban and prosecute every form of research, Plato unmistakably alludes to Athenian attitudes towards Socrates[17], more precisely to the account that he had given earlier in the *Apology*. In the long passage that I have quoted in part just now, we twice find the verb ζητεῖν (299b5. e7), which Plato uses in the *Apology* to characterise the investigations of Socrates (cf. Chapter VII 134-135). When the Eleatic Guest describes the accusations brought against the innovators,

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[14] The Greek text of 299b6-c6 runs as follows: πρῶτον μὲν μήτε ἰατρικὸν αὐτὸν μήτε κυβερνητικὸν ὀνομάζειν ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν, εἶθ' ὡς διαφθείροντα ἄλλους νεωτέρους καὶ ἀναπείθοντα ἐπιτίθεσθαι κυβερνητικῆι καὶ ἰατρικῆι μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' αὐτοκράτορας ἄρχειν τῶν πλοίων καὶ τῶν νοσούντων, γραψάμενον εἰσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον οἷς ἔξεστιν εἰς δή τι δικαστήριον· ἂν δὲ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα δόξηι πείθειν εἴτε νέους εἴτε πρεσβύτας, κολάζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις.

[15] This is the 'Younger Socrates', a junior member of the Academy about 365 B.C.

[16] The Greek text of Younger Socrates' answer (299e5-9) runs as follows: Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶσαί τε αἱ τέχναι παντελῶς ἂν ἀπόλοιντο ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδ' εἰς αὖθις γένοιντ' ἄν ποτε διὰ τὸν ἀποκωλύοντα τοῦτον ζητεῖν νόμον· ὥστε ὁ βίος, ὢν καὶ νῦν χαλεπός, εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον ἀβίωτος γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν.

[17] L. Campbell *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* (Oxford 1867) ii 153 considered this as a possibility ('perhaps'). More recent scholars rightly exclude every doubt, so e.g. Burnet (note on *Apol.* 24b9); A. Diès *Le Politique* (Paris 1935 and repr.) 68 n.2; Paul Friedländer *Platon* iii, 276-278. Friedländer is the only one who asks what the allusion is meant to convey; according to him its meaning is that Socrates *is* the true Statesman and therefore stands above the laws. This is true, but it is only one aspect of Plato's intention.

he combines in one formula the charges of both the old and the new accusers, a combination peculiar to the *Apology*[18]. Further, he recalls the penalty demanded by the accusers, which is in both cases the highest possible[19]. Finally, the answer of the Younger Socrates[20] corresponds in phrasing and content to the famous assertion of Socrates *Apol.* 38a3-6: in both works a life without investigation (*Polit.* 299e7 ἀποκωλύοντα ... ζητεῖν) or examination (*Apol.* 38a5 ὁ ... ἀνεξέταστος βίος) is declared to be unendurable for a man (299e7-8 ὁ βίος ... ἀβίωτος; 38a5-6 ὁ ... βίος οὐ βιωτός). Notice that the prohibition of research in the *Politicus* applies only to specialised science and technology; what the accusers wish to eliminate in Socrates' case is something much more important, because it is connected with the very meaning of life, viz. the investigation about τὰ μέγιστα (*Apol.* 22d7; see the note *in loc.*), which is the proper object of φιλοσοφία. Now, if in the *Politicus* Plato so strongly insists on the catastrophic effects of abolishing freedom of research in specific fields of study, he must have thought that the consequences would be much worse in the case of Socrates, if he were denied the freedom to investigate the conditions for living well. I do not contend that Plato already had this perspective on this issue when he wrote the *Apology*. But I do not doubt that, for the Platonic Socrates, exile from Athens would automatically have ended his lifelong examination. And that is why he rejects the third proposal.

c) An Objection and a New Proposal

In 37a2, Socrates attributed his hypothetical objection to the jury (see above, 192); here, the objection is purely imaginary[21], yet it discloses how deeply, in Plato's view, most of the jurors misunderstood Socrates' ideals. The hypothetical objector takes it for granted that Socrates' characteristic activity does not mean more to him than any other pursuit, and that exile as such is the thing that really matters; why, he asks, could Socrates not keep silent and give up meddling in other people's business? Socrates might feel discouraged indeed. Had the audience, in the course of the First Speech, not been impressed by the warm and emphatic passage in which he said

> If you should let me go on this condition (that I shall give up my investigations and my search for the truth), I should say to you: "Upon my word, men of Athens, I love you very much, but I shall listen to the god rather than to you and as long as I live, as long as I can, *I shall never stop seeking the truth* and addressing to you my exhortations and my arguments ... And so, men of Athens,

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[18] *Polit.* 299b7-8 (quoted in n.14) μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν ~ *Apol.* 18b7-c1 τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστὴς ... καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν; *Polit.* 299b8 (ib.) διαφθείροντα ... νεωτέρους ~ *Apol.* 24b9 τοὺς ... νέους διαφθείροντα.

[19] *Polit.* 299c5-6 κολάζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ~ *Apol.* 36b3 τιμᾶται ... θανάτου; cf. 40a7-8 νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι ... ἅ ... νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι (viz. the death-penalty).

[20] *Polit.* 299e5-9 (quoted in n.16).

[21] 37e3 ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι; see the note on 28b3.

> you may listen to Anytus or not and let me free or not, but this you should know, that *I shall never act otherwise* (than I have done till now), even if I am to suffer many deaths." (29d1-6. 30b7-c1)

That was the main point of his whole defence, as it was the purpose of his whole life. Now it appears that his audience did not take his words seriously and they still think that his ἐπιτήδευμα is of little consequence to him. He does not complain, however, and with a resigned tone that reminds us of the end of the Proposition (19a2-5), he observes that the hardest thing for him to do is to convince the jury that it is impossible for him to renounce his activity.

This observation gives him another opportunity to mention the two reasons why he made philosophy his calling. First, in practising philosophy he obeys the command of the god, as was argued at length in the Narration and repeated in the Digression. But the jurors will not accept this motivation and think it a mere pretext: as they see it, Socrates had made this choice because it suited him, and he should not now try to avoid his responsibility by invoking a divine command. The second reason, which is especially prominent in the Digression, is that Socrates considers the philosophical life to be *the* right life. But the jurors are not prepared to take this claim seriously. The two reasons, far from being mutually exclusive, are complementary. Once again (see Chapter V 81-82; Chapter VIII 153; above, 186), divine hints and human reason come together in Socrates' argument. In this case, Socrates' meditations are summed up in three lines that are perhaps the most powerful expression of his concept of the ideal of life, and they are powerful because Plato uses the plainest and most straightforward language. Where else, even in the *Apology*, do we find a more forceful formulation of what the Platonic Socrates has tried to convey to his audience and to us, the readers, than the sentence ὁ ... ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπωι? It contains the quintessence of Socratic philosophy and deservedly became a winged word[22].

Socrates, however, sees that all his explanations are to no avail. He repeats what he said at the beginning of the Second Speech about his proposal according to principle: that he is not prepared to propose for himself anything that would be an evil[23]. Of course, he uses 'evil' in the strict Socratic sense of the word, not as referring to things like execution,

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[22] Which deserves better than to be constantly mistranslated as "the unexamined life is not worth living"; see note *in loc.*

[23] The connection between 38a7-8 and a8-b1 is not very clear. After having said that things are truly as he asserted but that it is not easy to persuade others that they are so, Socrates adds: 'And besides (καὶ ... ἅμα) I am not wont to consider myself deserving of any evil treatment'. The latter sentence, however, is not really an addition ('and besides') to the preceding one, as if both were parallel assertions. Actually, it is the second premiss of a free syllogism of a type that is very common in Plato. The first premiss, as usually, is the minor: 'To abandon my philosophical activity would be an evil for me'. The second is the major, 'I am not wont', etc. The regular particle used to introduce the second premiss is καίτοι (Denn. 561-564).

banishment, disfranchisement (30d1-4), much less loss of money, which he would suffer if he had to pay a fine. He could readily accede to such a proposal, because it would not really mean a loss for him. To be sure, this seems to be merely an abstract possibility, since the maximum amount he could pay would be one mna, and the jury could scarcely accept so small a fine in such a serious lawsuit[24]. Still, Socrates proposes it. But then four of his friends, the first of whom is Plato, urge him to suggest a more substantial amount, for which they will put up security. Socrates acquiesces in their request and so he proposes a fine of thirty mnas[25].

There can be no doubt the historical Socrates actually did propose this fine. In a sense, this proposal might seem to be a retreat from the uncompromising attitude that Socrates had assumed until then. And that is how Xenophon understood it, who, in his *Apology* (§ 23), categorically maintains that Socrates, since his friends insisted that he should propose a fine, not only did not do it himself, but did not allow them to propose one for him either. He did not do so because 'to make a proposal for a penalty would imply that he was guilty' (ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν). I fully agree with Burnet (note on 38b1) that Xenophon's text 'is obviously intended as a contradiction of Plato'. This does not mean that Xenophon had any independent information about what actually happened in court; he had been absent from Athens since 401 and did not come back for several decades, if at all. True, he appeals to a certain Hermogenes to support his own interpretation of Socrates' attitude; but he does not say that Hermogenes was present at the trial. The first sentences of his *Apology* (§ 1) are very instructive in this respect: 'Others, too, have written about him (Socrates) and they all managed to express his big talk (μεγαληγορία), which proves that Socrates really spoke in that tone[26]. But they did not make it clear that, in his case, he considered dying preferable to living on, and so his big talk seems to be rather foolish (ἀφρονεστέρα).'

What Xenophon heard from Hermogenes showed that the tone Socrates used in his defence matched his intentions perfectly. Socrates wished to die in order to escape the miseries of old age (§§ 6-9. 22-23) and therefore wilfully offended (βαρύνω) his judges. On this point again, as on so many others, Xenophon differs from Plato[27] intentionally, in order to make Socrates' behaviour during the trial look more 'reasonable'. Of course, a

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[24] That was why Socrates had dismissed this possibility in 37c2-4.

[25] This was probably a normal amount: later in the century, in a case cited by Pseudo-Demosthenes (liii 18) one talent (sixty mnas) was an alternative acceptable to all parties (and the jury) for the death-penalty. If Socrates lost the votes of eighty more jurors at the second vote, this is more likely to be due to his announcement that he was not going to abandon his ἐπιτήδευμα and to his denial that the fine is a penalty (cf. below) than to the height of the fine.

[26] If the only ground of Xenophon's certainty on that point is that he found it in the several *Apologies* that were published before his own, we must infer that he did not consult any eye-witnesses but only written sources.

[27] *Apol.* 19a2-4; see Burnet *in loc.* and his p.65-66.

man like Xenophon could hold such a view, but one cannot share his opinions about Socrates' general attitude in his defence, or about the τίμησις. The Platonic Socrates states explicitly that proposing a fine in his case is not a confession of guilt, since he denies that he deserves any evil (38a8-b1), but he has no objection on principle to paying a fine if he were to be sentenced to that, for (he says) by that 'I would not suffer any loss' (38b2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην). His attitude is, therefore, consistent throughout the *Apology* and especially throughout the Second Speech. And that is precisely what makes the proposal of a fine unacceptable to the majority of the jury. Although Socrates is prepared to accept something that the jurors would regard as a penalty, he adds that he does not himself consider the fine a penalty.

d) Is Socrates' Attitude Arrogant? Final Remarks

So, even when he tries, to a certain extent, to be accommodating, Socrates is steadfast. Therefore, the question whether he is arrogant must be asked again. Above, 191-192, I said that it is not, because it is informed by his constant dedication to objectivity and by the certainty that his conversations were both a divine mission and a blessing for Athens. His attitude is not prompted by any contempt of people who do not see things the way he does himself, nor by any desire to be different from his fellow-citizens.

Nevertheless, the argument can be taken a step further than I did before. The objection raised at 37e3-4, although it manifests a total lack of understanding of Socrates' motives, has a conciliatory tone. The objector does not ask Socrates to accept the death penalty, but simply to go along with a practical solution that will free the jury from the necessity of sentencing him to death. Socrates had been declared guilty; he cannot afford to ignore this because the outcome of the trial is no longer open. He has been found guilty, so he must suffer a penalty. Therefore, the proposal according to principle, that same principle which failed to convince the jury of his innocence, is rather a quixotic demonstration. When Socrates afterwards rejects all other alternatives, he appears to be uncooperative. The objector feels uneasy and proposes something that, according to him, would be very simple and would respect both the obligation of the jury to pronounce a penalty and Socrates' scruples. In his eagerness to reach a gentlemen's agreement, the objector uses the ethical dative ἡμῖν (37e4), 'could you not be so kind as to ...' Is it not surprising, or even shocking, that Socrates does not try to meet the jury half-way? Is that not proof of pride and even of arrogance?

Actually, by proposing to pay a fine, and even more by accepting the amount suggested by his friends, Socrates makes a significant move towards the jury. Technically, a fine is certainly a penalty, as appears from the official text of the question τί ἄξιός ἐστι παθεῖν ἢ <u>ἀποτεῖσαι</u>; And because a fine of one mna — which Socrates could actually pay out of his own

resources — could be seen as a mockery of justice, he agrees to his friends' proposal. Further than that, however, he cannot possibly go; that is a matter of principle. The question is whether Socrates' choice, his ἐπιτήδευμα, is the right one and leads others to a better life, more in accordance with man's dignity and his duty. Or, to put it more concretely, is Socrates right in repeating that neither wealth nor honour nor life itself, but honesty and justice are the most important goods and that one should bear with resignation the loss of all the rest?

At this stage in the proceedings, the question becomes still more pointed: will Socrates back out and, in order to save his life, actually renounce his ἐπιτήδευμα? He will not, because, on the one hand, he does not admit that he was mistaken in his choice, and on the other he cannot stop leading a life that is a constant testimony of the true scale of values. On these points he cannot tolerate any ambiguity. If there is some defiance in his attitude, it is the same defiance which he showed in the affair of the Arginusae and in that of Leon: the quiet and unobtrusive determination to be faithful to his ideal. It belongs to the very mission of a prophet that he should not compromise in matters of principle. Nor did our Lord Jesus Christ accept such a compromise with the Pharisees and the priestly class. Socrates did not seek conflict, but when it arose he did not step aside. Through the simple words in which he adopts his friends' proposal, we experience that he is not fighting a pitched battle.

One might wonder whether it would have been better for Socrates to refuse to make a counter-proposal. In the text, there is no indication that he considered the possibility. But, in my opinion, if it had been mentioned to him, he would have rejected it. He did not question the legality of the proceedings against him. Because the law required it, he was willing to present his defence, regardless of his misgivings about the results it could lead to (19a5-7). After the death-sentence was legally passed[28], he refused to flee from prison. At this moment, the law required him to propose a counter-penalty, and so he did. Further, if he had not proposed an alternative, he would have forced every member of the jury, even those who were convinced of his innocence, to cast their votes for the death-penalty. That was something which he would certainly have thought was unjust. The 'proposal according to principle' was not Socrates' real τίμησις; it was his only way to make it clear that he thought that the verdict was a total error. His true τίμησις is the fine of thirty mnas. By proposing it, Socrates thought he had gone as far as his conscience would allow him to go in order to compromise with the jury.

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[28] Cf. *Crit.* 50b2-5. b7-c6.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THIRD SPEECH

1. *Introductory Remarks*

According to Diogenes Laertius ii 41, Socrates was found guilty 'by 281 votes more than those given for acquittal' (κατεδικάσθη διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα μιᾶι πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν). This cannot be true; either the text is corrupt or Diogenes misunderstood his unknown source, which must have said that Socrates was condemned by 281 votes and implies that there were 220 for acquittal[1]. Actually, we saw (note on 36a5) that the jury of Socrates numbered 500, not 501 members, but Diogenes' calculations, or those of his source, may reflect the more recent practice, which was to have juries of 201, 501, 1001, etc., members. Now, Diogenes relates further on (ii 42) that the jury passed a sentence of death 'with an accession of eighty fresh votes' (προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα). This means that eighty judges who had voted for acquittal were so incensed by the defiant tone of Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις that they voted for the harsher penalty. If we accept Diogenes' second statement, we must conclude that 280 + 80 = 360 judges voted for the death-penalty whereas 140 chose the fine of thirty mnas[2]. Anyway, as Burnet rightly says (161), we have no means of checking Diogenes' assertion, although it is in itself plausible enough (cf. Chapter X 198 and n.25).

Wilamowitz considers the Third Speech to be entirely fictional:

> Niemand kann im Ernst glauben, dass die Leute (the jurors) dageblieben und Ruhe gehalten hätten, zumal die verurteilenden, denen arg ins Gewissen geredet

[1] The simplest explanation of Diogenes' unacceptable text is that it is corrupted by a scribal error prompted by *homoioteleuton*. Between μιᾶι and πλείοσι the words <ἑξήκοντα μιᾶι> may have fallen out. The sense is then that Socrates was condemned by 281 votes, that is sixty-one more than those for acquittal. Of course, the loss of these two words can have taken place either in the older phases of the transmission of Diogenes' text or in that of his source.

[2] By a curious oversight Burnet writes (161) that the information given by Diogenes 'would give a division of 300 to 200'. But of course if, as he says, 'according to Diogenes ... there were eighty more votes for the sentence of death than for the verdict of guilty', that would entail that 300 - 80 = 220 jurors only found Socrates guilty and that Socrates was acquitted. Moreover, it would mean that since the first vote really gave a division of 280 against 220, there would have been only twenty votes more for the death sentence than for the verdict of guilty. That not only contradicts Diogenes' statement but also Burnet's own remark that 'a *considerable* turn-over of votes would not be surprising in view of the attitude taken up by Socrates in his ἀντιτίμησις' (my italics).

> wird. Niemand wird auch glauben, dass die Beamten, die den Verurteilten abzuführen hatten, ihm erst noch das Wort gegeben hätten. (*Platon* i 124).

One could support Wilamowitz' argument by observing that, once the trial had come to its official end with the proclamation of the results of the second vote, the members of the jury would have left the courtroom at once, so that there was no opportunity for Socrates to address them. It seems unlikely that the jurors would have taken their seats again to listen to another speech by the condemned.

Burnet, however, is not convinced; he regards Wilamowitz' twofold assertion as 'groundless'. He points to a piece of evidence that Plato gives us in the *Phaedo* and that the German scholar seems to have overlooked; this evidence indicates that the proceedings did not formally end with the second vote. For the case of Socrates was not an ordinary one:

> The stern of the sacred ship had been crowned by the priest of Apollo the day before the trial, and Socrates could not be put to death till it returned from Delos (*Phaed.* 58 a 6 sqq.) ... There was, therefore, the question of what to do with Socrates in the interval, and this had to be settled in court (Burnet 161).

As we read at the end of the *Phaedo*, Socrates says to his friends, a few hours before his death, that, after having taken the poison, he will no longer be with them (115d3 οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ), but will go away to the joys of the blessed. He then adds: 'So, give security for me to Crito, the opposite of that which he gave to the jurors (πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς): for he gave security that I would remain (ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν), but you must give security that I shall not remain here when I die, but shall go away' (115d6-e1); what will be burnt or buried is the corpse, not Socrates himself. At the end of the trial, Crito wished to spare his friend the indignity of imprisonment during the long delay before his execution[3] and therefore he offered to guarantee that Socrates would not attempt to escape in the meantime. No authority was entitled to grant or to refuse such a request except the jury itself, which could give its decision only by vote. Burnet rightly argues (161-162 and 172) that Crito's offer to give security must have been made 'after the sentence [of death] and before the court rose' (162). So we see that the proceedings were in this case not formally closed after the second vote and that the members of the jury had to take their places on the benches again. Actually, the *Crito* and the *Phaedo* show that Socrates spent the whole interval in prison; we must infer from this that Crito's offer was rejected[4].

Although all this is well established by Burnet, it does not really invalidate Wilamowitz' argument: if the situation which Wilamowitz considers impossible did not arise immediately after the second vote, but a bit

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[3] According to Xenophon *Mem.* iv 8,2 it lasted for fully thirty days.

[4] As Burnet points out (172), the imperfect ἠγγυᾶτο (115d8) implies that Crito met with a refusal.

later, viz. after the vote about Crito's request, that makes no essential difference. Neither does it help to say that we should not 'think of Socrates as sitting in the dock between two gendarmes ready to hurry him off to the cells as soon as the sentence has been passed' (Burnet 162). This may be true, but a real difficulty remains. Plato's text runs as if the Third Speech was delivered in exactly the same physical surroundings and legal context as the first two, but this cannot have been the case. After the rejection of Crito's offer, the proceedings were closed for good and the court rose. The King archon would not have allowed Socrates to mount the central βῆμα[5] again and to address the jury as a whole, because it was now free to go home. Even if Socrates had tried to speak again, those jurors who had voted for the death-sentence, an undisputable majority, would have prevented him by drowning him out with their shouts and by leaving the court-room.

It did not entirely escape Burnet's notice that there is a serious problem here; he does not, however, mention, let alone address it in his introductory remarks, but he does so, though as if as an afterthought, in his note on 40a1: 'I think we are to imagine the supporters of Socrates gathering round him for his last speech. He would hardly deliver it from the βῆμα.' What Burnet means with 'his last speech' is not the whole of the Third Speech, but only the section that is directed to the jurors who voted for acquittal, viz. 39e1-42a5. What, then, are we to make of the first section (38c1-39d9)? Do we suppose that the jurors who condemned Socrates gathered around their victim to hear how he judges them? Of course not. As Plato presents things, there is one formal speech, the two sections of which are directed to two different groups of jurors, but are delivered from the same place, presumably the central βῆμα. And that is just what Wilamowitz thinks is impossible and Plato's invention. The familiar and informal talk[6] that Socrates wishes to carry on with his supporters is no set speech. Nobody would have objected to such an informal conversation, as we may infer from the very words of the *Apology*: 'But with those who voted for acquittal, I should like to converse about this event, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Please remain here so long, gentlemen; for nothing prevents us from chatting with one another while there is time' (39e1-5).

My conclusion would be that something, not everything, is fictitious in the Third Speech of the *Apology* as it is published. Historically, there has never been a Third Speech that was delivered to the whole jury and from the same spot as the first two. Socrates did not address the jurors who had condemned him. But it is perfectly acceptable that he had an informal chat

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[5] On the three βήματα in the courtroom see the note on 34a5. Neither would the King archon have allowed Socrates to speak from the defendant's βῆμα, since he was no longer a defendant, but a man found guilty and sentenced to death.

[6] This characterisation is suggested by Socrates' words ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην and ὑμῖν ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω κτέ. (39e1. e5-40a1).

with a group of supporters who gathered around him after the court had adjourned and the most of the jurors had left the room.

If that is what actually happened, it could easily suggest to Plato the idea of letting Socrates deliver a third set speech. Its first section should then be considered pure fiction and the whole setting as well; the second section may be based, at least in part, on what Socrates said at that time to some of the jurors who had voted for acquittal[7]. The striking contrast in Socrates' attitude in the two sections may have resulted from the fact that the first section is entirely Plato's invention, the second only in part (see below, 212-213). We may guess that in the first we have Plato's assessment of Socrates' adversaries rather than Socrates' own view.

Anyhow, to Plato's readers it can hardly have seemed impossible for Socrates to deliver a formal speech after the official end of the proceedings because, in the first two speeches, he dominated the situation so completely that it seemed he could do whatever he wished. A Third Speech offered Plato an opportunity to work out several ideas which would have been out of place in the First or the Second. Above all, it made it possible for him to make Socrates express his convictions about the whole course of events.

2. *Socrates Addresses the Jurors who Voted for Condemnation*

Although the formula Socrates uses when addressing the first group of the jurors (ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι) does not make this clear, the first sentence shows that he is not speaking to those who acknowledged his innocence. In the second sentence, he makes the distinction between the two groups explicit — he neglects the difference between those who found him guilty and those who voted for the death-penalty[8].

What Socrates has to say to the jurors who condemned him concerns three points of unequal importance, as appears at once from the length of their treatment. Here, as in the Second Speech, he starts by acknowledging the new circumstances and by pointing out that his adversaries did not gain the great victory that they had probably anticipated. Since Socrates is seventy years old, they did not need to condemn him to death in order to get rid of him: that would have happened in a short time anyway. Without realising it they have achieved an unfortunate result: anyone who wants to cast a slur upon Athens will accuse the jurors of having killed Socrates, a clever man; to be sure, Socrates denies that he is clever, but the critics of the city will contend that he was. These matters are set forth concisely and quite composedly, as if what Socrates says does not touch his person. Then,

[7] Of course, as I said Chapter I 5-7, Plato would have been at liberty, here as in the rest of the *Apology*, to remodel, even drastically, what he remembered about Socrates' actual words.

[8] Compare 38d1-2 πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον with 39c1-2 ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου and d8-9 ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις.

however, he specifies that his first words were not directed to all the members of the jury, but only to those who passed a sentence of death. With that the tone changes and becomes very sharp, as we shall see below (under *c*).

a) Looking Back at the Lawsuit

Socrates' next reflection concerns the immediate cause of his condemnation: why was his defence not more effective? Two answers can be given. Either he was not able to find arguments which could persuade the jury, and this would be utterly shameful for a man who spent his whole life in disputations and whom his accusers considered to be δεινὸς λέγειν (17a6-b1); or he knew very well what most members of the jury wanted him to do but flatly refused to plead and grovel.

The second answer is of course the true one. Already in the Peroration of the First Speech, Socrates categorically dismissed the very idea of beseeching his jurors, although he was aware that they would be offended at his obvious departure from the usual practice of defendants. But he did this for sound reasons, one of which every Athenian could easily understand: such an abject attitude would not be honourable (καλόν) for him or for the jury and the whole city (34e2-3). What this refusal would necessarily lead to has now become all too clear: the death-penalty.

To Socrates' adversaries, this very fact proves that his defence was a failure, but he cannot agree with them: now that events have taken their course, he can look back and pass *his* judgment on his own conduct and on that of the jurors and the accusers. He regrets nothing. Never did he consider life to be the highest good for man; on that ground, he decided to stick to his post in battle[9] and acted as he did now in the face of the risks involved in a criminal lawsuit. Even as things have turned out, he feels that it was right to remain true to his principles. By recalling the argument of 28a2-30c1 he reiterates once again one of his most ardent beliefs, that being alive or dead is far less important than being good or bad[10].

The outcome of the trial was fortuitous: it proceeded from Socrates' sober and deliberate choice, a choice that he now reaffirms, after the sentence has been passed (38e4-5). Leaving the jurors aside for a moment, he sees the whole trial as a kind of contest between himself and his accusers (39b1-4). *He* escaped wickedness and was caught by death, a relatively slow runner; *they* were overtaken by wickedness, a more rapid racer. The death-penalty was passed by fallible men[11]; but the accusers were found guilty of evil

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[9] 38e5-39a4, which unmistakably alludes to 28d6-29a1.

[10] What was there called αἰσχρόν (28c3) or κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν (29b7) here bears the names ἀνελεύθερον (38e3), πονηρία (39a7), κακία (b4), μοχθηρία καὶ ἀδικία (b5-6).

[11] Cf. 40e7-41a2; *Crito* 54b8-c1.

and iniquity by truth itself. The vote of jurors does not guarantee a reliable verdict, only objective ethics are infallible judges of human conduct.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates says, and repeats emphatically, to Callicles[12], that an honest man, when confronted with unscrupulous adversaries, will necessarily be condemned to death. The defeat of a man of conscience is unavoidable in a society that does not care about morality but only about power and success. Here (39b7-8), Socrates expresses the same idea when he says: 'Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well'.

b) A Look into the Future

Near the end of the paragraph which I just examined, truth passes judgment on Socrates and his adversaries: he is acquitted, they are condemned. In the new paragraph we hear Socrates predicting how his adversaries will be punished. Until this moment, Socrates has scarcely spoken about the future. In the Digression, he asserted that he would never give up his elenctic and protreptic activity and his search for the truth (29d2-30a4. 30b7-c1), and in the Second Speech, he considered what a life outside Athens — that is, without the liberty to continue his examinations — would mean for him (37d4-e2). As regards other people's futures, one recalls the passage in which Socrates warns the jurors not to err in their treatment of the gift that God gave them in Socrates: if in their rashness they were to sentence him to death, they would spend their whole life asleep, unless God in his care for them sent them someone else to replace him (30d5-31a7). Of course, this hypothetical successor of Socrates would have to continue his mission and to apply the same method as he did.

What Socrates has to say in the Third Speech about the punishment that awaits the iniquitous jurors is twofold. On the one hand, he explains what it was in his conduct that irritated them so strongly that they sentenced him to death to get rid of him; on the other, he predicts that they will not attain their objective, since others, more numerous and more ruthless than he, will take over his task, so that the jurors' plight will be worse than in the past. In order to clarify these points he again uses several ideas and phrases which are already familiar to us from the many descriptions of Socrates' activity throughout the *Apology*.

Socrates' adversaries among the jurors had hoped that, by inflicting a death-sentence upon him, they would be free at last from the necessity of accounting for their lives (39c6-7 οἰόμενοι ... ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου). But they will soon find that what they achieved is something quite different, since from now on 'those who call (them) to account will be more numerous' (c8-d1 πλείους ἔσονται ... οἱ ἐλέγχοντες). These words remind us of the Narration, where we saw Socrates testing

[12] 508c4-e6. 521b4-d3. 522c7-d3. 526e4-527a4. In the beginning of his intervention Callicles already warned Socrates against this menace (486a7-b4).

everyone who enjoyed the reputation of being a clever man, but still more of the Digression. There, Socrates converses with an Athenian and asks him whether he is not ashamed to care about money, of which he always wants more, and for reputation and honour, whereas he neither cares nor worries about insight, truth and the best state of his soul. Socrates' next words I quote literally:

> If any of you disputes this and asserts that he actually does care, I shall not let him go at once or go away, but I shall question him, examine him, force him to answer' (29e3-5 καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσηι καὶ φῆι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω); and if I find that he does not possess virtue although he says that he does, I shall reproach him for attaching the slightest value to what is most precious and much more to what is worth less (29e5-30a2 καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῆι κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τά πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος).

In the last sentence, we find another verb that is typical for Socrates' attitude towards the people he examines, 'to reproach' (ὀνειδίζω)[13]; it recurs in the Third Speech, where Socrates says: 'If you imagine that by putting people to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you that you don't live in the right way, you are mistaken' (39d3-5 εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς διανοεῖσθε).

The long passage from the Digression explains clearly what is meant by the ἔλεγχος τοῦ βίου to which the more numerous successors of Socrates will submit the jurors (and, we may surmise, other Athenian citizens and even foreigners). ἔλεγχος is a methodical questioning that elicits answers revealing whether or not the examined person appreciates things according to the true scale of values and makes his choices accordingly. If he does not, he will have to be rebuked. That is precisely what Socrates' adversaries hoped to get rid of by eliminating him, since they bitterly resented his 'meddling with other people's private affairs' (31c4-5 ὅτι ... ἰδίαι ... πολυπραγμονῶ)[14]. However, the opposite will happen, and that is quite as it should be: 'That manner of escaping (criticism) is neither effective nor fair, but the following one is both the fairest and the easiest: not to try to hinder others but to work on oneself in order to reach the greatest possible perfection' (39d5-8).

Here again we find ideas well known to us from other parts of the *Apology*. The Narration depicted how the self-conceited man, when revealed by Socrates for what he was, got angry with him, and how this eventually led to the trial (and the death-penalty). From the Socratic point of view,

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[13] Cf. 30e7-31a1 ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον; 41e6-7 ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς (Socrates' sons) ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ.

[14] To give up that meddling would be ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν (36b6. 37e3. 38a1; see Chapter VIII n.2; note on 36b6).

when somebody shows me that I am ignorant or do not act correctly, I should not be angry with him but with myself and should do all I can in order to improve my knowledge and my conduct. But the Athenians do not do so; 'those who are put to the test (by Socrates' young friends) get angry with me instead of with themselves' (23c8 οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὑτοῖς)[15]. The right way for each person to react, as Socrates says here, is to work on himself and to 'take care that one becomes as virtuous as possible' (39d7-8 ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος). These last words are repeatedly used by Socrates when he describes the efforts that a person should make in order to reach the ideal of man[16].

I think this may suffice to show that, according to this passage, Socrates' successors are expected to do exactly what he himself did, viz. to examine others in private conversations, to set out to them the Socratic standards of value and to reproach them when they do not care about the right things and do not live as they should. It is not surprising that these young men will carry on his mission, since we know from the Narration that they not only delighted in attending Socrates' cross-examinations, but also, to quote Socrates' own words, 'they often imitate me and so attempt to examine others' (23c4-5). To be sure, in this passage Socrates remarks that he restrained them, although the jurors were not aware of it (39d1-2); this, however, does not necessarily contradict what was said in the First Speech: it may mean simply that Socrates prevented them from exceeding the limits which their youth and lack of experience laid upon them.

If I have established my point, we are confronted with a really difficult question: did Plato, in publishing the *Apology*, mean that Socrates' prophecy had found at least a beginning of its fulfillment and, if so, in what did it consist? Burnet (note on 39c8) writes that what Socrates is represented as predicting is 'the programme of the *viri Socratici*. Plato tried to carry it out by making the voice of Socrates live after his death'. The first half of this statement could be challenged, since there is no evidence that Socrates' companions thought that it was their duty to continue the activity of their master by taking people to task about their conduct as they met them in the street. Diogenes Laertius (iii 6; cf. ii 106), on the authority of Hermodorus, a well-informed member of Plato's Academy, reports that Plato 'at the age of 28 years[17] took refuge in Megara to Euclides with some other Socratics' (εἶτα γενόμενος ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν, καθά φησιν Ἑρμόδωρος, εἰς Μέγαρα πρὸς Εὐκλείδην σὺν καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ Σωκρατικοῖς ὑπεχώρησεν). If we accept this information, as nearly all scholars do, we have to assume

[15] See the note *in loc.* on the Socratic theme of anger towards oneself.

[16] 29e1-2 τῆς ψυχῆς (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται; 30b1-2 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται; 36c6-7 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο; see Chapter X 187.

[17] That is, in 399, immediately after Socrates' execution.

that, after Socrates' execution, a number of those who had belonged to his circle felt insecure at Athens and left the city for the neighbouring Megara, obviously waiting until the storm blew over. Normally, one would expect that, when they came back after several months, or perhaps two of three years, of voluntary exile, they would, at least for some time, have refrained from any collective high-profile activity that might arouse bad feelings in Athens. Therefore it is surprising to read in the *Apology* that, according to Socrates, 'your [the jurors'] punishment will follow *immediately* after my death' (39c4-5).

Moreover, we cannot easily imagine a man like Plato buttonholing people in the streets; for all we know, he did not have a total disregard of social conventions, as Socrates did. It would be easier to believe that Antisthenes[18], who delighted in being provocative, may in his ἐπιδείξεις have reproached the Athenians vehemently for their laziness, their love of money and pleasure and their naive admiration for Gorgianic rhetoric and Athenian demagogues. But such an ἐπίδειξις, a forerunner of the later Cynic diatribe, is not a private conversation and, although the criticisms of the prevailing judgments of value and ways of life that it may express might cause offence, it was not directed towards individuals. Moreover, Antisthenes, born ca. 455-450, could not be called a young man in 399 B.C., nor is it very probable that Plato would have singled him out as the only one who really carried on Socrates' activity — there was little love lost between the two Socratics, even though Antisthenes' anti-Platonic polemic seems to belong to a later period. Above all, what I have said about Antisthenes are just possibilities, not certainties.

Could we, then, accept the second part of Burnet's explanation and consider the Platonic dialogues and, although Burnet does not explicitly say so, the rest of Socratic literature, as the continuation of Socrates' life-long cross-examinations? From the view-point of the authors of these dialogues, this may certainly be correct, but published dialogues would not arouse among the jurors and the rest of the Athenian public the feelings of bitter irritation that they felt against Socrates' personal and oral discussions. What made these conversations, to use his own words, 'so irksome and odious that you are now seeking to be rid of them' (37d1-2; cf. 21d1. e1-2. e3-4. 23a1-2. c7-24b1), was precisely the fact that Socrates meddled with their own way of life and reproached them because they did not live the right way.

In Plato's dialogues, Socrates does not address *living* individuals who could feel that their privacy was threatened. Socrates' criticism of his interlocutors' opinions in the dialogues will not be interpreted by the jurors or the average Athenian citizens, if they read these works at all, as attacks on their own conduct. First, they are directed against people of a bygone

[18] On him, see the accurate and well-balanced discussion in Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* iii 304-311.

generation, many of whom were foreigners[19]; second, the debates in the dialogues are generally conducted on a higher philosophical level than would have been the case with the conversations that Socrates carried on with the man in the street; finally, in most dialogues the debates do not result in open enmity between Socrates and his partners — true, this does happen with Thrasymachus, Polus and Callicles, but not with Ion, Hippias, Euthyphro, Nicias and Laches and even less with Charmides, Lysis and Menexenus.

What could be taken as criticism was the last part of the *Gorgias*[20]: the ruthless and not quite fair criticism to which Socrates submits the great Athenian statesmen of the past would have been felt by all Athenian democrats as insulting to the deceased, and to themselves as well. But naturally, the Athenian public at large was not really touched by the Socratic literature and they could escape its criticism of their value system and their way of life by simply leaving it unread. The problem is that some of Socrates' assertions in the Third Speech are very sharp, especially when he says that immediately after his death a punishment will come upon the jurors, much more severe than that which they inflicted upon him (39c4-6). Are we to assume that the publication of, say, the *Charmides* or even of *Republic* i (if it ever was published separately) would be something 'much worse' for the jurors than death itself?

So I can find no satisfactory answer to the question I asked above. Perhaps Plato let himself be carried away by his own inspiration so that he was not fully aware of the implications of what Socrates says in 39c1-d9. The end of the *Gorgias* and of the *Apology*, in which Socrates' attitude towards the unconditional exigencies of the Good and his unrelenting questioning of set ideas play such an important role, may have seemed to Plato an adequate continuation of Socrates' life-task; and Socratic writings by other authors, though in many respects different from his, may have strengthened the impact his own works had. But if so, Plato did not take full account of the very specific terms of the prophecy that he attributes to Socrates with regard to the resentment that his followers would arouse in the jurors and in the whole Athenian civic community[21].

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[19] Restricting myself to those works that *could* have been published before the *Apology*, I mention Ion, Hippias, Protagoras, Thrasymachus, Gorgias, Polus, Meno, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.

[20] 503c1-d6. 515c4-516b4. 516d5-517a6. Cf. Chapter VI n.48.

[21] I have not found that the writings of other scholars on the problem of the fulfillment of Socrates' prophecy add anything of importance to what is said above; I wish only to refer to R. Hackforth *Composition* 141-143; Meyer 171-172; Erbse 'Enstehungszeit' 355-356.

c) The Tone of the Passage

Of the whole *Apology* this section is by far the sharpest in tone. To start with, this appears in the form: Socrates emphasises the fact that he has various things to *say* to those responsible for the death-sentence (λέγω 38c7. d2; φημί 39c3; ὡς ἐγώ φημι 38e1. 39c8); the orthotonic pronoun ἐγώ is found eleven times (38d1. e1 *bis*. 6. 39b1. 4. 6. c4. 6. 8. d1); the formulas with which Socrates addresses the first group of jurors have something trenchant, inasmuch as they only consider them as responsible for his condemnation and death, without paying any attention to their human qualities (38d1-2. 39c1-2. 4. d8-9).

But the harshness is more bitterly felt in the content of Socrates' words: he points to his adversaries' errors of judgment (38c1-3. 5-7. d3-6. 39a6-b1. c6-8. d3-8) and insists upon the fact that these were not merely oversights but resulted from their reliance on an incorrect value system; the correct understanding of values is then developed into a declaration of principle about what is right and wrong in the area of litigation (38d6-e2. e5-39b1. 39d3-8); Socrates refers to his own attitude to illustrate the theoretical rule (38d3-e2. e5-39b1). By doing so, Socrates himself assumes the functions of a judge, whose task it is to discriminate correct moral behaviour from immorality; and since nobody will have an opportunity to answer him, his verdict is final. But Socrates does more than reproach them for living by false standards of value. He asserts harshly that conduct dictated by false standards is always despicable, but above all when people vested with authority try to force their false judgments on those who are dependent upon them (38d3-e2). However, these iniquitous jurors will not be allowed to persist in their wrongful ways: a punishment, not exacted but announced by Socrates will make their lives unbearable (39c3-d3).

Still more severe is Socrates' short statement about his accusers (39b1-6). Although Socrates, a slow old man, has been caught by the slower runner death, they, clever and quick as they are, have been overtaken by a faster racer, wickedness. Socrates was condemned by the jurors in a trial that was no more than a historical accident[22], they, on the contrary, have been branded for all time by truth itself with the stigma of evil and injustice (b4-6). It is not surprising that Socrates, when he passes judgment on the accusers and the jurors, uses a sterner language than in the first two Speeches, but the degree of difference is greater than we might expect. Until now, he has always treated the accusers with a somewhat superior, though not heavily ironic tone: in their actions they depended wholly on the old slander-campaign (18a7-b1. 19a8-b2. 21b1-2. 22e6-23a3. e3-24a1. a6-b2);

[22] This is implied in the opposition (b5) between the aorist participle ὀφλών, which points to something that has reached its termination, and the perfect participle ὠφληκότες which denotes a permanent situation. — Cf. *Epist.* vii 325a5-7 κατὰ δέ τινα <u>τύχην</u> αὖ τὸν ἑταῖρον ἡμῶν Σωκράτη τοῦτον δυναστεύοντές τινες εἰσάγουσιν εἰς δικαστήριον.

they had no true personal responsibility and acted upon motives prompted by their environment; therefore Socrates could take them lightly, as he most clearly does in the Ἐρώτησις, but also in other passages (23e3-24c1. 36a5-b2). Certainly he did not treat them as evil men[23]. In the Third Speech, however, he does so emphatically and, in so doing, appeals to the supreme authority of truth. This is the more surprising since the context does not require a mention of the accusers. It looks as if Socrates has changed his mind now that he has been sentenced to death.

The very last words to his accusers and the jurors who had voted for the death-penalty are, I feel, especially curt. After speaking about their guilt and their impending punishment and, by contrast, about his own ideas about how to escape criticism, Socrates breaks off with the words: 'So with this prophecy to you who condemned me I take my leave' (39d8-9). This can only mean that Socrates will have nothing more to do with those men. Yet at the end of Socrates' words to the jurors who voted for acquittal, he returns to his accusers and the jurors who condemned him. He is now 'not very angry' at them (41d7) and assesses their deed much less severely than in the first half of the Third Speech, merely saying that they 'deserve blame' (41e1) for what they did[24]. But he even makes a request of them (41e2 δέομαι), viz. to take care of his three young sons for whom he will not be able to do anything more. What they[25] are asked to do for the boys is exactly what Socrates did for his fellow-citizens and what that group of jurors desperately tried to get rid of (39c7-8). Still more significant are the words 'I shall have received a just treatment from you' (42a1). Are these the words of the man who sternly declared that his accusers 'were branded by truth with the stigma of wickedness and injustice' (39b5-6)? Those jurors who let themselves be persuaded by the accusers had voted for a death-sentence that was wicked and unjust. The difference is too radical to be simply smoothed over.

This is why I dare to risk a conjecture: when Plato wrote 39e1-42a5, he had not yet planned 38c1-39d9. Originally, he thought only of representing Socrates as having a casual conversation with a group of those who voted for acquittal. Socrates' words and tone are calm and composed; the religious atmosphere that dominates 41c8-42a5 induces him to take a forgiving and lenient attitude towards his adversaries. He does not condemn them. He is even prepared to forgive and forget everything, on the condition that they take care of his young sons. This is so important in his eyes that all other considerations can be let go and Socrates can even say that he has been

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[23] At 24c5 ἀδικεῖν ... Μέλητον does not mean 'Meletus is guilty' or 'unjust', but 'Meletus breaks the rules' (of the game); see the note *in loc.*

[24] Although they deserve blame for a truly wicked deed: they thought they were harming Socrates (41d8).

[25] Probably together with the jurors who had voted for acquittal, cf. note on 41e1-2.

treated justly by them; in what they did against him, they did not do him any evil (30c6-d1; cf. 29b7-9. 37b5-7).

As I argued above, 202-203, the historical Socrates actually addressed only the 'good' jurors in a friendly conversation, not in a formal speech, and in accordance with this, Plato originally composed a 'third speech' that comprised only 39e1-42a5. That is the reason why, in its first sentence (39e1-3), Socrates explains how he is able to address those jurors after the session has been closed. If Plato had planned the whole of the Third Speech at the outset, he would have put that explanation at the opening of the Third Speech as we now have it. However, after he had written the present second part, he felt, — or, more probably, some of the other companions of Socrates felt and persuaded Plato to agree — that it ought to be made quite explicit that the sentence passed on Socrates was iniquitous and that the responsible persons, among whom the accusers could not be omitted, were guilty of judicial murder. And so, I surmise, Plato came to write the pages that are addressed to the jurors who voted for condemnation, without, however, integrating them perfectly with what follows. I do not mean that a text of the *Apology* was ever published that did not comprise 38c1-39d9, but simply that, in a first stage of writing, Plato did not plan an address of Socrates to the 'bad' jurors. The conjecture may seem risky but the difficulties which I pointed out are real enough, although hitherto they have apparently escaped the attention of all commentators.

3. *Socrates Speaks to the Jurors who Voted for Acquittal*

As I argued, the Third Speech originally included only this section. Anyhow, the second part shows a remarkable unity of content and of tone. With regard to content, Socrates' purpose is to interpret for the jurors who acquitted him the significance of the death-sentence. His interpretation is based on several considerations, all of which are in one way or another connected with his total trust in divine Providence. The tone is one of easy familiarity. Socrates appears to be much more relaxed than before; he is no longer expected to argue for his innocence of for a punishment appropriate to his deserts. There is no occasion for argument. Socrates simply holds an informal conversation, we might even say a chat, with the group that supported him.

a) Socrates Calls them 'Friends' and 'Judges

After a couple of opening sentences, Socrates addresses them as his friends (39e5-40a1 ὑμῖν ... ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν)[26]. He does not mean to imply that

[26] Note also the immediate change in tone from 39e1 on. The repeated λέγω and φημί (cf. above, 211) are replaced by ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην. Cf. also the ethic dative μοι in e4, and the informal word διαμυθολογῆσαι in e5. See also the note on 40a5.

their decision to vote for acquittal was determined by old bonds of fellowship regardless of objective justice. Such an attitude would justify the stern words that Socrates directed to the whole jury at the end of the First Speech: 'A judge is not appointed to grant favours in matters of justice (καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια) but to give judgment. And his oath obliges him not to favour those that please him, but to judge according to the law' (35c2-5). We remember that in the *Exordium*, Socrates conspicuously avoided asking for the jury's goodwill (εὔνοια) and favour (χάρις) (see Chapter II 34-35), although this was a regular, in fact an indispensable topic in the opening of a forensic speech. What Socrates means here is not that they acted as his partisans, but that the way in which these jurors voted shows that they were free of the hatred (ἀπέχθεια) and the prejudice (διαβολή) that many people in Athens felt towards him (18d2-e4. 21b1-2. d1. e1-4. 22e6-23a2. 24a1-4. 28a4-6), and that finally led to his condemnation. Since these jurors were not biassed against him beforehand, they were able to appreciate the justice of his argument (18a4-5). With such people Socrates does not feel on the defensive. He can speak quite openly about his faith without any fear of cynical laughter.

Next, Socrates addresses the same group with the formula ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (40a2), which he carefully avoided until now[27], and explains why he uses the phrase in this context: 'For if I give you that name, I am probably using correct language' (40a2-3). We should, however, be careful not to stretch the bearing of these words unduly. To be sure, according to strict Socratic principles, only the man who possesses 'knowledge of what is just and unjust'[28] may be called a judge (see *Rep.* iii 409d6-e1). But if so, no one but a philosopher would deserve that name. There would certainly not be many members of a jury who deserved it, since these were a random sample of the Athenian citizens. It is clear that the 'good' jurors casted their votes according to their lights, not according to knowledge in the full, Platonic sense of the word.

To explain what is implied here[29], we should remember the theory of the difference between 'knowledge' and 'opinion' that is elaborated in several dialogues of Plato, from the *Gorgias* and the *Meno* onward. I argued above (Chapter V 65) that this distinction is implied in Socrates' description of his investigation of the poets, although he omitted there, as he a fortiori does here, the technicalities without which the distinction between these two states of mind cannot be rightly understood. What Socrates aimed at in his defence was not to bring 'knowledge about such important matters as justice

[27] See Burnet's note on 17a1 and Chapter II 35. Brickhouse - Smith 210-212 rightly reject the thesis that this avoidance is in itself offensive to the jury. In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes addresses the jury 42 times as (ἄνδρες) Ἀθηναῖοι and only once, more than halfway into the speech, as ἄνδρες δικασταί (xviii 196).

[28] *Gorg.* 460a6-7 εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα.

[29] Cf. *Theaet.* 201c4-6.

and injustice'[30] to hundreds of people. That could only be achieved by dialectic, that is by protracted discussions in private intercourse[31]. The most Socrates can accomplish in a speech in court is to arouse a 'true opinion'[32] in the minds of unbiased listeners. In practical, though not in theoretical questions, true opinion will be as reliable a guide as knowledge proper, provided, however, that it is really true (*Men.* 97b5-10). But a man who has only an opinion on a given practical problem cannot *know* that it is a right or true opinion, since opinion and knowledge differ essentially: knowledge is always true, never false, whereas an opinion can be either true or false (*Gorg.* 454d5-8). It will become apparent, as the argument progresses, that the views of the 'good' jurors are not those of the philosophers but those of the common man.

b) Three Considerations that Show what the Death-Sentence Means for Socrates

α. The Silence of the Divine Sign

In his Answer to a Second Objection, Socrates had already appealed to his divine sign (31c8-d6) and in relation to that passage I discussed the most important features of the phenomenon (see Chapter VIII § 2a). Here, he treats some issues in more detail. We should note especially that the sign always directed Socrates away from a *specific* course of action (40a4-6; cf. 31d3-4), to use his own words, 'if I were going to do something amiss' (a6 εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν; Burnet's translation, cf. his and our note *in loc.*). In our case, what Socrates actually did was something that would normally have serious consequences. In conducting his defence, he deviated openly on many points from the normal attitude of a litigant, and the trial resulted in a death-sentence. The whole question, however, about which Socrates wishes to converse with his 'friends' is this: should we regard death as a misfortune for him or not? In his answer, Socrates will 'explain to them the meaning of what happened to him' (40a1-2). From his perspective, the fact that voice did not manifest itself at all during the trial is a clear indication that death is not a misfortune for him.

To be sure, Socrates had said this time and again, but as a principle that is valid for everyman (28d6-10. 29a4-b1. b7-9. 30d1-5). Here, the statement is personal: the behaviour of the sign concerns his personal fate, and it

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[30] In *Gorg.* 455a5-7 Socrates states that οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο (viz. the orator) τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγωι χρόνωι διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα, and Gorgias fully agrees (οὐ δῆτα). With ἐν ὀλίγωι χρόνωι, cf. *Apol.* 18e5-19a2. 37a5-b2. Cf. Chapter II 35.

[31] Even dialectic could not guarantee that this result will actually be reached in any individual case, see Chapter VIII 166-170.

[32] In the *Meno* and in most later dialogues the usual term for this is ὀρθὴ δόξα or ἀληθὴς δόξα; in the *Gorgias*, 'opinion' is called πίστις, a term that appears with the same force in *Tim.* 29c3. On the terminology see Dodds' note on *Gorg.* 454b8-455a7, p.206 at the top.

would certainly have warned him if what was about to happen was not 'lucky'[33]. The difference between our passage and the declarations of principle I just referred to is a new proof of the fact that there is no intrinsic connection between the divine sign and the order given to Socrates by the god of Delphi, which, together with rational motives, led Socrates in the choice of his ἐπιτήδευμα[34].

Meanwhile, in this case it is the absence of the divine sign that is significant. It did not warn Socrates, although to other people the situation would have seemed disastrous. Understandably, he seeks an explanation for this. With his customary cautiousness (40b7 κινδυνεύει) he answers that this negative indication actually has the force of a positive one, since the sign regularly manifested itself on quite trivial occasions.

Besides, he points out, although the hint is meant for him personally, it has a more universal meaning. If death is essentially evil it cannot be a blessing for Socrates. Therefore he can add, modestly making common cause with his friends the 'good' jurors, 'we (40b8 ἡμεῖς) cannot be right, all of us who consider death a mishap'[35]. As a group, they admit the popular judgments of value. But the silence of the voice implies that this opinion is erroneous. Socrates has convincing evidence for his own assessment of death, and that is the testimony of his accustomed sign. It confirms one of his most precious beliefs. Plato does not treat the σημεῖον as something that derives its credentials from another source; it has its own full authority. In this passage, the δαιμόνιον is used to support Socrates' belief in divine providence (cf. note on 35d7 and below, § 3bγ).

β. An Eschatological Dilemma

Having given a reason for thinking that death is something good for himself, Socrates goes on to present a line of thought designed to suggest that death is a good thing in general. It is a line of thought, not proof — and Plato stresses this by opening and concluding it with references to good hope: 'Let us consider also in this way how good a reason there is to hope that it [death] is a good thing' ('Εννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, 40c4-5); 'but you too, judges, must have good hope regarding death' ('Αλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρὴ ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, 41c8-9).

[33] 40c3 εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν; cf. Burnet *in loc.*, who translates 'to fare well in some way'. See also our note *in loc.*

[34] Scholars have shown a great ingenuity in connecting these. Burnet is quite right when, speaking of 'the positive command of God' to Socrates, he remarks dryly: 'with [this] the divine sign had nothing to do' (note on 31d6).

[35] Compare with this ἡμεῖς the ἡμᾶς of 35c5, on which see Chapter IX n.29. See also the note on 40b8-c1. From this point onwards, the 'good jurors' are treated as partners in a discursive, if not quite dialectic, process of thought (cf. c4 ἐννοήσωμεν; 41a7 ὑμῶν), of which the conclusion is formulated so as to exhort them (41c8-d2).

This emphasis on hope[36], the subject-matter and the position towards the end of the text link the second part of the Third Speech closely to the eschatological myths that conclude the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. These myths are followed by exhortations to the virtuous life as a means of salvation[37]. There is no explicit exhortation in the Third Speech, but the 'single truth to be kept in mind, that no evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death, and that the gods do not neglect his interests' (41c9-d2)[38] amounts to an exhortation to be a good man — these words may be regarded as 'implicit protreptic'[39].

But despite this parallelism, 40c4-41c6 is not a myth, as it is called by some. It does not explicitly assert a belief in life after death, as the myths do; it tries to keep within the bounds of reason, as the myths do not. The ground for this difference is that the Socrates of *Gorgias, Phaedo* and *Republic* is different from the Socrates of the *Apology*. In these dialogues, Socrates' ignorance is stressed far less than in the *Apology* (and in other dialogues): their Socrates is a man of firm convictions, on afterlife[40] as on other issues. The Socrates who said in the First Speech that 'to fear death is nothing but to think one is wise when one isn't' (29a4-6) cannot avow that he believes in εὐδαιμονία[41] after death without incurring the same reproof. In other words, the literary portrait of Socrates as drawn in the *Apology*, based as it is on Socratic ignorance and irony, prevents Plato from making Socrates more positive on this issue than he has done[42] (I shall try to demonstrate below that a firm conviction can be read between the lines).

This is a simple consideration, yet I believe that it is strong enough to outweigh evolutionist arguments, wide-spread though they may be. Those who say that Socrates is 'agnostic' about afterlife in the *Apology* because Plato himself was agnostic at the time he wrote it (whereas he had converted

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[36] Cf. *Phaed.* 114c8 (in the conclusion of the eschatological myth) καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη. Similarly, θαρρῶ *Phaed.* 114d8. 115e7; *Gorg.* 527c8 (concluding myths); *Euthyd.* 307c3 (concluding exhortation).

[37] Cf. Gaiser *Protreptik und Paränese* 187-196 (and 189 n.34 for the parallelism with *Apol.* 40c4-41c7). As De Strycker remarks in his review of this book (*Gnomon* 34 (1962) 13-21) 'la fonction paradigmatique de l'attitude de Socrate n'y concerne plus la dialectique comme recherche du vrai, mais la vie morale concrète comme conséquence nécessaire de raisonnements valables' (19). In my *Comm. Clit.* 82f., I classified the passages from *Gorg.* and *Phaed.* as 'protreptic situations' — the same should go for *Rep.* 621b8-d3 (but not *Apol.* 41c8-d2). See also Thesleff *Styles of Plato* 168.

[38] As Burnet notes (*in loc.*), there is a close parallel to these words in *Rep.* 613a4-b1, that is, in the passage immediately preceding the eschatological myth of that dialogue. Cf. below, 234-235.

[39] Cf. my *Comm. Clit.* 70-73.

[40] See for example *Phaed.* 63c2-4 ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.

[41] See Chapter V n.55 for the inadequacy of 'happiness' as a translation of εὐδαιμονία.

[42] Cf. H. Erbse 'Entstehungszeit' 342-343.

to a belief in afterlife by the time he wrote the *Gorgias*)[43] are guilty of neglecting the literary nature of both works. It is bad method and naive philology to argue that what is said in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias* reflects Plato's convictions at the time he wrote these two texts.

Regarding Socrates' two alternative views of the afterlife, annihilation and migration, several questions arise. To what extent do they represent the popular belief or beliefs of the late fifth and early fourth centuries? Does the dilemma exhaust the opinions current in those days? Is it a popular dilemma or Plato's own invention? And finally: are there any indications within the *Apology* (and subsidiarily in other Platonic texts) as to which of the two corresponds with Socrates' own opinion?

It is sometimes debated[44] which of the two alternatives is the Homeric view. Even if it were legitimate to speak of *the* Homeric view of death, which I strongly doubt, this seems to me an irrelevant question. A society's view of death depends strongly on how it views man, and the Homeric concept of man differs *toto caelo* from the one that lies at the bottom of Socrates' dilemma.

In Homer, man is a corporeal entity endowed with at least two different 'souls', the body soul or souls (θυμός, νόος, μένος), active when a person is awake, and the free soul (ψυχή), active only when the person loses consciousness or dies. But man himself is his body, as can be seen for example from the prologue of the *Iliad*: Achilles' wrath sent the souls (ψυχάς) of the heroes to Hades, but they themselves (αὐτούς) were made the prey of dogs and birds[45]. After Homer, faculties of the body soul (emotions, thought) were gradually ascribed to the ψυχή until it became

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[43] I take at random one statement from a good scholar, E.R. Dodds *Comm. Gorg.* 21: 'the Socrates who presents his myth as λόγος ([*Gorg.*] 523a) is not the agnostic of *Apol.* 29b and 40c'. — Similarly, those who take the *Apol.* as a historical document should pause to wonder whether it was at all possible for Socrates to express a firm conviction that his soul would survive after his death.

[44] So recently K. Alt 'Diesseits und Jenseits' 284-285, who sees no Homeric elements in the sleep alternative and some in the afterlife alternative (this is not far off the mark, cf. below 226-227). Cf. E. Ehnmark 'Socrates and the immortality of the soul' *Eranos* 44 (1946) 105-122, esp. 116-117.

[45] A 3-5; cf. Ψ 65-66 ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος ... πάντ' αὐτῶι ... εἰκυῖα; Ψ 107; similarly θυμός : αὐτός Δ 470; cf. also Theogn. 567-569 δηρὸν γὰρ ἔνερθεν γῆς ὀλέσας ψυχὴν ('life') κείσομαι (my body) ὥστε λίθος ἄφθογγος. The concepts of body soul and free soul were developed through comparison of Vedic, Medieval Scandinavian and Greek texts by the Swedish scholar E. Arbman; similar results were reached for Homer independently by B. Snell. See J. Bremmer *The early Greek concept of the soul* (Princeton 1983) 8-10 and *passim*. — Of course we shouldn't look for consistency in Homer: Achilles conceives of himself as having consciousness even in the underworld (X 389-390); the spirits of the dead converse with each other in ω and (even without drinking sacrificial blood) with Odysseus in the second half of λ.

normal to speak of man as a being consisting of a body and a ψυχή[46]. The ψυχή had become man's self.

Only after this stage has been reached will it become possible to set up the dilemma: 'is death the absence of consciousness or a migration of the ψυχή?' For Homer it is both. But once the ψυχή becomes the seat of human consciousness, reason, will and emotions, it is logical to ask what happens to it when the human body dies.

One possible answer is that the soul dies with the body. Death is 'the never-ending sleep' (τὸν αἰεὶ ... ἀτέλευτον ὕπνον) in Aeschylus[47] (cf. *Apol.* 40d1 οἶον ὕπνος); 'after death man is earth and shadow: nothing goes to nothing' according to Euripides[48] (cf. 40c6 οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι). Hence it is denied quite often that the dead are aware of anything[49] (cf. *ibid.* μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν). Buth if death is like sleep, it is rare that people value it as positively as Socrates does. Death normally means the absence of grief and toil: 'No grief touches the dead' (θανόντων δ' οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἅπτεται)[50]; Hades is 'a haven from sorrows' (λιμὴν 'Αίδας ἀνιᾶν)[51]. But at the same time, Hades is also the place 'where enjoyment is held to be of no account' (ὅπου τὸ χαίρειν μηδαμοῦ νομίζεται[52]).

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[46] Cf. n.56. — This concept leads easily to the definition of death as a 'separation of body and mind', already before Plato made this definition famous (*Gorg.* 524b2-4; *Phaed.* 64c4-5. 67d4; etc.): Eur. *Suppl.* 531-534 ἐάσατ' ἤδη γῇι καλυφθῆναι νεκρούς, ὅθεν δ' ἕκαστον ἐς τὸ φῶς ἀφίκετο ἐνταῦθ' ἀπελθεῖν, πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, τὸ σῶμα δ' ἐς γῆν; fr. 532. 839,9-14. 971 N².; *CEG* 10,6. 535. 545. Burnet's thesis that ψυχή as the psychological personality was a creation of Socrates (*The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul* London 1916, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 7) has been refuted by F. Solmsen, 'Plato and the Concept of the Soul (*Psyche*): Some Historical Perspectives' *JHI* 44 (1983) 355-367.

[47] *Agam.* 1450-1451; cf. κοιμήσατο χάλκεον ὕπνον Λ 241; Ξ 482. Throughout the next pages I am heavily indebted to E. Rohde *Psyche.* Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglauben der Griechen (Tübingen 1907⁴), notably his splendid chapter 'Die Laien' (ii 198-262). I am of course well aware (as Rohde was) of the problems inherent in reconstructing popular beliefs on the basis of dramatic texts where any utterance has first and foremost a dramatic function — also it goes without saying that I do not claim that the beliefs sketched here were at any time held by any of the three Attic tragedians. Recent treatments of the topic include A.W.H. Adkins *From the Many to the One* (London 1970) 62-74; D.B. Claus *Toward the Soul.* An Inquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή before Plato (New Haven - London 1981) 59-91. A synoptic overview of the literary and archeological material can be found in R. Garland *The Greek way of death* (Ithaca 1985) 48-76. 149-160.

[48] Fr. 532 N². Cf. *Alc.* 392-395 quoted below; *Tro.* 633. 636; *Hel.* 1421; *Iph. Aul.* 1251; Soph. *El.* 245.

[49] Aesch. fr. 266, 1-2 Radt καὶ τοὺς θανόντας εἰ θέλεις εὐεργετεῖν εἴτ' οὖν κακουργεῖν, ἀμφιδεξίως ἔχει; Eur. fr. 176, 3-5 N²; *Alc.* 726; *Tro.* 1248-1250; Aeschin. i 14.

[50] Soph. *O.C.* 955; cf. Aesch. fr. 255,3 Radt; Eur. *Alc.* 937; *Tro.* 638 (for the correct interpretation, cf. K.H. Lee *in loc.*); Soph. *Trach.* 1137; *El.* 1170; Dem. lx 33.

[51] *Trag. Adesp.* 369 Kannicht-Snell. Compare death as healer, Aesch. fr. 132c6. 255 Radt; Soph. fr. 698 Radt (and Pearson *in loc.*); Eur. *Tro.* 638.

[52] Aesch. *Eum.* 423 with Groeneboom's note *in loc.*; Eur. *Or.* 1084; hypothetically Soph. *El.* 356 εἴ τίς ἐστ' ἐκεῖ χάρις.

It is inevitable, when studying the prehistory of Socrates' first alternative, to make use of passages, especially from the tragedians, where the underworld is mentioned. In fact, the old conception of the free soul migrating to the nether world is quite frequently combined with the newer notion that the ψυχή ceases to exist. An interesting example can be found in Euripides' *Alcestis* (392-395): when Alcestis dies, the leader of the chorus says: 'She has gone, she is no more, Admetus' wife' (βέβηκεν, οὐκέτ' ἔστιν Ἀδμήτου γυνή). The two predicates are repeated and transformed in the monody of Alcestis' son: 'My mother has gone *down*, she is no more *under the sun*' (μαῖα δὴ κάτω βέβακεν, οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ... ὑφ' ἀλίωι).

But once the ψυχή is identified with the ego, a belief in the underworld does not necessarily entail a belief in loss of consciousness for the ψυχή. This can be observed in passages like the one from *Oedipus Tyrannus* where Oedipus justifies his blinding himself with the words: 'For with what eyes could I have looked upon my father when I had gone to Hades, or upon my unhappy mother, were I still able to see?' (ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὄμμασιν ποίοις βλέπων πατέρα ποτ' ἂν προσεῖδον εἰς Ἅιδου μολών, οὐδ' αὖ τάλαιναν μητέρ'[53]). There is Homeric precedent for this belief in the *Second Nekyia*. Nor are references to the nether world always to be taken literally: quite often one finds expressions like ἐν Ἅιδου κεῖσθαι which must be interpreted as 'to lie in one's grave'[54]. And then it is a small step to the belief that the souls of the dead are around us and aware of our words and actions, although in fact this step is rarely taken. Orestes addresses the soul of Agamemnon: 'Have you heard (my prayer) you who have suffered so terribly by my mother's hand?' Electra's husband is positive: 'Your father hears all this, I know it', and so is Electra (ἤκουσας ὦ δείν' ἐξ ἐμῆς μητρὸς παθών; — πάντ', οἶδ', ἀκούει τάδε πατὴρ ... — πάντ', οἶδα[55]).

[53] 1371-1373. Cf. Aesch. *Agam.* 1555-1560; Soph. *Ant.* 897-899; Eur. *Alc.* 363-364. I doubt if Dover *Greek popular morality* 246 is right in comparing *Trach.* 1201-1202; cf. Jebb *in loc.* See also Hyper. vi 35-39.

[54] Already in Archil. fr. 24,17 West ἐν ζόφωι δὲ κείμενος for which I refer to my note in J.M. Bremer - A.M. van Erp Taalman Kip - S.R. Slings *Some recently found Greek poems* (Leiden 1987) 21; cf. Soph. *El.* 464 ἐν Ἅιδου κειμένωι — referring to Agamemnon, who is supposed to be aware of the gifts given to him (442-443) and to be able to come and help Electra and Chrysothemis (453-454); *O.T.* 972; *Phil.* 861; Eur. *Hec.* 418; *El.* 123-124.

[55] Eur. *El.* 682-684-693 in the order of Diggle's text. This is of course a special case, where we must also take into account the much older belief that the souls of those who have been murdered or not buried properly turn into avenging spirits (so also Aesch. *Cho.* 456-460; Soph. *El.* as quoted in the previous note); this belief is also alluded to (ironically) in the passage from Pl. *Hipp. mai.* quoted below. But the belief could be systematised and rationalised, cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1013-1016 where the idea of τίσις is explained by the concept of the soul's dispersal into the ether (cf. Miss Dale *in loc.*). Awareness of the souls without the notion of revenge: Isaeus ix 4, where a sick man is brought to his stepson's grave because the stepson had liked the sick man; Xen. *Cyr.* viii 7, 17-22 where Cyrus asks his sons to live in harmony for his sake, because he will notice their actions after his death (cf. below, 224-225). There is, however, no general belief in classical Athens that the souls of all the dead are around us. Dover *Greek popular morality* 243-245 is too positive when he says that there is a 'strong tendency to speak *as if*

It is rather amusing to see even an 'enlightened' sophist like Hippias subscribe to this belief: he admits that his generation of sophists have made far greater accomplishments than previous ones (*Hipp. mai.* 281e9-282a4; cf. 281c4-6), but he is in the habit of praising the latter more than the sophists of his day and age (282a6 προτέρους τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγκωμιάζειν ἢ τοὺς νῦν) 'for fear of their wrath' (a7-8 φοβούμενος ... μῆνιν τῶν τετελευτηκότων).

An entirely different concept of afterlife is found in the various Bacchic and Orphic mystery cults and (especially important, one supposes, for Socrates' audience) the rites of Eleusis. The most prominent feature of these cults is the distinction between two groups, the initiated and the others. The first group will be happy after death, the second miserable. This belief is often connected with atoning for 'unjust deeds' and propitiating Persephone, as in Hades' prophecy in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* (367-368): 'those who have done unjust things will be punished forever, unless they appease your feelings with sacrifices' (τῶν δ' ἀδικησάντων τίσις ἔσσεται ἤματα πάντα, οἵ κεν μὴ θυσίῃσι τεὸν μένος ἱλάσκωνται[56]); similar statements are found on one of the Thurii gold leaves[57] and in Pindar[58].

It is not quite clear what was originally understood by penalty for ἀδικήματα, but in Pindar 'the crimes committed in this realm of Zeus are judged under the earth'[59] and Plato ascribes to people who 'produce a hubbub of books by Musaeus and Orpheus' the idea that one can be 'freed and purified from unjust deeds by rituals' that 'protect us from the miseries in the afterlife', whereas 'terrible things lie in store for those who have not performed these rites' *Rep.* ii 364e3-365a3. The notion of a special punishment after death for particular sets of wrongdoers, a notion as old as the *Iliad* (cf. Γ 278-279. Τ 259-260), thus develops into a belief in a general retribution for all unjust or evil deeds. This belief was certainly not restricted to adherents of mysteries, although one gathers from Cephalus'

[D.'s italics] relations between the living and the dead were not unlike relations among the living themselves'.

[56] For the problem of the exact nature of the ἀδικήματα, cf. Richardson *in loc.* — It is clear that this text (7th century) predates the unified concept of ψυχή. If I am not mistaken, ψυχή is not used for the self before Hipponax fr. 39,1 West, 48,1 Degani; there are some undatable occurrences in 'Theognis' (530; 910); Anacr. 360,4 *PGM* the meaning 'life' is not excluded and it is, I think, certain in Tyrt. fr. 11,5 West. Even if the traditional nature of lyric diction is taken into consideration, it is impossible to maintain (cf. e.g. M. Baltes 'Die Todesproblematik in der griechischen Philosophie' *Gymnasium* 95 (1988) 97-128, esp. 105) that the mysteries reflect the new concept of the ψυχή. Pythagoras was probably the first to adopt this concept.

[57] A3,4-6 ποινὰν δ' ἀνταπέτεισ' ἔργων ἕνεκ' οὔτι δικαιῶν ... νῦν δ' ἱκέτης ἥκω παρ' ἁγνὴν Φερσεφόνειαν. Text given according to G. Zuntz *Persephone* (Oxford 1971) 305.

[58] Fr. 133,1-2 Snell-Maehler οἷσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεται; cf. *Ol.* ii 57-58.

[59] *Ol.* ii 58-59 τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις. See H. Lloyd-Jones 'Pindar and the after-life' *Pindare, Entretiens Hardt* 31 (1984) 245-283 with a judicious bibliography.

conversation with Socrates in the first book of the *Republic* that it was normal not to take this belief very seriously[60]. In some but certainly not all mystery cults, the belief in a judgment of the souls was combined with a belief in the transmigration of souls.

If the unjust and the impious are punished in the afterlife, it seems logical to assume that the just and the pious are rewarded (regardless of initiation). But one does not find this conviction very firmly enunciated except in texts that are clearly meant to console the living, for example in Demosthenes' *Epitaphios* and in epitaphs[61]. This suggests that very few Greeks, apart from the initiated, were as 'full of good hope' about the afterlife as Socrates exhorts his judges to be.

It is now time to turn from the various popular beliefs to the Presocratic philosophers. Let me start by saying that we know very little about Presocratic theories of what happens to man after death, and what little data we have have led to distressingly conflicting interpretations. Nor should we expect every single Presocratic philosopher to have had views on the subject. The following synthesis is therefore offered without a great deal of confidence.

Whereas it is not clear whether Greek popular belief ever identified ψυχή with breath (and thereby with life)[62], it is reasonably certain that for various philosophers (Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, the atomists), ψυχή is a breath soul[63]. It is a fair inference that for most of these thinkers death meant a dispersal of the soul (in the case of Heraclitus: changing into water), but what this dispersal entailed is not clear: presumably total disappearance, the more so since it is by no means certain that this breath soul is identical to the human self, an identification which modern scholars normally take for granted[64].

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[60] *Rep.* i 330d7-e2 οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν; *Gorg.* 527a5-6 τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. The λεγόμενοι μῦθοι of *Rep. l.c.* may be Bacchic or Orphic or Eleusinian in origin, but we may deduce from this passage that they were sometimes believed by people who did not believe the promises of these mystery cults. The earliest attestation of a belief in general retribution outside specific religious groups is Aesch. *Suppl.* 230-231 κἀκεῖ δικάζει τἀμπλακήμαθ' ὡς λόγος Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦσιν ὑστάτας δίκας (Pind. *Ol.* ii was probably written for an adherent of 'Orphism' and should not be used as evidence for popular belief). Note the reservation apparent in ὡς λόγος, with which cf. οἱ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι in Pl. *Rep. l.c.* See further Dover *Greek popular morality* 261-268.

[61] Dem. lx 34 οὓς παρέδρους εἰκότως ἄν τις φήσαι τοῖς κάτω θεοῖς εἶναι, τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἔχοντας τοῖς προτέροις ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν μακάρων νήσοις; *AP* xvi 31 ('Speusippus'). Hypothetically Eur. *Alc.* 744-746; *CEG* 559.

[62] A case for ψυχή as 'breath soul' has been made by J. Bremmer o.c. (n.45), 21-24, but cf. M.L. West's critical comments in his review of Bremmer's book *CR* 35 (1985) 56-58.

[63] I may refer to J. Barnes *The Presocratic philosophers* London 1979, 472-477.

[64] Only for Diogenes of Apollonia can it be argued at all plausibly that the breath soul, identical to the ego, retains consciousness after death (cf. esp. 64A19, 42 D.-K. ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ); cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1014-1016 (see also n.55). But the

The statement ascribed to Anaxagoras, that 'we can learn about death in two ways: by the period before we were born and by sleep' (Ἀναξαγόρας δύο ἔλεγε διδασκαλίας εἶναι θανάτου, τόν τε πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι χρόνον καὶ τὸν ὕπνον, 59A34 D.-K.) deserves closer attention here. This statement seems to mean that death is a complete loss of consciousness, as a result of dispersal. Sleep as a paradigm (διδασκαλία) for death is most probably related to the statements about death being a never-ending sleep (the *Iliad* and Aeschylus quoted above, 219; the *Apology*), whereas 'not being born' (ὅμοιον τῶι μὴ γενέσθαι) is used by Hyperides (vi 43) for absence of αἴσθησις in a passage to be discussed below, 225-226. If my interpretation of Anaxagoras' statement is correct, one of his two διδασκαλίαι is taken from popular views, and there is a very good chance that the other is as well: as we will see, there are good grounds for assuming that Hyperides was influenced by the *Apology* — if so, the comparison of death as unconsciousness to the pre-natal state, which is not in the *Apology*, must have been taken from popular beliefs[65] (the influence of Anaxagoras on the latter or on Hyperides cannot be excluded but is definitely unlikely).

Pythagoras' theory of metempsychosis certainly presupposes the identity of the ψυχή with the self. But apart from that, we know nothing about his views: there is no evidence that he believed in judgment after death — indeed, the transmigration of the soul does not necessarily imply a separate existence for the soul after it has left one body and before it enters another[66]. Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that the Pythagorean observance of taboos, vegetarianism and other rules of life (perhaps also practising philosophy) implied expectations about something beyond transmigration, for example eternal blessed life, although it should be stressed that there is no positive evidence for this[67].

In Empedocles, the soul (here called δαίμων) is a fallen god who must atone for his crimes by spending thirty thousand seasons in successive bodies, after which it returns to its original εὐδαιμονία. Here again there is

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argument is far from unshakeable.

[65] As perhaps voiced by Andromache in Eur. *Tro.* 636 τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τῶι θανεῖν ἴσον λέγω, although K.H. Lee (note on 632-633) may be right in stating that she is not 'expressing a denial of an existence after death', but rather giving a relative evaluation of life and death.

[66] This has been argued cogently by Barnes *o.c.* (n.63), 111-112. The statement that the soul *agit in mundo incorporalem vitam* after death, attributed to Philolaus (44B22 D.-K.) is spurious, although it is perfectly possible that Philolaus thought so. The attribution to Pythagoras of the idea of a judgment after death in Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 28 (p.87,15-16 Deubner; cf. p.100,8-9) has little or no authority; Diog. Laert. viii 35 is only one of several later interpretations of a Pythagorean taboo.

[67] Nor should we expect all members of the sect to have had identical views. The Pythagorean ὑπομνήματα of which Diog. Laert. viii 24-35 purports to be an extract (58B1a. 58C3 D.-K.) presents a theory of the soul that closely resembles that of Diogenes of Apollonia (cf. n.64). See Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* I 201-202 and notes.

no evidence for incorporeal existence of the soul, and a judgment after each separate life seems to conflict with the general theory[68].

We shouldn't expect that the views of Presocratic philosophers had a great impact on Greek views on death and afterlife, but they did have some impact. From the second half of the fifth century, we find the idea that the ψυχή will be dissolved in the air also outside philosophical texts[69]; it is reported as a fear common among men by Cebes in the *Phaedo* (70a1. a4-6; cf. 84b6-8).

Before we can turn to the text of the *Apology* and compare Socrates' thoughts about death with popular and philosophic belief we should ask if there is a precedent for the dilemma he presents as well.

Three texts need to be quoted in full and analyzed in this connection[70]. The first one comes from Euripides' *Heraclidae* (591-596), where 'Macaria' asks her brothers to give her a splendid funeral once they have returned to Argos:

> This will be my treasure instead of having children and loosing my virginity, if, that is, there is really something under the earth. However, I hope there is nothing. For if we mortals who must die shall have worries even there, I don't know where to turn, since death is considered the most powerful medicine against sorrows.' (τάδ' ἀντὶ παίδων ἐστί μοι κειμήλια καὶ παρθενείας, εἴ τι δὴ κατὰ χθονός. εἴη γε μέντοι μηδέν· εἰ γὰρ ἕξομεν κἀκεῖ μερίμνας οἱ θανούμενοι βροτῶν, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅποι τις τρέψεται· τὸ γὰρ θανεῖν κακῶν μέγιστον φάρμακον νομίζεται).

The alternatives are perceiving nothing (which is preferred) and being aware at least of funeral rituals, which implies having a degree of consciousness (and is therefore a bad thing). No firm belief in either alternative is indicated.

Second, a long passage from Cyrus' death-bed speech in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is relevant. Having exhorted his sons to live in harmony (for various utilitarian and ethical reasons), Cyrus goes on: 'By our forefathers' gods, my sons, honour each other, if you care at all to do something for me. For surely you don't think you know for a fact that I shall be nothing anymore when I have finished human life' (οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἰδέναι ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐγὼ ἔσομαι, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου τελευτήσω, viii 7,17). Several arguments are adduced to disprove the idea

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[68] On Empedocles' doctrine of the soul and eschatology see Barnes *o.c.* (n.63), 103-104. 495-501.

[69] See the passages collected in n.46. C.W. Müller *Gleiches zu Gleichem* (Wiesbaden 1965) 167-173. Kannicht (*Comm.* Eur. *Hel.* II 261, on 1013-1016) assumes that this view was 'gedacht und popularisiert' by Euripides — the first is contradicted by the Presocratic parallels, the second is not unlikely.

[70] *Phaed.* 91b2-3 εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω (scil. that the soul is immortal) καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι κτὲ repeats the dilemma of *Apol.* 40c4-41c7 and sheds no new light on our problem.

that the soul does not survive death (among them a reference to 'the honours paid to the dead', τοῖς ... φθιμένοις τὰς τιμάς). Next the Homeric view is considered, that the soul survives but will be 'dumb' (ἄφρων, viii 7,20; cf. Ψ 104 ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν) — no mention is made of the underworld. To conclude, Cyrus presents two alternatives: 'If things are as I think they are, if the soul does leave the body, then have respect for my soul as well, and do as I ask. But if they are not, if the soul remains in the body and dies with it, then at any rate fear the gods' (εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐγὼ οἴομαι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καταλείπει τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν καταιδούμενοι ποιεῖτε ἃ ἐγὼ δέομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μένουσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῶι σώματι συναποθνήισκει, ἀλλὰ θεούς γε ... φοβούμενοι κτέ, viii 7,22). The soul's death, described as lack of perception, is opposed to its departure from the body and its awareness of what goes on in the human world. Cyrus argues for the second alternative at length; no mention is made of εὐδαιμονία in either alternative.

Finally, there is a passage from the epilogue of Hyperides' *Epitaphios*. Having uttered various platitudes on the theme of the immortal glory of those who died, the orator rounds off with the following words:

> Besides that, if to die is like not to be born, they [the dead] have got rid of diseases, sorrow and the other things that befall our human life. But if there is consciousness in Hades and care from heaven, as we suppose, then it is logical that they ... receive the greatest care from heaven' (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ὅμοιον τῶι μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσὶ νόσων καὶ λύπης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προσπιπτόντων εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον· εἰ δ' ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ ἐπιμέλεια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὥσπερ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, εἰκὸς ... πλείστης κηδεμονίας ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τυγχάνειν, vi 43).

In this case the alternatives are 'not being' on the one hand, and on the other migration to Hades, consciousness and being cared for by the gods (which of course implies εὐδαιμονία). The second alternative is firmly espoused.

I think there can be no reasonable doubt that the Hyperides passage is an imitation of Socrates' dilemma in the *Apology*. Not only are the two alternatives identical, but there are also closer verbal echoes. It may not mean much that Hyperides' words εἰ δ' ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἅιδου, which introduce the second alternative, are closely related to Socrates' description of the first ('the dead man has no consciousness whatever of whatever thing', μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, 40c6-7; cf. c9 καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν), for we find the same wording in Lycurgus (*Leocr.* 136 εἴ τις ἄρ' ἐστιν αἴσθησις τοῖς ἐκεῖ) and in the *Menexenus* (εἴ τίς ἐστι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν αἴσθησις τῶν ζώντων, 248b7-c1[71]). But Hyperides' *motif* of divine ἐπιμέλεια parallels the conclusion to Socrates' dilemma ('the gods do not neglect [the good man's] interests',

[71] Other instances from the Orators are collected by Westermann in his note on Dem. xx 87.

οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα, 41d2, cf. below, § 3bγ). To clinch the matter, Socrates speaks of meeting various mythological figures in Hades, including Agamemnon and Odysseus; in Hyperides, Leosthenes (the general who was killed in battle) will be welcomed by 'those who have led the expedition to Troy' (τοὺς ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατεύσαντας[72]).

Consequently, when we want to answer the question whether or not Socrates' dilemma was a common way of thinking about death and afterlife, the Hyperides passage can be disregarded. We are then left with the dilemmas in Euripides and Xenophon. It is obvious that their first alternatives are identical to Socrates' dreamless sleep. But their second alternatives are different from Socrates' conversations in Hades, and they are more basic as well as more logical than Socrates' hypothesis. The souls of the dead are either aware of nothing or of something. If the latter is true, they may or may not migrate to another world. And if they do, their may or may not enjoy εὐδαιμονία in Hades. Thus, whereas 'Macaria' and Cyrus set up true dilemmas, Socrates does not: his second alternative is in fact the result of choosing the most favourable options of a set of three dilemmas, in which, as we saw, each of the alternatives was actually believed by some Greeks in his time[73]. Nor does his dilemma correspond to philosophic views: in Presocratic eschatology the two main theories are not dispersal and afterlife but dispersal and metempsychosis.

We must conclude, therefore, that Plato transformed a popular concept of two alternative notions of afterlife to suit his own purpose. The first view is commonplace; can we be more specific about the origin of the second? Once we realise the difference between the Homeric and the late fifth-century concepts of ψυχή we have no good reason to doubt that the idea of Socrates having conversations with famous men in Hades was inspired by the *Odyssey* and the various later Νέκυιαι, for example Bacchylides' extensive report of the conversation of Heracles and Meleager[74]. It is certainly not necessary to assume, as scholars have done in the past[75], that the second alternative was inseparable from mystery cults, especially 'Orphism'. But since Plato's eschatological myths are undeniably influenced by ideas that were current among adherents of these cults, indeed originated

[72] *Apol.* 41b8-c1; Hyper. vi 35. — Xen. *Cyr. l.c.* may also be an imitation of Pl. *Apol.*, but if so, it is only the situation (a speech of farewell preceding someone's death) and the structure (a dilemma) that are similar. Since both are also found in Eur. *Heraclid. l.c.*, there is no good ground for supposing Xenophon to depend on Plato here.

[73] The conclusion that the dilemmas of Euripides and Xenophon are closer to popular belief is strengthened by the numerous passages in the Orators (cf. n.71) where the souls' awareness of what is happening on earth is presented in hypothetical clauses.

[74] v 76-175; cf. Pind. fr. 249a Maehler.

[75] Cf. Burnet, note on 40c7. 41a4 and the discussion in De Strycker 'Socrate et l'au-delà' 273-278.

with them, it is worth-while to look if these ideas are present here — the more so because, as I have shown, there is a close parallelism between this part of the *Apology* and Plato's myths.

There is no trace in Plato of the central idea of these cults, that is of initiation as a protection against punishment after death (much like late-medieval indulgences). The idea cannot have appealed to him, and the words 'a hubbub of books' (βίβλων ... ὅμαδον, *Rep.* 364e3), quoted above, 221, indicate, if not hostility, at least derision. But he did adopt the idea of a general judgment after death in other works, and the three judges in the *Gorgias*, Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus, also appear in the *Apology* (in the company of Triptolemus, about whom more will be said presently). Originally, in Homer and Pindar, these three judges served as arbitrators in conflicts between the dead or, in the case of Aeacus, between the gods — before Plato, there is no mention of any of the three as judges of the souls of those who have died[76]. Socrates' reference to them in the *Apology* ('the judges in the true sense of the word, who are said to sit in judgment there', τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, 41a2-3[77]) is carefully framed so as to admit of both interpretations.

Socrates expects that he will be able to continue his earthly practice of examining others. By the same token, one might think, Minos and his associates are continuing their earthly duties, as described in Homer and Pindar. Yet since Socrates mentions them in contrast to 'these people here who pretend to be judges' (τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, 41a1-2), it is perhaps not unlikely that he implies that it may be possible for him to appeal the unjust verdict handed down by the majority of his earthly judges. If there is a general judgment of the dead, Socrates will be tried and judged with absolute justice[78].

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[76] Minos: λ 568-571 (λ 569 is quoted and wrongly interpreted in *Gorg.* 526d2); Aeacus: Pind. *Isth.* viii 23-24 and Thummer *in loc.* For Rhadamanthys the evidence is inconclusive. Pind. *Ol.* ii 75-76 βουλαῖς ἐν ὀρθαῖσι Ῥαδαμάνθυος, ὃν πατὴρ ἔχει μέγας ἑτοῖμον αὐτῶι πάρεδρον could refer to the function of an assistant governor rather than that of subsidiary judge. But the most satisfactory interpretation was given long ago by Dissen - Schneidewin *in loc.*: the crowns mentioned in the preceding line are prizes awarded for athletic contests by Rhadamanthys. Rhadamanthys has nothing to do with the judge of *Ol.* ii 59.

[77] Burnet (*in loc.*) is definitely wrong in implying that the three are mentioned in this text as judges of the dead. Cf. De Strycker 'Socrate et l'au-delà' 275: 'Le texte de l'*Apologie* est d'une curieuse ambiguïté: l'activité des juges peut y être entendu aussi bien dans le sens du *Gorgias* que dans celui de l'*Odyssée*'. In the following paragraph, I follow De Strycker's arguments closely.

[78] About Socrates' statement that death is not an evil thing *for a good man* (40d1-2) cf. 229-230. It does not imply judgment because, from a Socratic point of view, an evil soul is its own punishment. The presence of Sisyphus among those questioned by Socrates (41c1) is not an argument for or against judgment, as his association with Odysseus shows that he is mentioned because of his cleverness (*Gorg.* 525e2 Sisyphus is mentioned as one who is punished, but on the authority of Homer). Cf. Z 153 ἔνθα δὲ Σίσυφος ἔσκεν, ὃ κέρδιστος γένετ' ἀνδρῶν; Theogn. 701 πλείονα δ' εἰδείης Σισύφου Αἰολίδεω; Alc. fr. 38a,5 Voigt.

The presence of Triptolemus among the judges is the only other detail in the *Apology* that suggests judgment. He does not have that role elsewhere in classical Greek literature, but he is pictured with Aeacus and Rhadamanthys in at least three different 4th-century vase-paintings[79]. Triptolemus is, of course, a central figure of the mystery cults of Eleusis and although there is no firm evidence for a Last Judgment in Eleusinian eschatology[80], it seems a reasonable hypothesis that Plato combined an Eleusinian triad of judges with the one he used in the *Gorgias*.

Likely as all this may be, it is at least as important to note that Plato does not wish to make a strong case for Socrates' belief in judgment after death as he does in the eschatological myths. At the most, this belief is suggested.

Other arguments for 'Orphic' elements are even less conclusive. Four poets are named who, Socrates says, everyone would be glad to meet, Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer. The former two are firmly connected with mystery cults (Musaeus especially with Eleusis[81]) but the list (and its order) was already traditional in Plato's time: it is given by Hippias and Aristophanes, and implied by Herodotus[82]. In Greek tradition, the four poets are the great teachers of the Greeks, who preserve and impart religious and other knowledge — it will not do to isolate two of them in order to argue for Orphic origin of the entire second alternative[83] or even to isolate them and label them 'Orphic elements'[84].

Our conclusion must be that what Socrates presents as τὰ λεγόμενα[85] is a mixture of Homeric and popular belief and his own invention. Traces of the doctrines of mystery cults may be present but this cannot be proved. Socrates is vague on the question of judgment and punishment or reward and deliberately so.

At this point we must stop to consider the difference between what Socrates as a literary character in a literary text of a philosophical nature states or may be assumed to believe, and what Plato may have believed himself when he wrote the *Apology*. Precisely because of Socrates' self-

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[79] Cf. LIMC *s.v.* Aiakos, 1-3.

[80] *Leg.* 959b5 the Athenian ascribes the theory of a judgment to ὁ νόμος ὁ πάτριος; this is explained by Dodds (*Comm. Gorg.* 374) as a reference to teachings at Eleusis.

[81] Cf. M.L. West *The Orphic poems* (Oxford 1983) 23-24. 41-44.

[82] Hippias 86B6 D.-K.; Aristoph. *Frogs* 1032-1035; cf. Hdt. ii 53,2-3 and Lloyd *in loc.* Aristophanes names Orpheus for τελετάς ... φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, Musaeus for ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς, Hesiod for γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους, Homer for τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν. Hdt. *l.c.* and Chrys. *SVF* ii 1077,41 restrict their didactic activities to religious things. Given the order Hesiod - Homer, that looks like the original scope of the list, unless one assumes (with M.L. West *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 47) that this order (for which cf. also *Rep.* ii 363a8. 377d4; x 612b2; *Tim.* 21d1-2) is chronological. The converse order is found *Ion* 531a1-2. 5. 7-8. b3; *Prot.* 316d7; *Symp.* 209d1; *Crat.* 402b4-6; *Rep.* x 600d5-6.

[83] So wrongly Burnet *in loc.*

[84] So K. Alt 'Diesseits und Jenseits' 285 and n.42.

[85] See note on 40c7 on the alleged association of these words with mystery cults.

confessed ignorance and vagueness the difference is not as trivial as it may look at first sight: it is a priori likely that what Plato wanted his readers to deduce from the *Apology* (which is the only thing that concerns us for the present, but cf. below, 235) is not identical to what we as readers of his entire literary output can conclude from a comparison of the *Apology* with related texts, especially since it would be methodically wrong to disregard the possibility that Plato's views changed. As I have pointed out above, 217, we must not argue from Socrates' ignorance in the *Apology* to Plato's agnosticism, but neither must we make the opposite mistake of reading into what Socrates says in the *Apology* theories that he defends in the *Phaedo* or the *Republic*.

Since Socrates only knows that he knows nothing, he cannot state a preference for one of the two alternatives, yet there are some indications that Plato wanted his readers to understand that Socrates believes in the second alternative. First (perhaps a little trivial, but nonetheless relevant), the order in which the alternatives are treated[86] and the relative length at which they are treated seem to favour this interpretation. Next, as I said, Socrates does not confront his jurors with a real dilemma but with two of a number of possibilities. If it can be shown that the first alternative is incompatible with his other beliefs as stated in or inferable from the *Apology*, then we have a strong reason for thinking that Socrates preferred the second view of the afterlife[87]. (I see no way of disproving his belief in the second alternative.)

There is one important signal in the text which should not be taken as an argument for the afterlife. Socrates urges the 'good jurors' to remember 'that no evil can happen *to a good man* either in life or after death' (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῶι κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, 41d1-2). The restriction 'to a good man' makes sense only if it is assumed that evil can indeed happen to someone who is not a good man. It does not follow, logically speaking, that evil *must* happen to a not-good (wicked) man, nor that it must happen to him *after death*, and indeed such an implication would be contrary to Socrates' conviction that wickedness is in itself an evil (compare 30d1-5: 'Meletus and others may think that to be killed is a great evil, but I rather think that to kill someone else unjustly is a great evil). It is true that in the *Phaedo* Socrates rejects the total annihilation of the soul and says it would be 'a stroke of luck for the wicked' (ἕρμαιον ... τοῖς κακοῖς, 107c6[88]), but even there he does not say or imply that there can be no total annihilation because the wicked have to be punished[89], and

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[86] The anonymous author of the Δισσοὶ Λόγοι (written shortly after 400) always puts the thesis he prefers second. Cf. H. Gomperz *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (Leipzig - Berlin 1912, repr. Darmstadt 1965) 183-187.

[87] Whether Plato did or did not realise that the dilemma is not real is immaterial. If he did not, he must himself have believed the second alternative to be true. But it is idle to speculate.

[88] See the perspicacious note *in loc.* of D. Gallop *Plato, Phaedo* (Oxford 1975).

[89] So wrongly K. Alt 'Diesseits und Jenseits' 285 n.38.

anyway we may not argue from what is said in the *Phaedo* to what may or may not be intended in the *Apology*. Nevertheless, it is important to note as well that what is said in the *Phaedo* is not contradicted in the *Apology*, just as the idea of a judgment after death, found in all the eschatological myths, is neither confirmed nor refuted by the *Apology*.

There is what I believe to be a good indication that Socrates does not treat the dreamless sleep alternative very seriously. It is his claim that there is great hope that death is something good. But what he says about annihilation is based on the criterion of pleasure, not of benefit, and even thus it does not succeed in making the point. To paraphrase his argument: Death is like a dreamless sleep. A night spent with dreamless sleep is better and more agreeable (ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον, 40d6) than most nights and days in one's life[90]. Therefore death is a gain (κέρδος, 40d2. e2).

This reasoning (it is not meant to be an argument) makes sense only on the assumption that dreaming or being awake is neither better nor more agreeable than having a dreamless sleep — the underlying thought being, I suppose, that a man may have nightmares when dreaming and may suffer all sorts of evil or disagreeable things when he is awake. First, as regards evil things, the greatest evil is wickedness and it is of course true that a man can act wickedly while awake but not while asleep. But in this respect it is of no consequence whether or not one actually dreams while one is asleep, so the reasoning breaks down. In fact, the whole issue of good and evil does not apply — if death means annihilation it is not an evil, but neither can it be maintained that it is a good thing: it eliminates the possibility of striving after insight and thus of achieving the 'best possible state of the soul' (29e1-2. 30b2). The man who compares himself to a gadfly that keeps a noble horse awake (30e2-31a1) can hardly consider eternal sleep a good thing.

The only thing Socrates may be said to have made probable is that death, if conceived of as a loss of consciousness, is *more agreeable* than life. The collocation ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον is telling in that it masks a flaw in the reasoning, as collocations of near-synonymous words so often do in Plato. Equally significant is the choice of the word κέρδος — from an ethical point of view, the right word would have been ὄφελος; contrast the formulation of the second alternative: 'What could be a greater good than this', 40e6-7. Since Socrates associates the criteria of benefit and pleasure, it is clear that his reasoning is based on popular notions of good and evil. Socrates' own ideas of pleasure are in fact evident in the second alternative: to practise his philosophical dialectic with the souls would be unspeakable

[90] D.L. Roochnik '*Apology* 40c4-41e7: Is death really a gain?' *CJ* 80 (1984-85) 212-220, esp. 214, claims that it is the refreshed waking up that makes the dreamless sleep pleasant, not the dreamless sleep itself: hence, he claims, the analogy with death without awareness breaks down. But Socrates does not claim that a dreamless sleep is pleasant, only that it is more pleasant than the overwhelming majority of days and nights in any person's life. Therefore death without awareness can indeed be more pleasant than life, since life entails the possibility of displeasure.

εὐδαιμονία (41c3-4)[91]. So, not only is the reasoning defective, but what is said in favour of the first alternative is actually at variance with his ideas on goodness and εὐδαιμονία as set out throughout the *Apology*. The contradiction is sufficient ground for assuming that Plato wanted his readers to infer that consciousness after death is the only true concept of death for Socrates, because it alone explains how death can be an ἀγαθόν.

But can we be certain that Socrates fully believed in his second alternative? There appears to be some evidence to the contrary. Three times, at strategic points, the beginning (40e5-6), the end (41c6-7), and after the statement 'I myself am prepared to die many times' (41a7-8), which separates the general good hopes from those particular to Socrates himself, Plato adds the condition 'if what is said is true'. Some reservations are of course necessary, given Socrates' ignorance[92], but three times in 28 lines seems insistent and significant. Next, Socrates expects that everyone wants to meet Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer (41a6-7). As we have seen, 251-252, they are mentioned here as poets and great teachers, but Socrates himself had said earlier that poets — not just the poets he had tested, but poets in general — have no knowledge and wisdom (22b8-c3). And finally, there is more than just a tinge of irony[93] when Socrates depicts himself questioning Palamedes, Ajax, Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus and 'countless other men and women whom one could name' (41c1-2) — one may doubt that all these people would enjoy it to the same extent as Socrates would, and Socrates indicates as much when he says that 'that is no reason for people there to kill you' (πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι, 41c4-5).

Still, the light-hearted way in which some of the details of the second alternative are treated does not seriously undermine this alternative as a whole, in the way the first alternative is virtually disproved by Socrates himself. The details, the amalgam of fantasy and traditions, are made doubtful, not the alternative itself. What matters is that the soul is immortal (41c6, the final statement of the afterlife passage) and retains its rational capacities, which for Socrates is a precondition for εὐδαιμονία.

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[91] Cf. De Strycker 'Socrate et l'au-delà' 273: 'Aussi le raisonnement qu'il fait ici sur la première hypothèse me paraît-il être un simple argument *ad hominem*, qui repose sur l'application vulgaire de ce qui fait le bonheur de la vie et non pas sur les principes socratiques qui identifient bonheur, perfection et activité raisonnable'; see also Th. Meyer, 163. The irony which is of course present in ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας (see below) cannot be used as a counter-argument: the afterlife will indeed fulfil Socrates' hopes of attaining εὐδαιμονία through knowledge, even if this knowledge may be obtained in some other way than by literally endless questioning.

[92] These reservations are also found in passages where Socrates is more positive about the immortality of the soul, e.g. *Men.* 86b6-7 καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην; *Phaed.* 114d1.

[93] Compare the tongue-in-cheek way in which Socrates explains the fun his associates have, using even the same words οὐκ ἀηδές, at 33b8-c4. There, too, the words are not entirely adequate. See Chapter VIII 171-172.

Thus, we may conclude that Plato's readers are meant to infer that Socrates believes the second alternative to be true. It is of course a matter of faith rather than a philosophical tenet, but that also goes for the myths of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. As I have already noted on some points of detail and wish to repeat now for the whole of the afterlife passage, the *Apology* is in complete harmony with these myths.

γ. The One Single Truth

There is, however, another article of faith, which is stated rather unobtrusively at the beginning of the third section, and this second belief goes a long way to explaining why Socrates believes in immortality. Socrates started the afterlife passage in a general way: there is good hope that death is a good thing. Halfway the second alternative, he concentrated on what he hopes death holds in store for him. Now he turns again to the 'good jurors': 'But you too, judges, must have good hope regarding death, and you must keep in mind this single truth, that no evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death, and that the gods do not neglect his interest' (41c8-d2).

I have already interpreted this sentence as an implicit exhortation above, 216-217, and discussed the possible implications of the phrase 'to a good man', 229-230. We must now consider its significance as a whole. In the previous passage Socrates gave reasons for hoping that death is a good thing — he now changes his position and states that it is certain that death is not an evil thing for a good man. The difference is highlighted by the contrast of the repeated formula 'if this is true' and the phrase 'this single truth' (41c9) in this sentence.

What Socrates presents here as 'truth' is not a self-evident statement, nor is it one of his philosophical tenets. Without any argument he states categorically what can only be described as a religious conviction[94]: as long as man does his duty by the gods — and this duty consists of acting rightly and justly — the gods will take care of him. This belief is articulated occasionally from the late fifth century onwards. Expressing her gratitude towards Achilles, who had promised to do his best to save Iphigenia, Clytemnestra tells him: 'If there are gods, your lot will be a good one, since you are a just man'[95]. Nicias tries to encourage the Athenian army as they are withdrawing from Syracuse: 'Throughout my life I have done many dutiful deeds towards the gods and many just and generous ones towards men. Because of this, my hopes for the future are still high, and the present

[94] 'A *religious* conviction ... which in the course of his [Plato's] thought gradually took on the shape of a *philosophical* theory', so rightly A.P. Bos *Providentia divina* (Assen - Amsterdam 1976) 7 (Bos' italics).

[95] Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 1034-1035 εἰ δ' εἰσὶ θεοί, δίκαιος ὢν ἀνὴρ ἐσθλῶν κυρήσεις. Two syllables have fallen out in the transmitted text of 1034, but that does not affect the meaning.

calamities do not make me as scared as I should have been' (Thuc. vii 77,2-3)[96].

In the *Apology*, this belief was suggested at the very end of the First Speech: 'I entrust my case to you and to the god to decide it as shall be best for me and for you' (35d7-8[97]). As we saw above, § 3 bα, it motivates Socrates' trust in his δαιμόνιον. Divine care implies that whatever happens to a man for whom the gods care is 'better' (βέλτιον, 41d5) for him. Better in what sense? At first sight we may be tempted to take it as 'morally improving', because the first part of the 'single truth', 'no evil happens to a good man' (41d1) reminds us of the axiom that wickedness is in itself an evil[98]. But on this interpretation, 'no evil happens to a good man' is a tautology: a good man is someone who does not become guilty of wickedness, and then the addition 'either in life or after death' makes no sense, nor does the second part of the single truth, 'nor do the gods neglect his interests' (41d2). We should indeed read the clause 'no evil happens to a good man' in the light of the passage about Meletus' and Anytus' inability to harm Socrates. As we saw there, being killed or exiled or deprived of one's civil rights are no μεγάλα κακά (30d1-4), no great evils. They may be minor evils, but if so, Socrates must mean something different by κακόν (οὐδέν) at 41d1 than he does by (μεγάλα) κακά at 30d3, since these minor evils do happen to a good man, as Socrates' own fate shows. Rather, 'no evil happens to a good man' is a relative statement: whatever 'minor evil' happens to a good man will be insignificant for him, since it does not harm his soul. 'Minor evils' are not κακά[99], but at the most πράγματα, 'troubles' (41d4), which do not harm the good man, even though Socrates' accusers and those who had voted for the death penalty thought they were harming him (d8 οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν).

But whereas the only harm is moral, harm to one's soul, it does not follow that benefit also is only moral benefit. It is true that virtue is the greatest good, but it is not the only one. Socrates' protreptic utterance 'from wealth does not come virtue, but from virtue come wealth and all other good things' (30b2-4) implies a scale of values which also includes honour and wealth. Man has to strive for moral good, and the external goods will arise

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[96] Cf. v 104; Dover *Greek popular morality* 258-259, where the reference to Lys. should read 'xxxiv 10'. Dover points out quite rightly that 'at least, the belief could be asserted as an encouragement': it does not follow that people who utter it under exceptional circumstances had actually adopted it as a rule of life, as Socrates had (although other evidence suggests that Nicias was indeed a deeply religious man). — Cyrus' belief that the gods take care of him (ἐμεῦ θεοὶ κήδονται, Hdt. i 209,4) is not explained; it may have other grounds than his righteous actions. Far more frequently, of course, one encounters the corollary of this belief, that the gods will punish wrongdoers; already in *Adesp. iamb.* fr. 35,9-11 West (Archilochus?).

[97] Cf. the note on 35d7 τῶι θεῶι, and see also 19a5-6.

[98] 30d1-5, cf. above, 229 and Chapter VII 147-148.

[99] Cf. Chapter VI 115. Slightly different Vlastos *Socrates* 219-221 on what he calls 'de-intensifying negation' ('no evil' is to be read as 'no great evil').

from that. It is in this light that we should understand Socrates' statement that death is 'better' for him. Not 'morally advantageous' in the sense that Socrates will become a better man by dying: Socrates will be 'better off' because he will be 'rid of troubles' (ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων, 41d4-5). The gods have decided, for reasons about which he does not speculate (and neither should we) that he will be better off dead.

As a corollary, Socrates' belief in Providence sheds new light on his hierarchy of ἀγαθά. If the care of the gods for good men manifests itself in the area of external goods, 'from virtue comes money' means in effect, 'Be virtuous, and the gods will see to it that you will receive the lower good things'. If this axiom is combined with the conviction that external goods have some value, then belief in Providence implies belief in the essential goodness and justness of this world and man's lot in it[100]. From the *Phaedo* onwards, Plato attempted to turn this belief into a philosophical explanation of the entire physical world (following Anaxagoras, whose explanation is dismissed in a famous passage in that dialogue, 97b8-99c6). But the belief was already there when he wrote the *Apology*, and it is to be found in various other works as well.

Leaving aside the *Euthyphro*, where the identity of the ὅσιον and the θεοφιλές (and of the ὅσιος and θεοφιλὴς ἄνθρωπος, 7a7) is the object of dialectic play (which does not mean that the identity is not seriously intended), passages can be cited from *Phaedo, Philebus* and *Laws*[101]. I quote in full two passages which connect divine care with immortality[102]. In the epilogue of Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, she says, 'And when man has begotten and raised true virtue he is destined to become beloved by the gods, and if any man will be immortal, it will be he' (τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένωι[103] ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ τωι ἄλλωι ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτωι καὶ ἐκείνωι, 212a5-7). In addition, a very close parallel to the 'single truth' passage is found in book x of the *Republic*[104]:

> We must therefore take it that whether the just man falls to poverty or illnesses or any other of the supposed evils, this will end up for him in something good

[100] As we saw, Chapter VII 148, suppositions that conflict with this belief are rejected because they are οὐ θέμις, at variance with the order of the world.

[101] *Phaed.* 62b7 τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους; *Phil.* 39e10-11; *Leg.* x *passim*, esp. 902b4-c2; cf. the juxtaposition of θεοφιλής and εὐτυχής at *Leg.* iii 690c5. See also *Phaed.* 58e5-6 μηδ' εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι.

[102] Cf. also *Gorg.* 527d1-2 (with reference to man's fate after death) οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσηι, ἐὰν τῶι ὄντι ἦις καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν.

[103] These words refer to the philosopher who has beheld the Form of the Beautiful, but the love and care of the gods extend to all good men; in any case, the passage shows that Providence and immortality go together, which is all that matters for the purpose of my argument.

[104] In this quotation and the conclusions drawn from it, I follow De Strycker 'Socrate et l'au-delà' 280-281. See also n.38.

in life, or else after death (τούτωι ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι). For the gods do not neglect whoever is prepared to do his best to become just (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέληι δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι) and by practising virtue to become like god as far as it is possible for a human being (613a4-b1).

This passage 'provides an authorised commentary on the one from the *Apology*' (De Strycker)[105]. It is made perfectly clear in the *Republic* that justice is its own reward, and that we must practice it for its own sake (cf. Chapter VII 138-140). But apart from that, Providence also takes care of lesser ἀγαθά, here including bodily health as well as wealth (which is mentioned as such in the *Apology*), and it is stated confidently that poverty, illness and the like will be compensated, as it were, in the afterlife (this is said after it has been proved that the soul is immortal).

If Plato's religious trust in Providence implies (and necessarily implies) a belief in immortality in the *Republic* (because some just men have wretched lives to the very end, like the 'crucified' just man of book ii, 361e3-362a3), the conclusion is, I think, inescapable that in the *Apology* he made Socrates prefer the alternative of afterlife because he himself thought that a belief in divine Providence, in a good world with good fortune for good men, is inseparable from belief in the immortality of the soul. No reader can have inferred this from the *Apology* alone, but we can draw the inference by combining what is said about Providence in the *Apology* with statements from other works. Those readers who knew something of Plato's views must have understood the full meaning of the 'one single truth, that ... the good man's interest is not neglected by the gods'. There is no evidence that Plato was ever agnostic about the afterlife; what Socrates says in the *Apology* can only be fully understood on the assumption that Plato always believed in the immortality of the soul, eternal εὐδαιμονία for good men, and a just world.

4. *Parting Words*

Of course Plato did not follow any model of forensic oratory for the Third Speech, because there was none. But the succession of themes in the final paragraph does suggest a model of sorts, and a rather surprising one at that.

There are three main topics: Socrates' impending death and the expectation of immortality (41c8-e1), the care for his sons (41e1-42a2), and the actual moment of parting (42a2-5). Both the topics and their order are strongly reminiscent of the concluding sections of the various Ἐπιτάφιοι that have come down to us. In order to illustrate this, I will give an analysis

[105] 'Le passage de la *République* fournit un commentaire autorisé à celui de l'*Apologie*; il nous fait voir ce que signifie, aux yeux de Platon, cette sollicitude vigilante dont les dieux entourent le juste durant la vie et après la mort.' ('Socrate et l'au-delà' 281).

of the final chapters of Pericles' Funeral Speech in Thucydides ii and supply parallels from the other texts[106].

(1) Immortality (43,2-3)[107]. In Thucydides, this consists of 'unaging praise' (ἀγήρων ἔπαινον) and 'ever-remembered reputation' (δόξα ... ἀείμνηστος). Thucydides does not treat this topic in a separate section but integrates it into the praise of the dead. It is the theme of the very last section of Lysias' *Funeral Speech* (ii 77-81), part of the consolation of the survivors. Here the fallen are said to leave behind 'unaging' and 'undying memory' (79 ἀγήρατοι ... μνῆμαι; 81 ἀθάνατον μνήμην), but also to be honoured as immortals (80 ὑμνοῦνται ... ὡς ἀθάνατοι; *ibid.* ταῖς αὐταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀθανάτους τιμᾶσθαι). In Demosthenes' *Funeral Speech* this theme is part of the praise of the dead as in Pericles', although the transition to the next theme, the consolation, is more gradual. Here, too, immortality is 'unaging fame' (32 εὔκλειαν ἀγήρω), but it is also said that 'one might reasonably call them assessors (παρέδρους) to the gods below, having the same rank as the good men from the past in the Isles of the Blessed' (34). Of the end of Hyperides' *Funeral Speech* only a fragment has been preserved (vi 41-43): here the topos is part of the consolation as in Lysias. Again we meet 'unaging reputation' (42 εὐδοξίαν ἀγήρατον) and 'immortal praise' (*ibid.* οἱ ... ἔπαινοι ... ἀθάνατοι); as in Demosthenes, there is also an explicit reference to the possibility of a good fate in the underworld (43), which had already been treated at length in the praise of the dead (35-38; cf. above, 225-226). There is no separate section on this topic in Plato's *Menexenus*, although there are passing references to the afterlife (246d7. 247c1-2) and to a consciousness after death (248b7) in the consolation.

(2) Consolation of parents, children and widows (Thuc. ii 44-45). This topic is found in all texts (Lys. ii 70-76; Dem. lx 36-37; Hyperid. vi 41-43; Pl. *Menex.* 246b2-248d2); it is the very last section in Lysias and it is followed only by a short epilogue in Thucydides, Demosthenes and the *Menexenus*. In Thucydides and the *Menexenus*, consolation goes hand in hand with exhortation: much less so in the other texts. There is, for obvious reasons, no corresponding part in the final section of the *Apology*.

(3) Maintenance of the orphans (Thuc. ii 46,1). Cf. Pl. *Menex.* 248d2-249b2. Absent from other texts. In the *Menexenus*, the care of the orphans is combined with care of the parents of the dead.

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[106] Of the recent studies of the genre, J.E. Ziolkowski *Thucydides and the tradition of funeral speeches at Athens* (New York 1981) confines himself to giving a long list of topoi; N. Loraux *L'invention d'Athènes, Histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la cité classique* (Paris 1981) is an excellent study of how the various Orators used these topoi to suit their various purposes.

[107] Cf. Loraux *o.c.* 113-118.

(4) Final words: 'And now, make lament each of you for his own dead, and depart' (νῦν δὲ ἀπολοφυράμενοι ὃν προσήκει ἑκάστωι ἀποχωρεῖτε[108], Thuc. ii 46,2). This looks very much like a formula, because it is found with only minor variations in Demosthenes and the *Menexenus*[109]. It is not in Lysias and may or may not have been in Hyperides.

It will be observed that among the fourth-century texts, the one closest to Pericles' Funeral Speech is actually the Funeral Speech in the *Menexenus*, and this correspondence strongly supports the influence of the genre ἐπιτάφιος on the end of the *Apology*. In addition, Plato works out the theme of the care of the orphans similarly in both works. Indeed, at various points in the *Menexenus* one is reminded of Socrates' philosophical examinations as recounted in the *Apology*, which Socrates now (41e1-7) asks the city to continue with regard to his sons. I quote a passage from the introduction to the consolation of the children:

> And I myself for my own part, O ye children of valiant men, am now exhorting you and in the future, wheresoever I shall encounter any of you, I shall continue to remind you and admonish you to do your best to be as good as possible (246b5-c2; Bury's translation, slightly modified).

Note especially the phrasing in the *Menexenus*, 'wherever I shall encounter any of you' (ὅπου ἄν τωι ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, 246b7-c2), which is similar to a clause from the *Apology* (29d6 ὅτωι ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν)[110]. And of course the exhortation to 'do one's best to be as good as possible' (προθυμεῖσθαι εἶναι ὡς ἀρίστους, 246c1-2) is identical to Socrates' claim that he 'goes around doing nothing but persuading ... to care ... for the best state of the soul' (*Apol.* 30a7-b2). Naturally, the *Menexenus* also refers to the city's material support of the orphans, by feeding them (249a3) and providing them with the full armour of a hoplite (249a7. b2)[111]. But even the latter is transformed into an exhortation to virtue: 'and when they arrive at manhood the city presents them with a panoply and sends them back to their own place, thereby exhibiting and reminding them of their fathers' way of life by giving each of them the instruments of their fathers' ἀρετή' (249a6-b1)[112].

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[108] There is a variant reading ἄπιτε which would correspond even more closely with the formulas as quoted in the next note (and with *Apol.* 42a2 ὥρα ἀπιέναι), but it is suspect for that very reason; cf. Classen - Steup *in loc.*

[109] Dem. lx 37 ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀποδυράμενοι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ὡς χρὴ καὶ νόμιμα ποιήσαντες ἄπιτε; Pl. *Menex.* 249c6-8 νῦν δε ἤδη ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες κοινῆι κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἀπολοφυράμενοι ἄπιτε.

[110] Cf. 30a3 ὅτωι ἂν ἐντυγχάνω; compare also *Menex.* 248e5 ὅπου ἂν ἕκαστος ἑκάστωι ἐντυγχάνηι ὁτωιοῦν τῶν ἐκείνων.

[111] Cf. Loraux *op. cit.* (n.106) 27.

[112] Note also the reminiscence of Socrates' scale of values in *Menex.* 246d8-e2 χρὴ οὖν ... ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο ἀσκῆτε (than giving one's life in battle), ἀσκεῖν μετ' ἀρετῆς, εἰδότας ὅτι τούτου λειπόμενα πάντα καὶ κτήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακά. The speaker goes on to mention wealth (e3), physical beauty and strength (e4-5), knowledge (e7).

Therefore, when Socrates asks the jurors and the accusers to punish his sons by 'vexing them' (λυποῦντες, 41e3) if they 'seem to care for either wealth or anything else before virtue', in other words by 'reproaching them (ὀνειδίζετε, e6; cf. above, 207) ... that they care for the wrong things', what he does is in effect to ask the city as a whole, as represented by the People's Court, to 'take over his role as a father', as the city does in the *Menexenus* (ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι καταστᾶσα, 249a5), and he emphasises the moral aspect of the city's role as a father in the same way in both texts[113].

Throughout the Second and Third Speeches Socrates had referred or alluded to points made at length in the First Speech. The request to punish his sons is one more case in point. When at the very end, Plato uses the Funeral Speech as a literary model, we are invited to compare Socrates to those who had fallen in war. The parallelism is obvious: like these men, Socrates is about to sacrifice his life for what he considers to be the highest values[114]. But more importantly, the men who die in battle are always thought of as benefactors of the city[115]. Once again, we are reminded of a passage from the First Speech, where Socrates describes his philosophical life as 'god's gift to you' (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν, 30d7-e1). It would have been out of keeping with Socrates' modesty to repeat those words verbatim at the end of the *Apology*; by using this literary model Plato is able to suggest them. The *Apology* thus ends with the theme of Socrates' mission as god's greatest gift to the city.

The changing tone of the final paragraph (from 41c8 on) reflects the rhetorical model. Throughout the second half of the Third Speech, Socrates uses personal and informal language. The frequent questions (40b6. e6. 41a5. a7. b7) engage the addressees in the line of thought[116]. The lengthy sentences with their anacolutha (notes on 40d2-7; d8; 41b5-6) mark the informal tone. The remark 'in any case that is no reason for people there to kill you' (41c4-5) is a joke at Socrates' own expense.

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[113] One might also suppose that Socrates' words that 'it was by now better for me to be dead and rid of troubles (ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων)' (41d4-5), where 'troubles' are, I think, illness and the general decline of one's physical state in old age (cf. note *in loc.*), are an echo of a topos of the genre Funeral Speech. Cf. Dem. lx 33 νόσων ἀπαθεῖς τὰ σώματα; Hyperid. vi 43 ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσὶ νόσων. In both passages, illness is coupled with grief, which has no place in the *Apology*.

[114] It will be sufficient to quote from the *Menex.*: 246d2-3 ἡμῖν δὲ ἐξὸν ζῆν μὴ καλῶς, καλῶς αἱρούμεθα μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν. Life under these circumstances is not worth living (ἀβίωτον, 246d6): cf. *Apol.* 38a5-6 'life without examination is not worth living for man'. Compare also *Menex.* 246b2-5 τούτων οὖν χρὴ μεμνημένους τοῖς τούτων ἐκγόνοις πάντ' ἄνδρα παρακελεύεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν πολέμωι, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν τὴν τῶν προγόνων with *Apol.* 28d6-29a1.

[115] Cf. Thuc. ii 42,3 κοινῶς ... ὠφέλησαν; Lys. ii 70; Hyperid. *Epit.* 9 πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιοι γεγένηνται τῆι πατρίδι; Pl. *Menex.* 237a4.

[116] See above, n.26 and 35.

Nothing of the sort is to be found in the final paragraph. Socrates does not, of course, adopt rhetorical language, and the passage contains some informal features ('it is clear to me', 41d3-4; 'troubles' (πραγμάτων), d4; 'I am not very angry', d7; above all the breaking-off ἀλλὰ γὰρ at 42a2, which parallels the main break in the First Speech, cf. Chapter VII 127). Yet the tone becomes serious and less personal, the sentences short, regular and formal[117]. 42a1-2 αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς may even be a legal formula (cf. *in loc.*). Also significant are the repetitions, which seem designed to lend the greatest possible clarity to the themes[118]. In the face of death, Socrates remains true to himself; his parting words are strikingly sober and earnest.

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[117] For the syntactic structure of 41e2-7, cf. note *in loc.* If I am right in assuming sentence-end after e5 ὄντες the longest sentence in this chapter takes up 4½ lines.

[118] 41d6 τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις ~ d8 κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν; e3 ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν ~ e6 ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν.

COMMENTARY

1. *17a1-18a6* Exordium

17a1 **ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι**: on the use of this formula instead of the more usual ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, see, besides Burnet (*in loc.*), *Gorg.* 522c1-2 with Dodds' important note *in loc.*

πεπόνθατε the verb seems to convey the idea πάθος, a 'mood', taking hold of the mind and disturbing its normal balance; cf. *Phaedr.* 251a1-252c2 (mood provoked by ἔρως); *Symp.* 198c2 (by φόβος). 215d6-216b3 (on the disturbance caused in Alcibiades by the talks of Socrates).

a2 **ἐγὼ ... καὶ αὐτός**: in this group, ἐγώ seems always to be separated from καὶ αὐτός by a particle (γε in ἔγωγε would suffice) or a few other words; see, for the nominative, *Apol.* 20c1-2; *Gorg.* 458b4. 489d1. 506b2; *Men.* 71b1; *Rep.* i 344d5; *Phaed.* 85b4; for other cases, *Apol.* 41b1; *Gorg.* 458c5.

δ' οὖν contrasts the important with the unimportant or (what often amounts to the same thing) the certain with the uncertain. Denn. 461 I 1 points out that in many cases δ' οὖν follows 'an indirect question introduced by εἰ μέν, ὅτι μέν, the answer to which the speaker cannot, or does not trouble to give'.

a3 **ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην**: not 'I all but forgot who I was' (Burnet), which would imply that Socrates nearly was persuaded that he was guilty. In fact ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἐμαυτοῦ is rather an equivalent of ἐξίσταμαι (*Menex.* 235a7; see Chapter II 30 and n.8) and is tantamount to 'to get beside oneself' or even 'to become entranced'; the reverse process is ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι ἐμαυτοῦ (*ib.* c3), 'to recover oneself'. This has already been noticed by Th. Meyer 115.

καίτοι 'introduces an objection ... of the speaker's own, which tends to invalidate, or cast doubt upon, what has just been said, or to make it appear surprising' (Denn. 556 I i); the third possibility applies here. 'An emphatic word following καίτοι is often stressed by γε' (ib. 564,4 i).

a5 **τοῦτο ἐν ὧι**: this uncommon group (cf. *Rep.* v 455b5 ἐν ὧι) seems to have been chosen to avoid two object clauses with ὡς (ὅτι) depending upon one another. In a similar way, a first ὡς is replaced by ὅτε after θαυμάζω in Dem. xviii 291 πολλὰ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἄλλα κατηγορηκό-

τος αὐτοῦ (scil. by Aeschines) καὶ ἐψευσμένου, μάλιστ' ἐθαύμασα πάντων ὅτε τῶν συμβεβηκότων τότε τῆι πόλει μνησθεὶς οὐχ ὡς ἂν εὔνους καὶ δίκαιος πολίτης ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην οὐδ' ἐδάκρυσεν κτὲ.

a6 **χρῆν**: although this is the reading of the primary MSS. (χρῆν BW: χρὴν T), confirmed by the old scholium ἔδει in T (ed. Greene, p.4), it cannot possibly stand. According to Burnet, who defends it, the prosecutors had said 'it would have been well for you to be on your guard'; but they could only warn the judges beforehand of a future danger; they could not say that the jurors ought to have been on their guard for it in the past. A parasitic -ν after a final -η is very common in literary as well as in documentary papyri in the Ptolemaic, and also in the Roman, period. So we should correct to χρή with the more recent MSS.

b1 **τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι κτὲ.**: cf. Aeschines iii 218 οὐκ αἰσχύνηι δὲ ἀλαζονευόμενος ἃ παραχρῆμα ἐξελέγχηι (var. ἐξελεγχθήσηι) ψευδόμενος.

b2 **μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν**: when indefinite pronouns and adverbs ending with -οῦν have a minimising force, they are regularly preceded by καί (in negative clauses by οὐδέ, μηδέ), as *Apol.* 32d2. 35b5; when the force is generalising, there is no particle, as *Apol.* 35a3.

b4 **εἰ μὴ ἄρα**: for the ironic εἰ μὴ ἄρα, see K.-G. ii 486,7 and des Places *Particules* 272-273.

δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν: the hyperbaton, by which Socrates disjoins the elements of the standing phrase δεινὸς λέγειν, emphasises his paradoxical suggestion that his opponents are giving the expression a meaning of their own, not in accordance with normal usage.

b6 **οὗτοι μὲν οὖν**: 'retrospective and transitional οὖν with prospective μέν' (Denn. 470,1), very common after a digression (here a4-b6) and generally supplemented by repeating the last words of this digression. See also des Places *Particules* 93-94.

ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 'as I said just before'; on this and similar formulas, see des Places *Formule de récurrence*, where our passage is discussed p.18.

b7 **ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε κτὲ.**: after οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, one would normally expect ἐγὼ δέ, but this would sound presumptuous and not be in tune with the Platonic Socrates' ἀστεῖον. Moreover, it would focus attention on himself, rather than on the content and, in a sense, also on the form, of the defence he will now deliver. It could, however, be doubted whether Burnet is right in printing δέ μου; perhaps δ' ἐμοῦ (Wohlrab, Schanz) would be better.

b8 **οὐ μέντοι κτἑ.**: Burnet prints a dash before these words and takes the following through c4 προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως to be a parenthesis (which itself contains a smaller parenthesis, viz. c2-3 πιστεύω ... λέγω); if so, γάρ (c4) brings the explanation for b7-8 ὑμεῖς ... ἀλήθειαν. The following notes will show that this is not correct. The γάρ clause is related to the immediately preceding words, and the sentence οὐ μέντοι κτέ. continues the train thought begun with ὑμεῖς δέ. To be sure, there is a change of perspective. Socrates had first said: '*they*, on their side (μέν), had told nothing but lies; the truth, however (δέ), and the whole truth, you will hear from me'. This sequence of thought is complete in itself. Socrates, though, is thinking not only about differences in *content* between the speeches of his accusers and his own, but also of one in *form*. Now, as to the form, the accuser's speech seems to be excellent and Socrates dismisses the very idea of competing with them in style. Hence the slightly abrupt οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, 'you will hear the whole truth from me; but no niceties of style, not indeed'.

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία: generally speaking, when μέντοι is accompanied by an oath formula, it is emphatic, as can be seen from the examples given by Denn. 399-402, II 1 i and ii. But here this would imply a rather harsh asyndeton. Therefore, it seems preferable to take μέντοι as adversative. When considered in its own right, this part of the sentence would normally follow upon a first part that would have run nearly as follows: λόγους ἀκούσεσθέ μου ἀληθεῖς μὲν παντελῶς, οὐ μέντοι κεκαλλιεπημένους γε κτέ. There is no objection to the addition of μὰ Δία, as can be seen from Dem. iv 49 (the reference in Denn. 402): ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκεῖνον (scil. Philip) μεθύειν τῶι μεγέθει τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνειροπολεῖν ἐν τῆι γνώμηι ..., οὐ μέντοι γε μὰ Δί' οὕτω προαιρεῖσθαι πράττειν ὥστε τοὺς ἀνοητάτους τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν εἰδέναι τί μέλλει πράττειν ἐκεῖνος (where μέντοι, as Denn. rightly remarks, is adversative, answering μέν). Another example, Ps.-Dem. xxxv 40 (before 338 B.C.), is even closer to ours, because the preceding sentence also has δέ, and therefore a μέν is lacking: ἐγὼ δέ, μὰ τὸν Δία, τὸν ἄνακτα καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα οὐδ' ἐπετίμησα, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἴ τις βούλεται σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ Ἰσοκράτει ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκειν· μαινοίμην γὰρ ἂν εἴ τί μοι τούτων ἐπιμελὲς εἴη. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οἶμαί γε δεῖν ἀνθρώπους καταφρονοῦντας καὶ οἰομένους δεινοὺς εἶναι ἐφίεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τῶι λόγωι πιστεύοντας. It is worth noticing that, except when adversative (cf. Denn. 405, ii), μέντοι is seldom followed by γε, either juxtaposed or separated. In our three passages (*Apol.* 17b8, Dem. and Ps.-Dem.), γε constitutes a supplementary argument for taking μέντοι as adversative.

b9-c1 **κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους ... οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους**: M.L. Earle *CR* 14 (1900) 20, followed by Burnet, thinks that κεκαλλιεπημένους ... ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν is chiastically contrasted with λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν

ὀνόμασιν, and κεκοσμημένους with εἰκῆι λεγόμενα; κεκοσμημένους, therefore has nothing to do with *ornatus orationis*, as Stallbaum would have it, but should be translated by 'marshalled', 'ordered', 'arranged'. The exact meaning of κεκοσμημένους will be discussed in the note on c1. In the meantime, we should not be too quick in seeing a chiastic arrangement here. Earle (quoted by Burnet *in loc.*) seems to think that this is guaranteed by the fact that there is already a chiasmus in the beginning of the sentence, where, of the sequence οὗτοι, ἐγώ, ὑμεῖς, ἐμοῦ (Burnet prints μου; see my note on b7), οὗτοι corresponds with ἐμοῦ and ἐγώ with ὑμεῖς. But surely, there is no contrasting correspondence between ὑμεῖς and ἐγώ, since ἐγώ in ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω is purely formulaic and bears no emphasis at all (cf. *Apol.* 18d8; *Hipp. min.* 368e1; *Crit.* 46d9; *Crat.* 408d5, etc.).

c1 **ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν**: as Riddell and Burnet have shown, in rhetorical terminology, which is different from logical (and grammatical) terminology, ὀνόματα are single words while ῥήματα are phrases or combinations of words. Examples of choice words, employed to 'give beauty to his speech' (καλλιεπέομαι), are Ἄρης for 'war' by Gorgias (82B6, II 286,11 D.-K), αἰών for 'life' by Polus (in Plato's *Gorg.* 448c6) and a long series of epithets enumerated by Aristotle *Rhet.* iii 2, 1405b34-1406a10 (so πολυπρόσωπος and μεγαλοκόρυφος, attributed respectively to the sky and the earth). The 'phrases' which Plato has in mind here seem to be pointed and unexpected combinations like λαβοῦσα οὐ λαθοῦσα ἔσχε (Gorg. *Hel.* 4) or paronomasias which Plato makes fun of, such as Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου· διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὑτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί (*Symp.* 185c4-5), or ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ (*Gorg.* 467b11-c1), rather than periphrases of the kind of ἔμψυχοι τάφοι for 'vultures' (Gorgias, 82B5a D.-K.) or πηγαὶ τροφῆς for 'milk' (Plato *Menex.* 237c5), which properly belong to the σχήματα διανοίας. Socrates' remarks on Agathon's rhetorical style in *Symp.* 198b1-e2 (see Chapter II 31) are evidence that careful attention to ὀνόματα and ῥήματα (b5) was typical of Gorgianic rhetoric (198c1-2 καὶ γάρ με Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεμίμνῃσκεν).

κεκοσμημένους: in passages dealing with the qualities of speeches, like this one, κοσμέω refers to *style* (λέξις) as appears from Isocrates, v 27 οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς περὶ τὴν λέξιν εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ποικιλίαις κεκοσμήκαμεν αὐτόν (scil. τὸν λόγον); *Epist.* ix 5 περὶ ὧν μὴ κομψῶς ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς διελθών, μηδὲ τῆι λέξει κοσμήσας ἀλλ' ἐξαριθμήσας μόνον καὶ χύδην εἰπών; Arist. *Rhet.* iii 2, 1404b5-8 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων (in Aristotle, ὀνόματα and ῥήματα, when opposed to one another, are the two principal kinds of words, viz. nouns and verbs) σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τἆλλα ὀνόματα ('words') ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς (scil. 21, 1457b1-1458a7; the most important groups are the γλῶτται and the μεταφοραί; cf. *Rhet.* iii 3, 1406a7-11 and b5-18; 10, 1410b12-14); 1405a14-16 καὶ ἐάντε κοσμεῖν βούληι, ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος

τῶν ἐν ταὐτῶι γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφοράν, ἐάντε ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων. We may conclude that κοσμέω is 'to adorn' speech either with diction or with images or with both. Since the use of elegant words has already been mentioned, κοσμέω probably refers here primarily to the use of metaphor and imagery. Earle (*loc. cit.*), and Burnet after him, understood κεκοσμημένους here as 'ordered', 'marshalled', 'arranged', in other words, they related it to κόσμος meaning 'order', not 'ornament'. Now, not only in Isocrates and Aristotle (as quoted above), but in all Greek rhetoric literature (e.g. Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 3, i p.10,15 and 11,11 U.-R.; *Isocr.* 2, p.58,1; *Thuc.* 22, p.359,8. 11) κόσμος and κοσμεῖν always refer to the 'adorning' of style. Besides, the meaning 'arranged' does not suit the context. 'Arrangement', 'composition', always implies a plurality of elements. It cannot be a plurality of words (whose arrangement would be what the rhetors called σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων), because then Plato would have written not λόγους κεκοσμημένους, but ὀνόματα κεκοσμημένα. It cannot be the plurality of the several parts of the speech (prologue, narration etc.) either, because the sentence as a whole, and the following too, has to do with style, not with composition.

c2 **εἰκῆι λεγόμενα**: 'things said in a happy-go-lucky manner'. The adverb εἰκῆι designates the extemporaneous, improvised way of speaking, in contrast with a carefully elaborated style, which normally implies writing. Cf. Isocr. iv 12 where τῶν εἰκῆι λεγομένων is opposed to τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσιν καὶ λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένους; xii 24 εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοίην ..., ὅμοιος ἂν εἶναι δόξαιμι τοῖς εἰκῆι καὶ φορτικῶς καὶ χύδην ὅτι ἂν ἐπέλθηι λέγουσιν; Alcidamas *Soph.* 26 (on the different parts of a speech, some of which have been prepared in writing while others are improvised) τὰ μὲν ἀκριβῶς, τὰ δ' εἰκῆι λέγοντα (scil. τὸν ῥήτορα); ib. 29 φρονιμωτέρους τοὺς εἰκῆι λέγοντας τῶν μετὰ παρασκευῆς γραφόντων; ib. 35 where εἰκῆι is contrasted with μετὰ προνοίας; Plato *Menex.* 234c4-6 ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰκῆι ἐπαινούντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου λόγους παρεσκευασμένων (cf. Chapter II 30).

c4 **ἄλλως**: most translators either render as if the text ran ἄλλο μηδέν ('let none of yours expect anything else' Fowler; so, too, Croiset) or they take ἄλλως with προσδοκησάτω ('let no one think otherwise' Blakeney; similarly Apelt). The first translation is clearly erroneous, and the second gives to προσδοκᾶν a meaning it cannot have. In fact, ἄλλως, as well as εἰκῆι, modifies λεγόμενα. The jury should not expect things *said otherwise* than extemporaneously and with the first words that come to mind. Why not? Because any other way of speaking would be unbecoming for a man of Socrates' age. It is quite important to keep in mind that the whole sentence is about the style, not about the content of the speech; it is because Burnet did not notice this that he gives an incorrect interpretation of πλάττοντι λόγους.

τῆιδε τῆι ἡλικίαι ὥσπερ μειρακίωι κτἑ.: in the *Menexenus* (236c8-9), Socrates pretends to hesitate before starting to recite the very sophisticated ἐπιτάφιος which he says he has heard from Aspasia, because that kind of Gorgianic oratory is more playful than seems fitting for an old man to deliver: ἀλλ' ἴσως μου καταγελάσηι ἄν σοι δόξω πρεσβύτης ὢν ἔτι παίζειν, as one could expect from a μειράκιον. Isocrates too in his old age felt that such rhetorical elegancies were no longer suitable for him: xii 3 ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ οὐχ ἁρμόττειν οὔτε τοῖς ἔτεσι τοῖς ἐνενήκοντα καὶ τέτταρσιν ἀγὼ τυγχάνω γεγονὼς οὔθ' ὅλως τοῖς πολιὰς ἔχουσιν ἐκεῖνον τὸν τρόπον ἔτι λέγειν (a manner he has described in § 2 as full of ἀντιθέσεων καὶ παρισώσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις διαλαμπουσῶν); v 27 (the beginning of which has already been quoted on 17c1) οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς περὶ τὴν λέξιν εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ποικιλίαις κεκοσμήκαμεν αὐτὸν (scil. τὸν λόγον) αἷς αὐτός τε νεώτερος ὢν ἐχρώμην καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπέδειξα. — Later teachers of rhetoric used to call the Gorgianic figures μειρακιώδη; so Dion. Hal. *Isocr.* 12 τῶν σχηματισμῶν τῆς λέξεως τὸ μειρακιῶδες (i, p.72,1-2 U.-R.); ib. τὰ κομψὰ καὶ θεατρικὰ καὶ μειρακιώδη (p.72,10); 13 τῶν σχημάτων τὸ μειρακιῶδες περὶ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις καὶ παρισώσεις καὶ παρομοιώσεις κατατριβόμενα (p.73,21-74,1); *Ad Pomp.* 6 τοῖς Γοργιείοις ἀκαίρως καὶ μειρακιωδῶς ἐναβρύνεται (ii 1, p.228,15); further references in Norden *Antike Kunstprosa* i 69 n.1. The μειράκιον could be the young student, as Aeschines i 175 (cf. 39-40), or the youth who has not yet learned to control his emotions and their expression, as in Aristotle *Rhet.* iii 11, 1413a28-b2 (εἰσὶ δὲ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ δηλοῦσιν ...· διὸ πρεσβυτέρωι λέγειν ἀπρεπές). In our case, he is the youthful orator, not, as Burnet thinks, 'the *naughty* boy', since nothing in the text points to naughtiness (for this we might recall the ἀτηρὸν ... παιδίον in Porphyry's *Vita Plot.* 3,5).

c5 **πλάττοντι λόγους**: Riddell, followed by Burnet, says this phrase means 'telling stories' and 'refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μειράκιον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric'. This certainly is not what the context suggests. The μειράκιον is opposed to the Socrates of seventy years; and the question is, what way of speaking is 'becoming' (πρέπον) for an old man. There is no hint of any attempt 'to hide a fault'. Certainly, πλάττω always points to artificiality; whether this applies to form or content depends on the context. When it refers to content, πλάττω means 'to fabricate', 'to forge'. Burnet thinks πλάττειν λόγους should be understood in the same way as αἰτίας, προφάσεις πλάττειν. This is open to doubt. One can 'forge false accusations' (ψευδεῖς πλάττειν αἰτίας, Isocr. xii 25) and 'imagine excuses or subterfuges' (προφάσεις πλάττειν, Dem. xxv 28). But normally, 'to fabricate speeches' would be 'to forge (apocryphal) speeches', as in Polybius (v 42,7) ἐπιστολὴν πλάσας ὡς παρ' Ἀχαιοῦ διαπεσταλμένην means 'having forged a letter as if sent by Achaeus'; it cannot be rendered by 'to tell stories', for that would be

πλάττειν μύθους, as in Plato's *Timaeus* 26e4-5 μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ' ἀληθινὸν λόγον (cf. *Gorg.* 523a1-3). There seem to be only two passages outside of the *Apology* where the phrase πλάττειν λόγους is found. In Sophocles' *Ajax* 148-149 τοιούσδε λόγους ψιθύρους πλάσσων εἰς ὦτα φέρει πᾶσιν Ὀδυσσεύς, the meaning 'to concoct' is only made possible by τοιούσδε: 'such are the rumours Odysseus is fabricating and bringing to the ears of everybody'. In Demosthenes' well-known tirade against Aeschines (xviii 121) τί οὖν, ὦ ταλαίπωρε, συκοφαντεῖς; τί λόγους πλάττεις; τί σαυτὸν οὐκ ἐλλεβορίζεις ἐπὶ τούτοις; the sense seems to be 'why do you practise fiddling with speeches', instead of studying seriously the text of the laws? It is quite crazy to imagine Gorgianic rhetoric will help you'. So, with λόγους as an object, πλάττειν would just be a synonym of καλλιεπέομαι and κοσμέω; it is 'composing polished speeches'. This use of πλάττειν as a rhetorical term is well attested in the fourth century: Alcidamas *Soph.* 12 μετὰ παρασκευῆς δὲ πεπλάσθαι καὶ συγκεῖσθαι δοκοῦντες ἀπιστίας καὶ φθόνου τὰς τῶν ἀκουόντων γνώμας ἐμπιμπλᾶσιν; Arist. *Rhet.* iii 2, 1404b18-19 διὸ δεῖ ... μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως, ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως ('avoid the appearance of speaking artificially, instead of naturally'); 8, 1408b22: prose should not follow fixed metrical patterns; this would lack persuasiveness, since it appears artificial, πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ. Certainly, in these passages, πλάττω concerns the rhetorical *form* of the speeches, not their content. True, the three instances are in the perfect passive, and to settle our question, an active form would be more conclusive.

c6 **καὶ μέντοι** 'sometimes introduces a new point ... It usually follows a strong stop' (Denn. 413). In the preceding sentences, Socrates has been talking about the style of his defence; now he will speak about his method of argumentation and discussion, a point that is for him of supreme importance. See Chapter II § 4.

καὶ πάνυ: καί is emphatic here as 'often before intensive and quantitative adverbs and adjectives' (Denn. 317,1), as in καὶ πάλαι (18b4), καὶ πολύς, καὶ μάλα, etc. The καὶ πάνυ group, which is already strong, is still further stressed by the insertion of the vocative ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, and by the *repetitio* δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι.

δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι: 'I entreat you most earnestly'; the addition of one or more coordinated synonyms is one of the most common devices to give emphasis to a word; so also *Apol.* 28e4-5 ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον ('as I had firmly convinced myself'). This doubling is particularly frequent in the Orators with δέομαι and similar verbs. In reading the Orators, I have noticed six different pairs of verbs, of which the most common is δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω (7 instances, all in Dem., Aeschines and several Ps.-Dem.), and ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ (4 instances, in Ps.-Lys., Aeschines, Ps.-Dem.); and three groups of three verbs, only one of which is represented by more than

one example, viz. δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ (6 times, in Dem., Ps.-Dem. and Hyperides). The combination δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι I have not found anywhere except in this passage of the *Apology*.

c7 **διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων**: 'with the same (kind of) arguments'. For the meaning, see Chapter II 38-89; Chapter IV n.22.

c8 **ἐν ἀγορᾶι ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν**: 'From an inscription found in 1970 (I 7180 [cf. R.S. Stroud *Hesperia* 43 (1974), 158-188; *SEG* 26 (1976-77) nr. 72]) it may be inferred that the "tables" at which the money changers and bankers sat occupied a well-defined and compact area; this was probably situated in the northwest corner of the Agora', Thompson - Wycherley *The Agora of Athens* 171 n.12.

d1 **θορυβεῖν**: Burnet translates this as 'to interrupt', with the following comment: 'The word θόρυβος only means a noisy demonstration, which may be "applause" as well as "interruption" according to the context', and to illustrate his point he quotes *Rep.* vi 492b5-c2. But actually, in rhetorical practice and theory, θόρυβος and θορυβεῖν always refer to *indignant* reactions of the audience, and these need not interrupt the speaker's words: if, after an orator has finished his speech, the reaction is unfavourable, it is also called θόρυβος, which we might rather render with 'protest', 'outraged reaction'. See Lys. xii 73-74 ἀναστὰς δὲ Θηραμένης ἐκέλευσεν ὑμᾶς (in the Assembly, after the capitulation of 404) τριάκοντα ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτρέψαι τὴν πόλιν ... Ὑμεῖς δ' ὅμως καὶ οὕτως διακείμενοι ἐθορυβεῖτε ὡς οὐ ποιήσοντες ταῦτα ... Θηραμένης δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῶι μέλοι τοῦ ὑμετέρου θορύβου (the use of the aorist ἐκέλευσεν, instead of the imperfect ἐκέλευεν, shows that the θόρυβος followed the *end* of Theramenes' speech); Dem. xix 122 (the Assembly has just decided to appoint Demosthenes with Aeschines and others as ambassadors to Philip in 346) ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ προελθὼν ἐξωμοσάμην εὐθέως, καὶ θορυβούντων τινῶν καὶ κελευόντων βαδίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἔφην ἐλθεῖν (here too, aorists are used); Ps.-Dem. lviii 50 (345 B.C.); *Apol.* 27b5 is particularly interesting; Socrates has just asked Meletus one of his famous 'little questions'; when Meletus does not answer, he turns to the jury: ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω ('he should answer, gentlemen, instead of uttering all kinds of indignant shouts'); if we translated 'interrupt', the force of ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα would be unclear. In Anaximenes' *Rhetoric*, too, θόρυβος (θορυβεῖν) is always indignant protest. In c. 18, he first gives advice about deliberative oratory (p.46,5-6. 14, where we see that the audience δυσχεραίνει, 45,27. 46,5). Then he goes on to forensic oratory, and develops a detailed program of what the defendant should do in different situations: when the θόρυβος arises in the first stages of his speech, or later on, when the protest comes only from a small group or, on the contrary, from the majority of the audience (p.46,14-48,3). In Aristotle too, when he is discussing the delivery

of real-life speeches, θόρυβος means 'unfavourable reaction' (*Rhet.* ii 23, 1400a9-11; iii 18, 1419a14-17); it can stand for 'applause' only in the case of rhetorical exercises or of theatrical performances (*ib.* i 2, 1356b23-25; ii 23, 1400b30-34). See note on 21a5.

ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί: this formula (also with ὧδε or οὕτως) introduces the explanation of a request or a statement that could be surprising to the audience, e.g. *Symp.* 204a1; *Phaedr.* 247c4; Isocr. viii 28; Dem. xxii 39.

d3 **ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως**: cf. Chapter II n.16 and 38-39.

d4 **ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ κτἑ.**: on the model, probably, of elliptical ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ (*Apol.* 23b1; 27a5), ἄν is normally anticipated between ὥσπερ and εἰ, even when the principal verb is expressed and is accompanied by a second ἄν; cf. K.-G. i 246,7; below, note on 41a7.

18a1 **ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην**: this relative clause is conditional with reference to the conditional clause εἰ ... ἔλεγον, on which it depends. This will appear if the conditional clause is changed to an independent one: ἐν ἐκείνηι ἂν τῆι φωνῆι καὶ τῶι λόγωι ἔλεγον, εἰ ἐν τούτοις ἐτεθράμμην. So the use of the pluperfect without ἄν is here quite regular; cf. Goodwin, §§ 510, 528 and 559.

καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν: the apodotic use of καὶ δὴ καὶ is definitely unusual. Denn. (257,3) thinks that in our passage the group should be divided into an apodotic καὶ δή (on which see his p.253 vi) and a καὶ that belongs to νῦν ('also now'). But the group καὶ δὴ καὶ seems to have too firm a unity to allow for such a division; moreover, the rather rare apodotic καὶ δή, for which, by the way, no Platonic parallel can be quoted, 'denotes the instant and dramatic following of the apodosis upon the protasis' (Denn. 253 vi), which surely does not apply here. Our case should rather be explained as an anacoluthon, as Denn. (257,3) rightly admits for the long, and very similar, sentence *Rep.* iv 420c4-e1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντα γράφοντας προσελθών τις ἔψεγε λέγων ὅτι ..., μετρίως ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπολογεῖσθαι λέγοντες· "Ὦ θαυμάσιε, μὴ οἴου δεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτω ... γράφειν ὥστε ..."· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, ἣ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἢ φύλακας (Burnet's punctuation, taken over by Chambry, is misleading: he closes the quotation marks only at 421a8. But surely, the answer to the art critic ends at 420d5 καλὸν ποιοῦμεν, just before καὶ δὴ καί; the following words, from καὶ δὴ καί on, belong to Socrates' rebuttal of the moralising critics, whose mouth-piece Adimantus has been in 419a1-420a1; this appears from the mention of the φύλακες, with whom the art critic was not concerned at all). In the sentence of the *Republic*, exactly as in that of the *Apology*, we see first, introduced by ὥσπερ, a comparative clause in the

modus irrealis (μετρίως ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν corresponding to συνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι); the following applications of the comparisons should in both cases have taken the form of a main clause, introduced by οὕτω καί. However, because the ὥσπερ clauses, with their subordinate conditional clauses, are so long, there is an anacoluthon: the speaker acts as if the first part of each of both sentences had been an independent clause, with which he coordinates the second part, the application of the comparison, by means of καὶ δὴ καί ('and so, of course, too'; Denn. 255,1). Neither passage is mentioned in Luise Reinhard's valuable book *Die Anakoluthe bei Platon*.

a2 **τὸν ... τρόπον τῆς λέξεως**, 'my way of speaking'. In this phrase, as in 17d3 τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως, the word λέξις does not refer to *style*, but, as the context shows, to the way of *arguing*. In *Rep.* iii 392c6-398b9, there is an extensive discussion of λέξις (also called εἶδος (τῆς) λέξεως 396b10-11. 397b4; τρόπος τῆς λέξεως 400d6), which analyzes ὡς λεκτέον as opposed to ἃ λεκτέον (392c6-8. 398b7-8). There are two fundamental ways of representing human conduct in speech, by narrative (διήγησις) and by representation (μίμησις); this, of course, is not a matter of style but of composition.

a3 **ἴσως**: a typical example of Socratic urbane understatement, on which see Lammermann *Von der attischen Urbanität*, esp. p.34. 36-37.

χείρων ... βελτίων: apparently, Greek comparatives do not commonly indicate a moderate degree, as is the case in Latin, e.g. *saepius* 'often enough', 'tolerably often', for which cf. Hofmann-Szantyr *Lateinische Sprache und Stilistik* (München 1965) 168-169. So we should take χείρων ('less good', not 'worse'!) and βελτίων with reference to the usual way of arguing of litigants (17d2 τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως) and especially with that of Socrates' accusers. The contention of Wittwer 'Suffix -τερος' 100 (apropos of *Gorg.* 500b2) that the pair βελτίων / χείρων simply marks a contrary opposition and that the words, when so coupled, have no comparative force, is mistaken. True, Plato often substitutes, as in *Gorg.* 500b2-3, τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν for τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. But he does that with the superlatives too, as appears from Socrates' statement on teleology in *Phaed.* 97b8-98b6, where one finds successively and without any difference βέλτιστος 97c6. 8; τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον d3; τὸ χεῖρον d4; (τὸ) ἄμεινον e2. 4. 98a5; (τὸ) βέλτιστον 98a8. b2; τὸ ἀγαθόν b3; τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον b5-6. Especially important is the fact that the substitution of the three degrees of comparison for one another occurs in passages where the opposite term is not mentioned (from 97e1 to 98b3 one finds three times ἄμεινον, twice βέλτιστον, once ἀγαθόν and no form whatever of κακόν). Therefore the comparatives do more than simply express the opposition as such. In Aristotle too τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ βέλτιστον are often used as equivalents; cf. A. Mansion *Introduction à la physique aristotéli-*

cienne 2d ed. (Louvain 1945) 274-275 (n.72f.). This is not a grammatical issue but a philosophical one. The shift is not due to any confusion between the degrees of comparison, but to the dynamic structure of 'desire', which always strives at a maximum of good.

αὐτό: equivalent to μόνον (LSJ *s.v.* I 3).

a4-5 **εἰ ... ἢ μή**: in disjunctive indirect questions, the negative of the second member may always be μή, and this is regularly the case when the second member contains only the negative (Lat. *necne*); cf. K.-G. ii 191-192.

a5 **ἀρετή**: that by virtue of which somebody or something is good according to the exigencies of his or its nature; so here, whatever characterises the ἀγαθὸς δικαστής and the ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ. When some task is involved, we may translate 'duty'. The modern notion of duty has been developed from the Stoic notion of τὸ καθῆκον. In Plato and Aristotle, it is still comprised under the more general conception of 'excellence' or 'ideal' (ἀρετή). See further note on 20b1-2.

2. *18a7-19a7 Proposition*

18a7 **δίκαιός εἰμι** purposely takes up εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή (a4-5). Since Socrates intends to start not with refuting the content of the indictment proper, he must first justify the plan of his defence. When a case was difficult to argue, Athenian pleaders would often try to obscure the main issue in a flood of irrelevant considerations; Lys. xii 38 οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὐτῶι (Eratosthenes) προσήκει ὅπερ ἐν τῆιδε τῆι πόλει εἰθισμένον ἐστί, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐνίοτε ἐξαπατῶσιν κτἑ. Jurors tended, of course, to be distrustful when a litigant resorted to such manoeuvres. In private suits before all courts both litigants had to swear that they would 'deal with the case itself' (εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐρεῖν, Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 67,1), and there was perhaps a special law prohibiting litigants before the Areopagus from 'speaking of matters outside the issue' (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν, Lys. iii 46). In their oath, the *Heliasts* swore that 'they would cast their vote only about the matters dealt with in the charge', ψηφιεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὧν ἂν ἡ δίωξις ἦι (Aesch. i 154; Dem. xlv 50; it is not certain if the complete text of the oath, as given Dem. xxiv 149-151, is authentic, but this part is). The prohibition is often mentioned or alluded to by the Orators, so Lycurgus *Leocr.* 11-13 (interesting for our passage because of the explicit mention of the δίκαιον); Dem. xviii 59; xxiv 6; Ps.-Dem. lvii 7. 33. 59. 60. 63. 66; lviii 23; cf. further Pl. *Theaet.* 172e1-4; Aeschines of Sphettus, fr. 25 Dittmar, XI Krauss. Plato himself adopted this rule for his Cretan colony, as appears from *Laws* xii 949b4-6 τὸ δίκαιον μετ' εὐφημίας διδάσκοντα καὶ μανθάνοντα ἀεὶ διατελεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, καθάπερ ἔξω τοῦ λόγου λέγοντος, τοὺς ἄρχοντας πάλιν ἐπανάγειν.

a8 **ψευδῆ** is used predicatively; the independent active construction would be: ταὐτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγοροῦσιν οἱ διαβάλλοντες.

b2 **καὶ πάλαι**: καί emphasises πάλαι, as 17c6 καὶ πάνυ. Since πάλαι is in itself a very vague word Socrates adds as a specification πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη.

καὶ ... λέγοντες: this second καί links λέγοντες with πολλοί.

b6 **μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές**: Burnet's explanation of these words as 'not a bit truer' is probably right. It might seem that, in addition to the οὐδέν which qualifies μᾶλλον, we need another one for ἀληθές to depend on (*'nothing* that would be a bit truer'). But besides the fact that such a double οὐδέν would be intolerable Greek, in expressions such as θαυμαστὸν λέγεις (*Laws* ii 657a3) no τι is needed; the same, of course, holds true for οὐδέν in clauses with a negative, as *Phaedr.* 241c4-6 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν, ἧς

οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῆι ἀληθείαι τιμιώτερον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. Cf. K.-G. i 60, Anm. 1.

ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης: with a proper name, τις can be contemptuous, as in Soph. *Phil.* 442 οὐ τοῦτον εἶπον ('I did not mean Odysseus'), ἀλλὰ Θερσίτης τις ἦν.

b7 **τὰ ... μετέωρα φροντιστής**: The following remarks may be added to the data supplied by Burnet. The use of the accusative for an object depending on a noun is quite exceptional in Greek prose, as appears from the instances quoted by K.-G. i 296, Anm. 4, and Schwyzer ii 73-74 (c). In our case, it is tolerable chiefly because it is parallel to τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκώς. Perhaps Plato wanted, first, to suggest, by the very use of an uncommon word (φροντιστής) and an uncommon construction, the abnormality of the conduct ascribed to Socrates by his slanderers — as Burnet says, the effect is that of a compound like μετεωροσοφιστής; second, he may have wanted to prevent any confusion about the meaning of φροντιστής (which should be understood as the agent noun not of the usual φροντίζω τινός, but of the relatively rare φροντίζω τι (for which see *Symp.* 220c7; Aristoph. *Eccl.* 263; Xen. *Mem.* i 1,11). It is worth noticing that where Xenophon (*Mem.* iv 7,6) imitates this passage of Plato, he drops τὰ ... ὑπὸ γῆς ... ἀνεζητηκώς and consequently writes τῶν οὐρανίων ... φροντιστήν.

b8 **τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν**: that Protagoras' ambiguous formula (80B6b D.-K.) had been taken as meaning 'to secure the victory for injustice or falsehood' appears not only from Aristophanes' *Clouds* (of which the most important relevant passages are referred to in Burnet's note), but also from two other texts quoted by Navarre *La rhétorique grecque* 230 n.1, viz. Xen. *Oec.* xi 25 (Ischomachus is speaking) ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγειν συμφέρηι, πάνυ ἐπιεικῶς (am I able to make a stand against my wife)· ὅταν δὲ ψευδῆ, τὸν ἥττω λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μὰ Δί', οὐ δύναμαι κρείττω ποιεῖν; Isocr. xv 15 (I would wish my opponent really had thought me as clever as he contended in your presence, for he never would have tried to embarrass me;) νῦν δὲ λέγει μὲν ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἥττους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν, τοσοῦτον δέ μου καταπεφρόνηκεν ὥστ' αὐτὸς ψευδόμενος ἐμοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγοντος ἐλπίζει ῥαιδίως ἐπικρατήσειν.

c1 **τὴν φήμην**: in the sense of 'rumour' or 'reputation', φήμη is infrequent in Attic prose. In Plato, we find it also in *Apol.* 20c7, *Rep.* v 463d6 and *Polit.* 309e8, and in some fifteen passages of the *Laws* with its many poetic words.

c2 **οἱ δεινοί εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι**: when a substantive is provided with a nominal attribute (here δεινοί), other complements, which normally should have the predicative position (here μου), can appear to be in an attributive

construction as well; so further *Apol.* 24b3. 25b5-6. 39e1-2. Cf. Gildersleeve ii § 674.

οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες κτέ.: this is the view of the uninformed multitude (commonly called οἱ πολλοί by Plato), as appears from the ψήφισμα of Diopeithes and from Eur. fr. 905 Nauck², both quoted by Burnet, and further from Xen. *Mem.* i 1,11 οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον ... λέγοντος ἤκουσεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως διελέγετο κτέ. For Plato, however, the study of celestial phenomena is precisely, with the acknowledgement of the superiority of the mind to the body, the most solid foundation of belief in gods, as is shown by *Laws* xii 966d6-967a8 ΑΘ. Ἆρα οὖν ἴσμεν ὅτι δύ' ἐστὸν τὼ περὶ θεῶν ἄγοντε εἰς πίστιν ...; ΚΛ. Ποῖα; ΑΘ. Ἓν μὲν ὃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλέγομεν ...· ἓν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν φοράν, ὡς ἔχει τάξεως, ἄστρων τε καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων ἐγκρατὴς νοῦς ἐστιν τὸ πᾶν διακεκοσμηκώς. ὁ γὰρ ἰδὼν ταῦτα μὴ φαύλως μηδ' ἰδιωτικῶς, οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἄθεος ἀνθρώπων ποτὲ πέφυκεν ὃς οὐ τοὐναντίον ἔπαθεν ἢ τὸ προσδοκώμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισαμένους ἀστρονομίαι τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις ἀθέους γίγνεσθαι, καθεωρακότας, ὡς οἴονται, γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις πράγματ' ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων. ΚΛ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πῶς ἔχον ἂν εἴη; ΑΘ. Πᾶν, ὅπερ εἶπον, τοὐναντίον ἔχει νῦν τε καὶ ὅτε ἄψυχα αὐτὰ οἱ διανοούμενοι διενοοῦντο (in 967a3 the MSS. have ὡς οἷόν τε; ὡς οἴονται is Apelt's conjecture, rightly adopted by Diès). The underlined words are relevant to our *Apology* passage. The same ideas are found in *Epin.* 982a4-e6 and Aristotle Περὶ φιλ. fr. 12 a (Walzer, Ross).

c3 **οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν**: Burnet, in his notes *in loc.* and in more detail on *Euthyphro* 3b3 and *Apol.* 24c1 and 26c2, contends that there is a clear-cut distinction between θεοὺς νομίζειν, which points to a practical attitude ('to worship the gods', 'to acknowledge them'), and νομίζειν εἶναι θεούς, which points to a theoretical attitude ('to believe in (the existence of) gods'). Surely, the distinction is a real one, and Meletus' indictment, or at any rate its terminology, was certainly concerned with the observance of the official cult, not with Socrates' personal convictions (cf. Chapter VI 87-88). But in the texts of both Plato and Xenophon the phrases are used interchangeably, with no apparent distinction, and this interchangeability is certainly not meant as a trap, as Burnet suggests on 26c2; such a translation as 'to acknowledge gods' would in many places suit both phrases; cf. Derenne *Les procès d'impiété* 217-223; J. Tate 'Greek for "Atheism"' *CR* 50 (1936) 3-5 and 'More Greek for "Atheism"' *ib.* 51 (1937) 3-6 (but such passages as Lys. xii 9 οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπους νομίζει refute Tate's contention that νομίζειν θεούς *always* means 'to believe in the existence of gods'). Fahr's book Θεοὺς νομίζειν discusses all the relevant texts and gives reliable interpretations, yet he tends to be too eager to understand νομίζειν θεούς

in the sense of 'to believe in (the existence of) gods'. In our passage, although the phrase used is θεοὺς νομίζειν, it does not refer to a refusal to participate in the official cult, but to some vague form of atheism, in other words to some speculative attitude. — Recent scholarship tends to deny any distinction between νομίζειν θεούς and νομίζειν εἶναι θεούς, giving a theoretical reading even to the first phrase. Cf. Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* III 237 n.2; J. Beckman *The religious dimension of Socrates' thought* (Waterloo, Ont. 1979; Studies in Religion, Suppl. 7) 55-56; Brickhouse - Smith 30-34; Reeve 78-79.

c6-7 **παῖδες ... καὶ μειράκια**, with καί 'linking alternatives, instead of ἤ' (Denn. 292,8) cf. below 23a7. A striking double instance in *Rep.* x 617e3-4 ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμαζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἕξει. W.J. Verdenius *Mnemos.* 17 (1964) 274 (on *Meno* 94b9) has collected further examples of this usage, which is more common than the text of Denn. would suggest. Cf. also S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 305. In *Epin.* 990c4-5 παῖδα ὄντα καὶ νεάνισκον the force of καί is, however, the usual one (the text speaks of something one ought to do as child *and continue* to do as a youth).

c8 **ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι κτἑ.**: that is, ὃ δὲ πάντων (ἐστὶν) ἀλογώτατον, (ἐστὶ τοῦτο) ὅτι κτἑ.; in this kind of construction, the ellipsis of the main clause is regular (K.-G. ii 355). An alternative explanation of this type of construction is given by Reinhard *Anakoluthe* 12 n.2: the ὅ clause is an apposition to the sentence, but the thought continues as if it were the main clause.

d1 **εἰδέναι**, 'to ascertain', 'to discover'. This ingressive aoristic meaning of εἰδέναι, though not uncommon in classical prose, has not attracted sufficient attention. Generally, the ingressive value appears clearly enough from the context, but it is often confirmed by a preceding or following aorist (here εἰπεῖν). Protagoras 80B4 D.-K. is especially important: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ' ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Kranz adds in the footnote: 'Nach Diels und Wilamowitz ist εἰδέναι aoristisch gebraucht; vgl. Luc. Dial. mer. 9 ἔχοιτε εἰδέναι', and he translates 'zu wissen (festzustellen?)'). For other instances see *Gorg.* 505e4-6 οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν ...· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν <u>γενέσθαι</u> αὐτό; *Crat.* 384b1-6 χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά ἐστιν ὅπηι ἔχει <u>μαθεῖν</u>· ... εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη ..., οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος; *Phaed.* 70d7-e1 μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων ... σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο εἰ βούλει ῥᾶιον <u>μαθεῖν</u>, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ζώιων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν ... εἰδῶμεν (BTW: ἴδωμεν Olymp. Stob. Burnet Robin) ἆρ' οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα κτἑ.; Isocr. xi 8 ἡδέως ἂν εἰδείην; Isaeus viii 4 μηδὲν

ἀγνοήσαντες ... ἀλλὰ σαφῶς εἰδότες κτέ.; Dem. xix 227 βούλεσθ' οὖν εἰδέναι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τούτου αἴτιον; perhaps one should add the common oratorical formula ἵν' εἰδῆτε (*Apol.* 32a6; Dem. xix 57. 61. 70, etc.; compare also Pl. *Ion* 534c7-d4), for which Meyer 47 and n.99 gives many references to the Orators.

d3 **οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ κτέ.**: Socrates, as Burnet rightly remarks, began the sentence as if he would speak only about those who attacked him out of spite and with the purpose of casting suspicion on him (the vagueness of the verb χρῆσθαι is well illustrated by the fact that φθόνωι describes a cause and διαβολῆι a purpose). But then he realises that other people may spread those rumours believing them to be true, and adds the dissymmetrical clause οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ κτέ. To emphasise the fact that the bad effect for him and the impossibility of defending himself will be the same in both cases, he adds πάντες to the main clause. Therefore, whereas the dash Burnet puts before οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοί is right, the second (after πείθοντες) is wrong, because it presents the main clause as related only to the slanderers in bad faith and so makes πάντες meaningless. If it had been Socrates' intention from the beginning to oppose both groups to that of the comedians, the sentence would have had some such form as ὅσοι δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ μὲν φθόνωι καὶ διαβολῆι χρώμενοι, οἱ δὲ (ὑπ' ἄλλων) αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι, οὗτοι πάντες κτέ. It is just such slight irregularities that give the style of the *Apology* its fluidity and liveliness.

d4-6 **οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν ... οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα**: cf. Lys. xii 24 ἀναβιβασάμενος δ' αὐτὸν (Eratosthenes) βούλομαι ἐρέσθαι, which is followed by an ἐρώτησις (or ἔλεγχος) quite similar to that of Meletus (24c9-28a1) but, understandably, much shorter.

d5 **ἐνταυθοῖ**: in Plato, this form occurs three times in the *Apology* and does not recur until *Phil.* (15a3) and *Laws* (v 734e3). In the later works it is a *recherché* variant of ἐνταῦθα; in the *Apology*, it means 'here in court' (18d5. 33d8. 40b2) and appears to belong to legal vocabulary, cf. Andoc. i 150; Ant. v 10; Dem. xxiii 66. For ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον cf. Ant. *l.c.* ἐνταυθοῖ πεποιήκασι τὴν κρίσιν ἐν τῆι ἀγορᾶι.

ἐλέγξαι: cf. notes on 21b9 and 29e5. Here, of course, 'to cross-examine'.

d6 **ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ**: ἀτεχνῶς underlines the correctness of the metaphor, ὥσπερ (in later dialogues οἷον; see the references in Ast *s.v.* ἀτεχνῶς) mitigates its boldness. The combination creates a balance characteristic of Plato's style, not unlike the balance found in δήπου (on which cf. Denn. 267 'the certainty of δή is toned down by the doubtfulness of που').

σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν: the position of τε is exceptional. Besides examples in poetry, Denn. 517 iv quotes one from Herodotus, one from Lysias and ten (one of which is ours) from Plato. In all these passages, two words (three in *Rep.* v 474e5) are closely bound together in meaning (πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε; χαρίσασθαι ἐκείνωι τε; ἐχέτω συγγνώμην τε, etc.). Here, the case seems to be different. The notion expressed by ἐλέγχειν corresponds to that of ἀπολογεῖσθαι and thus should have been expressed by a participle; then there would have been straightforward parallelism, and the position of τε would have been regular. In order, however, to make it clear that the ἔλεγχος here is a cross-examination, not a refutation or a proof, Plato adds the further precision μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. For the sake of maintaining a syntactic balance between the two groups and of balancing the main verb of the first, viz. σκιαμαχεῖν, with the main verb of the second, viz. ἐλέγχειν, upon which μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου depends, is put in the infinitive.

d7-e1 **ἀξιώσατε οὖν ... καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν** takes up, as a conclusion, the δίκαιός εἰμι that was formulated as a thesis in the first sentence of the Proposition.

d9 **ἑτέρους μὲν ... ἑτέρους δέ** are predicates; the old accusers are a first group, the new a second.

e1 **οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω**, 'about whom I have (just) been speaking'. The present λέγω can always refer to an earlier point in the argument, in so far as it is seen as continuous unity (cf. below 21b1. 24a6. d9. 30c7, although the imperfect is possible as well (e.g. 20e1. 26b1). The same usage of tenses is found in the formula ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω (17b6-7. 18d8), for which also the imperfect, the aorist and, in Plato's later works, even the perfect (for which see des Places *Formule de récurrence* 7-13) can be used. For οὓς λέγω as an equivalent to περὶ ὧν λέγω, compare 20d9-e1 οὗτοι ... οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον; 26b8-9; see further Dodds on *Gorg.* 490c8.

e5 **εἶεν** (or rather εἶέν), 'well', 'that is it', 'that will do'. This particle has nothing to do with the optative of εἰμί (the French translation 'soit', which is given not only by M. Croiset but even in Chantraine *DELG s.v.*, is as misleading for the sense as it is false for the etymology). It is used 'when the speaker is ready to proceed to the next point or the next step; usually he proceeds to it himself forthwith, and εἶέν then serves to preface a new topic or a new development in the argument or the announcement of a course of action' (Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 297). The very last possibility is what we have here. I would add that if, in a sense, εἶέν 'prefaces' what comes next, it does this by concluding peremptorily what preceded. It is always followed by a strong pause and a change of intonation. Cf. below the note on 34b6. Of the Orators, only Antiphon and Demosthenes use εἶέν.

ἀπολογητέον δή: δή is frequent in the sentence following upon εἶέν; see *Apol.* 19b2 εἶέν· τί δὴ λέγοντες κτέ.; *Gorg.* 508a8-b3 εἶέν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ ... ὁ λόγος ... ἤ ... σκεπτέον κτέ.; *Euthyd.* 279a1 εἶέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο (identical *Rep.* iii 412b8); *Phaed.* 105e8 εἶέν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; *Rep.* i 332d2 (οὖν δή); viii 543a1.

19a3 **εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί**: a subtle anticipation of what will be said below of the benefits the activity of Socrates brings to Athens (30c6-31b5; 36c2-e1) and of Socrates' trust in the care of Providence (30c8-9; 35d7-8; 39e1-42a5).

a4 **με ποιῆσαι**: the subject of the infinitive is expressed even though it is the same as that of βουλοίμην ἄν; this is regular when, as here, another infinitive has preceded with a different subject.

a5 **ὅμως**: the asyndeton with ὅμως seems to be very infrequent in Attic prose. At the beginning of a sentence, ὅμως δέ is exceedingly common (ὅμως μέντοι is rather rare) and ἀλλ' ὅμως is very frequent too (in some cases it can suggest a break-off, as *Apol.* 34d7). Certainly the following μὲν does not preclude either one of these two combinations, as appears from 33a5-6 ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην, and 38d6 ἀλλ' ἀπορίαι μὲν ἑάλωκα (compare also especially Lys. ii 2 ὅμως δὲ ὁ μὲν λόγος μοι περὶ τούτων). I have been able to discover only three other instances of asyndetic ὅμως: Lys. xxxi 3 γνώσεσθε μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπὸ ἴσης παρασκευῆς ἐγώ τε τοῦτον ἐλέγξω οἷός ἐστι καὶ οὗτος ἐπεχείρησε πονηρὸς εἶναι· ὅμως εἴ τι ἐγὼ ἐλλείποιμι τῶι λόγωι τῆς κατηγορίας, οὐκ ἂν δίκαιος εἴη διὰ τοῦτο ὠφεληθῆναι (the editors, after Markland, add <δ'> after ὅμως); Pl. *Charm.* 173a3-4 οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με· ὅμως τό γε προφαινόμενον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῆι παριέναι; *Rep.* i 345a5-7 ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῶι λανθάνειν ἢ τῶι διαμάχεσθαι· ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι (scil. ἡ ἀδικία) τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. So there are four examples where the MSS. do not have δέ; it certainly is not improbable that it should be added in each of them; still, the three Platonic instances seem to ring true: in each of them, ὅμως is preceded not by a statement of fact but by a suspicion (our passage and *Charm.*, *loc.cit.*) or a concession (*Rep.*, *loc. cit.*).

3. *19a8-20c3 Refutation of the Old Accusers*

19a8 **ἀναλάβωμεν**: the verb ἀναλαμβάνειν often means 'to pick something up in order to examine it', as *Apol.* 22b2; *Men.* 87e5; *Rep.* x 606e4; *Polit.* 261c4; it can also simply mean 'to examine', as in our passage and in *Phil.* 33c8-11 μνήμην ... ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν πρότερον ἀναληπτέον ... εἰ μέλλει τά περ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πηι γενήσεσθαι.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς: this phrase is very common in the Orators, either (as here) after the proposition, to introduce the proof (which in a defence will be the refutation) or, less frequently, to introduce the proposition itself; see Lys. i 5; vii 3; xii 3; xiii 4; xxxii 3; Isaeus ii 2; vii 4; Dem. xxxiv 5; xxxvi 3; xxxxvii 3; xl 5, etc.

a8-b2 **τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ... τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην**: Socrates contends there are three stages in the history of his prosecution: (1) the old accusation (ἡ κατηγορία), which is the doing of but a small group of people, those who were referred to above (18d2-3) as ὅσοι ... φθόνωι καὶ διαβολῆι χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον; (2) as a result of this (ἐξ ἧς) the bad reputation that Socrates got with ordinary people and the suspicion that they felt against him; (3) arising from these suspicions and this reputation (ἧι δὴ καὶ πιστεύων), the formal indictment brought in by Meletus. Plato likes to take up at the end of a section the idea with which he introduced it. Below (23c7-24a1), to conclude the Refutation of the Old Accusers, we find the same division into three stages, although more expanded and taking the form of a lively scene: (1) the victims of Socrates' cross-examinations wish to revenge themselves and spread accusations against him (23c7-d9); (2) while doing so, they succeed in 'filling the ears' of the Athenians with calumnies (23d9-e3); (3) as a result of this (ἐκ τούτων), Meletus, Anytus and Lycon attack Socrates with a lawsuit (23e3-24a1).

b1 **ἧι δὴ καὶ πιστεύων κτἑ.**: δή is the normal particle to emphasise a relative pronoun or adverb, or rather the connection expressed by it (Denn. 218-219); it can be strengthened further by a following καί (id. 294-295, i). Burnet, however, thinks that δή here means 'I suppose' and that 'Socrates professes not to know what Meletus really meant'. But first, although δή can indeed mark irony, and occasionally even skepticism — a use that is excellently analyzed by Denn. 229-236, it rarely, if at all, has this function in a relative clause. Second, what Socrates says here is not concerned with the exact meaning of Meletus' indictment, but with the relation between that indictment and the prejudices of the masses, a relation which is clearly that of effect and cause. Third, in the parallel passage 23e3-24a1, there is no sign of uncertainty.

πιστεύων: the verb does not mean here 'to trust something to be true', but 'to rely on something as providing a solid basis or adequate means to achieve one's purposes', in short 'to rely on something'; cf. Thuc. ii 39,1 πιστεύοντες (the Athenians) οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις (as Spartans do) ἢ τῶι ἀφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εἰς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχωι; v 112,2 τῆι ... μέχρι τοῦδε σωζούσηι τύχηι ... πιστεύοντες (the Melians); Plato *Laws* iii 682c2-3 (in the spite of former floods, people built cities) πιστεύσαντες οὐ σφόδρα ὑψηλοῖς τισιν λόφοις; Dem. xl 20; Ps.-Dem. xliv 3; Aesch. i 172. 194; Din. ii 4; iii 3. These two meanings of πιστεύω are mixed up in LSJ *s.v.* under I 1.

b2 **εἶεν**, 'that is it'; by inserting εἶεν Socrates insists that he has correctly formulated the question that should be examined.

διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες: this kind of repetition of the same nominal or verbal stem with variation both of the form and of the syntactical function (πολύπτωτον) is common even in Plato's so-called early works. In the *Apology* the following instances occur: 20d1-2 ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων (for which cf. note on 40c5); 22e1-5 ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῶι καὶ τῶι χρησμῶι ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν; 32c7 οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον; 34c1-2 εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῒ του ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη κτέ.; d2-3 ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι κτέ.; 36a2-3 οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο. Such turns, especially in a case like 34c1-2, are apt to strike the modern reader as contrived. It might be doubted, however, whether they felt to be so by Plato's contemporaries and, what probably amounts to the same thing, whether Plato himself used them as stylistic devices. As a whole, the style of the *Apology*, in accordance with Socrates' programmatic statement in the *Exordium* (17b8-c5), is very simple; in particular the Gorgianic figures are banned. The whole complex of problems concerning the polyptoton needs to be reexamined in depth.

b3 **ὥσπερ οὖν** because the slanderers are truly accusers (a8 ἡ κατηγορία), *therefore* (οὖν) we should examine their act of indictment, as a litigant does with his accusers.

c3 **Σωκράτη τινά**: here the indefinite pronoun is not contemptuous, as in 18b6, but suggests that the comedy gave a picture of 'some' imaginary Socrates, not of the real one.

φάσκοντα: the participle φάς of φημί is used neither in Attic authors nor in Attic inscriptions; its first appearance is in Aristotle, in the pair φάς and

ἀποφάς, with reference to affirmative and negative propositions (*Soph. El.* 30, 181b23-24; *De int.* 9, 18b7-8). Its regular substitute is φάσκων, the only part of the verb φάσκω used by Thucydides, Andocides, Plato and Aeschines. — The participles φάσκοντά τε ... καὶ φλυαροῦντα are subordinated to περιφερόμενον: Socrates is 'swinging about while he contends he walks through the air and talks a lot of other nonsense, etc.'.

c4-5 **ὧν ... πέρι**: the 'understood' antecedent is περὶ τούτων, 'talking a lot of nonsense about things about which ...'

c4 **οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν**: the same phrase below, 21b4. 24a5. 26b1; *Phil.* 21e1. 32e6-7. 33b3; *Laws* vii 793c7; x 900e7; *Epist. vii* 349b5-6; outside Plato, Dem. xix 17; Ps.-Dem. xxxv 17 (before 340 B.C.); xlviii 44 (about 341 B.C.); in d4 ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα the order of both words is reversed, a typically Platonic *variatio.*

c5 **ὡς ἀτιμάζων**: the present participle, whether with ὡς or without it, often has a final meaning, a usage which is well exemplified in Stahl 149-150, but mentioned neither by K.-G. nor by Goodwin nor by Schwyzer; see also W.J. Verdenius *Mnemos.* 27 (1974) 26. Here ἀτιμάζων does not mean '*hold* in slight honour', but '*treat* with scorn'; otherwise the sentence μή πως ... φύγοιμι, which was well explained by H. Richards *apud* Burnet, would not make sense.

c8 **ἀλλὰ γάρ**: breaking off (Denn. 103,2 ii).

d1 **μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι**: αὐτοὺς is the reading of BW, whereas TY have αὖ. Burnet adopts αὖ ('once more') and assumes that Socrates refers to 17c9 ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκήκοασι and 19c2 ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί. But neither of these passages seems to be specific enough to make αὖ sufficiently clear. Moreover, the parallels in the Orators favour αὐτούς: Lys. vii 25 αὐτοὺς τοίνυν ὑμᾶς τούτων μάρτυρας παρέχομαι; xii 74 καὶ τούτων ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι; cf. Dem. xviii 229.

d2 **διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν**, 'make it quite clear', emphatic coupling, as in 17c6-7.

d4 **φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις**: after the parenthetical sentence πολλοί δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, the main idea (ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν) is taken up with 'resumptive' οὖν (see notes on 17b6 and 40e2) and is now followed by an object, the indirect question εἰ πώποτε κτέ. This usage of οὖν is well acknowledged by Denn. 428,4; des Places *Particules* surprisingly ignores it.

d5 **ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε**: Meyer (56) rightly compares Dem. xviii 10 (if you know Aeschines' abuses of myself and my family to be untrue, then) τούτωι μὲν μηδ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πιστεύετε (δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως ἅπαντ' ἐπλάττετο). His comments, however, do not carry conviction. He says that this topos, since it is 'agonistischer Natur', is not any more 'sachlich berechtigt' in the *Apology* than elsewhere because the fact that Socrates is no cosmologist does not prove he is not guilty of τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. Actually, however, Socrates has just proved that one of the characteristics which were attributed to him was, in actual fact, imaginary; he invites the jury to conclude that other things for which public rumour is the only sole authority will also be totally unfounded. The accusation of being a Sophist, and thereby, of making the lie prevail upon the truth, he will refute presently.

d8 **ἀλλὰ γάρ**: cf. c8.

οὔτε ... οὐδέ γε: 'irregular responsion ... giving the effect of climax in the second limb' (Denn. 193 i), the first being simply a reminder of the contents of the preceding chapter.

τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν: with the meaning of 'being true' εἶναι is principally found in the answer-formula ἔστι ταῦτα (surprisingly enough, this formula is just mentioned (p. 14) but not taken into account by C. Ritter in his elaborate study of answers in Plato, *Untersuchungen über Plato* (Stuttgart 1888) 11-37). The veridical meaning is also found with the participles τὸ ὄν and τὰ ὄντα for 'truth' (singular e.g. *Rep.* x 613b10; plural e.g. *Phaedr.* 262b2; *Theaet.* 199b8) and in the adverbial phrase τῶι ὄντι. Elsewhere it seems to be rather uncommon. Aristotle discusses this meaning in *Metaph.* Δ 7, E 4 and Θ 10.

d9 **παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ**: the phrase, which is typical of an era when education was first felt to be of paramount importance and was first provided by people who made a profession of it, is found also in Isocr. xiii 1 εἰ πάντες ἤθελον οἱ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ μὴ μείζους ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ὧν ἔμελλον ἐπιτελεῖν, οὐκ ἂν κακῶς ἤκουον ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. Isocrates, unlike Socrates, did not object to the idea itself of 'undertaking to educate people', but only to exaggerated promises. In that respect, he truly continued the educational practices of the great Sophists, whom Plato constantly describes as making this their main ἐπάγγελμα (see e.g. *Prot.* 319a3-7; *Gorg.* 519c3-d1. e2-8; *Men.* 95b1-10; *Euthyd.* 273d8-9. 274a3-4, cf. 274e8-275a3). To be sure, Meno asserts that Gorgias refused to make that claim and derided people who did (*Men.* 95c1-4); he only called himself a teacher of rhetoric (cf. Dodds, *Comm. Gorg.* 7 and note on 459c6-d4). Still, Gorgias' activity is in so many respects akin to that of the

other Sophists, that it seems reasonable to include him among them; cf. Guthrie *Hist. Gr. Phil.* iii 36 and E.L. Harrison 'Gorgias'.

e1 **οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές**: for the duplication of the negative after οὐδέ, cf. *Gorg.* 510c3 and other instances mentioned by Denn. 197 ii.

ἐπεί ... γε: 'in sentences like this ἐπεὶ ... γε appears to mean "although", but that is only because it gives the reason for an antithesis not explicitly stated' (Burnet, note on *Euthyphro* 4c3, with further reference to 9b5 and *Apol.* 19e1). Recently, W. Kraus 'Ein konzessiv-adversatives ἐπεί?' *Forschungen zur römischen Literatur. Festschrift für Karl Büchner* (Wiesbaden 1970) 146-150, has argued for the same explanation at length, without, however, referring to Burnet. Starting from Thuc. ii 51,5 Kraus discusses 19 instances, 1 in Theognis, 4 in Thucydides and 14 in Plato. To the Platonic instances he quotes, add *Apol.* 20a2; *Prot.* 338c5; *Gorg.* 526a6; *Rep.* ii 358c6. 368b2; v 471c8. It may or may not be significant that in most of these places ἐπεί ... γε is used. Burnet's translation 'for the matter of that' is, as a rule, adequate; sometimes we may even translate 'since we mentioned that topic' (see note on 20a2). Cf. G.J. de Vries *Mnemos.* 23 (1970) 24-26. His examples and explanations, as well as those of Kraus, suggest that, apart from giving the reason for an implied antithesis ('I regret this because'), as Burnet says, the use may also be what is termed 'motivating' or 'indirect causal' ('I say this because'), e.g. Pl. *Symp.* 187a3-4 ὥσπερ ἴσως καὶ Ἡράκλειτος βούλεται λέγειν, ('I say "means"') ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε ῥήμασιν οὐ καλῶς λέγει; cf. Denn. 60 III 1 and 66 ii for a similar use of γάρ; note on 41a7 below. The latter is probably the origin of the idiom. See A. Rijksbaron *Temporal and Causal Conjunctions in Ancient Greek* (Amsterdam 1976) 71-72. 79-81; D. Muchnová 'Les propositions causales dites de motif' *Etudes de syntaxe du grec classique* (ed. M. Biraud), Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de Nice (Paris 1991) 135-143 — The καί that follows ἐπεί here (and in several other passages) does not coalesce with it but means 'too'; when καί means 'too', it is not often further emphasised by γε (Denn. 158,2). Socrates says 'that too' (καὶ τοῦτο) because his words (19c5-7) about natural philosophy imply that this is a most valuable thing, *provided* that it really is a science (which, in his opinion, the cosmological systems of his time were not).

e2 **εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη**: with reference to the natural philosophers there was a conditional clause in the indicative (19c6-7), although Socrates' skepticism was equal in both cases. But Plato likes to vary the expression of similar ideas; besides, the pretention of the Sophists is more dangerous, and therefore Socrates' irony is made more explicit. — When the indicative is used in the main clause governing a hypothetical clause, the optative is usually found in the subordinate clause when it *follows* the main clause. Goodwin § 501-502. 555 and Stahl 398-399, give many instances, but they

give conflicting explanations and neither is convincing; rather this is a sort of anacoluthon: the speaker first states something absolutely, and only afterwards feels some misgivings which he wants to express by adding a potential hypothetical clause. — Cf. my note *Mnemos.* 43 (1990) 355-356 S.R.S.

e4 **τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος κτέ.**: Socrates enjoys describing (ironically, of course) the amazing success of the Sophists; the sentence grows longer and more complex through the accumulation of various subordinate elements; this leads to a repetition of the verb and to an anacoluthon. Reinhard *Anakoluthe* 135-136 wrongly imputes the irregularity of the construction to Socrates' indignation at the corrupting influence of the Sophists; there is not one sharp word in the whole chapter, only a display of ironic admiration for what the Sophists prove able to accomplish.

e5-6 **τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν ... συνεῖναι ὧι ἂν βούλωνται**: before the Sophists started their activity, the only way a young Greek could train himself for public life was to 'associate with' (συνεῖναι) some influential man in his city, to hear him delivering speeches in Council or Assembly, pleading or testifying in trials, discussing political problems with his political friends or his opponents. The toung man could reciprocate applause or by going on some small errands for him. That is the situation that Socrates is referring to. The *Brutus* (305-307) shows how the young Cicero, while attending the lectures of the philosopher Philo of Larissa and the rhetor Molon of Rhodes, visited the Forum constantly in order to hear political and forensic speeches and the consultations of the able jurist Quintus Scaevola. — The verb συνεῖναι gradually acquired the meaning 'to attend someone's lessons', as *Gorg.* 455d2 τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; *Prot.* 313b7; so did the corresponding action noun συνουσία.

e6 **προῖκα**: Dodds (on *Gorg.* 519b3-521a1, p.365-366) remarks that in the fifth century 'to teach for money was still an ungentlemanly innovation', whereas 'in the fourth century ... the professional teacher was recognised and on the whole a respected figure.' However noble Socrates' disinterest might be, his attacks on the mere idea of paying for education were as unrealistic and antiquated as those which he quotes (with some sympathy, we regret to say) against the μισθοί introduced in Athens by Pericles in order to make democracy effective (*Gorg.* 515e2-9; see Dodds' sensible comments *in loc.*).

20a2 **χάριν προσειδέναι**: Fraenkel 'Socratis Apologia' 97 and Burnet *in loc.* aptly compare *Crat.* 391b10-11 χρήματα ἐκείνοις (scil. τοῖς σοφισταῖς) τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον.

ἐπεί, 'since we mentioned that topic'; a rather general statement that he has just made causes the speaker to remember some concrete fact that will

illustrate or confirm that statement; that this fact comes as an addition is expressed by καί. This is the indirect causal use, cf. on 19e1. See Chapter IV 55 and n.18.

ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἔστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός: logically, one would expect instead something like ἔστιν ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλος (τις) σοφὸς ἀνήρ, Πάριος. But word order in Plato is always very free. With him, one hyperbaton leads sometimes to a second and a third, so that there is an interlacing (cf. Denn. *Gr. Pr. St.* 54-55, which, however, is rather sketchy). Here, ἄλλος is placed at the beginning of the sentence, to contrast the new man with the 'big three' who were already mentioned. Πάριος follows close on ἐνθάδε to stress the fact that the man is a foreigner. Σοφός, a laudatory epitheton, is made emphatic by its position just before a marked pause.

a3 **ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα**: not οὗ ... ἐπιδημοῦντος; Socrates did not meet Euenus, but heard from Callias that the Sophist was staying in the City (cf. K.-G. ii 51).

a6 **δύο ὑεῖ**: in Athens around 400 B.C. the use of the dual, except in some formulaic phrases, was characteristic of colloquial as opposed to formal language. Our passage is one of the longest in Plato where the dual is consistently used (with 20b6 ὑέων as an exception at the end; Plato nearly always avoids absolute consistency), and the many dual forms contribute to give Socrates' words a tone of pseudo-naive bonhomie that contrasts with the reservedness of the once wealthy and still self-complacent Callias.

a7 **πώλω ἢ μόσχω**: when arguing *a minore ad maius* (see Chapter IV 56; Chapter VII 133-134), Socrates likes to start with examples taken from the care of animals; cf. *Apol.* 25a13-b6 (cf. also 27b5-6); *Euthyphro* 13a4-c5; *Gorg.* 516a5-b3; *Rep.* i 335b6-12 (quoted below, on b1); 342c4-7.

ἐγενέσθην, 'had been born' as foals or calves, not 'were', which would be ἤστην.

b1 **τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν**: there is, in itself, no irony in speaking about the ἀρετή of animals. For this fact and for the specificity of the ἀρετή of every kind of being, compare *Rep.* i 335b6-c3 (Socrates conversing with Polemarchus) Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνονται; — Χείρους. — Ἆρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων; — Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. — Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετήν; — Ἀνάγκη. —Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίγνεσθαι; — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Cf. *ib.* x 601d4-5 ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους <u>καὶ ζώιου</u> καὶ πράξεως.

b4 **τίς τῆς τοιαύτης κτἑ.**: asyndeton is not infrequent when two or more successive questions start with the same word (here τίνα ...; τίς ...;); at the end of the series the last question may be of a different type (here ἔστιν τις;); cf. Denn. *Gr. Pr. St.* 116; D. Fehling *Wiederholungsfiguren* 187-189.

τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, 'the goodness of the man and the citizen' (Burnet); cf. *Prot.* 322e2. 323a7. b2. 324a1. Despite the verbal similarity, *this* πολιτικὴ ἀρετή is something quite different from what several dialogues call δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή ('vulgar and social virtue') as opposed to 'true' or 'philosophical virtue' (*Phaed.* 82a10-b3, cf. 68c5-69c3, esp. 69b3; *Rep.* vi 500d4-9, cf. x 619c7-d1; *Laws* iv 710a5-b2), although modern scholars sometimes let themselves be deluded, like Görgemanns *Platons Nomoi* 125 n.1 and J. Klein *A commentary on Plato's Meno* (Chapel Hill 1965) 39 n.17. — There is no warrant at all for representing, as is often done, the Socrates of the *Apology* as an individualist who has freed himself from the bonds of the πόλις; on the contrary, he always sees the human ideal as both personal and civic; see *Apol.* 36c5-8; *Gorg.* 527b5-6; *Rep.* x 599d4-6 and, of course, the *Crito* as a whole.

b9 **ἐμακάρισα**: compare the scene in the *Euthydemus* where Dionysodorus claims that he and his brother are able to impart ἀρετή better than any other men: Ἀρετήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμεθα οἵω τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα. — Ὦ Ζεῦ, οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγετον πρᾶγμα ... Μακαρίζω ἄρ' ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς (273d8-e1. 274a6-7).

c1 **ἐμμελῶς**: on the fees paid to the Sophists we have but scanty and scattered evidence. The amount of 100 mnas that, according to Diog. Laert. ix 52 (80A1 D.-K.), Protagoras and, according to the *Suda* γ 388 (82A2 D.-K.), Gorgias charged each of their pupils certainly is impossibly high, since a drachma or a drachma and a half was in the time of Pericles the daily wages of a free worker at Athens (see note on 26d10ff.). The *Cratylus* 384b3 mentions τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν of Prodicus, which one could hear on the ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων; this would not be a single lecture but a course. Nestle *Vom Mythos zum Logos* 259, speaking of the fees of fifth-century Sophists, writes: 'das Gewöhnliche waren 3 bis 4 Minen ... für einen Unterrichtskursus', without giving any reference. The source, however, can only be Isocr. xiii 3, where he speaks about the eristics of his own time (the Κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν should probably be dated ca. 390 B.C.). Isocrates himself, according to Ps.-Plut. *x orat. vitt.* 837c, charged 1000 drachmas (10 mnas); this information, which in the Ps.-Plut. is linked to an obviously apocryphal anecdote about Demosthenes, was probably derived from a source we still possess, namely Ps.-Dem. xxxv 42 (about 351 B.C.). There, the unknown litigant says that his adversary, Lacritus, 'relies on his oratorical skill and on the thousand mnas he has paid his teacher', whom he

elsewhere (§ 15) identifies as Isocrates. From Isocr. xv 87, we learn that a full course at his school lasted for three or four years. Since the program of the ἐριστικοί about whom he speaks in xiii 3 would have covered a more narrow range of subjects than his program, one can expect their teaching to have extended over a shorter period; this could explain the lower fees they charged. Since Euenus seems not to have stayed permanently in Athens (Socrates had just heard about his arrival, although this would not be his first visit to the city), his course, too, will have been shorter than Isocrates'. So his fee does not strike us as especially low. Probably the οὕτως ἐμμελῶς of Socrates is as ironical as everything Plato represents him as saying about Euenus, in the *Phaedo* (see 60d8-e1; 61c6-9) as well as in the *Apology*. The man is only a second-rate Sophist; and Callias, who has nearly ruined himself entertaining expensive lecturers like Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus (see Plato's *Protagoras*), is glad enough that this time the amount is not so high as it would be for Euenus' more illustrious competitors. (Cf. Vlastos *Socrates* 241 n.26 'since the promise is a fraud his [Euenus'] product is outrageously expensive at any price'.) Finally, and this is Socrates' main point, although it is playfully expressed, ἀρετή is such an invaluable good that any price, however high, would still be a pittance to pay for it.

ἐγὼ γοῦν: 'Much the commonest use of γοῦν is to introduce a statement which is, *pro tanto*, evidence for a preceding statement. This has been well termed "part proof"' (Denn. 451-453, ii); cf. des Places *Particules* 133-135.

4. *20c4-24b2 Narration*

20c4 **ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν**: on this way of introducing an objection, see below, note on 28b3.

ἀλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες, 'following a rejected suggestion or supposition [here: that Socrates is a cosmologist or a Sophist] ... ἀλλά introduces, not a fresh suggestion, but a question. The speaker throws the burden of selection on the rejecter' (Denn. 9 II 1 i); Plato makes the question more urgent by inserting a vocative immediately after the particle.

c5 **τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα**: according to Burnet, who was followed by several other scholars, i.a. E. Wolff and W. Jaeger, τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα means 'your business', 'pursuit', 'occupation'. He adds, referring to *Phaed.* 61c8-9 and *Theaet.* 168a8-b1, 'The word [πρᾶγμα] is used more than once of philosophy regarded as a "way of life"'. But in both those passages, we find **τοῦτο** τὸ πρᾶγμα, which means quite simply 'the thing we just mentioned' and which in those places happens to be philosophy. The usual translation 'What's the matter with you?', 'What's your situation?' is certainly the right one. When it has this meaning, πρᾶγμα is normally accompanied by a possessive pronoun or a possessive genitive. Cf. *Crit.* 53c8-d1 (if by running away Socrates undermines the laws of his own city, will he have the effrontery, in another city, to argue that justice and law are the highest values?) καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; ('will Socrates' predicament not look shameful?'); *Hipp. mai.* 286e8-287a1 (Hippias promises to give Socrates such a solution of the problem of beauty that nobody will be able to raise any more objections) φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν ('my situation would be utterly common and not differ from that of ignorant people'); *Alc. I* 104d3-4 (Alcibiades cannot understand why Socrates is still wooing him, whereas all others gave it up) τῶι ὄντι γὰρ θαυμάζω ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα ('I wonder really what is the matter with you'); *Symp.* 217c6 (Alcibiades thought Socrates was enamoured of his beauty and gave him several opportunities, which Socrates, however, did not take advantage of; now he decides to make a frontal attack) ἰστέον ἤδη τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα ('one ought at last to find out what it is all about'); Dem. xxv 95 ἀνίατον, ἀνίατον, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἐστὶ τὸ τούτου (viz. Ἀριστοκράτους; 'the case of that man is simply desperate'). In Hyperides *Lyc.* A II 2, p.130 Colin, τοιοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ Ἀρίστωνος τουτουὶ πρᾶγμα, both translations are possible, but in light of the passages quoted above, it is reasonable to understand: 'the case with that man Ariston is as follows'. Cf. also 42a4 and the note.

πόθεν κτέ.: for the asyndeton, see above the note on 20b4.

c6 **σοῦ γε**: the collocations ἔγωγε and σύ γε are exceedingly common, as Denn. shows p.122-123. On p.151 (with n.1), he makes an interesting remark about the position of γε in sentences introduced by οὐ γὰρ δή, οὐ γάρ ... που or similar groups. Normally, γε emphasises the word which it immediately follows. But, in negative sentences of the kind just mentioned, 'that does not exclude the possibility that γε also attaches itself to the preceding particles: and that this is in fact so, follows from the consideration of passages in which γε is preceded by an unemphatic word.' Although I had accepted this doctrine at first, I now have my misgivings. In every one of the five instances quoted by Denn. (all from Plato), there is a real emphasis on the word preceding γε: *Gorg.* 489d3-4 οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγῆι τοῦ ἑνός ('emphasis on τοὺς δύο', according to Denn.; but the preceding sentence opens with ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω κτέ.; σύ is contrasted with ἐγώ ... καὶ αὐτός and therefore emphasised by γε); *Rep.* vi 509a7-8 οὐ γὰρ δὴ σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτό (= τὸ ἀγαθόν) καλεῖς ('emphasis on ἡδονήν'; but Socrates just commented enthusiastically on the exalted rank of the Good and said that it even transcends 'knowledge'; this is an allusion to 505b5-6, where, at the very beginning of the discussion about the Good, he had said that οἱ πολλοί identify it with pleasure, the 'more refined' with understanding. Since Socrates has just placed the Good even above knowledge, Glaucon can say '*you*, at least, will not do as one of the πολλοί and identify the Good with pleasure'); *Lach.* 195a5 οὔκουν φησί γε Νικίας ('emphasis on Νικίας'; but Laches did just say χωρὶς δήπου σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας, making a statement about *facts*; Socrates answers: '(whatever the facts may be,) this, at least, is not what Nicias *contends*); in *Apol.* 20c6, σοῦ γε is evidently contrasted with τῶν ἄλλων and therefore emphasised. Finally, Denn. quotes (151 n.1) *Symp.* 205e2-3 ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνηι γέ που ... ἀγαθὸν ὄν and says that in that passage 'where the stress is on ἀγαθόν, not on τυγχάνηι, γε really belongs to ἐάν'. But τυγχάνω ὤν means 'to be fundamentally' or 'by essence' (see the note on 29a7-8); here τυγχάνηι is indeed the word that γε emphasises.

περιττότερον, 'excessive', 'abnormal', 'out of the common'. Adjectives and adverbs expressing a difference (either from some particular entity, or from a norm) are in Greek often used in the comparative, so with ἐνδεέστερος, which is the opposite of περιττότερος (*Gorg.* 487b1; *Phaed.* 74e3, etc.), νεώτερος (*Apol.* 25a6, etc., compared with 24e4, etc.; *Euthyphro* 2a1; *Prot.* 310b5), καινότερος (*Phaed.* 115b5), ἀλλοιότερος (*Crit.* 46d6; *Crat.* 402b1), ἀλλοτριώτερος (*Rep.* vi 491d7). — Cf. Kühner-Blass i 564 n.9; K.-G. ii 306, and, for a more detailed treatment, Wittwer 'Suffix -τερος', whose collection of examples, however, is incomplete (thus for καινότερος only Theophrastus is quoted, not, however, *Phaed.*, *l.c.*, nor Xen. *Mem.* i 1,3, nor Isocr. xv 47), and whose interpretations are not cautious enough.

c7 **ἔπειτα** *mirantis* (cf. K.-G. ii 281), common after a participle, which in that case cannot be conditional; and here πραγματευομένου is not, since οὐδέν, not μηδέν, is used.

d3 **ὄνομα** is not, as often in Latin *nomen* and English *name*, a synonym of *fame*, but refers to the epithet σοφός (see 23a3, and further 18b7; 20d6-8; 38c3-4) as given to Socrates.

d4 **ἀκούετε δή**: 'with imperatives, usually, but not always, directly following the verb' (Denn. 216-217, iii), δή is primarily emphatic, but the transition to the connective or progressive meaning is a very easy one (*ib.* 236-240).

d5 **παίζειν**: the impression that Socrates is joking arises principally from his irony. He is wont to depreciate himself and to speak in the most flattering terms about the knowledge, dexterity, power or beauty of others (this is the proper meaning of εἰρωνεία, as Burnet rightly pointed out in his note on 38a1). Sometimes, however, he seems to boast (μέγα λέγειν, 20e5), as he seems to do now, when he says that he possesses σοφία; it will, however, soon appear that the σοφία he claims is very modest. In such cases his words somehow always have a *double entendre*, so that he seems to play not only with the people he speaks to, but with the reader as well. Still, he is quite serious at the same time. Actually, play is just the carefree and ironic side of earnestness, with which it is frequently alloyed in Plato. On παιδία and σπουδή, see C. Ritter *Platos Gesetze* (Leipzig 1896) 17-22, and G.J. de Vries' very thought-provoking book *Spel bij Plato*.

d6 **ἀλλ' ἤ**: after a negative, often (as here) after οὐδέν, with the meaning 'except', 'but'. In classical Greek, it is felt as a compound of ἀλλά and ἤ (not of ἄλλο or ἄλλα and ἤ); therefore a form of ἄλλος or ἕτερος can be found in the preceding part of the sentence, as in *Apol.* 34b3-4; *Phaed.* 97d2-3, etc. — Cf. K.-G. ii 284-285.

d7 **ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην**: δή often emphasises interrogative pronouns and adverbs (Denn. 210,5 i). — In questions, in which the interrogative pronoun has, as here, a predicative function, the subject, whether expressed or understood, remains in the same case as in the preceding sentence.

d8 **ἴσως**: in this 'boastful' passage, Socrates is speaking with exceptional caution and modesty, as appears from ἴσως and, in d9, κινδυνεύω and τάχα.

ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία: according to the Platonic Socrates, the human form of understanding, that is, the knowledge of one's own ignorance, is half-way between the gods' absolute knowledge and the presumptuous attitude of conceited people, as was explained at length in Chapter V 62-64. For the

Xenophontic Socrates, 'human knowledge' would rather be knowledge whose area is limited to man and human affairs and which refrains from exploring what is above man and does not concern him (*Mem.* i 1,12): καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν (scil. the natural philosophers) πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων (the cosmological problems) φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. In Plato's dialogues, Socrates never insists on restricting the field of human inquiry, but on the contrary, on expanding it, because no part can be understood except in its relation to the whole (cf. *Charm.* 156a9-c9; *Meno* 81c7-e1).

e1 **ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω**: of course, Socrates could say that they are simply conceited, and therefore the true name of their so-called σοφία would be ἀμαθία, but both good manners (τὸ ἀστεῖον) and his εἰρωνεία prevent him, here and elsewhere, from saying such things.

e2 **οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε κτἑ.**: true possession of any kind of knowledge, be it virtue or technical skill, implies that the possessor has some perception of it and so will have at least some tentative opinion about its nature; cf. *Charm.* 158e7-159a3.

αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι: in Greek ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην or τέχνην τινά does not differ in meaning from ἔχειν τέχνην (20c1).

e3 **φησί**, 'says that I *do*'; φημί is 'I affirm' as οὔ φημι is 'I deny'. Cf. on 29e3 and 33c4.

ἐπὶ διαβολῆι τῆι ἐμῆι: 'with the intention of making me suspected': for ἐπί with dative indicating the purpose, cf. K.-G. i 502-503.

e4 **μοι** here and 27b1 will be ethical dative, 'please'; cf. K.-G. i 423 d.

e6 **ἀξιόχρεων**: 'trustworthy', an appropriate epithet for a witness; cf. Dem. xl 61 μάρτυρας ἀξιόχρεως παρασχέσθαι. The same words ἀχιόχρεως and ἀναφέρειν are used by Euripides' Orestes when, in a desperate situation, he asks whether the Delphic Apollo, who ordered him to kill his mother, 'is not for him, Orestes, who appeals to that command, trustworthy, so that he will cleanse him from his stain', ἢ οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως ὁ θεὸς ἀναφέροντί μοι μίασμα λῦσαι (*Or.* 597-598).

e7 **εἰ δή**, 'whether actually'. The interpretation of δή as 'actually' is mentioned by Denn. 223-224 only in the case of conditional εἰ, but it should undoubtedly be accepted in our passage after interrogative εἰ.

21a1 **ἑταῖρος**: In Plato, this word has a wide range of semantic values, as appears from F. Sartori 'Platone e le eterie' *Historia* 7 (1958) 157-171. For the first use in our passage (ἐμός ... ἑταῖρος), cf. *Phaed.* 118a15 and *Lys.* 204a5 (see also *Soph.* 216a3); for the second (ὑμῶν τῶι πλήθει ἑταῖρος), which suggests only agreement on quite general lines of policy, not the membership of a close and partly secret group (συνωμοσία *Apol.* 36b8), cf. *Gorg.* 510a10 and *Epist. vii* 325d1.

ὑμῶν τῶι πλήθει: this phrase, or the more common τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον, can, in a speech, designate either the Athenian Assembly as the governing body of the democracy (as in 31c6), or special bodies (the Council, the juries) that deal with some kinds of public affairs as substitutes of the Assembly, or the democratic regime as such, or finally, as here, the democratic 'party'; for the latter see i.a. Andoc. i 136. 150; Lys. xii 66-67. xiii 1. 2. 11. 18; xxiv 25; Demosth. xxiv 111. 134. See also note on 31e2.

a3 **ἴστε δή**: emphatic δή is relatively common with words denoting certainty and evidence, as the verbs ὁρᾶν and εἰδέναι (Denn. 215 ii a) and the adjective δῆλος (*ib.* 205 ii).

Χαιρεφῶν: for the final position, cf. note on 40c5.

ὡς σφοδρός: for the asyndeton, see above, note on 20b4.

ἐφ' ὅτι ὁρμήσειε: 'with regard to anything that he pursued', πρὸς τοῦτο ἐφ' ὅτι.

a4 **καὶ δή ... καί** marks the progression from the general statement about Chaerephon's impetuous character to the specific example that is relevant in the context. The insertion of a word (here the enclitic ποτε) between δή and καί is exceptional; Denn. 257 refers only to *Soph.* 251c5 καὶ δή τι καί, although he quotes *Apol.* 21a4 on p.250. Add *Resp.* x 619b2 καὶ δὴ οὖν καί.

a5 **μὴ θορυβεῖτε** as opposed to 20e4 μὴ θορυβήσητε is probably a more urgent appeal. In itself, the negated present imperative can, but need not, imply that the action forbidden by the speaker is already taking place. Cf. C.J. Ruijgh *Mnemos.* 38 (1985) 28: 'on peut paraphraser la valeur de μὴ γράφε par "*stop!* ne continue pas à écrire" ... ou par "*stop!* ne commence pas à écrire"'. In the *Apology*, all requests to the jury not to make disturbances (but one) excuse potentially shocking language that Socrates is going to use, not using already: 17c6-d1 (Socrates is going to speak in his usual manner); 20e3-5 (he is going to cite Apollo as a witness); here (Chaerephon actually asked if anyone was wiser than Socrates); 27a9-b2 (Socrates will ask questions the way he always does); 30c4-6 (Socrates is about to say that

Meletus and Anytus cannot harm him). Cf. also 31e1. For similar passages in the Orators, see Ps.-Dem. lvii 50 and Lyc. *Leocr.* 52. Only at 30c2-3 is it likely that the jurors are protesting (Socrates has just said that he will not forsake his ἐπιτήδευμα even if he has to die many times), and at 27b5 Meletus is in fact shouting (cf. *in loc.*). Cf. L.A. Post *AJP* 59 (1938) 42 n.12: 'The common explanation of the succession μὴ θορυβήσητε, μὴ θορυβεῖτε in the *Apology*, that an uproar has arisen in the meantime, is most improbable though it cannot be disproved'.

a6 **ἀνεῖλεν**: the use of ἀναιρέω for 'to give an oracle' seems to have originated in a time when lots were put in the basin of a tripod and the Pythia had to pick one up to answer the question that had been asked. The relevant texts are fully discussed in P. Amandry *La mantique apollinienne à Delphes* (Paris 1950) 25-36; cf. J. Fontenrose *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley 1978) 219-223. The most interesting passage is Pl. *Rep.* x 617c6-618a1 which, however, does not refer to Delphic cleromancy, but to the lots scattered among the souls before their next reincarnation: since each soul picks up a κλῆρος for itself (the lots determine the order in which the souls select the kind of life they will lead on earth), the verb is in the middle voice. — Parke - Wormell *Delph. Or.* i, 414-415 (note 22 to p.403), consider it possible that the answer given to Chaerephon 'was determined by drawing one of two beans', one for a positive, one for a negative answer. In that case, ἀνεῖλεν would unexpectedly recover its original meaning. Fontenrose maintains that the Pythia always gave a spoken answer, and sometimes drew a lot in addition.

μηδένα: the negative μή is found in indirect discourse not only after ὑπισχνοῦμαι, but after other verbs expressing or denoting a solemn assertion, as ὀμνύναι, μαρτυρεῖν, ἐγγυᾶσθαι, etc. Cf. K.-G. ii 195-196; Goodwin § 685. — A.C. Moorhouse *Studies in the Greek Negatives* (Cardiff 1950) does not examine as such the question after what kinds of verbs the infinitive is negated by οὐ and μή respectively; the discussion p.121-130 touches on the issue, but restricts itself to the question whether with particular verbs the negative is attached to the infinitive or to the main verb.

a7 **ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει**: a nice example (cf. above, note on 20a2) of the free word order in Plato's 'early' works. The position of each word is determined by the degree of emphasis that the speaker wants to give to each element of the sentence. First, ὁ ἀδελφός: the status of the witness is of paramount importance; after this, those who are to be convinced (ὑμῖν); αὐτοῦ, previously deferred, can now come in; next οὑτοσί, as Socrates looks around and points to him (the late position of οὑτοσί seems to be regular in such a case; cf. *Apol.* 33d9. e3); and at the end the verb, which has no emphasis, since everybody knew that μαρτυρή-

σει would come. See note on 40c5 on sentence-final position of wholly predictable constituents.

b1 **ταῦτα λέγω**: for the present tense, see above, note on 18e1. — The story of the oracle was not told for its own sake, but only because it initiated a process which led to enmity against Socrates.

b3 **τί ποτε λέγει κτέ.**: the string of very short sentences and way Socrates asks the same question in different words three times suggest his perplexity; they show how he discussed the problem with himself and considered it from every angle without being able to find a satisfactory answer. The second formulation (with αἰνίττεσθαι) is more precise than the first (with λέγειν): it implies that Socrates' embarrassment was purposely provoked by the god. There must be a hidden meaning and therefore the oracle is an enigma indeed. On the one hand, the apparent meaning of the response cannot be accepted, since Socrates has no knowledge at all; and on the other hand the god — so much is certain (δήπου) — does not lie.

b4 **αἰνίττεται**: in a discussion of a statement of Simonides, Socrates says that speaking in riddles (αἰνίττεσθαι) means to use words (ὀνομάζειν) that say one thing but mean (διανοεῖσθαι) something else (*Rep.* i 332b9-c3). Poets are wont to do this (ποιητικῶς), but seers even more so, as Critias says in the *Charmides* with reference to the Delphic maxim γνῶθι σεαυτόν: λέγει (scil. ὁ θεός) πρὸς τὸν ἀεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ Σωφρόνει, φησίν. αἰνιγματωδέστερον δὲ δή, ὡς μάντις, λέγει (164e5-7). Such enigmas, however, were apt to lead people astray, and actually did (165a1-7). Therefore, what an inspired soothsayer says has to be interpreted by a προφήτης, an 'expounder'. The *Timaeus* protests against confusion between these two functions: 'Hence it is custom to set out interpreters to pronounce judgment on inspired oracles. Some people call them diviners, failing utterly to understand that they are just competent messengers of omens given by riddles or imagery (τῆς δι' αἰνιγμῶν οὗτοι φήμης καὶ φαντάσεως ὑποκριταί) and they should not by any means be called diviners, but with absolute correctness interpreters of what is divined' (72a6-b5; see Taylor *in loc.*). — What Socrates does in *Apol.* 21b4 is more than simply state that oracles need to be interpreted. He means exactly the same thing as Heraclitus had already said in words that were themselves somewhat enigmatic: ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει (22B93 D.-K.), in which κρύπτειν should not be translated 'to hide', but 'to suppress', 'to keep secret'. With his oracles, the Delphic god does not free us from the need for reflection and investigation; he just gives us a hint. By looking for what is concealed behind an apparent contradiction (22B51. 54) man can reach a deeper truth which cannot be learned by collecting information instead of thinking. — On the parallelism between poets and seers, see Chapter I 19 and below, notes on 22a9 and b8,

and my paper 'Poet's call and poet's status' *Listy filologické* 112 (1989) 72-80, esp. 76 n.29 S.R.S.

b6 **θέμις**: cf. Chapter VII 147-148 and n.52; Chapter XI n.100.

b8 **ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ**: the anaphoric pronoun αὐτοῦ can refer to (and be translated) 'the question at hand'; cf. *Phaedr.* 269d6 with G.J. de Vries' note *in loc.* and Hyper. *Eux.* 16: ἐξετάσωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τουτονὶ τὸν τρόπον.

τοιαύτην τινά: although 'the following' is more commonly indicated by τοιόσδε than by τοιοῦτος, τοιοῦτος is preferred when the indefinite τις is added; τοιόσδε τις is infrequent (*Rep.* i 351e9; *Symp.* 173e7; *Phil.* 54b1).

b9-c1 **ὡς ... ἐλέγξων**; 'thinking that here, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong' (Fowler's translation). True, ἐλέγχω can mean 'to cross-examine', 'to test' (LSJ *s.v.* II 1-3) as well as 'to refute', 'to prove wrong' (*ib.* 4 a). But the following words show clearly that the second meaning is intended here, since Socrates goes on καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῶι χρησμῶι ὅτι οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. What he tries to make clear is that the oracular response is not true. To be sure, he said only a moment before that the god cannot be lying because for him such a thing is out of the question (21b6-7). Nevertheless, Socrates knows for a fact that he has no cleverness whatever. So he will show not, of course, that the god is lying, but that the oracle, as it stands, is untrue and requires a special interpretation to make it true. So rightly Hackforth *Composition* 89: 'Puzzled by this oracle, he [Socrates] will refute it, will prove it to be false.'

c3 **διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον κτέ.**: the correct punctuation of this sentence seems to me the one defended by L. Reinhard *Anakoluthe* 180-181, following Hermann-Wohlrab and others. ὀνόματι οὖν opens a parenthesis which ends with c5 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. Therefore, the participle διαλεγόμενος αὐτῶι is coordinated by καί with διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον (in a sense, it simply reiterates the idea); both are what is sometimes called by the infelicitous name 'nominative absolutes' (a name which Reinhard, p.181, rejects; '*nominativus pendens*' is more correct) and actually involve an anacoluthon. K.-G. ii 105-106 show that this type of anacoluthic nominative is particularly frequent if the participle is coreferential with a following dative (as is the case with ἔδοξέ μοι). [Cf. S.R.S. 'Written and spoken language' 96-99.] Very similar to our passage is *Laws* iii 686d8-9 ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν στόλον οὗ πέρι διαλεγόμεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλος ... εἶναι. It does not seem possible to end the parenthesis after τῶν πολιτικῶν, as Croiset does. For then πρὸς ὅν would simply pick up τοῦτον; in Attic Greek, however, the relative pronoun does not have that function, which is normally fulfilled by οὗτος and a particle (here we would have had: πρὸς τοῦτον οὖν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν κτέ.). Burnet puts a dash after διαλεγόμενος

αὐτῶι, which suggests that these words end the parenthesis opened at ὀνόματι γάρ. This, however, is impossible, since καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῶι is not an acceptable *end* of a sentence; the similarity of this group to διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον shows that it, too, prepares the way for a main verb that will follow.

ὀνόματι ... οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν: Burnet sees in these words an allusion to Anytus. I think rather that Socrates does not wish to be specific, all the more so since a personal attack would divert attention from his main point here. Similarly, when Lysias xii 42 says μετὰ Ἰατροκλέους καὶ ἑτέρων ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, the names of those individuals are for his purpose simply irrelevant.

c6-7 **δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ... εἶναι δ' οὔ**: the opposition between a knowledge that exists in reality and one that exists only in the opinion of men (δοξοσοφία) is still a favourite topic in Plato's later dialogues, e.g. *Phaedr.* 275a6-b2; *Soph.* 229c1-10 (cf. 231b5-8); *Phil.* 48d8-49a2 (cf. 49d11); *Laws* v 732a3-b2.

d2 **πρὸς ἐμαυτόν**: with ἐλογιζόμην, cf. *Hipp. mai.* 288a7-8 πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἀναλάβω 'let me go over it for myself'; 295a5 σκεψαίμην πρὸς ἐμαυτόν.

δ' οὖν brushes aside, for the time being, the matter of the ill-will that Socrates' investigation aroused in the victims and in the bystanders (Socrates will return to that subject below, 22e6-23a5 and 23c7-24b1) in order to focus attention on the conclusion which he drew from the first examination; cf. Denn. 461-462.

τούτου μέν: a typical instance of μέν *solitarium* (Denn. 380-382), which is practically equivalent to γε (d6 τούτου γε).

d4 **οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι**: Socrates does not categorically disclaim any kind of knowledge, but what he knows is not very important; see Chapter II 37 and n.35. Cf. Wankel *Kalos kai agathos* 103, who compares *Gorg.* 518c4-5 οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν.

ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν κτἑ.: normally κινδυνεύει μέν would have been balanced by a δέ clause. Here, however, the second part of the antithesis is at once itself divided into a μέν / δέ antithesis. Attic usage, which allows μὲν γάρ / δέ, μὲν οὖν / δέ, μὲν τοίνυν / δέ and similar groups, does not tolerate μὲν δέ / δέ, although Wilamowitz *Geschichte der griechischen Sprache* (Berlin 1928) 14 n.1 = *Kleine Schriften* iii (Berlin 1969) 470 n.1 has pointed out that this combination is found elsewhere, namely in an inscription from Cyrene. Instead of μὲν δέ, one has to use ἀλλὰ ... μέν, and so one may even find, as here, μὲν / ἀλλὰ ... μέν. Curiously enough, Denn., who speaks

about ἀλλά balancing μέν (5-6, ii) does not mention this rule and therefore fails to recognise instances of it as a separate class: he quotes examples of it (Herod. viii 46,1; *Lach.* 191e4-5) with others which belong to quite a different kind (e.g. with ἀλλά 'breaking off').

d5 **ὥσπερ ... οὐκ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι**: this repeats almost verbatim *Meno* 84b1 ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδ' οἴεται εἰδέναι, where Socrates uses these words for the slave who, having been shown his error, realises that he does not know (ἀπορεῖ). See Chapter V 65.

d6 **ἔοικα γοῦν**: see the note on 20c1. This instance of γοῦν is discussed extensively by Denn. 455-456, II 1.

d7 **ἐντεῦθεν**, 'after that', in a purely chronological sense, not as d1 ('as a result').

d8 **ᾖα**: the imperfect of this verb can be used in the aoristic sense; cf. Blass - Debrunner - Rehkopf § 99, 1 (the fact seems to go unmentioned in the major grammars of Classical Greek); an aoristic sense is appropriate here and below 22a8. — On the other hand, ᾖα may here be a true imperfect denoting the background of an event, cf. my *Comm. Clit.* 373; at 22a8, it may be used to begin a narrative, cf. A. Rijksbaron 'The Discourse Function of the Imperfect' in id. (ed.) *In the Footsteps of Raphael Kühner* (Amsterdam 1988) 237-254 S.R.S.

e1 **ἐνταῦθα**, 'then', 'thus'.

ἄλλοις πολλοῖς: these are not the third, fourth and successive victims, but the bystanders who were present at the examination of the second (cf. d1 πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων for the bystanders at the examination of the first). It is only in the next sentence that Socrates speaks more generally about the continuation of his investigations and its consequences (note the contrast of the imperfect ἀπηχθανόμην e4 with the aorist ἀπηχθόμην e2).

e3 **ἐφεξῆς ᾖα**: as is suggested by ἐφεξῆς and confirmed by the imperfect ἐδόκει (e5), this ᾖα should be understood as a true imperfect. — From Homer on (ζ 241 πάσας ἑξείης), ἑξῆς (ἑξείης) and ἐφεξῆς are commonly used in combination with πᾶς.

e3-5 **αἰσθανόμενος μέν ... ὅμως δὲ ἐδόκει**: the regular construction would have been αἰσθανόμενος μέν ...ὅμως δὲ ἡγούμενος, with a participle in the second member as well as in the first; but the resoluteness with which Socrates decides to put the interests of the god above everything causes the shift to an independent construction; this nice anacoluthon is not mentioned by Reinhard.

e3 **καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς**: we should not, as Croiset does, understand the first καί as corresponsive (καὶ ... καὶ ...), because the difference in meaning between λυπούμενος and δεδιώς is not important enough for that (see the instances in Denn. 323-324, III 1; K.-G. ii 249). Cobet, followed by Burnet, bracketed the first καί. This, however, is not necessary: the first καί simply connects the group λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς with αἰσθανόμενος, as in Dem. liv 4 ὁρῶντες δ' ἡμεῖς καὶ λυπούμενοι. On this reading, ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην is object of αἰσθανόμενος, complement bordering on cause adjunct of λυπούμενος, cause adjunct of δεδιώς.

e5 **τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ**: on the vagueness of this phrase, see Chapter V 79.

22a1 **νὴ τὸν κύνα**: Burnet's note should be supplemented and corrected by Dodd's note on *Gorg*. 482b5; this oath has nothing to do with Orphism.

a2 **δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγειν**: here, as below b5-6 αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ, there is an echo of the *Exordium* (17b7-8; 18a5-6). But note above all the Socratic 'inversion' of a traditional topos (see Chapter IX 183; note on 29d9). The average litigant tends to keep quiet about facts that would not be to his credit. Socrates, on the contrary, must overcome his reluctance to say things that will damage the reputation of the 'clever men' of Athens.

ἦ μήν, 'upon my word', one of the relatively few cases of ἦ μήν in oaths in direct speech (Denn. 351,2).

a3 **οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες**: namely the politicians and the poets, as contrasted with ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι, the craftsmen (c9-d4). On the superiority of skill, which is a true knowledge, though of a limited subject, to the pseudo-knowledge of the Sophists and other people with pretension to universal ability, see the highly illuminating p.100-102 of Goldschmidt's *Dialogues*, of which I can only quote here the most important passages; the author explains the significance of Plato's method of treating both the Pseudo-Values (like Sophistry, Rhetoric, the Rhapsody of Ion, the Etymology of Cratylus) and the true Values ('knowledge' and the other 'virtues') as analogous to crafts: the analogy is intended to show that neither of them is of any 'use' in life (italics mine):

> Contre les pseudo-valeurs, l'analogie démontre qu'elles ne possèdent même pas l'honnête compétence d'une technique qui cultive sagement son domaine et à laquelle il suffit de savoir tenir le gouvernail ou d'être habile à fabriquer des savates. Où la prétention universelle de la fausse valeur voudrait s'installer, le raisonnement inductif prouve que de modestes techniques particulières [as appears most clearly from *Gorg*. 511b7-512d6] ont légitimement pris les places. Désemparée, elle peut restreindre son ambition démesurée et la ramener au

programme d'une technique précise. Ainsi Ion se jette, en désespoir de cause, sur la stratégie [*Ion* 540d1-6] ...

Mais l'analogie avait porté à faux. Elle avait supposé que la fausse valeur pût se comparer aux techniques, qu'elle fût une technique. Or, il n'en est rien. L'échec prouve au contraire que la pseudo-valeur n'est pas une technique, ***n'est même pas une technique***, mais une autre chose qu'on sera libre de préciser, quand la prétention aura dû s'avouer sans fondement: ce sera une flatterie, une inspiration, une imitation.

Contre les Valeurs, l'analogie démontre qu'elles non plus ne sauraient se légitimer comme techniques, que la Valeur aussi est déshéritée dans le monde des sciences. Poussée à bout, elle aussi peut finir par se cantonner dans une technique précise. Ainsi Polémarque, pour seulement trouver à la Justice quelque objet bien déterminé, fait de cette vertu une sorte de droit commercial [*Rep.* i 333a10-12]. Position intenable également et la Justice doit avouer à la fin qu'elle 'n'est pas bonne à grand-chose' [*ib.* e1-2].

Mais l'analogie avait porté à faux. Elle avait supposé que la Valeur pût se comparer aux techniques, qu'elle fût une technique. Or, il n'en est rien. L'échec prouve au contraire que la Valeur n'est pas une technique, qu'***elle est plus qu'une technique***, qu'elle est autre chose que seule l'obéissance aux exigences essentielles nous permettra de préciser.

Every 'value' is the recognition of the transcendence of the Good and of the claims it puts on our lives.

a4 **τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς**: a phrase typical of Socratic language; cf. *Symp.* 216a4-6 (Alcibiades speaking about Socrates) ἀναγκάζει γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι πολλοῦ ἐνδεὴς ὢν αὐτὸς ἔτι ἐμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ (the opposite to the ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς, on which see *Apol.* 29e1-3. 30a7-b2, cf. 31b5. 36c5-d1. 41e2-7), τὰ δ' Ἀθηναίων πράττω; compare *Phaed.* 74d5-75b2. On the notion of ἔνδεια, see Chapter V 64.

a6 **δεῖ δή**: this seems to be the sole instance of purely connective δή in the *Apology*; in cases such as 20d4 (see note) the force of the particle is half-way between emphatic and connective.

τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην: in a number of passages (*Parm.* 136e1-3 ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῶι ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν (cf. 135e2); *Laws* iii 683a2-3 νῦν οὖν δὴ τοσόνδε πλεονεκτοῦμεν τῆι πλάνηι τοῦ λόγου) πλάνη points to the 'roaming about' or 'discursivity' of dialectical research, a motif which is also connected with the famous μακροτέρα περίοδος of *Rep.* vi 504b1-3 and c9-d1 (cf. *Phaedr.* 274a2-3). Here, however, the metaphor describes Socrates' wearisome errand as he goes from one examinee to the next; Socrates' πλάνη is the first element of the implied comparison with Heracles.

a7 **ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος**: τινάς, as ὥσπερ, simply serves to excuse the use of imagery in prose (compare Cicero's use of *quasi quidam*). It is

undoubtedly the figure of Heracles who is called to mind by this phrase; cf. Soph. *Phil.* 1419-1420 (Heracles speaks) ὅσους πονήσας καὶ διεξελθὼν πόνους ἀθάνατον ἀρετὴν ἔσχον (the last words mean 'I acquired immortal glory', that is 'divine glory' or 'divine status').

a7-8 **ἵνα ... γένοιτο**: the optative is correct because πονοῦντος is an 'imperfect participle' (cf. Goodwin § 140).

a8 **ἤια**: see note on 21d8.

a9 **ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητάς**: to the modern reader it may seem surprising that poets should be thought to enjoy a reputation for intellectual ability or σοφία. That was, however, the common opinion in classical Greece, in part because a poet was a craftsman who knew *how* to say things, but more importantly because he knew *what* to say. Since from Homer on poets were thought to be inspired, they were closely akin to soothsayers (cf. on 21b4): both of them shared in a god's unlimited knowledge. Further, we should bear in mind that, until the second half of the fifth century, poetry was the most common means of conveying ideas: Solon wrote political pamphlets in elegiacs and iambics, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles discussed theological, ontological and cosmological problems in hexameters. The emergence of prose as a dominant form did not occur before the first decade of the fourth century. For the σοφία of poets, and especially of Homer, the σοφώτατος of them all, we have many witnesses, who either disagree with them on some point in spite of their reputation or who rely on the poets' authority, so Xenophanes 21B10 D.-K. ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες; Heraclitus 22B56 D.-K. Ὁμήρωι ὃς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων; 22B57 διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος; Pindar *Nem.* vii 20-24 (sweet-worded Homer said many things about Odysseus which should not be trusted, but his) σοφία ... κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις; Plato *Symp.* 196e1-2 (in order to establish the thesis that Eros is σόφος, Agathon will prove that he is a poet, who is able to make even men become poets) ποιητὴς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι; Dem. xix 244 σοφὸς ... ὁ ποιητής (viz. Homer); 248 τῶι σοφῶι Σοφοκλεῖ; Aesch. i 142 περὶ Ὁμήρου ὃν ἐν τοῖς ... σοφωτάτοις τῶν ποιητῶν εἶναι τάττομεν; 151 ὁ τοίνυν οὐδενὸς ἧττον σοφὸς τῶν ποιητῶν Εὐριπίδης. These quotations may suffice. As was said above (Chapter V 66-67), the Platonic Socrates is the first to deny that the poets' ability, ability though it certainly is, should be called 'knowledge'. He realises full well that he is contradicting traditional views: in the *Republic*, he asks whether the works of the poets are 'at three removes' from reality, as *he* is convinced they are, or whether, on the contrary (what is obviously the common opinion) poets really do have knowledge that can withstand scrutiny: ἤ τι καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ τῶι ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασιν περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν (x 599a3-4; note the similarity in phrasing with the *Apology*).

— Precisely because poets were thought to 'know' they were considered educators. Not only did their works, and especially Homer's epics, play the most important role in school curricula, and were especially thought to improve moral character (their instructing function, however important, was secondary): for adults, too, great poetry was thought to be the most authoritative model for sound judgment and right conduct. A large part of the debate between Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs* is dominated by this idea (just one quotation, 1033-1036 ταῦτα γὰρ ἄνδρας χρὴ ποιητὰς ἀσκεῖν. σκέψαι γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὡς ὠφέλιμοι τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ γενναῖοι γεγένηνται. Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ ..., Μουσαῖος δὲ ..., Ἡσίοδος δὲ ..., ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμηρος ...). In Demosthenes' time, when orators spoke in major political trials, they quoted extensively from the poets who were supposed to have given sound advice about how we should live (cf. Plato *Laws* ix 858d2 συμβουλὴν περὶ βίου). Aeschines, in his *Against Timarchus*, quotes four passages from Homer (144. 148. 149. 150), one from Hesiod (129), three from Euripides (128. 151. 152); Demosthenes, in his speech *On the false embassy*, takes over from Aeschines one passage from Hesiod and one from Euripides (243. 245), and of his own accord adds one from Sophocles (247) and one from Solon (255; our MSS. give 39 verses, but there are lacunas in the quotation that suggest that Demosthenes quoted more lines, which were subsequently lost); Lycurgus, in order to arouse patriotic feeling, cites 55 verses of Euripides (*Leocr.* 100) and 32 of Tyrtaeus (107). — On the whole question of the 'knowledge' of the poets, see Verdenius 'Platon et la poésie'; id. *Plato, Io*, 2d ed. (Zwolle 1959) 5-7; id. *Homer, Educator of the Greeks* (Amsterdam 1970); R. Harriott *Poetry and Criticism before Plato* (London 1969; not very insightful, but useful as a collection of materials); F.A.G. Beck *Greek Education 450 - 350 B.C.* (London 1964) 117-122; Verdenius 'The Principles of Greek Literary Criticism' *Mnemos.* 36 (1983) 14-59, esp. 25-37 and the references given there.

a9 **τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους**: with καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Socrates does not mean the comedians, who certainly did not, in the eyes of the public, qualify as σοφοί as it is understood in this context. Tragedy and dithyramb are explicitly mentioned because they were the only two genres for which Athens held annual official contests with highly appreciated prizes. If so, the 'other' poets are those who practised the various remaining forms of poetry, a few of which are enumerated in the *Ion* 534c3-4 διθυράμβους ... ἐγκώμια ... ὑπορχήματα ... ἔπη ... ἰάμβους.

b2 **ἀναλάμβανων**, 'taking in hand'; cf. above the note on 19a8.

b5 **ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι**: Socrates' main intention is (so he says) to refute (see the note on 21b9-c1) the oracle by exposing his own inferiority in knowledge; but, with his characteristic humour, he claims, *en passant*, to

have hoped also to learn something from those clever people, the poets, and so to kill two birds with one stone.

b7 **ὀλίγου**: this word is slightly pleonastic after ὡς ἔπος ... εἰπεῖν, which is no reason to suspect its authenticity: cf. Dem. xix 190 σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντες.

ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον: interpretation of poems seems to have become a fashionable form of entertainment in the late fifth century, probably under the influence of the Sophists. Socrates' strangely contorted exegesis of Simonides' *Scolion for Scopas* in *Prot.* 339a6-347a5 is a parody of the arbitrary way texts were used as pretexts for a display of ingenuity.

b8 **ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν κτἑ.**: as was pointed out in Chapter V 66, the presence of the words αὖ καί in this sentence raises a problem. For when speaking about the politicians, Socrates did not say that they possessed a real ability, which he had discovered was founded not on rational knowledge but on some other principle. Now, however, he speaks as if he had said this. What he is supposed to have argued must be something along the line of *Meno* 99b5-e2, where he says that successful political leaders like Themistocles, Aristides, and (perhaps) Pericles and Thucydides (the son of Melesias), achieved their results not on the strength of σοφία but through 'true opinion' (here, 99b11, termed εὐδοξία, whereas elsewhere it is called ἀληθὴς or ὀρθὴ δόξα, in the *Meno* as well as in other dialogues): οὐκ ἄρα σοφίαι τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν ... Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμηι, εὐδοξίαι δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται· ἧι οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμωιδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν (b5-c5). The end of this passage is identical, almost word for word, to *Apol.* 22b9-c3; whether one reads ἐνθουσιῶντες (F, *om.* BTWΛ; at *Apol.* 22c1 ἐνθουσιάζοντες is given by all witnesses) or not (cf. Bluck *in loc.*) does not affect the issue. There is, however, a difference: in the *Meno* the comparison is between the *politicians* and the soothsayers, in the *Apology* between the *poets* and the soothsayers. The αὖ καί implies that Socrates had said in *Apol.* 21c5-d7 something substantially the same as the *Meno* passage. However, nothing of the sort is found in the *Apology* as we have it. How can we explain this? I would suggest that the two little words αὖ καί are a vestige of what the text of *Apol.* 21c5-d7 was at an earlier stage, before Plato revised it for publication and gave it its final form. Originally, I think, Socrates had said in the *Apology* (as he says in *Meno* 99b5-6) that when politicians achieved success, it was not by dint of σοφία. If this is in fact the case, the presence of αὖ καί in the next paragraph would be perfectly normal. But then Plato realised that he could make the whole section 21b9-22e5 more effective by structuring the argument as a

progression to a climax (cf. Chapter V 69 and n.30). But if he did so and represented the politicians as the least clever of the three groups, he could no longer do in the *Apology* what he does in the *Meno*, i.e. recognise explicitly the politicians' real achievements, which are not only mentioned in the text just quoted (99c1 τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν), but are given sincere acknowledgement in the next sentence (c7-9 οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν;). So he limited the paragraph about the politicians (21c5-d7) to showing that their reputation for knowledge and the pride they took in it were both unfounded. In making these revisions, I would claim, Plato forgot to delete, in the paragraph about the poets, the words αὖ καί, which were no longer needed for the sense. If this reconstruction is accepted, we can perhaps go a step further still. The striking parallelism in theory and phrasing between *Apol.* 22b8-c3 and *Meno* 99b5-c5 can best be explained if we suppose that Plato worked on both approximately at the same time. Since the similarity between *poets* and soothsayers is in itself much more obvious than that between *politicians* and soothsayers, the latter could only be presented satisfactorily in a relatively extensive discussion, such as that of the *Meno*. So I think the original version of *Apol.* 21c5-d7 was an attempt by Plato to condense the text of *Meno* 99b5-c5 in a way suitable for the context of the Narration of the *Apology*. Since Plato was not very pleased with the result, and since he wanted to present the examination of the three successive groups as a climax, he remodelled the paragraph about the politicians. This would imply that the *Meno* (or at least that part of it) had already been written, if not published, when Plato drafted the Narration of the *Apology*. Cf. Chapter I 19.

c1 **οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί**: the double οἱ here and in *Meno* 99c2-3 (οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις) implies that there are two distinct groups, in other words that the two terms are not synonymous. In Thuc. viii 1,1, however, we find τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι, with just *one* article. Still, as A.W. Argyle 'χρησμολόγοι and μάντεις' *CR* 84 (1970) 139 rightly remarks, Thucydides is 'not given to tautology'. Therefore I think he is simply bringing together two related though distinct groups. Argyle (*art. cit.*) admits that he cannot make a clear-cut distinction between them. But it seems to me that he is not right in simply identifying χρησμολόγος with χρησμῳδός. The first word certainly can refer to a person fundamentally different from ὁ μάντις (Aristoph. *Birds* 960; *Peace* 1047; Thuc. ii 8,2. 21,3; cf. 54,2). The μάντις, who is a as rule an appointed public official, gives original answers to questions asked by consultants; the χρησμολόγος can be a private person who has a stock of versified χρησμοί and, when consulted, asserts that this or that already existing oracle is relevant to a question asked *now*. So, in spite of Argyle's doubts, Platnauer's note on Aristoph. *Peace* 1046-1047 is right, but it does not explain what is charac-

teristic of the other χρησμολόγοι, those who are also called χρησμωιδοί, and how these latter, who, like the μάντεις, give 'original oracles', are to be distinguished from the μάντεις. I cannot solve the problem either.

c2 **καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι**: here καὶ γάρ is not simply *etenim*, as is often the case (cf. Denn. 108,2), but καί refers to οὗτοι, 'for these people *too*'. For this usage of the group καὶ γάρ, Denn. (108,1) gives only poetical instances, with the exception of Dem. xix 22; see, however, K.-G. ii 338.

c3 **ἴσασιν**, in the full sense of 'to know', which corresponds with ἐπιστήμη and σοφία; in *Meno* 99b5-c5 (quoted above on 22b8) we find a rich assortment of synonyms: σοφία and σοφοί (b5), ἐπιστήμη (b8. 11), φρονεῖν (c2), εἰδέναι (c4), to which should be added νοῦς (c8).

c5 **τἆλλα** should probably be taken, not as the antecedent of ἅ, but in the strictly adverbial sense of 'besides', 'further' (cf. Lat. *ceterum*). This sense is the only one possible in d7 (see the note *in loc.*). Here it seems preferable, both because of the general similarity of both passages and because Socrates can scarcely mean that the poets claim to be clever in all the fields in which they are not, but rather in some of them (actually, he probably means τὰ μέγιστα, as in the case of the craftsmen).

c6 **καὶ ἐντεῦθεν**, that is: καὶ παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν.

c7 **τῶι αὐτῶι ... ὧιπερ**: the dative with words denoting a difference, here περιγεγονέναι, cf. 35a2 διαφέρειν; actually such datives often do not indicate the *degree* of difference, but rather the field in which one thing exceeds another (see *Phaedo* 96d8-e4, where we have a shift from αὐτῆι τῆι κεφαλῆι to διὰ τὸ ... προσεῖναι; and *Apol.* 21d6-7, where the ὅτι clause shows that the dative σμικρῶι τινι αὐτῶι τούτωι rather identifies the area in which Socrates is more clever (*dativus respectus*), than to the degree in which his cleverness is greater (*dativus mensurae* or properly *mensurae discriminis*).

d1 **ἐπισταμένωι**: whereas Isocrates, Lysias, Isaeus and other Attic prose writers frequently use ἐπίστασθαι with ὅτι (διότι, ὡς) or with a participial construction for 'knowing *that* something is so or so', Plato, so far as I can see, has ἐπίστασθαι only with an infinitive for 'knowing *how* to do something' or with a nominal object (as here d1. 2. 3). For 'knowing that ...' Plato uses εἰδέναι almost exclusively. There are three cases of ἐπίσταμαι ὡς/ὅτι (*Lach.* 188b6; *Euthyd.* 296e4; *Tim.* 76d8-e1) as against 162 of εἰδέναι. Cf. J. Lyons *Structural semantics* (Oxford 1963) 205-207. We might say, therefore, that with him, εἰδέναι points rather to a theoretical, ἐπίστασθαι rather to a practical knowledge. This distinction, however, should not be pressed. True, there is one passage where it is explicitly

mentioned, *Polit.* 258d4-e7, where ἐπιστήμη is divided into γνωστική and πρακτική. But on the whole this distinction does not play any significant role in his philosophy, whereas Aristotle, from the *Topics* (vi 6, 145a15-18; cf. 11, 149a9; vii 1, 152b4) on, constantly relies on the threefold division of ἐπιστήμη into θεωρητική, πρακτική and πολιτική. With Plato, ἐπιστήμη is, without further specification, used freely for practical (e.g. *Gorg.* 511c4 ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη) as well as for theoretical knowledge, as long as it is rational. So Plato is not playing a verbal trick here.

d2 **τούτου μέν**: the corresponding clause is not d3 ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο (which is simply the affirmative counterpart of the negative clause οὐκ ἐψεύσθην), but d4-5 ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν κτέ. As a livelier particle, ἀλλά, further emphasised by the vocative, expresses Socrates' disappointment better than δέ or μέντοι would have done; cf. Denn. 5-6,2 ii.

d2-3 **τούτου ... οὐκ ἐψεύσθην**, 'I was not disappointed in this expectation of mine'; the genitive with ψευσθῆναι or ἐψεῦσθαι is of the same kind as with ἁμαρτάνειν.

d3 **ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην**: '*some* things which I did not know', with the negative οὐ, as in c6 ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν (σοφοί), 29a6 ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν, 29b2; different from 21d7 and 29b8 ἃ μὴ οἶδα, 'whatever I do not know'.

d4 **σοφώτεροι**: although in Plato's time σοφός was no longer as common an epithet for a craftsman as it had been before (cf. LSJ *s.vv.* σοφία and σοφός I 1), it could still be used in this context without sounding awkward, e.g. *Prot.* 321d1-2 κλέπτει (ὁ Προμηθεὺς) ... τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί; *Laws* iii 696c2 τεχνικόν ... καὶ περὶ ταῦτα (the object of his craft) σοφόν.

d5 **ταὐτὸν ... ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί**: for the double καί, one in the relative and another in the main clause, see Denn. 324,2 i; this usage is frequent in Plato.

d6 **οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί**: not, as some translators (e.g. Blakeney; so, too, Burnet) have it, 'our good fellows the craftsmen', for this patronising use of 'good' (cf. French *brave* in 'un brave homme', 'mon brave ami') seems not to exist in Greek, but 'the able craftsmen' (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ἀγαθός I 3).

διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι, 'because they fully mastered their trade'; for this meaning of ἐξεργάζεσθαι, cf. Xen. *Symp.* iv 61 καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, Ἐμοί, ἔφη, παραδίδως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὴν τέχνην; — Ναί μὰ Δί', ἔφη· ὁρῶ γάρ σε καὶ τὴν ἀκόλουθον ταύτης πάνυ ἐξειργασμένον; id. *Cyrop.* viii 2, 5 (passive perfect) ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι

διαφερόντως ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν ἐξειργασμέναι εἰσίν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κτέ.

d7 **τἆλλα**: if τἆλλα here were not strictly adverbial, τὰ μέγιστα would be an explanatory apposition to it and the sense would be 'each of them would claim to be outstandingly competent in the rest, that is, in the most important matters'. But obviously the range of possible knowledge of any particular craftsman (ἕκαστος) beyond his own specialised field is not limited to what Socrates calls τὰ μέγιστα (on which see next note). So the meaning can only be: 'each of them *further* (τἆλλα) claimed to be competent also (καί) about the most serious matters'. Cf. above note on c5.

τὰ μέγιστα, that is, questions about ἀνθρωπίνη καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή (20b4-5), in other words issues on which εὐδαιμονία or τὸ εὖ ζῆν depends, or finally, if we look at them from a strictly objective point of view, problems concerning the Good (see Chapter V 62-65). The importance of this phrase was first pointed out by Goldschmidt *Dialogues*; see his 'Index grec' *s.v.* μέγιστα, where he refers to *Alc. I* 118a7; *Apol.* 22d7; *Gorg.* 451d7. 527e1; *Soph.* 218d2; *Polit.* 285e4; to these references can be added *Gorg.* 487b5; *Rep.* vi 497a3. 504e2 (which certainly refers to τὸ ἀγαθόν; cf. 504c2-3); x 599c6-d1; *Laws* iii 688c7; x 890b8; *Epist. vii* 341b1. The passages in the later works show clearly that this is a fixed phrase, though not a technical term; they should warn us once more not to be deceived by the apparent simplicity of the vocabulary of the *Apology*.

e1 **ἀπέκρυπτεν**, 'threw into the shade', 'cast a shadow on', 'made to appear insignificant'; for this meaning of the verb, cf. Alcidamas *Soph.* 30 (although I prefer simple extempore speech, I publish a written discourse) ἵνα ἐπιδείξω τοῖς ἐπὶ ταύτηι τῆι δυνάμει (namely τῆι τοῦ γράφειν) σεμνυνομένοις ὅτι μικρὰ πονήσαντες ἡμεῖς <u>ἀποκρύψαι</u> καὶ καταλῦσαι τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν οἷοί τ' ἐσόμεθα. — Burnet accepts W's reading ἀποκρύπτειν and takes it to be parallel to d5 ἔχειν (if so, because of d5 ἔδοξαν we should mentally supply ἔδοξεν); he considers the whole sentence d6-8 (διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην ... σοφώτατος εἶναι) to be a parenthesis and accordingly puts it between two dashes. In that case, however, the asyndeton with διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην is awkward, whereas with the reading ἀπέκρυπτεν of T (ἀποκρύπτει B) it is quite normal, since the new sentence specifies what has been announced in general terms (cf. Denn. *Gr. Pr. St.* 110 ii). — Recently, R. Renehan has twice defended Burnet's opinion about the reading ἀποκρύπτειν and its construction, viz. in *Criticism* 11-12 and in *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen 1976) 117-118, but his arguments do not convince me. The content of the last part of the Greek sentence (from d8 καὶ αὐτῶν on) is much more closely connected with the whole of the second part (d6ff.) than with the first. The parenthesis postulated by Burnet breaks the normal movement of the sentence as a whole.

ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ: see Chapter V 79.

e2-3 **πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν ... ἢ κτέ.**: δέχεσθαι, as βούλεσθαι, often means 'to prefer', even when not accompanied by μᾶλλον, e.g. *Phil.* 63b3-4 μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν; although in our passage ἢ corresponds to πότερα, still the translation 'I would *prefer*' suits the context better. With this meaning, δέχεσθαι is frequently put in the potential optative; see the instances given in des Places *Lexique s.v.*

e2-4 **οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν ... ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν**: the striking symmetry of the antithetic clauses suggests that Plato (and probably Greeks in general) was less sensitive than modern readers to the semantic and syntactic difference between transitive and intransitive ἔχειν. — On the double polyptoton with ἔχειν see the note on 19b2 διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες.

e2 **μήτε τι**: when directly following οὔτε or μήτε, τις is not replaced by οὐδείς (μηδείς); cf. 23b8; *Phaed.* 57a8 (contrast 57a7), etc.

e4 **ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν κτέ.**: a similar idea is expressed in *Laws* iii 689c6-d5; there, the Athenian says that people endowed with all possible forms of cleverness should be called ἀμαθεῖς and banned from public office when the καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῆι λόγοι (689b5-6) do not accomplish anything in their souls, whereas people who are of a contrary disposition should be called σοφοί and entrusted with power, 'even when, as the proverb says, they can neither read nor swim' (ἂν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται, d3); in other words, no specialised knowledge has any value without understanding τὰ μέγιστα.

e5 **λυσιτελοῖ**: this verb is most frequently used with reference to a *choice* between two or more possibilities, as in And. i 125 τεθνάναι νομίσασα λυσιτελεῖν ἢ ζῆν ('... that it was preferable ...'); *Laws* ii 662c1-2 λυσιτελοῦντα μὲν ἄλλα ..., δικαιότερα δὲ ἄλλα (note the comparative δικαιότερα). Brandwood's *Index* shows that out of the nine instances of λυσιτελής in Plato, seven are in the comparative or the superlative.

23a1-3 **πολλαὶ μὲν ... σοφὸς εἶναι**: there are two irregularities in this sentence: first, the lack of a δέ clause balancing πολλαὶ μὲν κτέ.; second, the use of the nominative σοφός which does not depend ultimately on a verb in the first person singular. About the first, Burnet says that πολλαὶ μὲν is answered by a5 τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει. This is impossible: if the first result of Socrates' investigation is a factual one (πολλαὶ μὲν ...), the second cannot be a general truth about the god (τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει ... ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι); besides, τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει obviously contrasts with a3 οἴονται γάρ με ('people think me clever, but actually God alone is'). For the second

irregularity, two different explanations have been suggested. Reinhard *Anakoluthe* 55-57 convincingly argues that, when a text speaks of different species within a genus, the names of the species can be presented as standing for themselves, independent of the construction of the sentence, and therefore in the nominative. As examples she quotes *Soph.* 266d6 (where BW have θεία and ἀνθρωπίνη, T the datives -αι, -ηι, whereas Heindorf, Burnet and Diès emend to accusatives (-αν, -ην)) and 229c8-9 (τούτωι γε οἶμαι μόνωι τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθία τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι, 'this part alone of ignorance I suppose was called by the name of foolishness'; ἀμαθία BT : -αν W Stob. Heindorf (e coni.) Burnet Diès). These instances are not conclusive: in the second the accusative can be justified by variants in the tradition, and from Ptolemaic times on the confusion between -α, -η and -αν, -ην is very common (see above, note on 17a6); in the first instance, a new nominal sentence with asyndeton would be quite acceptable. What is more important is the fact that *Apol.* 23a1-3 is not about genus and species. Other passages which Reinhard takes over from Riddell are examples introduced by οἷον; these are not to the point, since after οἷον an independent construction is quite normal. Burnet takes another course and points to the fact that *names* given to a person may always be in the nominative; in that case, as with our inverted commas, the name stays outside the construction. In *Apol.* 23a3, however, this is not the case, since σοφός is followed by εἶναι and thus integrated in the construction. So this explanation is not satisfactory either. Schanz solved both difficulties by writing λέγομαι instead of λέγεσθαι; it might be maintained that the infinitive is a scribal error, due to the influence of γεγονέναι. But we can perhaps keep the text and explain both irregularities as consequences of one anacoluthon. The sentence begins as if a member of the form ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγομαι, σοφὸς εἶναι (with the regular ὄνομα λέγομαι = ὀνομάζομαι) would correspond to the member πολλαὶ μέν. So the investigation would be said to lead to two results with regard to Socrates: some people hate him, many people call him σοφός. But of these two results, Socrates considers the first to be the immediate cause of the second (see Chapter V 61-62). To emphasise this, he inserts a ὥστε clause which explicitly mentions the διαβολαί. Now, since the slander consists precisely in representing Socrates as an atheistic cosmologist and an unprincipled Sophist, in short as a σοφός, the clause about the ὄνομα (which normally should have been coordinated to πολλαὶ μὲν κτέ.) is made parallel to πολλὰς διαβολὰς κτέ.; so its verb is put in the infinitive (in order to match γεγονέναι), whereas the nominative σοφός is retained, the more so because πολλαί ... ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι equals 'I have become hated by many'.

a1 **χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται**, expressive coupling, as in 17c6 (see note *in loc.*); this figure is normally used with synonyms; that χαλεπός and βαρύς could be felt as such is shown by the equivalence of the idioms χαλεπῶς φέρω and βαρέως φέρω.

a5 **τὸ δέ**, 'but in fact' (Burnet), opposing reality to opinion; the opposition is further emphasised by τῶι ὄντι after the vocative. Cf. note on 37a4.

ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι: the Platonic Socrates is consistent in his assertion of this doctrine (see Chapter V 62-64 and n.12). It was, however, prefigured in the writings of older thinkers, especially Heraclitus: 22B78 D.-K. ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει; 22B32 ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα (it *will* accept the name of Zeus, because the one intelligent being *is* most divine, but it *will not* if Zeus is attributed with the anthropomorphic features which he has in mythology, and if he is considered to be absolutely distinct from the other gods). Alcmeon 24B1 D.-K. περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι κτέ. might seem to say the same thing as Heraclitus 22B78; actually, the emphasis is just the opposite: Alcmeon's main intention is to affirm the solidity of his own arguments; the clause about the absolute reliability of divine knowledge has but a subservient role. Xenophanes' approach to the question is further removed from the Socratic outlook: 21B24 D.-K. οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ' ἀκούει; 21B25 ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. Other Presocratics affirm either, as Xenophanes, the perfection of divine knowledge (Epicharmus 23B23 D.-K.) or the limitations of human understanding (Xenophanes 21B35; Parmenides 28B6,4), but they do not connect the two views. What Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 87 Wehrli) tells us about Pythagoras in his dialogue Περὶ τῆς ἄπνου would be very important indeed if it had a serious documentary value: φιλοσοφίαν δὲ πρῶτος ὠνόμασε Πυθαγόρας καὶ ἑαυτὸν φιλόσοφον ...· μηδένα γὰρ εἶναι σοφὸν (ἄνθρωπον: secl. Cobet, Wehrli, *recte*) ἀλλ' ἢ θεόν. But the *combination* of the two ideas (a) that φιλοσοφία is essentially distinct from σοφία and (b) that σοφία belongs to God alone, is so typically Platonic that we cannot say whether any reliable tradition underlies this text, and, if so, what its content might be. See further Chapter VII 135-137.

a7 **ὀλίγου τινὸς ... καὶ οὐδενός**: cf. 17b7 ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν; 23c7 ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. These parallels prove that καί is here, as in *Theaet.* 173e4 σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, felt as equivalent to ἤ (cf. Denn. 292,8). Cf. note on 18c6-7.

a8 **τοῦτον ... τὸν Σωκράτη**, 'this Socrates', whom you know well; for οὗτος denoting what is familiar, cf. LSJ *s.v.* C 3 b. This prepares the next clause: Socrates has been chosen as an example, not because he is important by himself, but simply because he is well-known to the Athenian public.

b2 **ὦ ἄνθρωποι**: this formula of address (instead of the common ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι) seems to be used on purpose: the message of the god is directed to the whole of mankind (cf. b5-6 καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων; 30a3-4). Compare the beginning of the protreptic discourse in *Clit.* 407b1 ποῖ

φέρεσθε, ὤνθρωποι; with that in the *Euthydemus* 278e3 ἆρά γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν. (The surprising repetition of the unusual ὦ ἄνθρωποι in *Prot.* 353a3. c5. e5. 354a3. e3. 357a5, is caused by the sentence which introduces the whole discussion, namely 352e5-6 ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, viz. to be 'conquered by their lusts', as they call it themselves). In all instances of ὦ ἄνθρωποι in Plato, a god or godlike person is speaking: *Prot.* 343e6; *Symp.* 192d4; *Crat.* 408b1. Cf. S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* on 407b1. — For ὦ ἄνθρωπε (singular), see note on 28b6.

b3 **τῆι ἀληθείαι**, as opposed to δοκεῖν, a verb which has appeared five times (and οἴεσθαι also five times) in significant passages from 21b9 through 22c5.

b4 **ἐγὼ μέν**: μέν *solitarium* is especially common with forms of ἐγώ and ἡμεῖς (cf. Denn. 381 ii).

b6 **ξένων**: 'the ξένοι will include "Sophists" like Protagoras and rhetoricians like Gorgias and Thrasymachus' (Burnet), but also people with a different kind of reputation for σοφία, such as Ion the rhapsode (cf. *Ion* 532d6-7 σοφοὶ μέν που ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψωιδοί) and the wealthy and cultured Meno of Larissa (cf. *Meno* 70a5-6 πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ... ἐφ' ἱππικῆι καὶ πλούτωι, νῦν δὲ ... καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίαι).

b7 **τῶι θεῶι βοηθῶν**: as E. Skard 'Zu Platons Apologie (23b)' *SO* 24 (1945) 151-153, pointed out, this phrase is a reminiscence of the solemn oath which the Amphictyons took about 590 B.C. after the First Sacred War, 'never to cultivate the sacred plain nor to allow others to do so, ἀλλὰ βοηθήσειν τῶι θεῶι καὶ τῆι γῆι τῆι ἱερᾶι' (Aesch. iii 109; cf. 120. 122). Various texts collected by Skard suggest that, from that time on, the formula was a part of the regular Amphictyonic oath. There can scarcely be any doubt that, in *this* context, Plato used it 'in klarer Bewusstheit von ihrem sakralen Klang und ihrer stilistischen Valeur'. — Besides, to me it seems probable that the formula should be understood in the context of other similar phrases like βοηθεῖν τῶι νόμωι (Lys. xxii 3; Isocr. xix 49; Aesch. i 2. 33), βοηθεῖν τῶι κοινῶι (Plato *Laws* vi 767c1), βοηθεῖν τῆι πόλει (Dem. xxii 1), βοηθεῖν τῶι λόγωι in Plato: *Phaed.* 88e2; *Parm.* 128c6-7; *Phaedr.* 276c8-9; *Lach.* 194c2-3; *Prot.* 341d8-9. In all these cases the meaning is that devoted persons or groups should take the initiative in defending the rights and interests of some higher being which by itself is not able to act in the same way and with the same efficiency as human beings. So here, since the God of Delphi cannot mingle with people every day to make them acknowledge their ignorance and conceit, he has to rely on Socrates to perform this task.

b8-9 **οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι ... ἄξιον λόγου**: Socrates has never exercised any civic or military office (32a9-b1. 36b6-8) nor delivered speeches in the Assembly (31d5-7. 36b8) nor brought a political action against anybody (17d2). He has only been a member of the Council (32b1) and, as such, for one tenth of a year, a member of the Committee of πρυτάνεις (32b1-7); as most of the πρυτάνεις, he was, for one day, appointed by lot to be the Chairman of that Committee and in that capacity to preside over the meeting of the Assembly which happened to be held on that very day (*Gorg*. 473e6-474a1; not the day of the Arginusae trial, cf. Burnet's note on 32b6).

οὔτε τι: on τι after οὔτε, see above the note on 22e2 μήτε τι.

τῶν τῆς πόλεως ... τῶν οἰκείων: both fields of activity, the private and the public, are mentioned together in 36b6-9 too. In that passage, Socrates explains his reluctance to enter politics with arguments of a different kind which are by no means inconsistent with what he says here. Note the contrast between his attitude and that which is described in Pericles' Funeral Speech (Thuc. ii 40,2) as the normal one for an Athenian citizen (see Chapter VI 110; Chapter VIII 151-152).

c1 **μυρίαι**, 'extreme'. In Attic prose, the singular μυρίος seems to be found only in Plato, in whose works it occurs fourteen times.

c2 **οἱ νέοι μοι <οἱ> ἐπακολουθοῦντες**: I have added, by conjecture, an article that seems to be indispensable. For Socrates does not speak about what happens with youths *in general*, *when* they accompany him, but about that particular group of them who are always with him. This is further confirmed by the specification οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων. There are other cases of haplography in all the primary MSS. of the *Apology*: 18c1 οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, <οἱ> ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες (<οἱ> add. Heindorf); 23b2 ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰ> εἴποι (<εἰ> add. Stephanus); 25e4 τοῦτο <τὸ> τοσοῦτον κακόν (<τὸ> add. recc.). Besides, εἰ is omitted in 27a5 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι by the first hand of B, and ἂν in 27d9 τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων by the first hands of both B and T. — This case seems to have escaped the notice of the critics. οἱ should be inserted *after* μοι (οἱ νέοι μοι <οἱ> ἐπακολουθοῦντες), since in Plato μοι and σοι do not follow the article immediately — contrast 40a1 τὸ νυνί μοι συμβεβηκός; a4 ἡ γάρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική. For this reason, σοὶ, not σοι, should be written *Crit.* 54b1; *Alc. I* 119c3. Cf. M.H.B. Marshall *Verbs, Nouns, and Postpositives in Attic Prose* (Edinburgh 1987) 29-30.

c3 **οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων**: compare what Protagoras says about the fact that sons of rich people can spend more time on their education: οἱ τούτων (scil. τῶν πλουσιωτάτων) ὑεῖς, πρωιαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας

ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται (Pl. *Prot.* 326c4-6). This is all the more interesting, since Protagoras cannot be suspected of having favored oligarchy.

αὐτόματοι: the postponement of this word (which, as Burnet says, certainly goes with ἐπακολουθοῦντες) after the long specification οἷς μάλιστα ... πλουσιωτάτων, seems quite uncharacterisic of Plato's style (and of Classical Greek style in general). I suspect it had been omitted and was later inserted in the wrong place; it probably belongs just before or just after ἐπακολουθοῦντες. I think the two mistakes, the omission of οἱ and the displacement of αὐτόματοι (if I am right in assuming that they are mistakes) are somehow connected with one another. Or could αὐτόματοι be a misplaced variant or gloss of αὐτοί in c4? Cf. Burnet *in loc.*

c4 **χαίρουσιν**: for the pleasure that young people take in the examination and the embarrassment of 'clever people', cf. 33c2-4 and, more fully, *Rep.* vii 539b2-7. Socrates himself has other motives for devoting his time to that work. Still he himself does not fail to appreciate the humorous side of the matter, as appears from 41a8-c4 (notice how 41b5 οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη recalls 33c4 ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές, cf. Chapter VIII 171).

c5 **εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν**: εἶτα, used in asyndeton outside interrogative clauses, seems to introduce a specification of the content of the preceding clause, 'and so'; cf. *Phaedr.* 229c7 (and de Vries *in loc.*); *Rep.* v 462a5; *Soph.* 230b5.

c8 **ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὑτοῖς**: the idea that we should be angry with ourselves when, with the aid of another, we have discovered our own ignorance, rather than with those who brought about the deflation of our pretensions, is typically Socratic. Cf. *Hipp. mai.* 286d2-4 (Socrates tells Hippias about his conversation with the anonymous objector) καὶ ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν φαυλότητα ἠπορούμην τε καὶ οὐκ εἶχον αὐτῶι κατὰ τρόπον ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀπιὼν οὖν ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐμαυτῶι τε ὠργιζόμην καὶ ὠνείδιζον (cf. 292a2-b8); *Theaet.* 168a2-6 ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῆις (if you conduct discussions in a spirit of friendly objectivity), ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι ('those who take part in this exercise in your company') τῆς αὑτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὑτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν (cf. Diès *Théétète* 135 and n.4); *Soph.* 230b8-c2 οἱ δ' ὁρῶντες ('they then, when they see', viz. that their several statements contradict one another) ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται, καὶ τούτωι δὴ τῶι τρόπωι τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται (cf. Goldschmidt *Dialogues* 29-30 with notes 7 and 8). See S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 149-158. — G.B. Kerferd 'Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry' *CQ* 48 (1954) 84-90 tried to show that this passage

did not refer to Socratic-Platonic dialectic; his interpretation was successfully refuted by J.R. Trevaskis 'The Sophistry of Noble Lineage' *Phronesis* 1 (1955-56) 36-49). By contrast, the attitude depicted in *Rep.* vii 535d9-e5 is, in spite of some apparent similarity, wholly un-Socratic: it is the attitude of people who do not think that being in error is of any consequence and so, when their ignorance is exposed, simply are not indignant (understand: with themselves), but delight in their foolishness. — I am not sure whether Burnet is right in accepting T's omission of ἀλλ' before αὐτοῖς (cf. *Theaet.* 168a4 just quoted): although B much more frequently omits small words, T is far from immune to that kind of error (e.g. *Apol.* 27d9 om. ἄν; 28b5 om. οὐ; 31a5 om. ἄν^2; b9 om. τε; c2 om. ἐγώ). — T.V. Buttrey 'Plato's *Apology* 23c and the anger of the catechised' *LCM* 6 (1981) 51-53 pleads for the W^2 reading ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς, 'but not at them' (sc. Socrates' imitators). This is impossible because the anaphoric pronoun αὐτόν cannot be used in contrasts; Buttrey's interpretation of the passage would require τούτοις or ἐκείνοις.

d1 **τις ... μιαρώτατος**: when added to an adjective denoting a judgment of value, usually an unfavourable one, the indefinite τις may precede, as in *Prot.* 340e1 εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός; *Rep.* ii 358a8-9 ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. At the same time, τις has the effect of substantivating the adjective ('a most nasty character').

d3 **ἀγνοοῦσιν**: J.N. O'Sullivan 'On Plato, *Apology* 23 c-d' *AJPh* 97 (1976) 114-116 revives Ast's conjecture ἀποροῦσιν. His primary argument is that the victims of Socrates' young imitators know very well in what way Socrates corrupts the young, but want to save face (this is said in so many words in d7-9). But this overlooks the possibility that Socrates is being ironic.

d4 **τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων**: the Athenian in *Laws* xii 967c5-d1 describes in similar terms the attacks of the common people against those cosmologists who, in the past, did not acknowledge any explanation of the celestial phenomena other than a purely mechanical one: ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξειργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητας καὶ δυσχερείας τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ λοιδορήσεις γε ἐπῆλθον ποιηταῖς, τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας κυσὶ ματαίαις ἀπεικάζοντας χρωμέναισιν ὑλακαῖς, ἄλλα τε αὖ ἀνόητ' εἰπεῖν ('that was what provoked many accusations of atheism and feelings of revulsion against such people; abuse in particular became popular with poets, who compared those investigators with dogs barking at the moon and used in their language a lot of other foolish images'). In both these passages Plato does not use the term οἱ φιλόσοφοι, but the much vaguer οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες. When he uses φιλοσοφεῖν of Socratic philosophers, he usually adds such qualifiers as ὀρθῶς (οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς *Phaed.* 67d8. e4; cf. 64a5; 69d2; *Epist. vii* 326b2), γνησίως (*Rep.* v 473d2), ὑγιῶς

(*ib.* x 619d8), καθαρῶς (*Soph.* 253e5), ἀδόλως (*Phaedr.* 249a1-2), ἱκανῶς (*ib.* 261a4; *Rep. l.c.*), ὄντως (*Phil.* 57d1; *Epist. vii* 326b4). — On the other hand, it is interesting that the text of the *Laws* implicitly puts Socrates on a par with the φιλοσοφοῦντες who preceded him. Although in the *Apology* Plato emphatically denied that Socrates was either a cosmologist or a Sophist, he did not always depict him as totally isolated in his endeavour; in later dialogues, like the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides*, he gives him his own, to be sure rather special, place in the 'history of philosophy'.

d8 **ὅτι κατάδηλοι κτἑ.**: this is not a causal but an object clause, which explains τὰ ... ἀληθῆ ('the truth, namely that it clearly appears how ...').

e1 **καὶ συντεταμένως**: this first καί connects the group συντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες with φιλότιμοι ὄντες; cf. above the note on 21e3.

24a1 **τῶν ῥητόρων**: is this 'orator / rhetorician' or 'politician'? (see the note on 32b8). Lycon is elsewhere known as a politician — he is accused of betraying Naupactus in 400 B.C., cf. Derenne *Les procès d'impiété* 131 — not as a rhetorician. Diog. Laert. II 38 calls him a δημαγωγός. Hence Cobet's proposal to delete τῶν πολιτικῶν as a misplaced gloss on τῶν ῥητόρων. But there may be a distinction here between professional politicians on the one hand and, on the other, citizens who take good care of both their private affairs and those of the city (cf. Chapter X n.1).

a4-5 **ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν ... τἀληθῆ**: 'here you have the truth'; for this use of the ethical dative with ὅδε or οὗτος and with the verb εἶναι (expressed, 'understood' or replaced by an equivalent verb), cf. Soph. *Phil.* 261 ὅδ' εἰμ' ἐγώ σοι κεῖνος; 575 ὅδ' ἔσθ' ὁ κλεινός σοι Φιλοκτήτης, ξένε; *El.* 665 ἥδε σοι κείνη πάρα.

a5 **ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω**: for the aorist participle, cf. *Ion* 535c5 οὐ γάρ σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρῶ.

a6 **λέγω**, 'I *spoke* without concealing or glossing over anything'; for the present of λέγειν referring to the whole of the speech, see note on 18e1.

οἶδα σχεδόν: with εἰδέναι in the 1st pers. sing. of the present or imperfect, Plato repeatedly attenuates by means of σχεδόν the self-confidence which might seem to be implied in the verb; see e.g. *Lach.* 192c5; *Phaed.* 63e6 (cf. Lat. *fere scio*).

a7 **αὐτοῖς τούτοις**: for the false reading τοῖς αὐτοῖς in the MSS., cf. *Parm.* 148a1 κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ (this conjecture of Thompson's proved to be a variant quoted by Damascius *Dub. et sol.* ii p.211,7 Ruelle): κατὰ ταὐτὸ MSS.; see on this A. Carlini *ASNP* 39 (1970) 193. On the authority of the Armenian

version of the *Apology*, which is the only witness for αὐτοῖς τούτοις, see Carlini *ib.* 215 n.296. — Cf. 34c8 ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

a7-8 **τεκμήριον ὅτι ... καὶ ὅτι ...**: when an object clause introduced by ὅτι is followed by a one or more similar object clauses connected to the preceding clause by καί, the conjunction ὅτι may be repeated after καί. There is nothing about this in the grammars, but Prof. W.J. Verdenius (Utrecht), whom I consulted about the question, refers me to W. Wyse's note on Isaeus iii 15,3, in which five instances from Isaeus are quoted and one each from Thucydides, Xenophon, Isocrates and Demosthenes respectively. On τεκμήριον, cf. note on 40c1.

a7 **ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω**, 'that I am right', different from ὅτι τἀληθῆ λέγω, 'that I speak the truth'.

b2 **οὕτως εὑρήσετε**, viz. ὄντα; on the ellips of ὄντα see K.-G. ii 66-67.

5. *24b3-28b2 Refutation of the New Accusers*

24b3-4 **μὲν οὖν ... δέ**: as often with 'retrospective and transitional οὖν with prospective μέν' (Denn. 470-473), a form of οὗτος is found in the μέν clause (here αὕτη) and a deictic pronoun or adverb (here νῦν) in the δέ clause. Besides this, there is a change in addressee(s), and this change is marked by the chiastic position of πρὸς ὑμᾶς at the end of the first member and πρὸς ... Μέλητον at the beginning of the second.

b3 **οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι**: for the position of μου see the note on 18c2.

κατηγόρουν: for the use of the imperfect rather than the aorist, cf. *Apol.* 18b6 and *Gorg.* 482c5-7 (Callicles to Socrates) καὶ νῦν δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει (scil. Πῶλος) πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. There is no instance of the aorist indicative of κατηγορεῖν in Plato. In the forensic speeches of the Orators, the imperfect form of this verb is twice as common as the aorist indicative: in Andoc. the ratio is 3:3, in Lysias 8:2, in Demosthenes 18:11, in Aeschines 5:0, in total 34:16. There are no instances of the impf. or of the aor. ind. in Antiphon, Isocrates (forensic speeches including *Antid.*), Lycurgus and Dinarchus. Instances of these tenses with ἄν have been omitted from these calculations (there is one of the impf. in Antiphon and one in Aesch., none of the aor.).

b5 **τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι**: in Athens, it was customary for both parties in a lawsuit to extol their own ethical and civic merits (corresponding to the ἀνθρωπίνη τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή of 20b4-5) and to revile or to ridicule the character and the deeds of their opponents; in the lawsuit on the crown, Aeschines (iii 51-57. 171-176. 215-237) and Demosthenes (xviii 252-284). Anaximenes advises the speech-writer, when the jury is neither especially well- nor ill-disposed towards his client, that the latter should 'praise himself for the qualities that most concern the audience', λέγω δὲ **φιλόπολιν** φιλέταιρον <εὐχάριστον> ἐλεήμονα τὰ τοιαῦτα (36, p.81,2-3 Fuhrmann). See Chapter II n.13. Demosthenes (xxiv 127), when attacking Aristocrates, points out that he does not live up to his father's virtues, if his father really *was* a man of excellence, εἴπερ τῶι ὄντι χρηστὸς ἦν Λάχης καὶ φιλόπολις. (This Laches, Aristocrates' father, was probably the son of the general whose brave conduct we know from *Lach.* and *Symp.*)

b6-7 **αὖθις ... αὖ**, such pleonasms as αὖθις ... πάλιν, πάλιν ... αὖ, etc., are very common in Plato; cf. 27d6-7 θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, and LSJ *s.v.* αὖθις ii 1.

b7 **ὥσπερ ... κατηγόρων**: in this genitive absolute τούτων is the subject, ἑτέρων κατηγόρων ('a second group of accusers') the predicate.

b8 **ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν κτἑ.**: the liberty that Socrates takes in quoting the text of the indictment is marked not only by πως but also by the fact that it is given in indirect discourse. On the significance of the remodelling of the γραφή by Socrates, see Chapter VI § 1; for the authentic text and its meaning, cf. *ib.* § 2 and 3.

c1 **ἕτερα** does not mean 'other', which in this context would be exactly the same as καινά, but 'instead of them'.

δαιμόνια καινά: the official text of the indictment has καινὰ δαιμόνια; the difference has no real importance and is simply due to Plato's distaste for pedantic accuracy.

c5 **ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον**: here we have a kind of word-play on ἀδικεῖν. In addition to its general sense, this verb has two specialised meanings, the first of which belongs to the language of the law ('to break the law'), the other to that of play and sport ('to break the rules of the game', 'to cheat', 'to play foul'), and it is the latter that we find here, whereas the former occurred in b9 (the text of the indictment). For this 'sporting' sense, cf. *Alc. I* 110b1-5 πολλάκις σου ... ἤκουον ... ὁπότε ἀστραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ παιδίαν παίζοις ... λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις τῶν παίδων ὅτι πονηρός τε καὶ ἄδικος εἴη καὶ ὡς <u>ἀδικοῖ</u>; Aristoph. *Clouds* 25 (Pheidippides dreams that he is engaged in a horse-race) Φίλων, ἀδικεῖς· ἔλαυνε τὸν σαυτοῦ δρόμον ('you are cheating, Philon; keep to your own track'). In the same way ἀδικεῖν is used also for 'breaking the rules of dialectic', as *Euthyd.* 287c7-8 and *Theaet.* 167e1-168a2 (quoted in the next note). 'Meletus claims that I am breaking the law, but I say that he is cheating'.

σπουδῆι χαριεντίζεται: here, and below 27a2 and d6, χαριεντίζεσθαι is synonymous with παίζειν, which is substituted for it in 27a7. — The meaning seems to be 'he is playing games in a serious matter', which is not honest and breaks the rules. Burnet's translation 'he is a solemn trifler', 'his is playing a solemn farce' misses the mark as does his comment: 'The suggestion is that Meletus, who is in deadly earnest, is a *pince-sans-rire* (cf. the Hellenistic σπουδογέλοιος). The charge is repeated below 26 e 7, 27 a 7, d 6'. Actually it seems difficult to sever σπουδῆι χαριεντίζεται from the continuation of the sentence: ῥαιδίως (for which see Chapter VI n.59) implies that Meletus acts with frivolity where this is out of place, viz. when the consequence can be utterly serious; in προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν, the participle represents the same idea as χαριεντίζεσθαι or παίζειν, whereas σπουδάζειν takes up σπουδῆι, which therefore is not related to Meletus' *demeanour* but to the seriousness of the matters that he makes fun of. What

is incorrect in Meletus' behaviour, according to Socrates, is his pursuit of amusement in such a serious matter as a capital lawsuit and with problems that require the most careful examination. So he confuses σπουδή and παιδιά, although their respective rules are fundamentally different. A similar train of thought and exactly the same vocabulary are found in *Theaet.* 167e1-168a2 (Socrates explains to Theodorus how a dialectical discussion should be conducted in order to be fruitful; the immediate continuation of this text, viz. a2-7, has been quoted above in the note on 23c8) μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῶι ἐρωτᾶν ... ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῶι παίζηι τε καὶ σφάλληι καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται (as the two Sophists do in the *Euthydemus*), ἐν δὲ τῶι διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζηι τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον κτέ. Where Meletus goes wrong is exactly in not maintaining the proper distinction between σπουδή and παιδιά. — 'χάρις, χαρίεις, etc., though often used in approval of agreeable forms of wit, are sometimes found in deprecatory applications', S. Halliwell *CQ* 41 (1991) 284, citing Eur. fr. 492,2 N^2.; Dem. xviii 138. Add, from Plato, *Theaet.* 168d2.

c8 **ἐμέλησεν**: for μέλει μοι in relation to educational problems, cf. *Lach.* 179b1. 187c6.

πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι: the force of καί is to emphasise the fact that the point in question should be made as clear for the audience as it is for the speaker. In such cases, the particle can be joined either with the subject or with ὑμεῖς; cf. Dem. xxx 5 ὅθεν δέ ῥᾷστα μαθήσεσθε περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐντεῦθεν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐγὼ πρῶτον πειράσομαι διδάσκειν; Ps.-Dem. xliii 2 (ca. 370-368 B.C.) πειράσομαι δὲ κἀγὼ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς κτέ.; ib. 18 πειρασόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ... ἐπιδεῖξαι. This use of καί is not mentioned by Denn., but it is related to its use in relative clauses (Denn. 295-296, iii and iv).

c9 **καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ**: this kind of phrase has been studied, though inadequately, by Grace H. Billings *The Art of Transition in Plato* (Diss. Chicago 1920, repr. New York - London 1979) 54. Here, there is no transition connecting the preceding topic to the next, but a completely fresh start, since the preceding sentences were directed toward the jury, while this sentence and what follows is addressed to Meletus.

δεῦρο, to introduce an imperative, instead of the usual ἴθι or φέρε, is not common in prose. From Plato I can only quote *Crat.* 422c2 δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετ' ἐμοῦ; as an exhortation without an imperative it occurs *Rep.* iv 445c1; v 477d7. In other instances, e.g. *Theaet.* 144d7, the meaning is local.

d3 **δή νυν**, with an imperative, is more urgent than the simple δή (Denn. 218 iii). In Burnet's text, δή νυν is found, apart from this place, only in *Laws* iii 688e3. 693d2; v 737a4 (in the latter two places it also follows an imperative). But cf. *Soph.* 224c9 ἴθι δὴ νῦν, where νῦν has, at most, a vague temporal reference. See also *Rep.* iv 445c1 (cf. previous note) δεῦρό νυν.

d4 **μέλον γέ σοι**: in a participial clause γε is frequently causal ('since...') (Denn. 143,4).

τὸν ... διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῄς, ἐμέ is equivalent to ἐξευρὼν ... ὅτι ὁ διαφθείρων εἰμὶ ἐγώ, a 'clause of identification', as Gildersleeve calls it (ii § 668). For the suppression of ὄντα, cf. K.-G. ii 66-67. The insertion of ὡς φῄς just before ἐμέ lends the pronoun a special emphasis.

d5 **ὡς φῄς**: a common formula in forensic speeches, when the speaker quotes an assertion of the other litigant, the truth of which he doubts or denies; so ὡς φῄς Lys. xii 26; Dem. xix 171; ὡς σὺ φῄς Dem. xix 221; Din. i 9; ὥς φησιν *Apol.* 24b5; Lys. iii 39; Dem. xxxix 24; ὡς αὐτός φησιν Ps.-Dem. xl (ca. 348/7 B.C.) 31; Aesch. iii 84; ὡς οὗτός φησιν Lys. iii 30. iv. 5. vii 28. The formula is very often used by Socrates in a dialectical discussion, v.g. *Apol.* 25e4; *Euthyphro* 7e9; *Men.* 77e5. 92d8. — For ὡς ἐγώ φημι, see the note on 33c4.

d8 **καίτοι** 'often marks the transition from premise to premise, almost invariably from minor to major' (Denn. 561,3); in most cases 'the conclusion of the syllogism is left to the imagination. Usually the minor premise precedes, the major follows, often in the form of a rhetorical question' (ib. 562 ii).

αἰσχρόν is not an attribute of τεκμήριον but stands by itself.

d9 **ἀλλ' εἰπέ**: the normal use of ἀλλά with an imperative is at the end of a speech, 'as a clinching and final appeal' (Denn. 14). It repeats the initial imperative (d3), cf. *Rep.* i 328a9-b1 ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε (repeating 327c9 μένετ' αὐτοῦ).

e3ff. **δικασταί ... ἀκροαταί ... βουλευταί ... ἐκκλησιασταί**: the fourfold use of the ending -ται is surely intentional, especially since ἐκκλησιασταί is not a usual term (so rightly Burnet on 25a5; the word is, however, used fairly often by Aristotle); it underscores the gradation of the questions. Perhaps there is, besides, a parody of a feature of rhetorical style exemplified in Antiphon v 94 νῦν μὲν οὖν γνωρισταὶ γίγνεσθε τῆς δίκης, τότε δὲ δικασταί· νῦν μὲν δοξασταί, τότε δὲ κριταὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν. See also *Gorg.* 452e1-3 (Gorgias speaking) καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίωι δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν

βουλευτηρίωι βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαι ἐκκλησιαστάς, which, likewise, looks like parody.

e4 **πῶς λέγεις;** Not 'how do you mean that?', which seems to be implied by Jowett's loose translation 'What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youths?', but simply 'What do you say?', as appears from such instances as *Lys.* 208a4-7 ('would your parents allow you to drive one of your father's chariots?') — Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι ἄν, ἔφη, ἐῶιεν. — 'Αλλὰ τίνα μήν; — Ἔστιν τις ἡνίοχος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μισθὸν φέρων. — Πῶς λέγεις; μισθωτῶι μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἢ σοὶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται κτέ. In tragedy, the common πῶς εἶπας; has the same force; cf. F. Ellendt *Lexicon Sophocleum* 676a. For 'how do you mean that?' the Greek is πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; e.g. *Euthyd.* 279d5-6; *Symp.* 202c5; *Theaet.* 152d1.

παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν: the equivalence of παιδεύειν and βελτίους ποιεῖν has already been implied in the discussion of the Sophists, where we first found παιδεύειν (19d9. e2), then καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν (20b1-2; cf. b4-5).

e10 **τί δὲ δή;** In the course of a Socratic induction, τί δέ; is used to introduce a new question, parallel in content and form with the preceding one (cf. Denn. 176 c). Generally, as in 25a3 τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; the formula τί δέ has no influence on the syntactical construction and is best rendered simply with 'and' (so, in that passage, 'And the councillors?'). In exactly the same conditions one also finds τί δὲ δή, which is by no means as uncommon as Denn. *l.c.* suggests (cf. *Rep.* i 333a10. 342a1. 349c4; *Phaed.* 65a9. d4, etc.). — The spellings τί δαί; and τί δαὶ δή; often occur in the MSS., but are likely to be incorrect, especially τί δαὶ δή, since δαί is already an emphatic form that will probably not be reinforced by the proportionally weaker δή. According to K.-G. ii 134,5 we should always write δέ when the formula is 'transitional'. This distinction is observed in *Paris.* 1807 (A), the oldest Plato MS, which originally reserved τί δαί for surprised questions; afterwards, most instances of original τί δέ were 'corrected' to τί δαί as well. Denn. quotes several instances in Euripides and Aristophanes where δαί is required by the metre (263 ii). About τί δὲ δή/τί δαὶ δή, Denn. was apparently not able to make up his mind (264, top of the page).

οἵδε οἱ ἀκροαταί, the reading of BWY, seems preferable to T's οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταί which is accepted by Burnet. The sentence does not (*pace* Burnet) belong to one of the kinds of questions that can be introduced by δέ and that have now been well classified by Denn. 173-177.

οἱ ἀκροαταί: this noun is never used in Attic forensic speeches to refer to those members of the audience who were not members of the jury. Such

listeners are usually called οἱ (ἔξωθεν) περιεστηκότες, viz. Dem. xx 165. xxv 98. liv 41; Aesch. ii 5. iii 207; Dinarch. i 30. 66. ii 19; cf. Aesch. iii 56 ἐναντίον τῶν δικαστῶν ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὅσοι περιεστᾶσιν. We find, however, the participle οἱ ἀκροώμενοι as well, viz. Lys. xiv 46; Dem. xix 196 (τοὺς περιεστηκότας ἔξωθεν καὶ ἀκροωμένους); cf. Aesch. i 77 (ἀκροᾶσθαι). 117 and 173 (ἀκρόασις).

25a5 **ἀλλ' ἄρα**, 'but then', that is 'but, *if this is so*, will it not be impossible with regard to the civic body as a whole, since each citizen is legally a member of the Assembly in his own right, to assert that they corrupt the young?'

a12 **πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν**, 'I find myself, if we are to believe you, in a most awkward predicament'. This seems to be a current phrase; cf. Isocr. ii 12 μηδὲ καταγνῶι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν ὡς κτέ.; xv 212 τοσαύτην ἡμῶν ἀτυχίαν κατεγνώκασιν ὥστε κτέ. — The original meaning of καταγιγνώσκω τί τινος is 'to discover something unfavourable in somebody'.

b1 **πάντες ἄνθρωποι**, 'everybody'; for the omission of the article in such phrases, cf. Gildersleeve ii § 651.

b2 **τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν**: an apposition to a whole sentence usually precedes it; it is in the accusative case, as appears from instances as *Theaet.* 153c8-d1 καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ... προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει; cf. Riddell *Digest* §§ 13-14.

b3 **οἱ ... πολλοί**, not 'the majority', but 'the masses', 'ordinary people', that is, according to the context, either (as here) the layman as opposed to the specialist, or (as mostly in Plato) the people who let themselves be guided by their instincts and by current opinion as opposed to the philosophers who always try to follow the guidance of the λόγος.

b5 **περὶ ἵππων**: Plato is fond of slight stylistic variations when he has to reiterate an idea which he has already formulated in a certain way. Here, he substitutes the genitive for the more normal accusative περὶ ἵππους as found in a13, although the verb is the same (οὕτως ἔχει).

τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ζώιων: for the position of ἁπάντων, see the note on 18c2 οἱ δεινοί ... μου κατήγοροι.

b6 **δήπου** in replies is especially frequent in Plato with πάντως (Denn. 268,4 i).

ἐάντε ... οὐ φῆτε ἐάντε φῆτε: in a few phrases in which the negative is felt to coalesce with the verb, οὐ can be retained where the general rule would

demand μή. This is particularly the case with οὔ φημι, 'to say no', 'to deny'; cf. Lys. xiii 76 ἐὰν μὲν οὖν φάσκῃ ...· ἐὰν δ' οὐ φάσκῃ κτέ.; cf. Goodwin § 384, who points out that μή is found too. — Here the negative member precedes because it is the most relevant one.

b7 **εὐδαιμονία ... περὶ τοὺς νέους**: as Burnet points out in his note on *Phaed.* 64d8 (τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας), περὶ with the accusative can replace a genitive depending on a noun; here this would be a genitive of the subject ('our young people are, I dare say, very lucky'). I do not think, as does G.J. de Vries *Mnemos.* 8 (1955) 295, that one should accept this equivalence as little as possible. — Many translators (e.g. Jowett, Schleiermacher, Salin, Croiset) render the construction as if it was an *irrealis*; the potential ('attenuative') optative is a touch of Socratic urbanity.

c1 **ἀλλὰ γάρ**, breaking off, cf. 19c8. 26a8: 'there is no need to belabour the point'.

c6 **οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον**: in Plato οἰκεῖν (with a further qualification in the form of an adverb or a prepositional phrase) is not infrequently synonymous with ζῆν, e.g. *Phaed.* 67c9; *Rep.* viii 557a9; *Polit.* 301d5 (this is how I read the passage with J.B. Skemp; Diès has a different interpretation); *Phil.* 63b3; Des Places *Lexique* (*s.v.* 2) gives four further instances, of which, however, only one (*Laws* ix 880e1) is to the point (in the other three passages οἰκεῖν has πόλις as its subject and means 'to be governed'; cf. LSJ *s.v.* II 2).

ὦ τᾶν: the occurrences of this phrase have been recently examined by G.J. de Vries 'Remarks on a Greek Form of Address' *Mnemos.* 19 (1966) 225-230 (on our passage 228-229) and by B.R. Voss 'Zusätzliche Bemerkungen zu ὦ τᾶν' *ib.* 21 (1968) 366-373 (on our passage 367). They both rightly stress the touch of condescending superiority which the use of ὦ τᾶν always conveys. Most scholars print τᾶν with the circumflex, Burnet with the acute; this latter form rests on the authority of Apollonius Dyscolus *De adverbiis* 159,10-160,13 (Schneider, in *Gramm. graeci* II i 1), esp. 160,11-13 (the text is mutilated) οὕτως καὶ τὸ ὦ ἐτᾶν ... (came to lose the ἐ-) καὶ τὸν ὀξὺν τόνον ἀντὶ περισπωμένου παραλαβεῖν. Recent lexicographers and philologists either do not mention the problem at all (so Schwyzer; Vendryes *Traité d'accentuation grecque*) or simply mention the existence of both forms (so LSJ *s.v.*; Frisk *GEW s.v.*; Chantraine *DELG s.v.*).

c7-9 **οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ ... ἀγαθόν τι**: see Chapter VI 113-115.

d2 **ἀποκρίνου**: contrast the aorist ἀπόκριναι in c6; here the sense is 'go on answering'.

ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι: in *Laws* xii 956e5-6, Plato takes over this provision of Athenian Law: ἀποκρίσεων ... ἀνάγκας.

d8 **τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ κτἑ.**: in order to be regular, this long sentence should have been built on one of the following two models, either

(a) τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ
ὥστε (α) σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας κτἑ.,
(β) ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ κτἑ.

or (b) (α) σὺ μὲν οὕτω σοφὸς εἶ
ὥστε ἔγνωκας κτἑ.,
(β) ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω
ὥστε ἀγνοῶ κτἑ.

But what seems so startling to Socrates is not so much that a very young man could have superior insight (σοφία) to a very old man — as Socrates would have to admit if Meletus were right — nor that Meletus, despite his lack of experience, could have discovered the truth formulated in d9-e1, but rather the strange and indeed incredible 'conceit of knowledge' (ἀμαθία) which, according to Meletus' answers, would have taken hold of Socrates of all people. Since this last point is expressed more forcefully in construction (b) than it is in (a), the sentence, which began on the pattern of (a), changes to model (b) at the beginning of the second member, that is of (β). A similar shift is found in Isocr. vi 84. In our passage, however, the style is more flexible. Socrates is so astonished at the thought that he extends his reaction, adding a new consecutive clause (e4) to the already modified second member; for this consecutive clause, there was no place in the original design of the sentence. This complex anacoluthon with its interesting psychology has, surprisingly enough, escaped the attention of Luise Reinhard. Formally, the section e1-3 (that is, b, β) has a parallel in *Rep.* i 343c1-4 (Thrasymachus addressing Socrates) καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶ περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῶι ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον κτἑ.

τοσοῦτον σοφώτερος: with a comparative, τοσούτωι is more regular, but cf. Lys. ii 16 τοσοῦτον ... ἀτυχέστεροι; Xen. *Cyr.* vii 5,80 οὐ τοσοῦτον βελτίονας ... ὅσον ἐλάττονας.

e1 **ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω ὥστε κτἑ.**: cf. Isocr. vi 84, from the anacoluthon adduced above, (εἰ) ἡμεῖς δὲ εἰς τοσοῦτον μικροψυχίας ἔλθοιμεν ὥστε κτἑ.

e4 **ὡς φῂς σύ**: see note on 24d5.

e5 **οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα**: the Platonic Socrates likes to act as if his most startling paradoxes are accepted by everyone as a matter of

course. See *Gorg.* 474b2-10 where he defends the double thesis that it is preferable to suffer than to commit injustice and to atone for one's offenses than to escape punishment: ΣΩ. ... ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς. Isocrates' reaction to this is noteworthy (xii 117-118): δυοῖν γὰρ πραγμάτοιν προτεινομένοιν μὴ σπουδαίοιν κρείττω τὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι τοῦ δεινὰ ποιεῖν ἑτέρους ἢ πάσχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῦ μὴ δικαίως τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ φεύγοντες τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην ἀδίκως Λακεδαιμονίοις δουλεύειν (the author thinks of the struggle between Athens and Sparta about the hegemony of Greece). ἅπερ ἅπαντες μὲν ἂν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἕλοιντο καὶ βουληθεῖεν, ὀλίγοι δ' ἄν τινες τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφῶν ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν φήσαιεν.

e6 **ἤ, εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων**: cf. Gaiser *Protreptik und Paränese* 181 n.30, apropos of *Euthyphro* 11b-e where, however, as he rightly points out, it is not Socrates' ignorance that is represented as involuntary, but for once his κομψότης: 'Wie gewöhnlich wird hier das unsachliche Verhältnis [of Socrates' opponent] ... auf Sokrates geschoben, der die Beschuldigung mit Eingeständnis seines Nichtwissens beantwortet und sagt: Wenn ich etwas nicht recht mache, geschieht das unfreiwillig'. Gaiser aptly refers to *Hipp. min.* 373b6-9, *Rep.* i 336e2-4, *Gorg.* 488a2-4, and further to *Apol.* 25e6-26a1 (our passage) and 37e5-6 (this last passage, however, has nothing to do with 'involuntary fault' caused by ignorance).

26a1 **κατ' ἀμφότερα**, 'according to both aspects', hence 'in both cases'. For this and similar expressions in a dilemma, cf. Gorgias *Palam.* 26 ὥστε δι' ἀμφότερα ἂν εἴης ψευδής; Dem. xxv 38 καὶ μὴν κατ' ἀμφότερα ἄξιός ἐστιν ἀπολωλέναι, τοῦτο μὲν ..., τοῦτο δὲ κτέ. (where each member works out one of the alternatives, introduced by εἰ).

a2 **τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων**: for καί in the sense of 'that is' cf. W.J. Verdenius *Mnemos.* 9 (1956) 249 and Bonitz *Index arist. s.v.* καί, 357b13-18.

a3 **διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν**: occasionally νουθετεῖν *can* imply the use of force, e.g. *Laws* iii 700c6-7 παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῶι πλείστωι ὄχλωι ῥάβδου κοσμούσης (gen. abs.) ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο (viz. in the good old times); ix 879d5 πληγαῖς ... νουθετεῖν. But in most passages, as in this one, νουθετεῖν differs but slightly, if at all, from διδάσκειν, with which it is often combined, v.g. *Rep.* iii 399b4-5 δεομένου ... διδαχῆι καὶ νουθετήσει; *Laws* viii 845b4-5 νουθετήσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα (opposed to πληγαῖς κολάζειν). In *Soph.* 229e1-230a3, a distinction is made between a

harsher and a softer part of the art of διδασκαλική; the combination, however, is called νουθετητική.

a4 **οὗ γε ἄκων ποιῶ**: following a relative pronoun, γε gives the clause a causal force (Denn. 141-142, 2 i). The MSS. read ὅ γε; to keep their text, editors assume an ellipse of ποιῶν which, as Burnet rightly says, would be 'very harsh'. Still, he prints ὅ γε and posits the following rule: 'A relative clause with the antecedent suppressed may represent any case required by the construction, whatever the case of the relative may be (cf. *Euth.* 3 c 9 *n.*). ... An exact parallel is *Phaedr.* 242 c 1 (of the 'divine sign') ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν'. This does not seem convincing. In the *Euthyphro* the relative clause precedes the main clause, hence an 'attraction' would be awkward. The *Phaedrus* passage should be interpreted exactly as *Apol.* 31d3-4 ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με (scil. the 'divine sign') τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, about which Burnet writes *in loc.* 'The inf. πράττειν does duty twice over, with ἀποτρέπει and with μέλλω'. Therefore the antecedent, expressed in *Apol.* 31d4, suppressed in *Phaedr.* 242c1, is the accusative τοῦτο (not the genitive τούτου). So it will be better to adopt Schanz' correction οὗ, the more so since Plato may not consistently have distinguished the 'false diphthong' οὗ from the short ὅ, cf. Wilamowitz *Platon* ii 337-338.

a5 **συγγενέσθαι**, as a teacher with his pupil; cf. 19e6 συνεῖναι and the note *in loc.*

ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας: cf. Dem. xx 138 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύξονται καὶ μὴ 'θελήσουσιν ποιεῖν κτέ.

a7 **κολάσεως ... ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως**: on the implication of these words see Chapter VI 116-118.

a8 **ἀλλὰ γάρ** breaking off, as 25c1. A comparison of 26a8-b3 with 25c1-6 is interesting for Plato's art of *variatio*: in c5 the vocative goes with the imperative, in b3 with the interrogative clause; the first time we have ἡμῖν εἰπέ, the second time λέγε ἡμῖν with the reverse word-order and the present instead of the aorist, etc.

b3 **δῆλον δή**: with δῆλος, emphatic δή is common in Plato; cf. Denn. 205 ii and my note on 21a3.

b8 **τοίνυν**, 'then', a particle typical of conversation, and so most frequent in Aristophanes and the dialogical passages in Plato; in about half the Platonic instances it goes with an imperative (here εἰπέ) or a hortative subjunctive; des Places *Particules* 285-286 and 292.

b8 **καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τουτοισί**, 'for my benefit as well as for that of the gentlemen of the jury' (dative of advantage) rather than '*to* me and *to* the gentlemen of the jury' (Fowler) and '*à* ces juges et *à* moi' (Croiset); cf. below 27b8-9.

c2 **νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς**: *pace* Burnet *in loc.*, there can be no question that Socrates has wilfully 'interpolated' εἶναι in order to take advantage of the ambiguity of νομίζειν; see the note on 18c3.

ἄρα is referential, cf. note on 41e6.

c3 **τὸ παράπαν** appears most commonly in negative clauses (v.g. *Laws* x 885c7-8 ἡμῶν ... οἱ μὲν τὸ παράπαν θεοὺς οὐδαμῶς νομίζομεν, οἱ δὲ κτέ.; 908b4-5 μὴ νομίζοντι θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν κτέ.). Here one could say that the negative is replaced by alpha privative (cf. *Laws* x 898d11-e1 τὸ παράπαν ... ἀναίσθητον), but τὸ παράπαν appears in affirmative clauses too, as *Gorg.* 450d9-e1 τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς (viz. a certain category of τέχναι) διὰ λόγων ἐστίν (cf. *Soph.* 239d3; *Tim.* 50e2), where it means 'in general'. Two lines below (c5) Socrates uses παντάπασιν in a negative clause of the same content; Meletus in his answer (c7) reverts to τὸ παράπαν.

ἄθεος 'multiplici sensu adhibebatur, e.g. 'a deo relictus', 'qui est sine deo', 'improbus, 'impius', 'deorum contemptor', 'deos, quos civitas agnoscit, negans', 'is, qui nullos esse deos putat'. qua ultima significatione Plato primus utebatur (Apol. 26c 3)', M. Winiarczyk (ed. of Diagoras and Theodorus) xii; cf. R. Renehan *Greek lexicographical notes* (Göttingen 1975) 15-16.

c5-6 **οὔτε ... τε**: this is the normal combination to connect a preceding negative clause with a following affirmative one; Denn. 568,4.

c7 **ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς**: on this, see Chapter VI 98-100.

d1 **ἵνα τί**: in classical Attic the phrase seems to appear only twice in Plato (here and *Symp.* 205a2), four times in Aristophanes and once in Demosthenes (xix 257); in view of the last instance, which occurs in a very solemn and pathetic passage, it seems better not to categorise the phrase as colloquial, as Goodwin does (§ 331).

οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην, 'not even sun or moon', with the first οὐδέ adverbial, the second connective; Denn. 193, last paragraph; K.-G. ii 294.

d2 **ἄρα**: when this particle, though having a logical force ('then'), is not connective, it often comes relatively late in the sentence; Denn. 41 IV.

ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι: on the cult of Sun and Moon among Greeks and 'barbarians', see Chapter VI 120-123.

d4 **μὰ Δία** can be used with the same force as οὐ μὰ Δία; see *Gorg.* 489e2 (with Dodds' note *in loc.*); *Euthyd.* 293c5; *Phileb.* 36a4; *Alc. I* 130c7; *Demod.* 385e1. 386a2; Aesch. i 88; μὰ τὸν Δία *Euthyd.* 292a6. The idiom is, of course, quite common in the comic poets.

d6 **Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν**: according to Burnet *in loc.* 'the suggestion is that Meletus is hopelessly out of date, and this is all the more emphatic if we accept (as I feel we must) Taylor's view that the trial of Anaxagoras took place *c.* 450 B.C.' But there is no such suggestion: what Socrates means is simply that Meletus is as ignorant of natural philosophy as he is of educational matters. For the date of Anaxagoras' trial, cf. Chapter VI n.15.

d7 **ἀπείρους γραμμάτων**: the phrase means 'illiterate' in all the senses of the word; Burnet takes it in the narrow sense of 'unable to read or to write' and says that here it 'can only refer to reading the book (of Anaxagoras) for themselves'. Although I am unable to prove my suspicion, I take it that Socrates is not thinking of the young reading for themselves, but listening to an ἀναγνώστης reading aloud to an audience in the ὀρχήστρα. The γράμματα here are not the letters or characters, but, as the context shows, books or literature, as *Parm.* 127c3 ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων; the singular γράμμα applies to *a* book, as *ib.* 128a2-3 καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται. Therefore, 'illiterate' also implies 'unfamiliar with literature'.

d8 **ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι**: 'when a clause with ὥστε depends on an infinitive in indirect discourse, and is itself a part of the quotation, its verb representing a finite mood of the direct form, it regularly has the infinitive, ... even when on other grounds a finite verb would seem more natural ... The negation οὐ of the direct form is generally retained with such an infinitive' (Goodwin § 594; Goodwin speaks of indirect *discourse* even when the main verb is not a *verbum declarandi*, but a *verbum sentiendi*, as here οἴει).

d9 **τούτων τῶν λόγων**, 'such assertions'.

καὶ δὴ καί: this group commonly introduces a specific instance of a general rule expressed in the preceding clause (Denn. 256,2); it indicates that the case in question is not unexpected and conforms to the rule; literally 'and of course ... too'. Here we seem to have an ironic variation of this usage:

when one supposes, with Meletus, the jury to be utterly uneducated, one can 'of course contend also' that the young hear from Socrates as his own inventions strange doctrines which they know perfectly well to be those of Anaxagoras. Denniston's interpretation (257,5) is unconvincing; he takes καὶ δὴ καί 'to be analogous to καὶ δή in surprised questions' (cf. 250 ii). But that sense of καὶ δή is itself quite exceptional, if it exists at all.

d9-e1 **ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε ... πριαμένοις κτἑ.**: what the young men can occasionally procure for money are not *books*, but the contents of Anaxagoras' teaching. There is no suggestion whatsoever of the young men buying books.

e3 **ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διὸς οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ;** ἀλλά cuts short the digression about Anaxagoras in order to get back to the fundamental question of 26c1-6 (cf. Denn. 8, end of the first paragraph). In ὦ πρὸς Διός, ὦ is an interjection, which in poetry can be used with the imperative (LSJ *s.v.* II 1), but in prose, it seems, it occurs only in questions, as here and *Prot.* 309d3; *Rep.* i 332c5; *Euthyd.* 281b4-5; Dem. xxi 98. 166; xxix 32; Xen. *Cyr.* vi 2,15.

e5 **οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία**, with emphatic μέντοι; see note on 17b8.

e6 **καὶ ... μέντοι**, 'and even', gives 'liveliness and force' to an afterthought; Denn. 413 and 414 i.

e9 **ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίαι καὶ νεότητι**: the first two near-synonyms are not infrequently coupled, as *Rep.* iii 403a2; *Laws* x 884a6-7; Isocr. viii 119; the first and the third in *Laws* iv 716a6-7.

27a1 **ἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα συντιθέντι**: ἔοικεν introduces a comparison, for which ὥσπερ apologises (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ὥσπερ II), as *Phaedr.* 270d9-e1 ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείαι.

αἴνιγμα συντιθέντι διαπειρωμένωι is the participial form of the finite construction αἴνιγμα συντίθησι διαπειρώμενος, in which the present participle is conative and is therefore equivalent to a final clause ('he constructs a riddle in order to try me', 'to see whether I will fall into the trap'); cf. below e3-4 ταῦτα ... ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω. This last passage tells against Burnet's view that in a1 'the first participle is subordinated to the second'.

a2 **γνώσεται ... ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου**: after γιγνώσκω ('to perceive', 'to realise') the object plus participle can be in the genitive under the influence of the synonymy with αἰσθάνομαι (which in such cases governs the genitive, as 22c5).

ὁ σοφὸς δή: a typical instance of 'ironic' δή, which Denn. (234,6) excellently describes as follows: 'δή ... often denotes that words are not to be taken at their face value, objectively, but express something merely believed, or ironically supposed, to be true. Hence δή often gives the effect of inverted commas.' The reference is to the so-called 'cleverness' of Socrates (*Apol.* 18b7. 20d6-7. 35a2. 38c3-4).

χαριεντιζομένου does not, as Burnet says, mean the same as σοφιζομένου, but as a7 παίζοντος; cf. d6; note on 24c5.

a6 **καίτοι**: see the note on 24d8.

a8 **συνεπισκέψασθε δή**, 'I beg you to examine with me', i.e. 'by my questions I shall show you'.

ᾗι μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν: Burnet translates 'on what grounds I hold this to be the meaning of his words'. I doubt, however, whether this is correct. Normally, ᾗι means 'how', not 'why'. True, LSJ *s.v.* II 2 give 'therefore' as a meaning of ᾗι and quote 'Thuc. i 25, ii 2, al.'; but in those passages the sense is that of Lat. *itaque* ('so it comes' or 'came that...'), which is something quite different from 'why'. In *Hipp. mai.* 292b9-10 οὐκοῦν εἴπω σοι καὶ ᾗι αὐτὸς οἴομαι δικαίως ἂν τύπτεσθαι ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος, although Fowler translates ᾗι with 'why', I would rather suggest that ᾗι modifies δικαίως ἂν τύπτεσθαι, and that the meaning is 'how justly, in my opinion, I would be beaten if I made that reply'. If I am right about the usage of ᾗι, in *Apol.* 27a8 the adverb would modify not φαίνεται (which I take to be, as οἴομαι in *Hipp. mai.*, another instance of Socrates' tongue-in-cheek modesty) but λέγειν. If so, ταῦτα would point to the sense which Socrates has just given of Meletus' text (ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων), and λέγειν should be translated 'to mean', as in 21b3-4 τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεὸς καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; 'what does the god mean and what does he hint at by his riddle?'. In my opinion, Socrates says here that he will make clear *how* the terms of the indictment contain such a contradiction. The answer is that they contain it in a deceptive and subtle way and that the deception lies in the use of the term δαιμόνια. Socrates will uncover the trick by showing first that δαιμόνια implies δαίμονες, second that δαίμονες implies θεοί. Once these implications are revealed, the contradiction becomes obvious (cf. 27d5-6).

a9 **ὑμεῖς δέ**: Socrates already addressed the jury (a8) in order to outline the logical structure of the argument that he will develop, and then turned to Meletus to introduce his first question. But at that moment, he realises that the string of his questions, so typical of his kind of dialectic, might arouse unfavourable reactions among the jurors (cf. Chapter II 34-35). So, before addressing Meletus any further, he turns again to the jury and begs them not

to protest if he conducts the discussion in his customary manner. In thus showing Socrates changing his mind, Plato creates the impression that Socrates' speech is improvised on the spur of the moment.

b2 **ἐὰν ... τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι**, 'if I conduct my argument...'.

ἐν τῶι εἰωθότι τρόπωι: the use of ἐν with τρόπος is not common (cf. LSJ *s.v.* τρόπος II 3). It means 'within the boundaries of', that is: 'according to'; compare ἐν (τῶι) νόμωι, ἐν (τοῖς) νόμοις in *Critias* 121b7-8; *Laws* ix 869c5. 874c6. xi 917b2.

b3 **ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων**: although the partitive genitive ἀνθρώπων depending on ὅστις seems a priori very natural, I do not know of another instance in Plato except *Apol.* 31e2 (as opposed to ὁστισοῦν — etc. — ἀνθρώπων, *Euthyd.* 303e6-7; *Rep.* i 335b3 etc.). In Aristophanes it appears once (*Peace* 736), never in Lysias, Isocrates or Demosthenes.

ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει: Fahr Θεοὺς νομίζειν 144, aptly refers to *Rep.* v 476c2-4 ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἄν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἕπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; The passages are similar only in form, not in content, since the *Apol.* passage has nothing to do with the theory of Forms.

b5 **καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω**, not 'and not make one interruption after the other' (Burnet), but 'and not make a lot of confused objections'; cf. the note on 17d1. — Prof. R. Renehan (private communication to S.R.S.) suggests the correction θορυβεῖτε; the sense would then be 'let him answer and don't keep interrupting'. Of course, after ἀποκρίνεσθω, the corruption to θορυβείτω would be natural. But I am convinced the transmitted text is right: (1) in this context, 'let him answer' would, I think, be ἐᾶτε αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνεσθαι not ἀποκρινέσθω; (2) 27c4 μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος strongly supports θορυβείτω and is more than a little odd if ten lines before Socrates had to ask the jurors to stop protesting in order to allow Meletus to answer; (3) the correction is only tenable if the jurors are actually shouting, but they probably are not (until 30c2), cf. on 21a5; (4) μή ... θορυβεῖτε and the like are used to introduce startling statements, but there is nothing so particularly startling in 27b3-4 that Socrates has to repeat his request made at 27a9-b2.

ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους κτἑ.: note the typical stylistic *variatio* between the questions about ἀνθρώπεια, ἱππικά, αὐλητικά, and finally δαιμόνια.

b7 **ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν**: although Socrates does not take Meletus seriously, his manners retain the utmost sophistication; 29d7 shows that this vocative suggests high esteem and warmth.

b8 **εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει** instead of εἰ μὴ σὺ ἐθέλεις: the sense is not 'if you refuse to answer', but 'if you don't wish to answer', which again is more courteous.

ἐγώ σοὶ λέγω κτέ., 'for your benefit'; cf. above 26b9 and *Gorg.* 515c3-4 ὡμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὔ; ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

b9 **ἀλλά**, 'at least' (cf. Lat. *at*), Denn. 13,3; with ἀλλά in this sense, the 'emphatic word or phrase is often limitatively qualified by γε' (ib., 12,2).

c1 **δαιμόνια ... πράγματα**: the addition of πράγματα to δαιμόνια cannot be called sophistic since, as Burnet has convincingly argued in his note on 24c1, δαιμόνια in the text of the indictment is an adjective. One should compare *Euthyphro* 3b7 περὶ τὰ θεῖα and c1 περὶ τῶν θείων with *Meno* 81a6 περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα.

c4 **ὤνησας ὅτι ... ἀπεκρίνω**: usually the way in which a person helps or gratifies another is expressed by ὀνίνημι with a complementary participle, as *Hipp. mai.* 301c6 ὀνίνης ἀεὶ νουθετῶν. I have found no other instance of the construction with ὅτι. (Aristoph. *Lys.* 1033 is not relevant.)

c5 **οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῂς κτέ.**: the entire argument is given a fresh turn by an anonymous author, from whom it is adopted in a condensed form by Aristotle *Rhet.* ii 23, 1398a15-17 ἄλλος (scil. τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐνθυμημάτων) ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ· οἷον τί τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστιν; ἆρ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον; καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι. There is good reason to think that Aristotle's source is the *Apology of Socrates* by Theodectes of Phaselis, about whom cf. Chapter I n.7. See Baiter-Sauppe *Oratores attici* ii, 335 (supplement to 247a39) and F. Solmsen *RE s.v.* Theodektes 1, col. 1734,33-42. Aristotle's version of the argument in *Rhet.* iii 18, 1419a7-12 is derived directly from the *Apology* (the words d9-10 τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή are quoted, with minor variations, at 1419a11-12); see Chapter VI 101.

οὐκοῦν introduces the minor premise of a syllogism or enthymeme, the minor, as often, preceding the major; see des Places *Particules* 160-165 and Denn. 434 b α.

μὲν, answered by c8 δέ.

καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, i.e. καὶ αὐτὸν νομίζειν καὶ ἄλλους διδάσκειν νομίζειν.

c6 **εἴτ' οὖν ... εἴτε ...**: in disjunctive clauses, Plato is fond of underscoring one (usually the first) or both of the members by emphatic οὖν ('actually'); Denn. 418-419 and des Places *Particules* 7-9; cf. below 34e5.

ἀλλ' οὖν, 'at any rate', generally (as here) followed by γε, has the same force as δ' οὖν (about which see the notes on 17a2 and 21d2), viz. 'an elimination of the secondary or irrelevant, ... a resumption of the main issue' (Denn. 443-444,4; cf. des Places *Particules* 212-222); ἀλλ' οὖν differs from δ' οὖν in that ἀλλ' οὖν does not necessarily need a syntactical construction parallel to that of the preceding member.

c7 **κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον**, a frequent formula in polemical discussions, v.g. *Rep.* i 334d5; *Meno* 92a2-3; *Euthyd.* 286e2; Isocr. xi 43.

c9 **ἔχει δή**, 'yes, it is so'. In affirmative answers, δή emphasises the word taken over from the question; Denn. 227,14.

c10 **τίθημι**, 'I reckon you as agreeing', i.e. 'I assume that you agree'; cf. *Gorg.* 481c1 πότερόν σε θῶμεν (so rightly Madvig: MSS. φῶμεν; see Dodds *in loc.*) νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα;

d1 **ἤτοι ... (γε) ... ἢ ...**, 'either ... or ...'. In this group, which is particularly common in Plato, the enclitic τοι always coalesces with the first ἤ, calling attention to the alternative, but apparently not emphasising the first member; Denn. 553,7.

ἤτοι θεούς γε ... ἢ θεῶν παῖδας: we cannot say that this opposition was firmly established in Greek religious terminology. In current language a δαίμων, though belonging to the world of divine beings, was not the object of a cult proper and was therefore felt to be somehow less divine than the great gods; cf. Nilsson *Gesch. gr. Religion* i 216-217; W. Burkert *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Periode* (Stuttgart etc. 1977) 278-282.

φῂς ἢ οὔ; 'yes or no?'; cf. *Rep.* v 475b4 τοῦτο ... φάθι ἢ μή, 'answer this with yes or no'.

d4 **εἴπερ**, *siquidem*, 'since'; this causal clause covers the two possibilities introduced respectively by εἰ μέν and εἰ δ' αὖ.

ὡς σὺ φῄς: see the note on 24d5.

d5 **ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι**, i.e. ὃ ἐγώ φημι, <φάσκων> σε αἰν. καὶ χαρ., 'this is precisely what I assert *when I say* that you are presenting us with a riddle and making fun of us'. In such cases the participle of the *verbum dicendi* (here φάσκων) can be suppressed; cf. *Laws* v 731e1-2 τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν (scil. λέγοντες) ὡς φίλος αὑτῶι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει ... ἐστιν, 'that is what they have in mind *when they say* that every man is naturally his own friend'. Compare England's translation in his note *in loc.*: 'that is that which people mean *when they say* [here and below italics mine] that everybody is naturally dear to himself', and that of des Places: 'c'est ce qu'on entend *quand on dit* que ...'.

d6 **φάναι** repeats, as a kind of apposition, the infinitives αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι.

d7 **αὖ ... πάλιν**: cf. *Lach.* 193d6 αὖ πάλιν; *Rep.* vi 507b6 πάλιν αὖ; and the note on 24b6-7.

d8 **εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν**: as I said in the note on d1, this can hardly be a traditional view and is rather introduced here *pour les besoins de la cause.* In other passages in which Plato clearly adopts contemporary notions, it is the ἥρωες that he represents as the children of the unions of gods and mortals; so *Crat.* 398c11-d2 οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἡμίθεοι οἱ ἥρωες; — Τί οὖν; — Πάντες δήπου γεγόνασιν ἐρασθέντος ἢ θεοῦ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς; *Rep.* iii 391d1-2 θεοῦ παῖδά τε καὶ ἥρω; *Laws* ix 853c4-5 θεῶν παισὶν νομοθετούμενοι τοῖς ἥρωσιν. When in the *Hipp. mai.* the Sophist makes a distinction between those ἥρωες who are the offspring of gods and others that are not (293b1-9), he seems to do this merely in order to extricate himself from a contradiction. For further references see des Places *Lexique s.vv.* δαίμων 2° and ἥρως.

νόθοι τινές: Fraenkel 'Socratis Apologia' 98 aptly compares *Epin.* 986b5-8 μηδεὶς ... νομίσηι πάντων ἡμῶν ὡς οἱ μὲν θεοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν (viz. of the celestial powers), οἱ δ' οὔ, μηδ' ὡς οἱ μὲν γνήσιοι, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοί τινες οἵους οὐδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδενί (that is: νόθοι). When Plato does not examine *ex professo* problems of theology, he often sticks to the traditional mythological views and language, especially in an *argumentum ad hominem*, as is the case here,; but when he sets out, as in the *Epinomis* (if he is its author), to lay down the principles of a philosophically sound theology (i.e. the astral one), he will reject such a notion as that of divine bastards. Here τινές after νόθοι unobtrusively casts a doubt upon that notion.

d9 **ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται**, 'of whom the tradition, in each case, says that they are the children' (for this use of λέγομαι, cf. below 41a3 and τὰ λεγόμενα 40c7. e5-6. 41c7 and the note on 40c7). Such traditions were collected in the last section of Hesiod's *Theogony* (965-1020) and in the *Catalogue of*

Women or *Eoeai* ascribed to him. For δὴ καὶ after a relative pronoun, see Denn. 294-295 B I i and 218-219, 9 i.

d10 **θεοὺς δὲ μή**: after verbs of 'thinking' (here ἡγέομαι), the negative with the infinitive is normally οὐ (Goodwin § 685), although in a number of cases one finds μή, as after πεπεισμαι below 37a5. b2 (in both cases the strength of the belief no doubt played a part in the choice of the negative). Here, however, we have a case analogous to disjunctive indirect questions (for which see the note on 18a4-5), viz. that of an opposition of two members connected to one another either by (τε) καί or by μέν ... δέ, of which the second consists of one word with the negative or καί with the negative. In such second members either οὐ or μή can be used; cf. K.-G. ii 192, Anm. 2.

e1 **ἵππων ... παῖδας**: for παῖς applied to animals, cf. Archil. fr. 179 West; Aesch. *Ag.* 50. A.W. Verrall *The 'Agamemnon' of Aeschylus* (London 1904) 195-196 points to several compounds with παιδ- applied to animals: παιδοφόνος λέαινα (Eur. *Med.* 1407), παιδολέτωρ (*Rhes.* 549), said of the nightingale, μὴ παιδουργεῖν (*Ion* 175) said of birds. τέκνον, not παῖς is the normal word to refer to the offspring of animals, παῖς being found only in poetry, and, apparently, rarely at that. Still, the usage in our instance has, of course, no poetic flavour; the word had to be taken over from θεῶν παῖδας (-ες) in 27d1. 8. 10. It is not unlikely, however, that Plato makes a playful allusion to the line of Simonides quoted in the next note, since that too applies to mules.

e2 **[ἢ] καὶ ὄνων**: surely ἢ should be bracketed here. Mules are not 'the offspring of horses, *or possibly* asses', but of a male *and* a female animal of the species horse *and* ass, or conversely. It does not seem right to take, as Burnet does (note on e1), ἵππων and ὄνων as feminines, since in the context the gender of the animal does not matter. This interpretation is confirmed by Aristotle *Rhet.* iii 2, 1405b23-28 καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῶι ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν ἐποίησε· "Χαίρετ', ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες <u>ἵππων</u>" (*PMG* 515)· καίτοι καὶ τῶν <u>ὄνων</u> θυγατέρες ἦσαν. In my opinion, ἢ is an old correction (or perhaps an old gloss) of the καί in the next words ἵππους δὲ <u>καὶ</u> ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι; see next note.

ἵππους ... καὶ ὄνους, i.e. 'would reject the existence of horses *or* of asses'. If we admit the existence of mules, it would already be absurd to deny the existence of *either* horses *or* asses; it is not true that it would only be absurd to deny the existence of *both.* The alternative, which was certainly intended by Plato, could, in principle, be marked by καί, as it is 18c6-7 and 23a7 (see the notes *in loc.*). But in the context, καί would be highly misleading

since in the preceding words <u>ἵππων ... καὶ ὄνων</u> means 'horses *and* asses'. Therefore I think that the original text was ἵππους ... ἢ ὄνους, and that the conjunction καὶ was substituted by mistake for ἢ under the influence of ἵππων ... καὶ ὄνων. In the course of transmission, the error, I suppose, was detected and ἢ was added *in margine* as a correction for the second καί. At a next stage, this correction was misunderstood as indicating an omission before the first καί.

e3 **ἀλλά** cuts the argument short, as in 26e3.

e4 **ἀποπειρώμενος** resumes διαπειρωμένωι in 27a1 (see the note).

ἡμῶν: not only Socrates but the jury and the bystanders too; cf. 27a3-6 ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν (Socrates) καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

[τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην] should be excised as a gloss of ταῦτα. It is impossible to keep both, but in my opinion Schanz was ill-advised when he rejected ταῦτα. First, the pronoun has the right position in the sentence: it is the object of ἐγράψω but separated from it in order to convey emphasis. Second, τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην is not precisely what is meant, since the experimenting has to do with the form, not the content, of the indictment.

e5 **ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς**: a deliberative indirect question.

ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν κτἑ.: with οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν (τίς μηχ. ἐ., etc.), just as with ἀνάγκη ἐστί, καιρός ἐστι, ὥρα ἐστί, σχολή ἐστι, etc. the normal construction is the infinitive, of which there are at least ten instances in Plato. The construction with ὅπως is found once in Herodotus (ii 160). In our passage, the abnormality is scarcely felt, since the dependent clause comes before the main clause.

e6 **καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα**, with καὶ 'marking a minimum' (Denn. 293,2), as 28a4. b7.

οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν: cf. Lys. iii 44 οὐ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐρᾶν τε καὶ συκοφαντεῖν; xii 41; Ps.-Dem. xlvi 6.

28a1 **δαίμονας ... θεούς ... ἥρωας**: there are several instances of this set of nouns in Plato: *Crat.* 397d9-e1 (bracketed by Burnet, but rightly kept by Méridier); *Rep.* iv 427b6-7; *Laws* iv 717b2-4. v 738d2. vii 801e2-3. 818c1. The question has been raised why the ἥρωες are mentioned here, although they were not mentioned in the argument. Burnet (notes on 27d8 and e1) thinks that Plato reserves the term δαίμονες for the offspring of a male god and a mortal woman, and calls the offspring of a mortal father and a divine mother ἡμίθεοι or ἥρωες; the latter are, in his opinion, implied by the words

ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων (27d9). There is no trace, however, of this subtle distinction either in the *Apol.* or in other works of Plato. *Crat.* 398c11-d2 (quoted above in the note on 27d8 εἰ δ' αὖ κτἑ.) explicitly includes both groups in the category of ἥρωες, and *Rep.* iii 391c8-d7 gives the names θεοῦ παῖς and ἥρως to 'Theseus, son of Poseidon and Pirithous, son of Zeus', that is, to two demigods who according to Burnet's classification could not be called ἥρωες. Therefore, if the words μήτε ἥρωες are authentic in our passage (and the other instances of the list of three are strongly in favour of their authenticity), we can conjecture that Plato, when speaking of semi-divine beings, wanted to refer to them not only by the unusual appellation δαίμονες, but also by another, more customary term. For the terminology, see also below the note on 28c1 τῶν ἡμιθέων.

a2 **ἀλλὰ γάρ** marks the break in the train of thought, as 19c8. d8, coinciding, as 26a8, with Socrates' turning from Meletus to the jury.

ὡς ... ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ depends on ἀπολογία, the action noun of ἀπολογέομαι, which can be followed by an ὡς clause, as *Phaed.* 69d7-e1 ἀπολογοῦμαι ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς ... ἀπολείπων ... οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω; this clause expresses the defendant's claim, not the argument he gives to prove it.

a3 **οὐ πολλῆς ... εἶναι ἀπολογίας**: for this predicative use of the genitive, cf. *Gorg.* 461a7-b2 ταῦτα οὖν ὅπηι ποτὲ ἔχει ... οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι; cf. K.-G. i 373.

a4 **καὶ ταῦτα**: for καί 'marking a minimum (descending climax)', see Denn. 293,2.

a5 **ἀπέχθεια ... πρὸς πολλούς**, 'hatred among many', not 'towards many'. Cf. LSJ *s.v.* πρός C I 6 b: 'In phrases of the form ἡ πρός τινα εὔνοια (ἔχθρα, etc.), πρός sometimes means *towards*, as ἡ πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλία the affection of their wives *towards* or for them, Xen. *Cyr.* 3. 1. 39 ..., but sometimes *at the hands of*, ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐμένεια, Thuc. 5. 105...'.

a6 **εὖ ἴστε**, imperative (as 30a5. c6), not indicative.

a7 **ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος**: these words are intended to remind us of 18d2 φθόνωι καὶ διαβολῆι.

a8 **ἃ δὴ καὶ πολλοὺς ... καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἥιρηκεν**: a passage from Anaximenes' extensive recommendations about the way a speaker should dispel the suspicions which slander (διαβολή) might have aroused against him is evidence that this idea was a rhetorical topos: c.29, p.62,15-18 Fuhrmann ἀεὶ δὲ κατηγορεῖν χρὴ διαβολῆς καὶ λέγειν, ὡς δεινὸν καὶ κοινὸν καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον. ἐμφανιστέον δ' ὅτι καὶ πολλοὶ ἤδη

διεφθάρησαν ἀδίκως διαβληθέντες. To be sure, the whole chapter directly concerns the *exordium* of a deliberative speech, but Anaximenes implies (p.59,13-20 F.) that his advice holds good for forensic oratory as well, and of course the verb διεφθάρησαν suggests convictions by a law-court.

6. 28b3-31c3 Answer to a First Objection

28b3 **Ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις**: to introduce an objection after a pause, ἴσως with the potential optative of a verb of saying, interrupting, wondering, etc., and with τις or an equivalent as subject (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* i 2,19 ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοί) is very common (in the *Apol.* 20c4. 31c4. 37e3); in Isocrates there are three cases of τάχα (v 39. vii 71. viii 57). The particle is always οὖν. This usage is classified by des Places *Particules* 62 under the heading 'transition familière'; inadvertently, however, he quotes our passage with the reading ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, which is that of BT^2 and of Croiset (and Wohlrab), whereas Burnet rightly omits δ' with T, Eusebius and Stobaeus; if des Places had really intended δ' ἂν οὖν, he would have classified *Apol.* 28b3 under δ' οὖν in his chapter vii. In *Symp.* 202d5 πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς εἴη κτλ. (not an objection) there is a similar intrusion of δ' before ἂν οὖν in TW, while B, *P.Oxy.* 843 and Stobaeus have the correct reading. As Denn. observes (460), in *Symp.* 202d5 (he does not mention *Apol.* 28b3) and in Xen. *Lac. resp.* 2,8 εἴποι δ' ἂν οὖν τις, 'δὲ ... οὖν is not in line with the normal usage of δ' οὖν'. I have found one instance of ἴσως and the potential optative with the particle δέ instead of οὖν, but it is not really parallel: Lys. xii 50 ἴσως δ' ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι κτλ., where the subject of ἔχοι is the accused and the sense is that he could oppose the immediately preceding statement of the accuser; so an adversative particle is required ('he could, however, object ...').

εἶτα is used 'in questions or exclamations to express surprise, indignation, contempt, sarcasm, and the like' (LSJ *s.v.* II); it is frequent in Plato's lively style, e.g. *Crit.* 43b1; *Hipp. mai.* 290a9; *Euthyd.* 287b2. 302c6; *Rep.* i 338d7.

οὐκ αἰσχύνει: why, according to the objector, Socrates should be ashamed, is explained in Chapter VII § 2.

b4 **ἐπιτήδευμα**: there are, in Plato, many instances of this word and others derived from the same stem, but, although they have strong ethical and educational connotations (cf. 29c4), they are not as technical as e.g. βίος for 'way of life', for which see *Apol.* 38a5; *Gorg.* 500c7-8 τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι; *Rep.* x 600b3-4 Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου and other passages quoted in des Places' *Lexique* s.v. βίος.

κινδυνεύεις: a key-word for the whole passage; cf. b6 κίνδυνον; c3 κινδύνου; c9 κινδύνου; d4 κινδύνου; d8 κινδυνεύειν; e4 ἐκινδύνευον.

b5-9 **οὐ καλῶς λέγεις ... ἢ κακοῦ**: cf. Dodds on *Gorg*. 521a2-522e8 (p.368): 'In choosing his manner of life Socrates chose also his manner of death, and chose it with his eyes open. It is not an argument calculated to convince Callicles, and it does not convince him (cf. 522c). But for Plato the trial of Socrates was, as Friedländer said, "the crucial experiment" which tested the worth of the two opposed ways of life and set the final seal of authority on Socrates' mission'.

b5 **ὦ ἄνθρωπε**: the use of this very cold, almost disdainful formula suggests that Socrates feels that he has scarcely anything in common with a man who judges by such standards. For other instances of ὦ ἄνθρωπε conveying the same force, see the *Hipp. mai.*, where the fictitious objector, the σχέτλιος (289e7), who has already called Socrates ὦ τετυφωμένε σύ (290a5), and has become tired of Socrates' inept answers, says to him: αὐτὸ γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὤνθρωπε, κάλλος ἐρωτῶ ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέν σοι μᾶλλον γεγωνεῖν δύναμαι ἢ εἴ μοι παρεκάθησο λίθος, καὶ οὗτος μυλίας, μήτε ὦτας μήτε ἐγκέφαλον ἔχων (292d3-6); cf. *Prot.* 314d6-7 (Callias' impatient door-keeper shuts Socrates and Hippocrates out) ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ... οὐκ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῶι; 330d6-8 ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῶι ἐρωτήματι καὶ εἴποιμ' ἄν· Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; *Gorg*. 518e2-3 Ἄνθρωπε (on the omission of ὦ, see Dodds *in loc.*), ἐπαΐεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς; *Rep*. i 329c2-3 καὶ ὅς· Εὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; 337b1-4 Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δὶς ἓξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα ...· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς. — In *Gorg*. 452b5, however, one might doubt whether the tone is peremptory.

b7 **ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι**: when life and death are viewed as alternative objects of evaluation or of choice, τεθνάναι is the regular form in prose, not ἀποθανεῖν; cf. 38e5; *Hipp. mai.* 304e3; *Gorg.* 483b2; *Phaed.* 62a5 (with Burnet's note); Her. i 31; Andoc. i 125; Isocr. v 47. 55. x 53. *Epist.* vii 9. But cf. Isocr. ix 3, ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀποθνήισκειν εὐκλεῶς αἱρουμένοις: given εὐκλεῶς, τεθνάναι would have been illogical.

ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, 'a man with even a grain of self-respect'. For the idea, cf. *Gorg*. 512d8-e5 μὴ γὰρ (μή with the indicative in a cautious assertion) τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῶι θεῶι ... τὸ ἐπὶ τούτωι σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη.

b8-9 **πότερον ... πράττει ... ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ**, 'whether he acts as a man of spirit or as a coward'.

b9 **φαῦλοι**, 'second-rate', just the opposite of what a Homeric hero stands for, viz. αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων (Z 208). Not only is

the predicate placed at the beginning of the sentence, but the insertion of τῶι γε σῶι λόγωι before the subject gives it even more emphasis, which has been lost on most translators.

c1 **ἂν ... εἶεν**, 'were (or: are), I dare say', in the potential, not 'would be' or 'would have been', as many translators have it, as if the text ran ἂν ... ἦσαν.

τῶι ... σῶι λόγωι, 'by virtue of ...' or 'as result of your principle', slightly different from κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (27c7).

τῶν ἡμιθέων: this is the term normally used for the Homeric heroes in lyric poetry; its meaning is well explained by W.J. Verdenius *Mnemos.* 25 (1972) 7-8. In Plato, it is found only here and 41a4, and in *Crat.* 398c11-d2 as quoted in the note on 27d8 (significantly, in a discussion of the etymology of ἥρως, derived from ἔρως); elsewhere he uses ἥρως (see the notes on 27d8 and 28a1), whereas Isocrates has twelve instances of ἡμίθεος against three of ἥρως.

ἐν Τροίαι, 'in the plain of Troy', as always in Homer, e.g. ε 306-7 τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις οἳ τότ' ὄλοντο Τροίηι ἐν εὐρείηι.

c2 **ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος ὑός**, rather than 'Αχιλλεύς, because the divine status of his mother gives him a higher rank than most epic heroes. Besides, the designation of someone by his parents' name(s), normally that of the father, is not uncommon in Greek prose (to say nothing of poetry), especially in the vocative, e.g. *Hipp. min.* 373a6; *Lach.* 180d7; *Charm.* 158b1; *Lys.* 207b8. 209a5; *Euthyd.* 278e2. 279d1-2, but in other cases too, e.g. *Rep.* ix 580b9 (with a play on 'Αρίστωνος and ἄριστος).

c4 **ἐπειδὴ κτἑ.**: the scene was well-known; not only is it alluded to in *Symp.* 179e1-180a4 (Burnet), but in Aeschines i 150, verses Σ 95-99 are read to the jury by the clerk.

c5 **θεός**: in Attic prose, θεά is only used in fixed phrases; cf. LSJ *s.v.* θεά, and to avoid confusion, as in the *Crat.* passus quoted on 27d8.

c6 **ὦ παῖ κτἑ.**: on the manner in which Plato treats the Homeric text here, see Labarbe *L'Homère de Platon* 340-344. Moreover, it is clear that Plato recognised the expressive value of the double αὐτίκα: by twice inserting (c8. d2) φησί after the adverb he underscores the repetition, which might have been blurred by the intervening remarks.

c8 **φησί**, here and d2, has as its subjects not Thetis and Achilles respectively, but 'the poet' or rather 'the text', *pace* the translators, the commentators and

Labarbe. Otherwise, after the aorists εἶπεν (c4) and ὠλιγώρησε (c9) Plato would have used ἔφη (twice); cf. *Rep.* iii 391b3-4 Πατρόκλωι ἥρωϊ, ἔφη, κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι (Ψ 151), where ἔφη corresponds to the preceding verbs εἶπεν (a5), εἶχεν (b1) and ἦν (b2). When Plato inserts the present tense φησί into a quotation that has been introduced by the immediately preceding context, the subject of the verb is always the poet (or the poem), in most cases Homer: *Io* 537a8. 538c2; *Hipp. min.* 370b4; *Gorg.* 484b6 (Pindar); *Meno* 95e5 (Theognis); *Crat.* 391e5. 402b5; *Rep.* ii 363b3 (Hesiod); *Laws* iii 681e3. iv 718e4 (Hesiod); vi 771a1. In only two of these thirteen passages is there any question ar ambiguity about the subject of φησί: in *Io* 537a8, the subject might possibly be Nestor, but the context (a1 περὶ τεχνῶν λέγει πολλάκις Ὅμηρος; c2 ταῦτα δὴ ... τὰ ἔπη εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή) argues strongly against this interpretation; in *Hipp. min.* 370b4, there is nothing against supplying Achilles as subject of φησὶν, except for the testimony of all the other passages. Labarbe (40 n.1) is wrong in citing *Symp.* 174d2 as evidence, since the subject of ἔφη is Socrates in that passage, as he is of a9 ἦ δ' ὅς and of b3 ἔφη. All these examples are clearly marked as quotations in their contexts, so that there can be no doubt to whom or what the verb φησί refers. When, however, the quotation consists only of a few words that have become proverbial and is not identified as a quotation by the preceding words, there is normally an expressed subject and the verb may stand either in the present or the 'aorist': *Prot.* 315b9 ἔφη Ὅμηρος; *Men.* 76d3 ἔφη Πίνδαρος; *Theaet.* 170e2 φησὶν Ὅμηρος; *Phil.* 66c8 φησὶν Ὀρφεύς; *Laws* ii 660e7 φησὶν ὑμῶν ὁ ποιητής, i.e. Tyrtaeus; *Epist.* xi 359a1-2 φησὶν Ἡσίοδος. — Strictly speaking, when φησί is used absolutely there is no subject to be supplied, neither 'the poet' nor his name; the meaning is simply 'says the text', whether it is a poem or a document or (in later authors) an authoritative book, as appears from *Phaedr.* 258a4-5 "Ἔδοξέ" πού φησιν "τῆι βουλῆι" ἢ "τῶι δήμωι" ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, where (*pace* G.J. de Vries in his commentary *in loc.*) the subject of φησιν is not a6 ὁ συγγραφεύς, who is the subject of a6 λέγει (and indirectly of a5 εἶπεν) so that the meaning is: "It has been decided", so the text runs, doesn't it? (=που), "by the Council" etc'. This is established beyond doubt by many passages in the Orators, in several of which the subject of the verb of the preceding clauses cannot be subject of φησίν, e.g. Dem. xx 69 καὶ γὰρ ... τοῦτ' ἐν τῆι στήληι γέγραπται· "Ἐπειδὴ Κόνων", φησίν, "ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους"; xix 62 ἀκούετ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. "Ὁμολογία Φιλίππου καὶ Φωκέων", φησίν, οὐχὶ Θηβαίων καὶ Φωκέων ...· καὶ πάλιν· "παραδοῦναι δὲ τὰς πόλεις Φωκέας", φησί, "Φιλίππωι"; Hyper. *Euxen.* 7 τοῦτ' ἤδη καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τῶι νόμωι ἐγράψατε, ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοῆι μηδείς· "Ἐάν τις", φησί, "τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καταλύηι;" Aesch. iii 110 (apropos of the curse invoked by the Amphictyons on the transgressors of the decree concerning the respect owed to the sacred land) γέγραπται γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῆι ἀρᾶι· "εἴ τις τάδε", φησί, "παραβαίνοι ἢ πόλις ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ ἔθνος, ἐναγής", φησιν,

"ἔστω τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος" κτἑ. See further Dem. xix 278. 279. 298; xlv 28; Ps.-Dem. xliv 68; lvi 36; Aesch. i 13. 19. 22. 28. 29. 30; iii 14. 21. 44. 67. 111. 121. 126. 138; Lys. xiii 5. So φησίν does not refer to a person mentioned in the preceding lines, but simply to the text itself. In Plato *Charm.* 164e5-6 (apropos of Γνῶθι σεαυτόν) λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἀεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ "Σωφρόνει", φησίν, the interpretation of the divine dictum is given as an equivalent of the original formulation.

ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας: on this anacoluthon, see Chapter VII 132. There is a similar one in Lycurgus *Leocr.* 99 χρήσαντος δ' αὐτῶι τοῦ θεοῦ ... ὁ δὲ τῶι θεῶι πιθόμενος τοῦτ' ἔπραξεν. *Pace* Burnet, there is no parenthesis in c7-8.

c9 **τοῦ ... θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου**: a good instance of the natural way in which a hendiadys arises. Below, d4-5, Plato omits the articles for the sake of variation.

d1 **δείσας**: the participles of verbs which denote an emotion or its physical manifestation are nearly always in the ingressive aorist; so δείσας, φοβηθείς (28e6. 32c2), ἡσθείς, χαλεπήνας, ὀργισθείς (34c8), τρέσας, δακρύσας, γελάσας, μειδιάσας.

τοῖς φίλοις: with this 'universalising' plural, Socrates starts the interpretation along an ethical and objective line of the very emotional and subjective actions and reactions of Homer's Achilles. As the model of the man of honour and conscience, the hero embodies, for Socrates, devotion to a code of conduct, not obsession with a desire for personal revenge. With d2 δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῶι ἀδικοῦντι, Socrates takes his moralising interpretation beyond what the Homeric text can justify: the ἐπαμῦναι of Σ 97 and the ἀποτεῖσαι of 93 have nothing to do with an ideal of justice.

d3 **καταγέλαστος**: this word suggests the standards of a 'shame-culture'; A.H.W. Adkins *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) 48-50 and *passim* has shown that these standards inform all value judgments in Homeric society. It deserves notice that Socrates, at the very moment he is replacing shame with radically different standards, still does not discard it altogether. Prof. W.J. Verdenius kindly drew my attention to B. Snell *Szenen aus griechischen Dramen* (Berlin 1971) 19-21. See also B.M.W. Knox *The Heroic Temper, Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley - Los Angeles 1964) 175 n.89.

κορωνίσιν: it seems to me that Plato, while taking delight in quoting carelessly (c5 οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι), still remains vaguely conscious of the authentic reading ἐτώσιον (Σ 104), since it can only be that word

which elicited καταγέλαστος. Cf. *Theaet.* 176d4 γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, where ἄλλως ('in vain') proves that he knew the true reading.

d6 **τῆι ἀληθείαι**: 'in truth', as opposed to the erroneous opinion of the objector. Note the absolute confidence with which Socrates, here and below (29b6-7. d8-e3. 30b2-4. d2-5), proclaims those axioms of which he is morally certain. Socratic ignorance has nothing to do with skepticism or agnosticism.

οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξηι: Demosthenes, too, speaks about a step which he has taken on his own initiative, by putting himself forward in each of the successive stages in which the alliance between Athens and Thebes was negotiated in 338 B.C.: xviii 221 διὰ ταῦτ' ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμαυτὸν ἔταττον, because nobody could do it better; cf. xviii 63 ὁ γὰρ ἐνταῦθ' ἑαυτὸν τάξας τῆς πολιτείας εἴμ' ἐγώ.

d7 **τάξηι**: by introducing the notion of τάξις here, which will play a prominent part in the next sentence, Plato links the first movement (the general principle) with the second (the application to Socrates' case).

βέλτιστον: we might translate 'because he considered it his duty', since, until the rise of Stoicism, the Greeks had no specific word for 'duty'; cf. the note on 18a5.

d8 **μένοντα κινδυνεύειν**, 'to be steadfast in danger', in contrast with λιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν (29a1).

d10 **δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος**: in the main clause of the rhetorical figure of δείνωσις, δεινός means 'strange' with a pejorative connotation, and therefore 'shocking', 'absurd', 'scandalous'. — The potential optative does not of course deny the reality of the facts of Socrates' past life (that they are *his* deeds and still remain relevant is expressed by the perfect tense); what is represented as purely imaginary is the contrast expressed in the hypothetical clause, and it is imaginary because its second member, the λιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν, is merely a hypothesis for the sake of argument.

e1-6 **ὅτε μὲν ..., τότε μὲν...· τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος ..., ἐνταῦθα δὲ κτἑ.**: on the double μέν and δέ, see Denn. 385-386, ii b. It is typical of Plato's anti-rhetorical style that he avoids the symmetrical ὅτε δὲ ..., τότε δέ, and uses the genitive absolute and ἐνταῦθα instead.

e1 **ἔταττον** (here and e3): not τάττοιεν, because what Socrates has in mind are not all the cases, *whatever they may be*, in which officers assigned a post to him, but just the three specific ones which he will mention presently.

e2 **ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει**: Burnet (*in loc.*) doubts whether the famous battle of 422 B.C. is meant here, since 'Cleon had only 1,200 hoplites under his command (Thuc. v.2)'; 'it was not necessary to call up the older men for a distant expedition in order to provide a force such as that, and Socrates was over forty-seven at the time'. He would rather think of 'the fighting which accompanied the founding of Amphipolis in 437-6 B.C., when Socrates was about thirty-two'. Actually, however, we know of no expeditionary force nor of any important fighting on that occasion, and the way in which the encounter is mentioned alongside two famous battles would have led every Greek of the early fourth century to understand the text as referring to the events of 422. On Amphipolis in those years, see J. Papastavrou *Amphipolis. Geschichte und Prosopographie* (Leipzig 1936) 11-22; R. Meiggs *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 195-196. 333-338.

ἐπὶ Δηλίωι: on the topography, see now W.K. Pritchett *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, ii *Battlefields* (Berkeley - Los Angeles 1969) 24-36 (The Battle of Delion).

e3 **ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις**: Burnet characterises this phrase as 'a modest one', which 'has just the opposite effect to εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος'. I can see no justification. Thuc. i 142,9 τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι should certainly be taken as 'more than other things' (Gomme *in loc.*).

e4 **τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος**, 'now that the god orders me' (so too Jowett and Schleiermacher), rather than 'when God assigned me ...' (Burnet; similarly Fowler and Croiset), although, of course, τάττοντος could be an 'imperfect participle'. The god's command has lasting force and continues to be relevant: cf. 30a5 ταῦτα γὰρ <u>κελεύει</u> ὁ θεός, and Chapter V 81-82.

ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, 'as I became thoroughly convinced'. The use of synonyms is a way to give emphasis; see the note on 17c6 δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι. Other instances are collected by Gunnar Rudberg 'Sokrates' Reden' *SO* 24 (1945) 14, who, however, quotes cases in which the second word is a synonym of the first indiscriminately with others where it is an antonym, an explanation, etc.

e5 **δεῖν**, after a verb of command, is logically superfluous, but not exceptional; cf. 35c7-8 μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με ... τοιαῦτα δεῖν ... πράττειν; *Rep.* v 473a5-7 μὴ ἀνάγκαζέ με ... τοιαῦτα ... δεῖν ... ἀποφαίνειν.

29a1 **λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν**: A. Carlini *Maia* 21 (1969) 273-274 finds a parody of this passage in in fr. 257 Kock = K.-A. of Antiphanes, Οἴμοι τάλας, ὡς ἄδικον ὅταν ἡ μὲν τύχη λίπηι τινὸς τὴν τάξιν, ὁ δὲ τρόπος μένηι. Actually, however, Antiphanes does not refer to Socratic philosophy, but to the criminal offence of λιποτάξιον, as he also does in fr. 129 Kock, 127 K.-

A., v.9: τὰ δ' ἐγχέλεια γράψομαι λιποταξίου; cf. Plato com. fr. 7 Kock = K.-A. and Aristoph. fr. 808 Kock, 846 K.-A.

δεινὸν τἂν εἴη, 'yes, that would be unthinkable'. The use of τοι, which appeals to the audience (cf. Denn. 537), and maybe also the asyndeton, emphasises the repetition of δεινόν. A similar use of μεντἄν (cf. Denn. 544,12 and 402 ii) is found in Isaeus x 12 θαυμαστὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ... Ἀπολλοδώρωι οὐκ ἂν οἷόν τε ἦν ..., ἀλλ' ἑτέρωι ... ἐξέσται ... Δεινὰ μεντἂν γίγνοιτο. The asyndeton, however, may be caused by an anacoluthon, so that no new sentence starts here, cf. note on 32b5.

a2 **ὡς ἀληθῶς** goes with δικαίως.

τότ' ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις: following the paradoxical use of the δείνωσις (see Chapter VII 140-142), this is again a typically Socratic reversal of the positions; cf. Chapter IX 183; 35d2-5. For the idea that disloyalty to the ideals and methods of philosophy should be punished, cf. *Hipp. mai.* 292a2-b11 (notice b6 and b9 δικαίως).

a3 **ἀπειθῶν**: Socrates cannot admit to a separation of theory and practice, of convictions and actions. When someone honestly acknowledges the existence of true gods, endowed with perfect insight (cf. 23a5-6), he cannot even think of disobeying them. And if he imagines that he himself possesses absolute knowledge, that is tantamount to claiming to be more than a man (20d7-e2, cf. 23a6-7, b2-4) and such a claim is incompatible with reverence for the gods.

a6 **μὴ ὄντα** corresponds to a4 οὐκ ὤν; Plato had to change the negative to μή, because the participle depends on δοκεῖν, subject infinitive of ἐστιν; cf. *Parm.* 162a1-3 ἔστιν ἄρα ... τὸ ἓν οὐκ ὄν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ... εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν, where the original οὐκ ὄν is replaced by μὴ ὄν after εἰ.

ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν: for the negative, cf. note on 22d3. On the omission of the subject of οἶδεν, see Dodds on *Gorg.* 456d2.

οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει κτἑ.: Croiset wrongly puts a comma after θάνατον and takes οὐδ' to be copulative ('nor') as if there were two objects of οἶδε (θάνατον and the εἰ clause) and translates 'personne ne sait ce qu'est la mort, ni si elle n'est pas,' etc. But that would be οἶδεν οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον, τί ἐστιν οὐδ' εἰ κτέ. Moreover, Socrates cannot mean anything of the kind. For him, as for every Greek of his day and age (cf. Chapter XI n.46), death is simply separation of body and soul (cf. *Gorg.* 524b3-4; *Phaed.* 67d4-5). As a matter of fact, in such sentences, οὐδ' εἰ is the negative form of εἰ καί, which is found a few lines below (b8-9): ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, with emphatic καί ('of

which I don't know whether they are not indeed blessings'). On emphatic καί see Denn. 316-323; Denn. seems not to have noticed that there is an emphatic οὐδέ corresponding to emphatic καί. Cf. 38a2-3 ἐάντ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ὂν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπωι κτἑ.; and with οὐδ' εἰ *Laws* v 727d4-5 ἐλέγχων ὡς οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδ' εἰ τἀναντία (used adverbially, as c4, and equivalent to τοὐναντίον) πέφυκεν μέγιστα εἶναι πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἐκεῖ (excellently translated by Saunders: 'whether our encounter with the gods in the next world may not be *in fact* [italics mine] the best thing that ever befalls to us'). Cf. *Rep.* ii 368b7-c2 (quoted below, note on 29d4; there, δέδοικα μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἦι = μὴ καὶ ἀνόσιον ἦι). Cf. G.J. de Vries *Mnemos.* 32 (1979) 163-164; W.J. Verdenius 'ΟΥΔΕ "Not at all"' *ibid.* 164; S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 363-364.

a7-8 **τυγχάνει ... ὄν**: when τυγχάνω in the present stem is accompanied by a present participle, it does not necessarily indicate chance or coincidence or anything of that kind: quite often it simply lends more emphasis to the verbal idea expressed by the participle. In this respect the translations of LSJ are misleading.

a8 **δεδίασι**, viz. most people, those who do not think along Socratic lines. For the idea, cf. *Phaed.* 68d5-6 τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι (in contradistinction to οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίαι ζῶντες) τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν εἶναι.

b1 **καίτοι**: Burnet is right in accepting the reading of Eusebius, against the καὶ τοῦτο of BTW Stobaeus. With αὕτη following, τοῦτο is intolerable (it is just a gloss on αὕτη). And καίτοι is the normal particle to introduce, after a minor premiss, the major which is expressed in the form of a question (Denn. 562-563, ii).

πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν κτἑ.: cf. *Laws* ix 863c2-6 διχῆι μὲν διελόμενος αὐτὸ (the subject under discussion, viz. ἄγνοια as a cause of ἁμαρτήματα) ὁ νομοθέτης ἂν βελτίων εἴη, τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν αὐτοῦ κούφων ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον ἡγούμενος, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν, ὅταν ἀμαθαίνηι τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίαι συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξηι σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν; in *Soph.* 229c1-10 two kinds of ἄγνοια are distinguished, the worst of which should be called ἀμαθία and consists of τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι. On the use of ἀμαθία in this context see note on 25d8.

b2 **ἡ ἐπονείδιστος**, 'the kind to be reproved', since it is an evil, while ignorance of trivial matters is not.

b3 **καὶ ἐνταῦθα**, 'more especially in *that* respect': Socrates is not only persuaded in a general way that he knows nothing of importance (21d3-6. 23b3-4), but more in particular that he knows nothing of the after-life.

b4 **εἰ δή**, 'if really', 'if after all' (Denn. 223-224,11); Socrates feels reluctant to admit superiority in the field of σοφία.

τούτωι ἄν: when the verb of a potential or counterfactual main clause is understood (here φαίην), ἄν is kept. See K.-G. i 243-244; LSJ *s.v.* ἄν III.

b5 **οὕτω**: LSJ *s.v.* I 7 refers to our passage as having οὕτω to introduce an apodosis after a participle. But first, this usage implies that the action expressed by the participle is an event anterior to or a condition necessary for the main verb action, and that is not the case here. Moreover, in such cases one normally finds οὕτω δή, not οὕτω καί, which would be impossible. Actually, οὕτω καί emphasises the conformity between the real situation (οὐκ εἰδώς) and Socrates' opinion about it (οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι); cf. 21d5 <u>ὥσπερ</u> οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι (scil. εἰδέναι).

b6 **ἀδικεῖν**: the verb that describes the moral quality of the action precedes the one indicating the action itself, because it is the qualification that determines Socrates' judgment.

τῶι βελτίονι: from the Socratic perspective this is tantamount to τῶι σοφωτέρωι. God is absolutely σοφός.

b7 **κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν**: the opposites of the two basic aspects of τὸ ἀγαθόν, viz. τὸ ὠφέλιμον and τὸ καλόν.

οἶδα: notice the strong emphasis given to the verb by its position at the end of a rather long sentence. Socrates' confidence with regard to this crucial point is the more striking since he just insisted upon his ignorance concerning such a serious question as that of after-life. Cf. the note on 28d6.

b9 **φοβήσομαι ... φεύξομαι**: on the role of fear in this section, see Chapter VII 131.

c1 **ἀφίετε**: here, c7 and d2 ἀφίοιτε, conative presents, 'if you are prepared to let me go'. Of course the jury could not make such a deal, since after the first speech of the accused they had to vote 'guilty' or 'not guilty' and after his ἀντιτίμησις they had to choose between the two τιμήματα. Socrates considers the possibility just for the sake of argument. Cf. Chapter VIII 157-159.

c1-2 **ἢ ... οὐ δεῖν ... ἢ ... οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι** corresponds to the indicatives ἢ ... οὐκ ἔδει ... ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐστιν. For δεῖν as the substitute for an independent ἔδει, cf. Dem. xxii 21, where φησὶ δεῖν corresponds to 23 προσῆκεν and 28 χρῆν. A similar argument is found in Ps.-Dem. lix 112 ὥστε πολὺ

μᾶλλον ἐλυσιτέλει μὴ γενέσθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα τουτονὶ ἢ γενομένου ἀποψηφίσασθαι ὑμᾶς.

λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς is rather 'say in your presence' than 'say to you' (ὑμῖν); cf. *Gorg.* 493b7-c1 ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων.

c4-5 **ἤδη [ἂν] ... διαφθαρήσονται**: the use of ἄν with the future (whether indicative, optative, infinitive or participle) is a *quaestio vexata*, which cannot be treated adequately in a commentary. A few remarks, however, may be helpful. Since 1945 two comprehensive studies were published about the subject, H. Raeder 'Ein Problem in griechischer Syntax. Die Verbindung der Partikel ἄν mit Futurum' *Kongel. Danske Vid. Selskab, Hist.-filol. Medd.* 33. 5 (1953), and A.C. Moorhouse '"Αν with the Future' *CQ* 40 (1946) 1-10; both authors defend the existence of the construction. See further W.J. Verdenius *Mnemos.* 11 (1958) 197 (on *Phaed.* 61c4) and G.J. de Vries *ib.* 25 (1972) 43 and 48 (on *Euthyd.* 275a and 287d), and *Comm. Phaedr.* 35 (on 227b9-10; with bibliography). Raeder and Moorhouse cite some forty instances in classical Greek (exclusive of Homer); some twenty of these can easily be corrected, such as *Apol.* 30b9 (οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος codd.: -σαντος Cobet; see the note *in loc.*), or are doubtful because there are variants in the MSS. The remaining examples are to be taken seriously as evidence, but do not seem to me to establish a solid ground for the defence of the construction in question. The principal objection to the construction is that it is impossible to identify its value. A.O. Hulton '"Αν with the Future: A Note' *CQ* 51 (1957) 139-42, has convincingly shown that Moorhouse's attempt at an interpretation is not satisfactory (in some passages the value should be emphatic, in others ironic, here it should mark an understatement, there a possibility), but his own suggestion remains very vague ('an implication of conditions and determining circumstances'), as Moorhouse pointed out in his reply, *ib.* 53 (1959) 78-79, and would apply equally well to any kind of conditional sentence. In view of this I am inclined to think that, in the cases in which anacoluthon cannot be admitted, ἄν should always be eliminated by correction. In our passage, there is probably no anacoluthon, since after the future optative (of reported speech) εἰ διαφευξοίμην, which in direct speech corresponds to εἰ διαφεύξεται, a 'minatory' or 'monitory' protasis (to use traditional terminology; cf. note on 41a2), in direct speech, a potential main clause optative would give an awkward anticlimax. One could assume that AN is a dittography of ΔH in ἤδη, or perhaps better that it was added by a corrector (perhaps of the early Roman times) who thought that εἰ διαφευξοίμην was a potential optative.

c4 **ἐπιτηδεύοντες**: see the note on 28b4.

c5 **διδάσκει**: so Anytus would say, but Socrates himself denies absolutely that he is a teacher; see Chapter VIII 167.

c6 **πρὸς ταῦτα**, 'confronted with that', viz. with Anytus' demand that Socrates should be put to death. Because the report of Anytus' statement has become rather long, Socrates feels the need to give the sentence a fresh start.

ὦ Σώκρατες,: the position of the vocative at the opening of the sentence emphasises the earnestness of the warning. At the end, the extreme brevity of the main clause ἀποθανῆι emphasises the threat.

νῦν μέν: μέν is answered not by c7 μέντοι but by c8 δέ.

c8 **ἐν ταύτηι τῆι ζητήσει κτέ.**: see Chapter VII 133-135.

ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς: this clause shows that in a menace or a promise the conditional clause is not necessarily expressed by εἰ with the future.

d1 **εἰ οὖν με**: for the 'resumptive' οὖν, which often occurs in Plato in conditional protases, see Denn. 428-429,4; des Places *Particules* 52.

ὅπερ εἶπον, 'as I just said'; cf. 21a5.

d2 **ἀφίοιτε**: for the thematic form with thematic accentuation there is a parallel in Xen. *Hell.* vi 4,3 ἀφίοιεν (Kühner-Blass ii 213), whereas προοῖτο (*ib.* 215) has athematic accentuation; cf. further Aristotle *De an.* iii 8, 432a8 ξυνίοι.

ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς κτέ.: in a characteristic effort to be courteous, Socrates wishes to attenuate the effect of his refusal, which might otherwise sound rude. In Plato, Socrates is always a model of charm and good manners (τὸ ἀστεῖον). Cf. Lammermann *Von der attischen Urbanität* 45-46, who compares *Phaedr.* 228e1-2 and *Prot.* 335d6-336a2; see further references in the next note.

d3 **ἀσπάζομαι ... καὶ φιλῶ**, 'I care very much for you', with the emphatic use of synonyms (cf. the notes on 17c6 and 28e4). The same 'urbane' turn of phrase occurs *Rep.* x 607a1-5 (about the fans of Homer) φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωιδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν. Surprisingly, LSJ mention for ἀσπάζεσθαι only the meaning 'welcome kindly', 'greet' and variations of it, not 'be fond of', which, however, is not uncommon; see *Lys.* 217b4 (ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν); *Rep.* v 474d7. 479e10 (ἀσπ. τε καὶ φιλ.; cf. 480a3 φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι); *Laws* iii 689a7 (φιλ. τε καὶ ἀσπ.); Lys. ii 75; Ps.-Dem. lii 23.

d4 **ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ**, 'as long as I live, as long as I can'. The verb ἐμπνέω does not sound dramatic in Greek, and translating it as 'as long

as I have breath in my body' would not preserve the tone of the original; cf. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 926; Herodas i 90. For this idiom see *Rep.* ii 368b7-c2 δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἦι παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνηι κακηγορουμένηι ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι.

οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι κτἑ.: the exceptional emphasis of these words shows that they express the very heart of Socrates' way of life. Wolff *Platos Apologie* 40 aptly compares Eur. *H.F.* 674-679 οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας Μούσαις συγκαταμειγνύς, ἁδίσταν συζυγίαν. μὴ ζώιην μετ' ἀμουσίας, αἰεὶ δ' ἐν στεφάνοισιν εἴην· ἔτι τοι γέρων ἀοιδὸς κελαδεῖ Μναμοσύναν, where the γέρων ἀοιδός (so too v. 110) of the Chorus professes that in the uncertainties and vicissitudes of life he will not renounce his sacred task of celebrating Heracles' victories in song; cf. Wilamowitz *Euripides Herakles*[2] (Berlin 1908 and repr.) 356-359. Whether Plato, when writing this sentence, was aware of the similarity with the *H.F.*, I would not venture to say.

d5 **παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος**: see Chapter VII 133.

d6 **ὅτωι ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν**: in the whole passage (cf. 30a3. e7. 31b4), Socrates insists on the fact that he carries out his mission by seeking personal contact, not by giving speeches before a crowd. The idea will be treated more fully in the Answer to the Second Objection.

d7 **ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν**: The tone is quite different from what it was in 28b5-d5. There, Socrates indignantly rebuked the anonymous objector who tried to induce him to act like a coward: here, with a slightly brusque outspokenness, which springs from sincere respect and warm affection, he urges the Athenian man in the street, who has every reason to be proud of his city, to realise that ***noblesse oblige***. The warm tone indicates that Socrates, too, is proud to be an Athenian.

Ἀθηναῖος ὤν: for the pride that should inspire every Athenian, cf. Dem. xviii 68 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γ' οὐδεὶς ἂν εἰπεῖν τολμήσαι, ὡς τῶι μὲν ἐν Πέλληι τραφέντι, χωρίωι ἀδόξωι τότε γ' ὄντι καὶ μικρῶι, τοσαύτην μεγαλοψυχίαν προσῆκεν ἐγγενέσθαι ὥστε ..., ὑμῖν δ' οὖσιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην ἐν πᾶσι καὶ λόγοις καὶ θεωρήμασι τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετῆς ὑπομνήμαθ' ὁρῶσι τοσαύτην κακίαν ὑπάρξαι ὥστε τῆς ἐλευθερίας αὐτεπαγγέλτους ἐθελοντὰς παραχωρῆσαι Φιλίππωι.

τῆς μεγίστης: in such contexts μέγας does not indicate quantity, that is, the size of the territory or the number of inhabitants; the sense is rather 'important', 'leading', 'principal'; cf. *Rep.* v 494c5; Thuc. ii 65,5 (about Pericles) τῆς πόλεως ... μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτὴν

καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ' ἐκείνου μεγίστη; v 111,4 ὑμεῖς (the Melians) ... οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεως ... τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι.

d8 **εἰς σοφίαν**, 'in the field of culture'. Athens' prominence, indeed leadership in this area during the late fifth and early fourth centuries is mentioned several times in contemporary literature. Cf. *Prot.* 319b3-4 (Socrates speaks to Protagoras) ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι; 337d3-6 (Prodicus speaks) ἡμᾶς ... σοφωτάτους ... ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ... νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας (Athens). In Aristoph. *Clouds* 299-312 the Clouds, when visiting Athens, extol its beautiful religious festivals and the dramatic and dithyrambic contests; Pericles in Thuc. ii 38,1 speaks of 'the many relaxations for the spirit, the contests and religious festivals held regularly throughout the year and the homes furnished elegantly and in good taste'; in the epitaph of Euripides, 'Thucydides' (metre and style are pre-Alexandrian) calls Athens 'the Greece of Greece', Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλὰς Ἀθῆναι (*Anth. Pal.* vii 45,3). — Pericles' phrase (Thuc. ii 41,1) that Athens is τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσις does not refer to its cultural achievements, but to the example it sets to other Greeks in the area of constitution and political way of life.

ἰσχύν: on the significance of this word concerning the date of the *Apology*, see Chapter I 19-21.

d8-e1 **χρημάτων ... τιμῆς ... φρονήσεως**: on this tripartition of desirable things, see Chapter VII 135-137.

d9 **οὐκ αἰσχύνει**: unobtrusively, but deliberately, as it seems, Socrates repeats the οὐκ αἰσχύνει (28b3) of the objector. As so often in the *Apology*, he, the accused, is the man who sets forth for the jury the true standards of conduct and the true ideas about τὸ καλόν and τὸ αἰσχρόν. Compare *Gorg.* 522c4-e1: Callicles asks Socrates whether he finds it honourable (καλῶς ἔχειν) for a man to be unable to defend himself in court because he is unable to flatter; Socrates answers affirmatively, if the man in question can use the most effective line of defence, his innocence before both men and gods; but if he felt unable to avail himself of that line of defence, then he would be ashamed (522d5 αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν).

e1 **δόξης καὶ τιμῆς**: the use of two synonyms gives the second member greater emphasis than the first and marks its greater importance.

φρονήσεως .... καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς: the three words here are not synonyms, but, in their close relation, they give a fuller description of the third and highest class of good things. To strive for insight is evidently to care for truth, the object of knowledge. Now ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς or

ἑαυτοῦ is the same as ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς (31b5; 41e5), and φρόνησις is, for Socrates, the ἀρετή *par excellence*. On the importance of the ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς in Plato, see the references collected in my paper 'On Fragment 5a of the *Protrepticus*' in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* edited by I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg 1960) 89. For ἀλήθεια, cf. Chapter II n.43; Chapter VII 131.

e2 **οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις**: the regular construction would have required οὐκ ἐπιμελούμενος οὐδὲ φροντίζων, but the slight anacoluthon gives the question more urgency. The synonyms provide emphasis, but more importantly provide a better balance in the sentence: otherwise, the δέ clause would have been too meagre compared to the μέν clause.

e3 **φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι**, 'says that he *does* care' (φημί 'to affirm'; so too 30a1 φάναι; note on 20e3).

e5 **ἐλέγξω**, 'I shall put them to the test, force them to give an account', cf. 39c7 διδόναι ἔλεγχον with d1 ἐλέγχοντες. See Chapter XI 206-207.

30a1 **ὀνειδιῶ**, 'I shall say: "shame on you"'. There is a close semantic link between the verbs ὀνειδίζω and αἰσχύνομαι. — Cf. *Rep.* i 347b1-3 ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον (= φιλοχρήματον) εἶναι <u>ὄνειδος</u> λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν. This is the opinion of οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι (b1), who, in the context, are in fact the φιλόσοφοι, although Plato does not use the word in order to avoid a difficult discussion. See Chapter XI 207 and n.13.

a1-2 **τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ..., τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα**: switching over from the superlative to the comparative is in accordance with Plato's tendency to avoid rigorous symmetry. Besides, in discussions of the scale of values, he regularly passes from the 'good' to the 'better' and the 'best' and vice-versa; the same holds good for synonyms and antonyms. See e.g. the famous passage about teleology, *Phaed.* 97b8-98b6, examples from which are cited in the note on 18a3.

a2 **καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ**: although Socrates has already said (23b5-6. 29d6) that he directs his activity at all men, he did not until now explicitly state that he does not reserve it for the young. Here he makes this clear and again in a8, as a preliminary to discussing (b5) the accusation concerning corruption of the young. Although the majority of 'those who are present' (οἱ παρόντες 21d1. 22b7. 23a4) at Socrates' elenctic conversations are young aristocrats (23c2-3; cf. 33b9-c4), his philosophical activities are by no means restricted to the young. Below (33a5-b8; see note on 33a7), Socrates will return to this point in more detail.

a4 **ἐγγυτέρω ... γένει**: this expression, and still more the superlative (οἱ) ἐγγυτάτω γένει, is often found in discussions about the rights of the next of kin, especially in matters of inheritance, or about the duties they have towards living or deceased relatives. There are 19 instances in Isaeus (in Isaeus mostly with γένους as a partitive genitive); others occur in the private orations of the *Corpus Demosthenicum*, e.g. 10 in xliii and 6 in xliv. Several examples can be found elsewhere in Plato, either in the proper sense, as *Hipp. mai.* 304d3 (γένους); *Laws* vi 774e7 (id.). ix 866b1 (-τατα), or metaphorically, as *Soph.* 265a2. What Socrates says here should be considered in the light of what the Laws say in the *Crito* (50e7-51c3) about how the fatherland should be treated as a father and a mother, so that Socrates' fellow-citizens should be regarded as his brothers. Compare further *Apol.* 31b4-5, where Socrates says that he treats young people as a father or an elderly brother would, taking care of their moral progress.

a5 **κελεύει ὁ θεός**: that the god wishes Socrates to influence foreigners as well as citizens was already said 23b5-6.

εὖ ἴστε: imperative.

a6 **μεῖζον ἀγαθόν**: these words introduce the ideas that will be developed in 30c2-31c3.

τὴν ἐμὴν τῶι θεῶι ὑπηρεσίαν: a reminder of 23c1 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

b1-2 **ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... τῆς ψυχῆς**: the quintessentially Socratic expression ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς is also found in Isocrates, viz. ix 41; xiii 8; xv 250; cf. also vii 32; xv 180-185. 290 (this last passage is quoted in part by Burnet on 29e1; at any rate the *Antidosis* (xv) is influenced by Plato's *Apology*). But everywhere Isocrates' intention is quite different from Plato's; in xiii 8 he even engages in a polemic against Plato. The most important point is that Isocrates considers wealth, honours, an influential position and security to be the highest values for man; Socrates emphatically denies this in the *Apology*. See xii 244 φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντες εἶναι νομίζομεν (so the author agrees with that opinion) τὸ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν ἄλλων (the very thesis which Socrates vehemently rejects *Gorg.* 490a6-491a6); xv 217 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡδονῆς ἢ κέρδους ἢ τιμῆς ἕνεκά φημι πάντας πάντα πράττειν (that is, for the sake of χρήματα and τιμή, not of φρόνησις καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ψυχή); ix 40 ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν τυραννίδα τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχητότατον εἶναι (compare *Gorg.* 470d5-473e5); *Epist.* vii 5 αὐτοί τ' ἂν ἔξω τοῦ κινδύνου εἶεν (contrast *Apol.* 28b5-29a1) καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῖεν· ὧν ἀγαθῶν μείζω χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν ἐστιν.

b3 **ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα κτέ.**: see Chapter VII 138-140 and n.39. Burnet (*in loc.*) takes χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἅπαντα to be the subject and ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις as the predicate. This construction, however, cannot be accepted. The parallelism of the two pointedly antithetical members requires (1) that the sentence could be ended with χρήματα, and that καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κτέ. should be considered as an afterthought; (2) that γίγνεται should in both members mean 'comes from'. Besides, the collocation of ἅπαντα shows that ἀγαθά cannot be separated from τὰ ἄλλα and ἅπαντα. If Plato had wanted to say what Burnet makes him say, he would certainly not said it in such an ambiguous and misleading way.

b4 **καὶ δημοσίαι**: although Socrates always converses with individuals, his ethics are no less concerned with civic than with private life; cf. 36c5-8 and already 20b4-5 where he says, in passing, that 'virtue' is ἀρετὴ ἀνθρωπίνη καὶ πολιτική. Cf. also the famous paradox *Gorg.* 521d6-8 οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῆι ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῆι τέχνηι καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν.

b5 **ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά**, 'you may call those words of mine harmful', that is 'subversive'; but this is so absurd that no Athenian would say it.

b6 **βλαβερά** announces the Answer to a Second Objection, in which the notions ὠφέλιμον / βλαβερόν will play the same role as καλόν / αἰσχρόν in the Answer to a First Objection.

οὐδὲν λέγει: a polite substitute for ψεύδεται. I cannot agree with LSJ *s.v.* λέγω III 6 that the expression here and in Aristoph. *Birds* 66 means 'to lie'; in *Birds* 66 οὐδὲν λέγεις evidently means 'nonsense!'.

b7 **φαίην ἄν** is not parallel to 29d2 εἴποιμ' ἄν. What Socrates has said since 29e3 is no longer a direct answer to the jury's proposal. Therefore, φαίην ἄν is rather 'I would (like to) say', 'if I might say so', and its function is to attenuate the abruptness of both πρὸς ταῦτα (on which see Burnet's excellent note) and the two pairs of alternative imperatives.

b8 **οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαντος**: the MSS. have οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος, but the correction ποιήσαντος (Cobet) is certain. For the general problem of ἄν with the future, see note on 29c4-5. In the MSS. confusion of the sigmatic future and the aorist active and middle is quite common. The result may be a barbarism as Dem. xviii 168 (quoted by Burnet), where the MSS.'s reading συμπνευσόντων ἄν (-σάντων ἄν corr. Elmsley) is an obvious error, since the future would be συμπνευσομένων. In order to show how easily such futures and aorist can be confused, I shall quote the instances in which ἄν is not involved from book v of Thucydides, according to the edition of Stuart-Jones-Powell: 6,2 ἄξαντα codd.: -οντας Linwood, edd.; 22,1 δέξασθαι

codd.: -εσθαι Markland, edd.; 30,1 σπείσασθαι codd.: -εσθαι rec., edd.; 46,2 κελεύσαντες codd.: -οντες recc., edd.; 90 πείσοντες codd.: -αντες recc., edd.; 98 μελλήσοντας codd.: -αντας fortasse Schol., edd. In 41,3 the MSS. are divided between ποιησομένους and -αμένους, in 63,3 between στρατευσάμενος and -όμενος, and in 87 between βουλεύσοντες and βουλεύσαντες. Finally I might refer to the potential optative 94,1 οὐκ ἄν δέξοισθε codd. (-ησθε G): -αισθε Bekker, edd.

c2 **μὴ θορυβεῖτε**: cf. note on 21a5.

c4 **μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν**: according to des Places *Particules* 126 οὖν (in γὰρ οὖν) 'takes up the thread of the discourse after a digression, a parenthesis', in this passage and in *Symp.* 218b8 and *Tim.* 77b1-2. This analysis does not seem to be correct: resumptive οὖν is a connecting, not an emphatic particle, whereas in γὰρ οὖν it is γάρ that has a connective force while οὖν is simply a reinforcement of γάρ (cf. Denn. 445-448).

c5 **ἄττα ... καὶ ἄλλα**: i.e. καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα.

c6 **ἐάν με ἀποκτείνητε**: see note on 30e1.

c7 **οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω**: 'such as I said just before', with the same use of the present tense as in 18e1 οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω (see the note *in loc.*).

οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς: a litotes for οὐκ ἐμὲ βλάψετε ἀλλ' ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. This turn of phrase, which occurs frequently in Thucydides (οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ and οὐ τὸ πλέον ἤ for οὐκ ... ἀλλά), is rather uncommon in Plato.

c8 **ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ κτἑ.**: after ἐμέ, we should probably not take μέν as preparatory to d2 μέντοι, but as *solitarium* (cf. 23b4 and the note); the sentence ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν follows as an afterthought, after the parenthesis οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι ... βλάπτεσθαι.

c9 **οὐ ... θεμιτόν**: on the religious connotations of this expression see Chapter VII 147-148 and n.52. A similar idea with a more explicit reference to divine Providence is expressed in *Apol.* 41d1-2 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῶι κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα; cf. Chapter XI § 3bγ.

d1-2 **ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν ... ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν**: in a long passage of the *Gorgias*, Socrates and Polus repeatedly mention (466b11-c2. c9-d3. 468b4-6. c2-3. d1-2. e8-9. 470b2-3) the punishments which orators succeed in bringing down on their opponents, viz. death, banishment, confiscation of property: in one passage (468e8-9) confiscation is replaced by imprisonment;

it is remarkable that the loss of civic rights is never mentioned in the *Gorgias*. Imprisonment is substituted for confiscation of property in the *Apology* because Socrates, poor as he is, (23b9-c1. 31c3), has no property to forfeit; therefore it is pointless to say that confiscation would not de a great harm to him; cf. 37c4 and 38b1-2.

d2 **ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν κτἑ.**: '*he* can have such punishments inflicted upon me, *but I* do not consider them great harms'. As nearly always when a μέν / δέ contrast is the second member of a coordination, the δέ clause is the relevant part of the second member, whereas the μέν clause has a concessive force ('though he thinks differently'). Plato uses ἀλλά, not δέ, because the antithesis is: he can legally inflict punishment on me, *but not* (ἀλλ' ... οὐ), in my eyes, any real harm.

οὗτος: not the vague χείρων ἀνήρ of the preceding sentence, but, as normally in a forensic speech, the other party, viz. Meletus; in d4 he is referred to as οὑτοσί.

d5 **ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτεινύναι**: of the 243 instances of an infinitive dependent on ἐπιχειρέω counted by me in the Platonic corpus, 216 are in the present and only 27 in the aorist. P. Stork *The Aspectual Usage of the Dynamic Infinitive in Herodotus* (Groningen 1982) 109-132 shows that verbs meaning 'begin', 'be / make ready', 'try', 'intend' and the verb μέλλω are predominantly followed by the present infinitive in Herodotus, where ἐπιχειρέω five times governs a present infinitive, never an aorist infinitive.

d6-7 **πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ... ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν**: as Meyer (18 with n.41) points out, there is no parallel for this idea in the Attic Orators. The *accuser* might say that he was prompted to prosecute by his zeal for the well-being of the city; but if the *defendant* would say anything of the kind, it could only be taken as a ridiculous and absurd lie. — I may add that Socrates is wont to speak paradoxically and to turn things upside down (cf. *Gorg.* 481c1-4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ); even when he uses a topos of forensic oratory, he does so with a purpose quite different from and in most cases opposite to what was normal for litigants. Cf. Chapter II 32-34.

d7 **τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν**: for the position of ὑμῖν with respect to the article τήν see Gildersleeve ii § 673.

καταψηφισάμενοι: coincident aorist participle (Goodwin § 150).

e1 **ἐὰν γάρ με ἀποκτείνητε κτέ.**: cf. Andoc. i 144-146 σκέψασθε τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἄν με σώσητε, οἷον ἕξετε πολίτην, ὃς πρῶτον μὲν ... ἔτι δὲ ... Ἔχει δὲ καὶ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὕτως· ἐάν με νυνὶ διαφθείρητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑμῖν ἔτι λοιπὸς τοῦ γένους τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐδεὶς κτέ. (Meyer also quotes this passage, 19 and n.43). For Andocides, these are only subsidiary arguments; according to Socrates, the service which he does for the city is indispensable, and therefore the issue of the lawsuit is of vital importance to Athens.

e2-3 **εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν**: what is ludicrous is not that the city should be compared with a horse, which is a noble animal (cf. *Hipp. mai.* 288b8-c5), never used as a draught animal or a beast of burden, but Socrates comparing himself with a gadfly, a loathsome insect, which does not seem to be of any use at all.

e4 **ἵπποι μεγάλοι**: size was considered as an essential element of beauty; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iv 7, 1123b6-8 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλωι σώματι· οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ.

e5 **οἷον δή** picks up the comparison with emphasis: 'yes, it is just as a gadfly that the god has attached me to the city', whereas τοιοῦτόν τινα is used to introduce ὃς ὑμᾶς κτέ., viz. the description of the *role* which Socrates is to play.

e6-7 **προστεθηκέναι** and **ἐγείρων** recall e3 προσκείμενον and e5 ἐγείρεσθαι; their function is to sustain the vividness of the comparison. On the other hand, πείθων and ὀνειδίζων characterise Socrates' 'awakening' of others as protreptic, as is described *Clit.* 408b5-c4 τούτοις δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ... ὡς ... πάντων ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν οὔτ' ἀντεῖπον πώποτε οὔτ' οἶμαι μήποτε ὕστερον ἀντείπω, προτρεπτικωτάτους τε ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ἐπεγείρειν ἡμᾶς, see Chapter VII 133, S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 118-119; for ὀνειδίζειν, cf. 30a1. 41e6 and *Gorg.* 526a4 (joined with παρακαλεῖν); *Clit.* 408e5 (joined with προτρέπειν, S.R.S. *Comm. Clit.* 347-348). — The three participles ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων are 'circumstantial' (to use Goodwin's terminology), while προσκαθίζων is 'supplementary' to παύομαι.

31a3 **ἴσως τάχ' ἄν** and τάχ' ἂν ἴσως are common pleonasms in Plato, especially in the verbose style of the later dialogues; see Ast *s.vv.* ἴσως and τάχα.

a4 **οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι**, i.e. οἳ ἂν νυστάζοντες ἐγείρωνται ('people who are awakened from their doze'); cf. *Laws* v 747b3-5 (on the benefits of learning arithmetic) τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι τὸν νυστάζοντα καὶ ἀμαθῆ φύσει ἐγείρει καὶ εὐμαθῆ καὶ μνήμονα καὶ ἀγχίνουν ἀπεργάζεται. — With this new comparison, the imagery takes a slightly different turn: we picture a fly

constantly buzzing from place to place, irritating not a horse, but a drowsy person who tries to swat, or even to kill an annoying insect.

κρούσαντες ἄν με: for the threefold ἄν, see Goodwin § 223; in § 224 the same author points out that a conditional participle is especially apt to have double ἄν near it. Cf. note on 41a7.

a5 **πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτωι**: the contrary of 29c1 Ἀνύτωι ἀπιστήσαντες. Socrates consistently represents Anytus as an influential man, whose authority is more likely to impress the jurors than Meletus' arguments.

a7 **τυγχάνω ὤν**: see the note on 29a7-8.

b1 **οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνωι ἔοικε κτέ.**: for the argument, see Chapter VII 148. — It was commonly admitted that an excellent man should not neglect his own interests in order to promote the well-being of others; see Herod. i 97,1: Deioces enjoys such a reputation for justice that people come from everywhere to have their differences settled by him; overburdened, he refuses to act as an arbitrator any longer οὐ γάρ οἱ λυσιτελέειν τῶν ἑωυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα τοῖσι πέλας δι' ἡμέρης δικάζειν; Democr. 68B253 D.-K. τοῖς χρηστοῖσιν οὐ συμφέρον ἀμελέοντας τῶν ἑωυτῶν ἄλλα πρήσσειν· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια κακῶς ἔσχεν (a gnomic aorist; the fragment continues by saying that one should not neglect public affairs either).

b2-3 **ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων**: although ἀνέχομαι can be construed with an object in the genitive, the not uncommon construction with an object and a 'dominant' participle ('ab urbe condita construction'), both in the genitive, seems to be influenced by the genitive absolute; cf. Schwyzer, ii 393-394. 404.

b3 **τὸ ὑμέτερον πράττειν**: there seems to be no difference between πράττειν τὸ αὑτοῦ (e.g. *Rep.* iii 407a1; *Phaedr.* 247a6) and πράττειν τὰ αὑτοῦ (*Gorg.* 526c3-4; *Rep.* iv 433a8; *Polit.* 307e3-4). Both expressions can mean either 'to take care of one's interests' (this is the case here) or 'to mind one's own business', 'to keep to one's field of action'.

b4 **ἰδίαι ἑκάστωι προσιόντα**: the expression leads up to the Second Objection (c4-5) ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίαι μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ κτέ.

ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, who takes the place of a deceased father and acts as ἐπίτροπος of his infant brothers; cf. below 33d6. e3-4. 34a2. Cf. note on 30a4.

b7 **ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί**: δή underscores the evidence which one sees (as more generally, it appeals to the listener's knowledge or reason) and is therefore placed both after ὁρᾶν (Denn. 215 ii a) and after δῆλος (*ib*. 205 ii); ὁρᾶτε is the indicative; cf. *Gorg*. 461a5 ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτός; *Apol*. 40a7 ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί.

b8 **ἀναισχύντως οὕτω**: 'Position of οὕτω or οὕτως, mostly *before* the word which it limits, but in Poets sts. *after*' (LSJ s.v. οὕτως B). It would, however, be an error to think that the postposition of οὕτω(ς) only occurs in poetry (the *Supplement* of LSJ now says: 'for "mostly" read "in prose almost always"'). In Plato, postponed οὕτω(ς) has an intensifying force here and in *Symp*. 198b3; in other places, it has diminishing force: *Prot*. 351c7 ἁπλῶς οὕτως; *Laws* i 633c9 (id.); *Hipp. min*. 368a8 ἀνέδην οὑτωσί. The postponed intensifying οὕτω(ς) is more frequent in Demosthenes; see Rehdantz-Blass *Demosthenes' neun Philippischen Reden* ii 2^4 (Leipzig 1886) index *s.v.* οὕτω(ς), where some instances from other authors are cited too. — The reference is to 17a3-b4.

b9 **τοῦτό γε ... ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι**: this seems to be the only instance of the transitive use of this verb; elsewhere it is used absolutely to mean 'to lie impudently', so Dem. xxix 20; xlv 44; liv 33; Ps.-Dem. xliii 42; xlviii 6.

οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο, 'were not able to'; ἐγενόμην fulfills the role of an aorist of εἰμί; cf. 33a6 διδάσκαλος ... οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην; *Lys*. 223b8.

c2 **ἐγώ**: emphasises the contrast between Socrates and his accusers.

7. 31c4-34b5 Answer to a Second Objection

31c4 **ἴσως ἂν οὖν κτέ.**: see Chapter VIII 151.

ὅτι δή: speaking of 'ironical' δή, Denn. 229 remarks that 'the classification is difficult, since many uses have an ironical tinge in some contexts but not in others'. In several of its eight classes (229-36), δή points to the fact that what is said is not simply true, because it is only alleged or thought to be so by some people. He puts our passage in group 8 (236), which comprises 'various shades of irony, scorn and indignation which δή can express'. In my opinion, there is no irony here as such; the particle denotes that the word ἄτοπον is used not from the view-point of Socrates, but from that of the hypothetical objector. Socrates admits the facts but he rejects the appropriateness of the words καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ to describe them. We could translate ὅτι δή by 'that, as some say'. Cf. the referential use of ἄρα, on which see note on 40e6.

c5 **συμβουλεύω**: in the Answer to a First Objection, Socrates used several verbs to designate his protreptic activity, viz. παρακελεύομαι and ἐνδείκνυμαι (29d5-6, cf. 31b6), πείθω (30a8. e7. 31b5), ἐγείρω (30e7). Here he prefers συμβουλεύω, which he uses below (33d3) and in other works (e.g. *Lach.* 180e1; *Euthyd.* 304b1), because it can also refer to giving political advice (31c6).

περιιών picks up περιέρχομαι (30a7); cf. 23b5.

πολυπραγμονῶ: see Chapter VIII 151-152.

c6 **ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον**, 'appearing before the Assembly' (Burnet). This combination of idioms does not occur in the Orators, although τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον is very common (see the note on 21a1).

συμβουλεύειν τῆι πόλει: a fixed expression (*Gorg.* 455d2-3; Aesch. i 29). συμβουλεύειν is the regular term for giving advice in the Assembly (*Prot.* 319c2. d1. 6); the adviser of the Assembly is its σύμβουλος (Dem. xviii 189. 192. 212; Aesch. ii 157. 165); speeches given before the Assembly (δημηγορίαι) belong to τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν γένος τῶν λόγων (Arist. *Rhet.* i 3, 1358b7-10; cf. Anaximenes 2, p.11,4-5 Fuhrmann).

d1 **ὃ δὴ καὶ κτέ.**: there is no reason to assume, with Burnet (*in loc.*), that here and 19b1 δή means 'I suppose' and is ironical. As we saw above (note on c4 ὅτι δή), δή can be ironic in quite a variety of contexts, but it never is after a relative pronoun. In this position, its force is described by Denn.

(218,9) as 'usually stressing the importance of the antecedent, or its exact identification with the consequent'. Speaking about καί in relative clauses, he says: 'καί is often combined with a preceding δή here' (294,1 i). The meaning is: 'Something divine and supernatural happens to me, the very (feature) to which Meletus made a mocking allusion in his indictment'. See Chapter VI 96-98.

ἐπικωμῳδῶν: Meletus makes a mockery of the divine sign and travesties it, representing a quite personal and private phenomenon as if it implied a revolution in public worship.

d7 **[πάλαι] ἐπεχείρησα**: Cobet is certainly right in deleting the first πάλαι. Burnet writes *in loc.*: 'As the text stands, it "implies that there would have been but a brief interval between his (Socrates') *début* and his death" (Adam)'. The question, however, is not whether Socrates would have been occupied with politics early or later in his life, but whether, if he had played a political role, he would have been able to escape death. The first πάλαι, thus, gives a false emphasis, whereas the second is quite normal; we can very well say in English: 'If I had taken to politics, I would have lost my life long ago'. Besides, the double πάλαι would have a heavy rhetorical ring, which by itself would make it suspect in the *Apology*. The first πάλαι is one of the many instances of faulty anticipations or repetitions that occur in our MSS. of the dialogues, especially of the *Phaedo*, and that have been rightly condemned by G. Jachmann *Der Platontext* (Göttingen 1942) — although this author should not be followed in his opinion concerning the history of the text. A similar anticipation of πάλαι is found *Phaed.* 63d4 (whereas d5 is correct). Another duplication in the *Apology* is 33d7-8 (καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι).

d8 **ἀπολώλη**: in classical prose, the pluperfect with 'Attic' reduplication has no augment (with the exception of ἠκηκόη); in Aesch. i 95 both spellings are found in the MSS.

e1 **οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν**: the idea, which is repeated below (36c2-3), is this: the examination to which Socrates submits others is at the same time directed at himself, as appears from 28e5-6 φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, and 38a3-5 ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος. Therefore, his activity is no less profitable to himself than to those with whom he converses. Socrates expresses the same idea when he describes in the *Republic* (vi 496c8-d5) what would happen to a philosopher who insisted on acting justly in a corrupted city: ... οὐδ' ἔστι σύμμαχος μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶι δικαίωι βοήθειαν σώιζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε συναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἷς πᾶσιν

ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελὴς αὑτῶι τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο.

καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ: cf. Dem. xix 227 ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω· ἀξιῶ δὲ μηδένα ἄχθεσθαί μοι λέγοντι τἀληθῆ.

e2 **ὅστις ἀνθρώπων**: see note on 27b3.

ὑμῖν: litigants before the People's Court frequently use ὑμεῖς to refer to acts of the Assembly or of its democratic majority; see e.g. Lys. x 4 ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ..., ἐξ ὅτου δ' ὑμεῖς κατεληλύθατε (after the exile of the democrats in 404/3) εἰκοστὸν τουτί (ἔτος ἐστίν); xiii 65 (Thalheim and Hude; 67 Gernet-Bizos) συλλήβδην γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες καὶ ἐν τῶι δήμωι (the Assembly) καὶ ἐν τῶι δικαστηρίωι συκοφαντίας αὐτοῦ κατέγνωτε; Dem. xviii 169 ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπορεύεσθε; in xx 2 ὑμᾶς is taken up by τὸν δῆμον. See note on 21a1. The traditional explanation is that the Athenian juries are supposed to be the δῆμος itself in its judicial role (on the further assumption that the ἐκκλησία is the sovereign institution of Athenian democracy). This hypothesis is combated by M.H. Hansen, cf. especially *GRBS* 19 (1978) 127-146; repr. with additions in *The Athenian Ecclesia* (Copenhagen 1983) 139-160; *The Athenian Ecclesia II* (Copenhagen 1989) 213-218. Hansen points out that δῆμος never refers to any other democratic institution than the Assembly; it cannot be used as a synonym of δικαστήριον and is often opposed to it as in Lys. xiii quoted above. But there is more to our usage than the simple fact that many members of the court had actually partaken in the Assembly meetings referred to, as Hansen suggests: this is probably false for Lys. x quoted above (which does not refer to an act of the Assembly anyway). Jurors in the People's Court are treated as if they are the Athenian people, not so much out of respect for the sovereignty of the δῆμος but because it is advantageous for the orators to do so, either because the glorious history of Athens thus reflects on the jurors (Dem. xviii: Athens' — and Demosthenes' — finest hour) or because they are then morally bound to past decisions made by the Athenians (Lys. xiii). See also Ostwald *Sovereignty* 34 n.131.

e4 **ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα**: see Chapter VIII 156-157 and n.13.

32a1 **τῶι ὄντι**, 'in reality', not only for the sake of appearances, as so many politicians do.

a2 **καὶ εἰ**: καί qualifies ὀλίγον, not εἰ; cf. Denn. 301 ii.

a4 **μεγάλα ... τεκμήρια**: the hyperbaton gives emphasis to μεγάλα. With τεκμήριον, μέγας means 'conclusive', as 40c1 and often both in Plato (e.g. *Ion* 534d4-5; *Prot.* 341e1; *Crit.* 52b1; *Crat.* 436c2-3; *Symp.* 196a5; *Rep.* ii

360c5) and in the Orators, who have it also with σημεῖον (e.g. Dem. xix 115. 241; lviii 43; Ps.-Dem. xlii 24; xlvii 77; lix 82. 93; Aesch. i 25; ii 103. 141; iii 46. 177. 238; Lyc. *Leocr.* 129; futher references in Meyer 51 n.121). — According to Aristotle *Rhet.* i 2, 1357b3-10, the τεκμήριον is a demonstrative proof (ἀναγκαῖον), whereas the σημεῖον is only a sign or clue that yields no more than a probabile assumption; the terminology of Anaximenes (cc. 7, 9 and 12) is less precise, but amounts to the same. Here, however, the τεκμήρια are two instances that substantiate the general rule given 31e2-32a3 (so also in the passage cited from the *Ion*); below in 40c1 it refers to an informal *argumentum e contrario* (as in *Crit.* and *Crat. l.c.*): if not *a*, one would reasonably expect *b*; not *b*; therefore *a*.

a4-5 **οὐ λόγους ἀλλ' ... ἔργα**: cf. Dem. xix 178 ἐπέδειξα ... μάρτυσι τοῖς γεγενημένοις αὐτοῖς, οὐ λόγοις χρώμενος.

a5 **ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ συμβεβηκότα**: with Wohlrab and Croiset, I prefer this reading, which is that of B, whereas Burnet follows T in printing ἀκ. δή μοι τὰ συμβ.; W has ἀκ. δή μου τὰ συμβ. It seems to me that a dative is necesseary with συμβεβηκότα, which otherwise would be too vague. With the reading of T, we should take μοι (and δή) with ακούσατε and interpret it as an ethical dative ('I beg you'), as in 30c2-3 ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν. It is not certain, however, that μου is authentic; there may have been two variant readings in Antiquity, viz. ἀκ. δὴ τὰ ἐμοὶ συμβ. (not attested by any MS) and ἀκ. δή μου τὰ συμβ. (W); the reading of B would then be a conflation of both.

a6 **ἵνα εἰδῆτε κτἑ.**: as Meyer (p.47 with n.99) points out, the Orators regularly use this formula to introduce remarks anticipating what the audience will be able to conclude for themselves from what is said later.

οὐδ' ἂν ἑνί: about the insertion of ἄν between οὐδέ and a form of εἷς, Kühner-Blass say only (i 632, Anm. I) that it is 'sehr häufig'; the phenomenon is not mentioned at all in Meisterhans-Schwyzer *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*[3] (Berlin 1900; repr. Hildesheim 1971). In the Platonic corpus (except the Spuria) there are 25 instances (only five of which have the form ἕν) against 60 of οὐδεὶς ἄν (35 of which have οὐδὲν). There never is a particle between οὐδέ and ἂν εἷς (etc.). Similarly, a preposition may be inserted (mentioned by Kühner-Blass *ib.*), as in *Phaed.* 100c5 οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο (= δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο); *Rep.* v 453a2 οὐδ' εἰς ἕν; *Phaedr.* 245d2 μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός; *Parm.* 156c2 μηδ' ἐν ἑνί; *Laws* x 887e8 οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἱκανοῦ λόγου.

a7 **ἅμα κἂν ἀπολοίμην**: I agree with Riddell and Croiset that this is the correct reading; ἅμα, 'at once', with ἂν ἀπολοίμην, expresses the same idea as πάλαι with ἂν ἀπολώλη in 31d8. The ἀλλὰ in Burnet's ἀλλὰ κἂν (an

ancient variant of ἅμα, as he points out himself) implies a very harsh ellipsis. ἅμ' ἂν καὶ, as proposed by M. Gronewald *RhM* 119 (1976) 12, is also possible.

a8 **φορτικὰ μὲν ... ἀληθῆ δὲ**: on the litigants' habit of enlarging on their merits see 24b5 and the note. Whereas such boasting is often exaggerated or even unfounded, Socrates will speak only the plain truth.

b2 **ὑμεῖς**: see the note on 31e2; cf. ὑμῖν (b5. 6) and ὑμῶν (b8. c2).

b4 **ἐβούλεσθε**: Burnet prints ἐβουλεύσασθε ('You decided by a resolution of the Council'), the reading of T and the Armenian version, whereas BW have ἐβούλεσθε. However, ἐβουλεύσασθε cannot be right, since what Socrates tells here did not happen in the meeting of the Council but in the Assembly (see Chapter VIII 161-162). T's variant originated from the proximity of b1 ἐβούλευσα and c2 βουλευομένων. Burnet's objection to ἐβούλεσθε is that 'it would be very weak to say "when you wanted", and could rather imply that they did not in fact do what they wanted'. But at the moment in question, the majority of the Assembly merely *wanted* to sentence the generals by a collective vote and *had not yet decided* to do so; Socrates describes his opposition to what the mob and the orators *tried* to achieve, but had not yet achieved. The present participle βουλευομένων (c2) would be illogical if the aorist ἐβουλεύσασθε had preceded, whereas it is quite normal after ἐβούλεσθε.

παρανόμως: the late position of the adverb gives it a strong emphasis; it is Socrates' comment on what he relates in the sentence. This stylistic device is relatively rare in Plato, but common in Demosthenes; cf. G. Ronnet *Etude sur le style de Démosthène dans les discours politiques* (Paris 1951) 52-55. For the comparative clause (ὡς ... ἔδοξεν) which does not pertain to the main clause as a whole, but only to one word (παρανόμως), cf. Dem. xix 155 ἐνθένδε μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοὺς ἐξήγαγον οὕτως ἄκοντας, ὡς καθαρῶς οἷς μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐποίουν εἴσεσθε.

b5 **τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος**: in their simplicity and conciseness, these words form a striking contrast with the preceding ὕστερον πᾶσιν ὑμῖν. Afterwards, when the irreparable had happened, everybody realised that the procedure had been illegal; but at the critical moment, Socrates stood alone. The effect is enhanced by the adversative asyndeton, 'a dramatic device', as Denniston says (xlv). Note that τότε is not, as ἐνταῦθα and ἐντεῦθεν, a 'backward-pointing ... adverb' that does not require a connective particle (*ib.* xliv, ii). In Plato, τότε opens a sentence without a connective particle only after a change of speaker, except three times in late works (*Tim.* 53a2; *Laws* viii 835a2. x 900a6; *Meno* 95c8 there is no new sentence). [Alternatively, there is an anacoluthon, caused by b2 ὅτε, so that the period contains two main-

clause predicates; if so, a comma, not a full-stop should be printed before τότ'. Cf. my note on *Rep.* iii 389a3-7, *Mnemos.* 43 (1990) 344-345. For similar reasons, one might consider printing a comma, not a full stop, after 29a1 τάξιν. See also on 41e2-7 S.R.S.]

b6 **ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην**: 'I voted against', that is, as we see from Xenophon (*Hell.* i 7,15), in a vote taken by the prytaneis on the question whether they would submit (προθήσειν) to the decision of the Assembly the procedure described in the γνώμη of Callixenus.

b7 **ἐνδεικνύναι ... καὶ ἀπάγειν**: on this procedure, see M. H. Hansen *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes.* A study in the Athenian Administration of Justice in the Fourth Century B.C. (Odense 1976) 15 and 30-32. In Xenophon's narrative, this threat is not mentioned explicitly, but it is implied in Callixenus' stand against those who declared that they would refuse to propose the γνώμη; he threatened to have them sentenced, together with the generals. Since the generals had already been imprisoned by order of the Council (*Hell.* i 7,3), it would also have been necessary to arrest the prytaneis who persisted in opposing the wish of the Assembly. ἔνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή were just such speedy procedures to have a suspect arrested on the spot.

b8 **τῶν ῥητόρων**: according to W.R. Connor *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 116, 'by the 420's it [the term ῥήτωρ] seems to have become a popular word for "politicians"'. Plato does not name the 'rhetors', who, we learn from Xenophon, were Lyciscus (§ 13) and above all Callixenus (§ 14).

ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων: cf. Dem. xix 122 θορυβούντων τινῶν καὶ κελευόντων.

b8-c1 **μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ... διακινδυνεύειν**: cf. Isocr. xiv 42 μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου ποιούμενος τοὺς κινδύνους. For μετά with the gen. in the sense of 'on the side of', see LSJ *s.v.* μετά A II. We find the same idea below e3-4 ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις. In Soph. *Phil.* 1251 ξὺν τῶι δικαίωι τὸν σὸν οὐ ταρβῶ φόβον the meaning is rather 'with justice on my side' (i.e. τοῦ δικαίου βοηθοῦντός μοι).

c2 **μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι**: 'to side with you' (Burnet); cf. Isocr. xvi 5 ἐπειδὴ παρακαλούμενος ὁ πατὴρ (Alcibiades, the father of the litigant) οὐκ ἤθελε γενέσθαι μετ' αὐτῶν (the Four Hundred).

μὴ δίκαια βουλευόμενων: the participle is descriptive ('as what you intended to do was not compatible with justice'), not conditional. In the case of δεῖ, χρή, etc. with an infinitive, the negative is usually οὐ, since it is felt

to pertain to the main verb and not to the infinitive, but μή is also quite normal, e.g. *Phil.* 33b2-3 ἐρρήθη ... μηδὲν δεῖν ... χαίρειν; Xen. *Mem.* iv 6,6 εἰδότας δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἴει τινὰς οἴεσθαι δεῖν μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν; Isocr. v 79 χρὴ δὲ μὴ καταφρονεῖν τοῦ πλήθους; Dem. xxii 26 δεῖν δ' ᾤετο μηδένα ἀποστερεῖσθαι τοῦ δίκης τυχεῖν ὡς ἕκαστος δύναται; xxix 11 ᾠήθην δεῖν μηδὲν ἄλλο τούτου πρότερον ... ἐλέγξαι. When a circumstantial participle depends on a verb that requires μή, its negative will also be μή, as is the case here (cf. 29a6 μὴ ὄντα compared with a4 οὐκ ὤν).

c3 **δεσμόν·** alludes to the arrest and imprisonment indicated by ἀπάγειν (b7 with the note).

c4 **αὖ**: 'again', that is: 'I went through another adventure'.

c5 **πέμπτον αὐτόν**: K.J. Dover 'Δέκατος αὐτός' *JHS* 80 (1960) 61-77 (reprinted *The Greeks and their Legacy* 159-180) has shown that the man designated by an ordinal number with αὐτός did not have authority over his colleagues; cf. Ch.W. Fornara *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501-404* (Wiesbaden 1971) 29-36. So the phrase does not suggest that Socrates was more than simply one of the five who were charged with the odious task of arresting Leon.

εἰς τὴν θόλον: on the building see Thompson - Wycherley *The Agora of Athens* 41-46; John Travlos *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (London 1971) 553-559. Our passage is the only evidence that the θόλος was the seat of government under the Thirty; it appears from Lysias xiii 37 that it was also the meeting-place of the Council at that time.

c7 **οἷα δή**: when δή is added to adjectival οἷος 'the note of disparagement, irony or contempt is rarely quite absent' (Denn. 220 v a).

πολλοῖς πολλά: this kind of polyptoton does not normally have a special stylistic effect, as is shown by B. Gygli-Wyss *Das nominale Polyptoton im älteren Griechischen* (Göttingen 1966) 47-48 and Fehling *Wiederholungsfiguren* 230. Here, however, it does, as appears from its collocation in a triple hyperbaton (οἷα ... πολλά, ἄλλοις ... πολλοῖς, ἐκεῖνοι ... προσέταττον).

c8 **τότε μέντοι**: the adversative particle contrasts the case in which Socrates was involved with the many others in which, as is implied, the Thirty met with no opposition.

d1 **ἔργωι αὖ**: 'again with deeds', since Socrates' voting against the proposal of Callixenus was a deed too.

d2 **εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν**: according to Burnet 'it was hardly respectful to the court to express indifference to the heaviest penalty it could impose'. This, however, is not the real point here. The contrast expressed in the μὲν ... δέ ... clauses does by no means draw attention to the jury or to the penalty it could inflict. The death about which Socrates speaks is not the penalty that Meletus demanded, but what the Thirty threatened him with. Rather, as Burnet says first, 'in Plato ἀγροικία generally implies ... using expressions which might offend an urbane taste', in other words it has to do with the phrasing rather than with the meaning. What is apt to be offensive here is the proud tone of Socrates' words. His total indifference to what most people would call the worst danger (cf. 34c6-7 κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον) could be interpreted as arrogance and contempt for other people, — not only for the jurors. When Socrates refuses to appeal to the pity of the jury, he explains why he does so (34d8-e1): τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλὰ κτέ. (cf. 37a3 ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος). During the harsh Thracian winter, Socrates' fellow-soldiers in the Athenian expeditionary force reacted to his behaviour in the same way as the jurors: while his comrades wrap themselves up as warmly as they can, οὗτος δ' ἐν τούτοις ἐξῄει ἔχων ἱμάτιον μὲν τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ καὶ πρότερον εἰώθει φορεῖν, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ῥᾷον ἐπορεύετο ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑποδεδεμένοι, οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν (*Symp.* 220b4-c1; Alcibiades speaking). There, Socrates is seemingly arrogant in his conduct, here in his assertive language. For the idiom, cf. *Gorg.* 508e6-509a2: ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις. In our passage, the tone of Socrates' words is scarcely less categorical and the clause εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν modifies the immediately following οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, just as in the *Gorgias* the formula reflects on σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις.

ἀγροικότερον, 'rather blunt', 'a little crude' (Dodds on *Gorg.* 462e6); for the value of the comparative see K.-G. ii 305-306. Wittwer 'Suffix -τερος' 83 and 89-90 thinks that in passages like ours the contrast with 'die feine, gebildete, städtische Art des Redens' can still be felt. Of course this is so: ἄγροικος is the opposite of ἀστεῖος. But the contrast is between the words, and it is not expressed by the suffix -τερος, as appears from the fact that ἀστειότερος is not in use, whereas ἀγροικότερος is common; Aristoph. fr. 685 Kock, 706 K.-A. gives a good illustration of the difference: διάλεκτον ἔχοντα μέσην πόλεως / οὔτ' ἀστείαν ὑποθηλυτέραν / οὔτ' ἀνελεύθερον ὑπαγροικοτέραν.

d3 **τούτου δὲ**: for epanaleptic οὗτος with repeated δέ after a preceding substantival phrase with article and δέ, see Denn. 184 ii.

τὸ πᾶν: opposed to 2 οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν.

d4 **ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ ... οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα**: ἀρχή here is not 'sovereignty' but 'the group holding office' (cf. LSJ *s.v.* II 4), as below 37c2. — For the idea, cf. Lys. xii 29 εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἦν ἐν τῆι πόλει ἀρχὴ ἰσχυρότερα (than the Thirty), ὑφ' ἧς αὐτῶι (to Eratosthenes, who belonged himself to the Thirty) προσετάττετο παρὰ δίκαιον ἀνθρώπους ἀπολλύναι, ἴσως ἂν εἰκότως αὐτῶι συγγνώμην εἴχετε· νῦν δὲ κτέ.

d6-7 **ᾤχοντο ... ᾠχόμην**: repetition of the verb emphasises the contrast.

d8 **διὰ ταχέων**: see Chapter VIII 164.

e2 **εἰ ἔπραττον**: the reality implied by this unreal protasis is ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔπραττον, not ἀλλ' οὐ πράττω; therefore the meaning is 'if I *had been regularly engaged* in politics', not 'if I engaged in politics'. We have here an unreal supposition concerning the past. Cf. Goodwin §§ 410 and 413.

e3 **πράττων** is conditional ('if, when acting as a politician, I had championed what was right'); cf. *Men.* 71e2-4 (Meno speaking) αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.

ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ goes with ἐβοήθουν, as ὥσπερ χρή with ἐποιούμην.

ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις: cf. *Rep.* vi 496d1 ἐπὶ τὴν τῶι δικαίωι βοήθειαν (quoted with the context in the note on 31e1); *Rep.* ii 368b7-c2 (quoted in the note on 29d4); cf. also on 23b7.

33a1 **ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κτἑ.**: ἀλλά marks a break and introduces a recapitulation (cf. Denn. 8 ii).

a1-2 **δημοσίαι τε ... καὶ ἰδίαι**: see Chapter VIII 170.

a2 **φανοῦμαι**: scil. ὤν, which is often suppressed (Goodwin § 902; K.-G. ii 66-67). In this passage, ὤν would be an 'imperfect participle' (Goodwin § 140) and the meaning is: 'You will find out that I *have always been* such a man'. The use of φανοῦμαι or φανήσομαι with a participle to indicate the conclusion which an impartial mind will reach after a careful examination of the facts is extremely common in the Orators; see e.g. Lys. vii 23; xiii 79. 87; And. ii 26 (*in fine*); Ps.-And. iv 32; Isocr. xvi 44; xviii 16. 63; xix 17; Isaeus viii 4. 11; Dem. xxii 47. 69; xxix 38; xxxvi 15. 38; xxxviii 11. 38 (very similar to our passage); Aesch. i 4. The imitation of forensic oratory formulas is, as elsewhere in the *Apology*, deliberate.

ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος: cf. Ps.-Dem. xliv 12-13 τούτωι ... πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν ἐγγυτάτω· πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν οἱ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι (where Gernet wrongly suspects οὗτοι); cf. Dem. xviii 282 οὗτος εὑρέθης.

a3 **οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον**: resumes, but now with a focus on private relations, what Socrates said 32a6-7 about public life: οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον.

a4 **οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ**: Burnet prints δὴ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ (without the article) and says that this is the reading of T, whereas οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ (without δή) is ascribed to BT[2]; Croiset's critical apparatus gives 'οἱ BW: δὴ οἱ TY' but is probably incorrect (moreover, it is far from certain that Y is independent of T). Anyhow, the article cannot be omitted. To be sure, φασίν can, independently, mean 'people say', but in that case its implicit subject cannot be modified by a participle like διαβάλλοντες in Burnet's text. (*Theaet.* 181c1-2 is not entirely comparable, *Rep.* iv 430e7-8 the text is suspect.) On the other hand, δή is not likely to have been inserted by a copist or a revisor. Therefore I take the original reading to be οὓς δὴ οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ.

a6 **ἐγενόμην**: see above the note on 31b9.

λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος: 'when I speak and (so) fulfil my own task'. In *Rep.* iii 406e2 τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων is opposed to d6-7 τῆς ... προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα; iv 433a8-9 τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν is clarified by μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν. The task of which Socrates speaks here is the one laid upon him by the god (23b7-c1. 28e4-6. 29b6-7. 30e3-31a1), viz. that of testing people and persuading them to strive for ἀρετή. Therefore, when he is concerned with the private conduct of other people, this cannot be called πολυπραγμονεῖν, as the objectors would have it (31c5). — On the meaning of λέγειν, see the note on b3 λέγω.

a7 **εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος**: this proves that Socrates is not a teacher, since only young people have teachers. That Socrates' interlocutors are adults as well as young men has already been stated explicitly above (30a2-3. 8) and is implied in many passages of the *Apology* (17c9. 19d1-3. 29d5-7. 30e7. 31b3-5. 36c3-5. 37c7-d2. 38a4-5. 41b5-6. e2-7). Cf. on 30a2.

b1 **καὶ πλουσίωι καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν**: as Burnet rightly says, this means that Socrates makes himself available to whoever wants to question him. When παρέχω is followed by a dative and an infinitive, the person designed by the dative is always the subject of the infinitive. The whole sentence is equivalent to παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐάντε τις βούληται ἐρωτᾶν ἐμοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ἐάντε (βούληται) ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. Dialectic is a game of questions and answers in which one

person calls another to account for his opinions and, in his turn, gives account of his own (cf. *Gorg.* 462a3-5 ἐν τῶι μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος ... ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου). In the first part of the sentence (up to b2 ἐρωτᾶν) Socrates' partner asks the questions; in the second, that same partner gives the answers. Therefore, we should take ἀποκρινόμενος with τις and not, as Burnet says, with the subject of λέγω; such a hyperbaton would be contorted and misleading.

b3 **ὧν ἂν λέγω**: as results from the preceding note, this amounts to the same thing as ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ. The practice of the dialogues and the description that Sorates gives of his μαιευτική in a famous passage of the *Theaetetus* (148e6-151d6) show that whoever asks the questions leads the discussion (cf. *Apol.* 27b2 ἐὰν ἐν τῶι εἰωθότι τρόπωι τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι); he is the man who 'speaks' while the other 'listens' (and answers). For this, see *Rep.* x 595b9-c6: Socrates says there that 'one should speak' (b8 ῥητέον; c3 id.; b10 λέγειν) and not keep silent about the danger that lurks in the poetry of Homer, however much we like it. Glaucon agrees and Socrates adds: Ἄκουε δή, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου. Glaucon replies: Ἐρώτα. So 'to speak' is the same as 'to ask'; the role of the partner, when seen passively, is 'to listen', when seen actively, 'to answer' (cf. *Gorg.* 458e1-4).

καὶ τούτων κτέ.: see Chapter VIII 166-170.

b5 **ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην κτέ.**: in causal relative clauses, the negative is often μή. According to Goodwin (§ 580), this can only be the case when the relative clause is conditional; but this statement does not fit the facts. See J.M. Stahl 770,3, who quotes i.a. *Ion* 534d3 and *Euthyd.* 302c1-2.

ὑπεσχόμην: for ὑπισχνέομαι indicating a 'profession', cf. *Prot.* 319a3-5 (Socrates speaks to Protagoras) δοκεῖς ... μοι ... ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. In the *Antidosis* (xv), in the rebuttal of his critics, Isocrates discusses at length (especially 199-208) the ὑποσχέσεις (201; cf. 75) which a teacher can reasonably make to his pupils. More common, however, are ἐπαγγέλλομαι and ἐπάγγελμα; see e.g. *Prot.* 319a6-7 (the Sophist's answer to the words just quoted) Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι; Xen. *Mem.* i 2,8 Σωκράτης δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο μὲν οὐδενὶ πώποτε τοιοῦτον (viz. to impart ἀρετή), ἐπίστευε δὲ κτέ.

b7 **ἰδίαι**: the word should not be taken here in the sense in which it is used above, in 31b4, c4 and 33a2 (cf. 32a2). With regard to his private conversations, Socrates denies that there have ever been any 'privileged' moments, at which he communicated secret doctrines to a small group of intimates. The Socratic circle was always an 'open' one; it had nothing to do with a Pythagorean conventicle or a political ἑταιρία.

ὅτι μὴ κτέ: this relative clause has conditional force since it is equivalent to εἰ μὴ ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἅπαντες παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούουσιν; therefore the negative is μή. Usually, ὅτι μὴ is simply equivalent to εἰ μή (without a relative pronoun); cf. Goodwin § 550.

b8 **ἀληθῆ λέγει**: 'is (not) right' (note on 24a7): not until 34b5 (cf. note) does Socrates accuse anyone of not speaking the truth.

b9 **ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε κτέ**: ἀλλά can be used to indicate that 'the speaker anticipates an objection which another is likely to make' (Denn. 8 iii). This can be done in a question, as here and Xen. *An.* ii 5,23 ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ὑμᾶς ἐξὸν ἀπολέσαι οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἤλθομεν;

τινες: in the parallel passage 23c2-4, to which Socrates refers here (33c1-3), he says explicitly that these followers are *young* people; implicitly, he admits this throughout the passage 33c8-34b5.

c1 **πᾶσαν κτέ.**: there is no connective particle because this clause says the same thing as the preceding ἀκηκόατε.

c2 **χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις ... εἶναι σοφοῖς**: whereas χαίρω and ἥδομαι are very common with a participle in the nominative, the construction of the complement and the participle in the dative does not seem to occur anywhere in Attic prose, except in our passage; there are, however, three instances in Homer (E 682; κ 419. τ 463), all with χαίρω.

c4 **οὐκ ἀηδές**: with this adjective and with the adverb ἀηδῶς, this litotes is common in Plato; see *Apol.* 41b5; *Prot.* 335c6; *Euthyphro* 3e1; *Phaedr.* 229a5. 265c4; *Theaet.* 143b2; *Laws* i 625a6. vi 779b4. For the thought, cf. *Soph.* 230c1-3 (about ignorant and conceited people whose ignorance is exposed) τούτωι δὴ τῶι τρόπωι τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται, πασῶν ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην (for the bystanders) καὶ τῶι πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην.

ἐμοὶ δέ: here we have a double opposition, on the one hand between Socrates and the young men who belong to his circle, on the other hand between their respective motives for examining people who think they are clever but are not: Socrates' motive is obedience to a divine command, his young friends are spurred on by their delight in attending the examinations. On the relevance of this second opposition see Chapter VIII 170-172.

ὡς ἐγώ φημι: 'you may take that from me'. The phrase lends an emphatic and defiant tone to an assertion; see *Apol.* 36c4. 38e1. 39c8; *Gorg.* 450c2; *Rep.* v 466b7 (ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν); Lys. xiii 75. Its function is, therefore, quite different from that of ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω and similar expressions, which refer

to something said before; therefore, Burnet's formulation in his note on 36c4 ('not merely equivalent to ὅπερ λέγω') is misleading. Cf. des Places *Formule de récurrence* 14.

προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: cf. 28e4 τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος; 30a5 ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός; and already 23c1 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c5 **καὶ ἐκ μαντείων κτἑ.**: see Chapter V § 5, esp. 81-82.

ἐξ ἐνυπνίων: cf. *Phaed.* 60e4-61a4 as quoted Chapter V 82, a text which not only shows the importance that Socrates attached to dreams, as Burnet (note on *Apol.* 33c5) rightly points out; it directly confirms what Socrates says in our passage, for the vision, in its various forms (cf. 60e5 ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλληι ὄψει φαινόμενον), always gives Socrates the same instructions, viz. μουσικὴν ποιεῖν. For Socrates, this means φιλοσοφεῖν, and φιλοσοφεῖν is inseparable from examining oneself and others: *Apol.* 28e5-6 φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους; 29c7-8 μηκέτι ἐν ταύτηι τῆι ζητήσει (for the meaning of ζήτησις here, see Chapter VII 133-135) διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν; cf. 29d5-6 φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος; 38a3-5 ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος. — On Plato's views about dreams, see p.339-350 of P. Vicaire's paper 'Platon et la divination' *Revues des études grecques* 82 (1970) 333-350; R.G.A. van Lieshout *Greeks on Dreams* (Utrecht 1980) 103-136.

c6 **θεία μοῖρα**: depending on the context, this phrase can either identify divine Providence with God himself, or define it as a divine dispensation, viz. God's will with regard to a particular individual in a specific situation. In Plato, the distinction is not clear-cut. In our passage, ἄλλη points to the second sense, while προσέταξε (cf. c4-5 προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) suggests the first. The fluctuation between both senses has no significance for Plato's philosophical theory. On the use of θεία μοῖρα in Plato, see J. Souilhé 'La θεία μοῖρα chez Platon' in *Philosophia perennis*. Festgabe J. Geyser (Regensburg 1930) i 11-25; J. van Camp et P. Canart *Le sens du mot* θεῖος *chez Platon* (Louvain 1956) 428 (Index analytique *s.v.* μοῖρα, θεία).

c7 **ταῦτα**: not the answer given in c2-7 to the question asked in b9-c1, since neither the motive that impels the young to attend Socrates' cross-examinations, nor the ways in which the god conveyed his command to Socrates, can be called 'easy to verify'. The demonstrative refers to what Socrates said 33a5-b8; see Chapter VIII 172.

d1-4 **εἴτε ...· εἰ δὲ μὴ κτἑ.**: on this kind of anacoluthon, of which we find another instance below, 40c9-e4 (εἴτε δὴ ...· εἰ δ' αὖ ...), see Denn. 506-507, ii.

Besides the linguistic irregularity, there is a shift in thought. The sentence starts as if there were two possible scenarios: (a) either the young men themselves came to realise after some time that Socrates has done them moral harm, in which case they should themselves take action against him; or (b) their relatives became aware of Socrates' bad influence and should now attack him. But, as the sentence progresses, Socrates gets caught up in the first alternative, and sees two further possibilities: (a') either the young perceive the harm that was done to them and ask for punishment; or (b') they see it all right, but they are unable to take the initiative on their own behalf and therefore their relatives should do it for them.

d3 **συνεβούλευσα**: see note on 31c5 συμβουλεύω.

αὐτούς: *ipsos*, as d5 αὐτοί, in contradistinction to their fathers and other relatives.

d4 **καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι**: on the authenticity of these words, see the note on d7.

εἰ ... μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον: such an accusation, coming so long after the fact (d2 πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι), would be tantamount to admitting that, in their childhood, they had taken Socrates' bad advice and acted according to it; if so, shame would now prevent them from acting against Socrates.

d6 **ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας**: 'other relatives'. If ἄλλος is followed by an attributive participle or adjective, the latter takes the article even when the referent is indefinite: absence of the article is possible only when the participle (adjective) is predicative (as 22a5). 'The other relatives' would have been τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, cf. 27a3-4 τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας. See *Prot.* 324b4-5 (people are punished for the sake of the future) ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσηι μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα ('nor anyone else who ...'); *Rep.* ix 575c5 οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ συνεπόμενοι αὐτοῖς; *Euthyd.* 289 d4-5; *Clit.* 408b2; *Epin.* 986a2. If προσήκοντες had been felt as a substantive noun, the article after ἄλλους (which De Strycker wanted to delete) would certainly have been wrong. S.R.S.

d7 **νῦν μεμνῆσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι]**: Burnet writes: 'The repetition of καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι from d4 has a certain effectiveness, and νῦν μεμνῆσθαι would be very weak if it stood alone'. I cannot agree with either of these statements. In my opinion, the double καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι is stylistically intolerable in any Greek author, much less in Plato; one of them should be eliminated. A similar duplication is discussed in the note on 31d7. The only question is whether the first or the second καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι is a spurious repetition of the other. One could argue that, in d4, κατηγορεῖν is explicit enough in

itself, whereas, taken independently, μεμνῆσθαι is very vague and calls for further specification, as in Dem. xviii 176 εἴ τι δύσκολον πέπρακται Θηβαίοις πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τούτου μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ἀπιστεῖν; *ib.* 307 μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τηρεῖν. But here, in the second alternative, μεμνῆσθαι simply takes up κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι and is therefore, despite the compression, clear enough and the more effective for its brevity. I am inclined to delete the second, since it is omitted in T (and Y); this reading could be an old variant, although, as Burnet rightly says, the omission 'may be due ... to homoeoteleuton'. So it remains possible that καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι should be deleted at d4 and kept at d7-8.

d8 **πάντως**, 'at any rate'. At the opening of a sentence, πάντως can stand either in asyndeton (e.g. *Gorg.* 497b8; *Symp.* 175b6; *Theaet.* 143a8) or with δέ (as here and *Hipp. min.* 368b2; *Symp.* 173b7; *Laws* i 625b1) or γάρ (*Theaet.* 146c5). The function of πάντως δέ is approximately the same as that of δ' οὖν: it indicates that what follows is certain and important, as opposed to the preceding clause, which may be somehow dubious or irrelevant.

d9 **ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης**: because of the long-standing intimacy arising from proximity and from being of the same generation, Crito knows Socrates better than any other man and will be able to appreciate exactly what his influence on the young Critobulus has been. — Cf. Ps.-Dem. liii 4 Νικόστρατος γὰρ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, γείτων μοι ὢν ἐν ἀγρῶι καὶ ἡλικιώτης, γνωρίμως μέν μοι εἶχεν καὶ πάλαι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐτελεύτησεν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγρῶι κατώικουν, οὗπερ καὶ νῦν οἰκῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλλήλοις ἤδη ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ γείτονές τε εἶναι καὶ ἡλικιῶται.

e3 **τοίνυν**: 'further'. Denn. (575,2) describes this use of τοίνυν as 'introducing a fresh item in a series'. He notes (577,5) that there is usually a strong stop before 'transitional' τοίνυν, but here there is only a minor syntactic break.

e4 **ἐν ταύτηι τῆι διατριβῆι γεγόνασιν**: from the general meaning 'occupation', διατριβή develops into that of 'study' and more specifically of 'joint intellectual training under the guidance of a master'. This last usage is common in Isocrates, especially in the *Antidosis* (xv), which is strongly influenced by the *Apology*, e.g. 175 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἡ φιλοσοφία τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν ὥστε διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους, οὐ τοῦτον χρὴ μόνον κολάζειν, ὃν ἄν γράψηταί τις τούτων, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐκποδὼν ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὴν διατριβὴν ταύτην ὄντας; 242 ὥστ' οὗτοι μὲν (the sycophants who attack Isocrates and his teaching) σωφρονοῦσιν ἀναιρεῖν ζητοῦντες ἁπάσας τὰς τοιαύτας διατριβάς, ἐν αἷς ἡγοῦνται βελτίους γενομένους (scil. the pupils) χαλεπωτέρους ἔσεσθαι ταῖς αὑτῶν πονηρίαις καὶ συκοφαντίαις. As synonyms of διατριβή in this sense, Isocrates uses φιλοσοφία, παιδεία and μελέτη (see e.g. xii 19. 27-28. 262-3). The corresponding verbs are συνδιατρίβω (*ib.* 200. 251; cf. *Lach.* 180d3; *Symp.* 172c5) and προσδιατρί-

βω (*Theaet.* 168a3). In Aeschines, διατριβή means an institute for higher education: i 132 ὡς ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ διατριβαῖς γεγονώς; 175 (describing Demosthenes, who, as a teacher of rhetoric, shows off before his pupils about a recent success in a political lawsuit) σεμνυνόμενον ἐν τῆι τῶν μειρακίων διατριβῆι.

e5 **Θεοζοτίδου**: on this man and on the significance of Socrates' mention of his name, see Chapter VIII 174-175.

34a5 **ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ**, 'I yield my place to him' (Burnet). In addition to the passages which Burnet quotes to support his interpretation many others are quoted by Th. Meyer 57 and n.145; add *Laws* xii 956e6 παρακαταβάσεις, a legal ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, the meaning of which was first explained by L. Gernet *Platon, Les Lois*, Introduction (Paris 1951 and repr.) cxli n.3 (end). — In an Athenian law-court there were three βήματα, one for each of the litigants, which they occupied while they were not speaking, and a third one from which the litigant delivered his speech, and the witnesses gave their testimony. For this see L. Gernet *Démosthène, Plaidoyers civils* ii (Paris 1957) 240 n.3 (the references, however, should be Aesch. ii 59 and iii 165. 209); cf. further Lys. x 15. 20.

a7 **ἑτοίμους**, scil. ὄντας; for the omission of this participle see note on 33a2.

τῶι κακὰ ἐργαζομένωι is synonymous with τῶι διαφθείροντι, as appears from 25c7-d7.

a8 **ὥς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος**: this is the normal formula when a litigant quotes an unfavourable description which his opponent gave of him, as Ant. vi 26 καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων καὶ ἀδικῶν, ὡς οὗτοί φασιν, κτέ.; Dem. xxx 29. 31.

καὶ Ἄνυτος: Anytus is explicitly mentioned in this context because the 'corruption' of the young is primarily a political charge. See Chapter VI 92-94; Chapter VIII 174-175.

b1 **αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ κτέ.**: viz. 'I speak of the attitude of the next of kin, *for* the sole motive that can prompt them to give me their support is that they know the truth of my explanation of what my conversations with the young amount to'. On ... μὲν γὰρ ... δὲ ..., cf. the note on 30d2.

τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες: for if Socrates were condemned, the young men would be guilty by implication, since their conduct was thought to have been inspired by his 'lessons'.

b5 **συνίσασι**, 'they know perfectly well and can testify that...'.

Μελήτωι ... ψευδομένωι: here Socrates' language is strikingly blunt compared with 30b5-6 εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ..., <u>οὐδὲν λέγει</u> and 33b6-8 εἰ δέ τίς φησι ..., εὖ ἴστε ὅτι <u>οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει</u>. Here, as in the *Exordium* (17a4-b5), Socrates calls his accusers impudent liars.

8. 34b6-35d8 Peroration

34b6 **εἶεν δή**: on the sense of εἶεν, see note on 18e5. This passage makes it quite clear that εἶεν is retrospective, not prospective, since it is followed by a μέν sentence concerning what the speaker has already said; compare further *Lys.* 204e9-10.

ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ κτἑ.: on this transitional formula see Chapter IX 180-181.

b7-c1 **τάχα δ' ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ... εἰ κτἑ.**: after verbs denoting an emotion, as θαυμάζω, αἰσχύνομαι, ἀγανακτῶ, etc., a clause introduced by εἰ is often used to express the reason for the emotion. The meaning does not differ substantially from that of an object (or causal) clause with ὅτι, but the tone is more modest and characterises τὸ ἀστεῖον; see Goodwin §§ 494-496; K.-G. ii 369-370. Such a clause is not really a conditional clause; hence the negative οὐ: ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω (c5-6); cf. Goodwin § 386.

c1 **ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ**: the normal construction would have been ἂν ... ἀγανακτήσειεν εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν ... ἐγὼ δὲ κτἑ.; but the speaker inserts the participle ἀναμνησθείς in order to emphasise that the objector himself had been the agent in part of the facts concerned. So the 'subject complement' αὐτός of the μέν clause is, by means of prolepsis, made object of the participle and becomes ἑαυτοῦ. The μέν clause, however, cannot do without a subject, which is why Plato wrote ὁ μέν.

c2 **ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος**: neither *polyptoton* nor *figura etymologica* were felt by the Greeks to be stylistic devices; see the note on 19b2-3 διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες. For the placing of ἀγῶνα next to ἀγῶνος, see Fehling *Wiederholungsfiguren* 232-233.

ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε: see the note on 17c6-7 δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι.

c5 **ἄρα**: on the use of ἄρα in an 'argument par contraste' see des Places' excellent pages *Particules* 264-268; the treatment in Denn. 35-37 is less adequate.

c6 **ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι** is equivalent to ὡς ἂν ἡγήσαιντο οἱ πολλοί, 'as would be the opinion of the masses', who do not accept the true scale of values.

c7 **τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις**, with a 'resumptive' οὖν (Denn. 428-429), here not following a parenthesis, but because the main verb (b7-c1 τάχα δ' ἄν τις ... ἀγανακτήσειεν) is so far away. See note on 40e2.

c7-8 **αὐθαδέστερον ἂν ... σχοίη** has the same ingressive aorist as ἂν ... ἀγανακτήσειεν (verbs expressing emotion).

d1 **εἰ δή**: although δή is connective here, some semantic influence of the very common collocation εἰ δή in the sense of 'if indeed', 'if really' (see note on 29b4) seems to be perceptible.

d2 **εἰ δ' οὖν** 'is particularly used when a speaker hypothetically grants a supposition which he denies, doubts, or reprobates ... "But if so-and-so *does* happen" ... Occasionally, the εἰ clause is elliptical' (Denn. 464-466), as is the case here. — Croiset's punctuation (a dash after ἔγωγε) is obviously wrong.

d3 **εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι**: μέν is preparatory, answered by ἀλλ' ὅμως (d7). R. Meridor points out *Mnemos.* 35 (1982) 339 that Denniston was wrong in saying that μέν / ἀλλ' ὅμως is not found in prose; there is one more instance in Plato: *Lys.* 219b6-8. The force of καί is rightly taken by Denn. 323 to be emphatic; καί goes with εἰσίν. Admittedly, its position is unusual; but the presence of μέν and of the two enclitics scarcely allow a different word order. — If this interpretation is rejected, καί could perhaps be taken in the sense 'I have not only supporters about whom I have just spoken (in ch. xxii); I have relatives *too*'.

d4 **ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης**: according to Labarbe *L'Homère de Platon* 301-305, Plato here quotes τ 163 according to a version of the text in which line 163 was continued by ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, the first hemistich of a line 163a not attested elsewhere. To my mind, this opinion is definitely improbable. Not only does such a hemistich have a very prosaic ring, but it appears that there is no instance in Homer of ἀνθρώπων just before the penthemimeres in syntactical and lexicographical surroundings analogous to those of the postulated line 163a (as documented in the lists of the genitive plural ἀνθρώπων at the different metrical places of the hexameter as given by J. Latacz *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos s.v.* ἄνθρωπος col. 877,68-879,43). However, the main reason why Labarbe's hypothesis should be rejected is that in the Homeric context the hemistich can have no function at all. Penelope has already once asked Odysseus, who is disguised as a beggar, who he is, where he comes from and where he himself and his parents have their dwelling (τ 105 τίς πόθεν εἶς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες;). Odysseus tries to avoid giving an answer on account of the grief that he feels when he thinks about the difference between his past and his present state (106-123). Penelope replies that she, too, fell from happiness into a most painful condition, so she insists that Odysseus should nevertheless make his origin known (162-163 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς μοι εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος ὁππόθεν ἐσσί· οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης). In this epic style, the verse that explicitly refers to a proverb

(παλαιφάτου) should be the last one that the queen speaks. Its meaning is clearly defined by the preceding one (εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος; cf. verse 105 quoted above) and anything that might be added could only blunt its edge. In the *Apology*, however, the words πέφυκα and ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων act as a substitute for verse 162 that has not been quoted. — G. Lohse 'Untersuchungen über Homerzitate bei Platon' *Helikon* 5 (1965) 249 also rejects Labarbe's postulated line 163a, but his argument is too sketchy.

d6 **καὶ ... γε**: γε emphasises the importance of the addition (Denn. 157).

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: when he mentions his sons whom he will leave behind as orphans, Socrates is seized by emotion; hence the vocative. Compared with the reality of Socrates' present situation the vague image of the fictitious objector fades away — although the latter has just been addressed in d3 ὦ ἄριστε — so that Socrates all at once turns to his real audience, the members of the jury. The whole sentence is a stylistic master-piece; not because it contains any emotionally charged language, or, for that matter, any careful choice or disposition of words, but simply by its slightly jerky movement and by the way in which unobtrusive details, added one by one, gradually complete the picture of Socrates' situation.

d8 **τί δὴ οὖν**: in the groups δὴ οὖν and οὖν δή, which are equivalent in meaning and especially common in questions, the first element is, according to Denn. 469, more likely to be connective, the second ancillary. I think, however, that in questions beginning with an interrogative pronoun or adverb (as here) δή is emphatic and οὖν ancillary.

d9-e1 **οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος ... ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κτέ**: the construction would have been more regular if the second member had had the form ἀλλ' οἰόμενος οὐ καλὸν εἶναι κτέ. Before this ἀλλ' οἰόμενος, however, Socrates inserts as a parenthetical *praeteritio* the indirect question εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ... ἔχω ... ἢ μή, dependent on the main clause ἄλλος λόγος. So the δέ member should have an independent construction as well and οἰόμενος is replaced by οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. This anacoluthon is not mentioned by L. Reinhard.

e1-2 **εἰ ... ἢ μή**: for the negative μή in the second alternative, see the note on 18a4-5.

e2 **δ' οὖν** returns to the main point after the answer to an indirect question introduced by εἰ μέν has been dismissed as irrelevant (Denn. 461, I 1, second paragraph). Cf. 17a2.

e5 **εἴτ' οὖν ... εἴτ' οὖν**: on emphatic οὖν in disjunctions see the note on 27c6.

ψεῦδος: 'the neut. sg. ψευδές is not found in early writers, ψεῦδος being used instead' (LSJ, *s.v.* ψευδής in.); cf. H. Frisk *Kleine Schriften* (Göteborg 1966) 21.

e5-35a1 **ἀλλ' οὖν ... γε**: see the note on 27c6.

35a2 **εἴτε σοφίαι εἴτε ἀνδρείαι**: these two 'virtues' are singled out because people will take them into special account when appointing somebody for public office.

a3 **αἰσχρόν**, in contrast with 34e3 καλόν; the idea is picked up 35a8 by αἰσχύνην περιάπτειν.

a4 **οἵουσπερ**: at the beginning of a new sentence, this relative adjective is equivalent to its anaphoric counterpart (in this case, τοιούτους); it is worked out by the following participles δοκοῦντας and ἐργαζομένους, just as 33a2-3 τοιοῦτος was explained by συγχωρήσας.

a5 **δεινόν τι**, 'something unheard of', 'something scandalous'; see the note on 28d10.

a6 **ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων**: cf. the Anonymus Iamblichi 5,1 καὶ περὶ φιλοψυχίας δὲ ὧδε ἄν τις πεισθείη ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὑπῆρχε τῶι ἀνθρώπωι εἰ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἀποθάνοι ἀγήρωι τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθανάτωι τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, συγγνώμη ἂν <ἦν> πολλὴ τῶι φειδομένωι τῆς ψυχῆς (Diels-Kranz ii 402,14-16); of course, Socrates' judgment on φιλοψυχία is quite different from that of the Anonymus (see *Apol.* 37c5-d3).

a8-b1 **ὥστ' ἄν τινα ... ὑπολαβεῖν**: ἄν with the infinitive can replace the potential optative in consecutive clauses (cf. Goodwin § 592); here, the potential construction is used in order to mellow whatever might be painful in the consequence mentioned ('so that perhaps a foreigner could come to the idea that ...').

ὥστε ... καί: usually καὶ follows ὥστε immediately (cf. Denn. 299,4), but here ἄν and an enclitic are inserted because of Wackernagel's Law, which stipulates that any prepositive word should come as early as possible in the 'syntactic domain' (phrase, clause) within which it operates (cf. J. Wackernagel 'Über ein Gesetz der indogermanischen Wortstellung' *IF* 1 (1892) 333-436, reprinted *Kleine Schriften* I (Göttingen 1953) 1-104).

b1 **ὑπολαβεῖν** as a rule governs the infinitive (e.g. 40b6 τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;). Instances of ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι are rare: in Plato only *Crat.* 405c6-7 is a certain parallel. In *Laws* ii 669e5 and Dem xxxviii 27 ὑπολαβεῖν could also (but less probably) mean 'to reply that', and with this

sense of the verb ὅτι is regular (see e.g. *Phaed.* 87c7; *Symp.* 193b6; *Rep.* x 598d1-2 and Adam *in loc.*). ὑπολαβεῖν ὡς occurs in *Gorg.* 460e6 and *Laws* ii 641e5. The subordinate clause seems to be used here for stylistic reasons, namely to avoid an accusative and infinitive depending from another accusative and infinitive.

b1-3 **οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ... προκρίνουσιν**: *pace* Burnet, I do not think that προκρίνω here has anything to do with κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων, for which cf. Rhodes' note on Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 8,1 with references. The most common meaning of the verb is 'choose before others', 'prefer', 'select' (LSJ I 1a; for further references see Pl. *Epist.* vii 335b5; Xen. *Mem.* iii 5,19; Isocr. vii 22-23; xii 145). I strongly doubt whether in any context it denotes a '*preliminary* selection' of candidates (LSJ I 1b) from whom the officers will afterwards be appointed by ballot; that there will be a second stage after the election does not result from προ-, but from the explicit mention of κλήρωσις (κληρόομαι, λαγχάνω). Socrates is thinking primarily of the election of the στρατηγοί, but also of the members of an embassy, a committee, etc.

b2 **ἑαυτῶν** is not a partitive genitive (Croiset), which would be otiose, but depends on the comparative force of προ-.

ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς: the use of ἐν in the sense of 'in the field of', 'with respect to' is rather exceptional. To the miscellaneous instances referred to by Schwyzer ii 458 and LSJ *s.v.* ἐν A I 7 (among which *Apol.* 28b1, which is rather different) add the three quoted by Riddell *Digest* § 117, viz. *Rep.* iii 402d2; *Symp.* 213e3; *Theaet.* 206a6.

b3 **γυναικῶν**: this word expresses bluntly the Platonic Socrates' low assessment of the capacity of women to attain 'virtue', especially σοφία and ἀνδρεία. We get the same impression, but still more strongly, from two passages of the *Phaedo* in which the narrator is Phaedo, but in which Socrates' words are quoted too.

> Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of things that women always do say: 'O Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them'. And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, 'Crito, let somebody take her home'. And some of Crito's people took her away wailing and beating her breast. (60a3-b1; Fowler's translation).
>
> (When they saw that Socrates had drunk the poison, his friends were no longer able to restrain their tears). Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said, 'What conduct is this, you strange men! I sent the women away [a reference to 116b4-5] chiefly for this very reason, that they may not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave.' (117d3-e2; same translation).

According to these texts, women as such are characterised by their impressionability and by their irrepressible need to express their πάθη, especially φόβος and λύπη; cf. also *Rep.* iii 387e9-10. 395d5-e4. To be sure, Plato contends in *Rep.* v 455c4-456c3 that women differ from men only in having less physical strength and that they are equal to men in every other respect, i.a. in natural aptitude for philosophy (456a4), but in the same book (v 469d7) he speaks as a matter of course of γυναικείας τε καὶ σμικρᾶς διανοίας, an implicit judgment which is confirmed by utterances like *Theaet.* 171e5-6 πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δέ; *Epist.* viii 355c3-4 ὁ δὲ τοὺς πλουσίους εὐδαίμονας ὀνομάζων λόγος αὐτός τε ἄθλιος, γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων ὢν λόγος ἄνους κτέ. — For other misogynic passages in Plato, see P. Shorey *What Plato said* (Chicago 1933 and repr.) 632 (note on *Laws* 731d) and 636 (note on 781a). See note on 40c2.

ταῦτα γάρ: 'I say this because ...'; often γάρ does not explain the content of the preceding sentence, but the reason why the speaker wanted to utter it (Denn. 60-61). Cf. note on 19e1 ἐπεί.

b4 **οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν**: Forster's conjecture ἡμᾶς has been adopted by most editors (Croiset mistakenly presents it as his own) and has been confirmed by the Armenian translation. Burnet defends ὑμᾶς, the reading of BTW, because, he says, τοὺς δοκοῦντας ... τι ... εἶναι clearly refers to 35a2 <u>ὑμῶν</u> οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν. That is true enough but does not prove his case. In 35a2 ὑμῶν stands for the whole body of Athenian citizens (opposed to a8 τῶν ξένων). But here (35b4), Socrates opposes the *judges* in their functions (b7 καταψηφιεῖσθε), designated by ὑμεῖς (b5 ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν), and the *accused* who are wont to stage scenes of lamentation, designated by ἡμεῖς (b5 ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν). The same pronoun ὑμεῖς cannot, as Burnet would have it, in the same set of alternatives (οὔτε ... οὔτε ...) represent first the accused (b4, 'when you are on trial', as Burnet paraphrases) and then the judges (b5). To be sure, τοὺς δοκοῦντας κτέ. (b4-5) reiterates ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν (a2), but this last phrase is only a generalisation of what was said 34e4-35a1 about this particular defendant, Socrates, who enjoyed the δόξα of being a different kind of person, a σοφός.

b5 **καὶ ὅπηι**: on this καί see the note on 17b2 μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

καὶ ὅπηι τι οὖν is the reading of BTW and should be retained. Heindorf's correction ὁπηιοῦν τι, adopted by Burnet (cf. Wilamowitz *Platon* ii 347), is not necessary. The enclitic τι may be inserted into indefinite relative pronouns and adverbs ending in -οῦν, while still keeping its full syntactic function in the clause, as appears e.g. from Dem. xlv 53 δεινὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν εἰ καὶ καθ' ὅτου τις οὖν (= εἴ τις καὶ καθ' ὁτουοῦν) τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρεῖ, πολλῶι δὲ δεινότερον εἰ κατὰ τῶν συγγενῶν; Xen. *Cyr.* iii 4,10 ὁποίου τινὸς οὖν (= ὁποιουοῦν τινος); *Oecon.* 12,5. There are no parallels

in Plato, but as there are only five instances of -οῦν followed by a form of τις (*Crat.* 389b9; *Theaet.* 152d4; *Soph.* 245d8. 247d8; *Tim.* 50a2), that means little. For other monosyllabic words inserted before οὖν, see Herod. vi 56 ὁκόσοισι ἂν ὦν (=ὁκοσοισινῶν ἄν); Isocr. v 7 ὅπως γὰρ οὖν (=ὁπωσοῦν γάρ).

ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, 'if we try to do so' (*de conatu*).

b8 **καταγέλαστον**: here, as often, 'despicable' rather than 'ridiculous'.

ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος, 'keeping his composure and dignity'; the moral connotation of the phrase appears clearly from *Phaed.* 117e2 ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. The immediately preceding words in that passage are ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίαι χρὴ τελευτᾶν (cf. note on 35b3). With both passages one may compare *Laws* xii 949b2-4 (about how lawsuits should be conducted) μήτε ἱκετείαις χρώμενον ἀσχημόσιν μήτε οἴκτοις γυναικείοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον μετ' εὐφημίας διδάσκοντα καὶ μανθάνοντα ἀεὶ διατελεῖν.

c2 **διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν**: cf. Ps.-Dem. xxxv 43 οὔτε διδάξαι οὔτε πείθειν.

c5-6 **οὔτε ... ἐθίζειν ... οὔτε ἐθίζεσθαι**: prosecutors often argue that if the jury allows itself to be persuaded by the defendants to be too compliant, they will set a bad precedent for the man in the street and future jurors alike; see e.g. Lys. xiv 22 ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντες δίκαιον κελεύωσιν αὐτοῖς χαρίζεσθαι, μεμνῆσθαι χρὴ ὅτι διδάσκουσιν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις μὴ πείθεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι λίαν προθύμως τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι βοηθοῦντες πολλοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιήσουσι; Dem. xxiv 218 (last sentence of the speech) πάντων οὖν ἕνεκα τῶν εἰρημένων ἄξιον ὀργισθῆναι καὶ κολάσαι καὶ παράδειγμα ποιῆσαι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς τὸ πράως ἔχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ καταψηφίζεσθαι μὲν ὀλίγου δὲ τιμᾶν, ἐθίζειν καὶ προδιδάσκειν ἔστ' ἀδικεῖν ὑμᾶς ὡς πλείστους. Socrates borrows this topic from contemporary forensic oratory, but, as he is wont to do (cf. Chapter II 32-34), he turns it around: when he wishes for high standards to be set, it is not in order to harm his adversaries or to escape punishment himself, but to ensure that both his own behaviour and that of the responsible jurors will conform with justice and religious duty.

c8 **δεῖν**: for pleonastic δεῖν see note on 28e5.

ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι κτἑ.: for the negative μή in causal relative clauses see the note on 33b5.

μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια: the pair is traditional; see e.g. *Rep.* x 615b7; *Polit.* 301d2; *Laws* ii 663b2. It is a commonplace in forensic speeches, especially

in the *exordium* (e.g. Ant. ii β2; Lys. xiii 3; Isocr. xiv 2), but even more in the peroration (e.g. Ant. ii δ12; iii δ10; iv β9. δ11; Lys. xiii 97; Isaeus vi 65; Dem. xxi 227; Din. i 111).

d1 **ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως**: there is no other instance of ἄλλως τε (...) πάντως in Plato, although there are three in Aeschylus (*Prom.* 636; *Pers.* 689; *Eum.* 726). The group μέντοι νὴ Δία emphasises πάντως; but that too is unique in Plato (in itself, μέντοι νὴ Δία is quite common). μέντοι is, of course, emphatic (Denn. 399-404).

d2-3 **εἰ πείθοιμι ... καὶ ... βιαζοίμην**, 'if I *tried* to persuade and to force you'.

d3 **τῶι δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην** and (d4-5) **ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ** are typical *oxymora*. The word ὀξύμωρος is not attested in Greek and we know it only from Servius ad *Aen.* vii 295, a proof that the figure was not treated in contemporary rhetorical teaching. Neither is it a rhetorical flourish here. It underscores how the very idea of ἐλεινολογία and ἱκετεία ought to be, both to Socrates and to the jury, absolutely unacceptable.

d4 **ἀτεχνῶς**: 'literally'; the adverb, which is commonly used to introduce 'metaphors, comparisons and ... proverbs' (Burnet, note on *Euthyphro* 3a7), is here applied to an *oxymoron*; 'it emphasises the essential accuracy of apparently hyperbolical expressions' (*ib.*).

d5 **κατηγοροίην ἂν ὡς κτἑ.**, with an object clause as in ἀπολογέομαι ὡς (*Phaed.* 69d7-8).

d7 **ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω κτἑ.**: Socrates does not leave the decision to the jury in the same sense as he leaves it to the providential God (see next note). He is well aware that most members of the jury lack knowledge of justice. He has said in the Proposition (18e4-19a5) that it would be difficult to eradicate deep-rooted prejudices in the short amount of time given him for his defence; he will echo this in the Second Speech (37a6-7; cf. note on 37a6 ὀλίγον ... χρόνον). But he is involved in a legal process and he agrees that it should take its due course (cf. 19a6-7). This is the reason why, in the *Crito*, he refuses to flee from prison; as the Laws put it, 'can a state continue to exist, will it not be totally ruined when sentences passed have no force and are made null and void by private persons?' (50b2-5).

τῶι θεῶι: it is remarkable that we have passed from the plural ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω (d5) to the singular ἐπιτρέπω ... τῶι θεῶι. In some passages of the *Apology* (21b3. e5. 22a4. 23a5. b5. c1), ὁ θεός clearly points to Apollo, who gave the oracle about Socrates to Chaerephon. Futher on, however, the reference to Apollo is much less direct (28e4. 30a6. e3. 31a6-8), and in these passages it seems that ὁ θεός should be understood as 'God' rather

than 'the god (of Delphi)'. This is especially true in the last sentence of the First Speech. The God of whom Socrates speaks here is the providential God who takes care of those who trust him and live according to his will (cf. 41c9-d2; Chapter XI § 3bγ). Man has no clear insight into the divine governance of the world: he often does not know for sure what is good for him and what is evil (42a3-5 compared with 29a6-b7; cf. also Socrates' prayer at the end of the *Phaedrus* 279b8-c3). Therefore, mortals cannot do better than trust in God. Such a God, who governs the world as a whole, cannot be one of the many gods of the Greek Pantheon. Should we then agree with Burnet when, commenting on the final sentence of the *Crito* (54e1-2) ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτηι ἐπειδὴ ταύτηι ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται, he writes: 'Here there can be no question of any particular god. The words are definitely monotheistic'? Burnet's first statement is correct, but the second cannot be accepted. Monotheism did not exist among the Greeks, because they did not raise any question about unity or plurality in the world of the divine. According to Wilamowitz' simplifying but illuminating formula, god was for them a 'Prädikatsbegriff' (*Platon* i 271-272; *Der Glaube der Hellenen* i 18-19). They asked what realities might be called divine or even gods; they were not so much concerned with the problem of what were the essential attributes of God or the gods. They saw the divine as a polymorphic whole, and this was the view not only of the common man, but of the philosophers as well (Xenophanes, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Middle Platonists and the Neoplatonists). There are gods and there are divine things on a variety of levels. In those areas where religion is a personal matter, especially in reliance on divine help, the expression of religion in prayer seems to lead automatically to a one-to-one dialogue. That was, I would think, how Socrates felt his relationship to divine reality, as he spoke the words we are commenting on. The god to whose service he has devoted his life (23b9-c1; cf. 29a6; 31a7-8; 37e5-6) and to whom he entrusts all his interests ceases to be one specific member of the Pantheon in contradistinction to others. He is just God, concretely experienced as a divine, transcendent individual. This, however, is 'religion vécue' and not theological speculation. Thus, neither Socrates nor Plato derive from actually acknowledging one god, next to whom there is *de facto* no place for other ones, a monotheism *de iure*. The texts passes quite easily from the collective θεοί, in which no individual god is designated and which corresponds to traditional religious language, to the θεός of this form of personal religion. This is what happens in 35d3 ~ d7 and in 41d2 ~ 42a5.

9. *35e1-38b9 Second Speech*

35e1 **τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν**: the sentence opens with a μέν clause describing the impact of the verdict on Socrates as if a second member with δέ would follow, dealing with Socrates' counter-proposal, e.g. περὶ δὲ τῆς τιμήσεως κτλ. But the normal sequence of thought is interrupted by the defendant's comments on the vote count. A discussion of their validity is, however, brushed aside at 36b3 with δ' οὖν, which, in a sense, corresponds to μέν.

36a2 **καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον**: the substitution of an independent clause for a dependent one introduced by ὅτι is not exceptional after ἄλλοι (-α, -ως, etc.) τε καί; see e.g. 41c5-6; Lys. vii 6.

τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο: although nobody seems to have suspected these words, they are very weak after ἐπὶ τούτωι τῶι γεγονότι, a phrase that makes the subject of γέγονεν obvious; besides, at the end of the sentence the participle γεγονώς is used again, but in a wholly different sense (for which see Burnet *in loc.*; Platonic instances of the latter sense are *Men.* 82d2-3. 83c1. e7. 84e2. 3. 85b1. 6; *Theaet.* 147e6. 148a1. 2). I surmise that τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο is a gloss intended to make explicit a subject that was 'understood'. See also the note on 40c6 τὸν τεθνεῶτα.

a5 **ὡς ἔοικεν**: these words indicate that the calculations are not to be taken in full earnest.

εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων: since 500 was the normal number of dicasts for a γραφή, 280 members must have voted 'guilty', 220 'not guilty'. Juries of 201, 501, 1001, etc. members are not attested before the second half of the fourth century B.C. Cf. the data collected in Harrison *The Law of Athens* ii 47, notes 2 and 3; Brickhouse - Smith 26.

a7 **μὲν οὖν**, 'or rather', a clear instance of what Denn, (475,3 i) calls the 'adversative' and elsewhere 'corrective' use of this group of particles. Socrates means that he was not correct in speaking about his escaping in the *modus irrealis*; actually, he *has* escaped Meletus. Denn. (478, bottom of the page) hits the nail on the head with his analysis 'the speaker objects to his own words, virtually carrying on a dialogue with himself'. He adds (479) that des Places *Particules* 113 confirms his belief that *Laws* v 728a2 is 'the only Platonic example in continuous speech', whereas it is common in dialogue (475,3 i). In fact, des Places misunderstands *Apol.* 36a7 and takes (p.90) μέν as preparatory, although there follows no δέ clause nor an equivalent of it, and οὖν as conclusive ('marque une conclusion tirée de ce qui précède'), which it clearly is not.

b1 **οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων**: a stock phrase, probably taken from the text of the relevant law; see Dem. xviii 266; xxxiv 7; lviii 6; Ps.-Dem. xxvi 9; Aesch. ii 14; Din. i 54.

b3 **δ' οὖν**, 'anyhow', whatever you may think about my argument; cf. note on 17a2.

ὁ ἀνήρ may function, in the nominative, as a sort of anaphoric pronoun (cf. LSJ *s.v.* VI 2); here opposed to ἐγώ.

b6 **οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον**, practically equivalent to ἐπολυπραγμόνουν. For ἡσυχία as a synonym of ἀπραγμοσύνη see Ehrenberg 'Polypragmosyne' 467-468 and *passim*, who refers i.a. to Thuc. i 70,8; Isocr. xv 151. 227; Ps.-Dem. vii 70. Of course, Socrates means the same thing here as in 31c4-5, a πολυπραγμοσύνη ἰδίαι, as appears from 36c3 ἰδίαι ἕκαστον. — Cf. note on 37e3; Chapter VIII n.2 and the literature quoted there.

ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας κτἑ: in order to answer the question τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν Socrates need only speak about what he actually did for the benefit of Athens, not about aims which he refused to pursue. But the whole sentence is intended to remind us of the scale of values according to which Socrates has made his choice between three βίοι (cf. Chapter X 187-188).

b7 **χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας**: the two main forms of lucrative professional activities, on the one hand commerce and banking, in the other the running of an estate.

b9-c1 **ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν ... ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι**: the normal construction would have been ἡγησάμενος ἐπιεικέστερος εἶναι, but the subject of the infinitive should have a strong emphasis and ought therefore to be expressed, necessarily in the accusative. αὐτός ... ἐπιεικέστερος would also have been possible grammatically, but would have contrasted Socrates with other persons in an irrelevant way; contrast 38b8 αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι.

c1 **εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα**: Burnet's translation 'by having recourse to them' is erroneous. Socrates does not mean that he is too honest to have recourse to either economic or political activities in order to remain safe, as if such pursuits were means to an end, namely safety; they are ends in themselves. This passage corresponds to 31e2-33a3; the honest man (ἐπιεικής) is the same as the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός of 32e3 ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ and as τὸν τῶι ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου of 32a1. Such an honest man cannot hope to escape death (36c1 σώιζεσθαι; cf. 31e2 σωθήσεται; 32a2 σωθήσεσθαι) if he is engaged in political or economic pursuits, because in both those fields he will meet unscrupulous adversaries. The meaning of ἰέναι is the same throughout the passage (c1 ἰόντα; c2 ᾖα; c3 ἰών; c4 ᾖα),

viz. 'take to', 'engage in' and not 'have recourse to', 'resort to', 'take refuge in'. To be sure, in 31e2-33a3 we have only seen that honesty in *politics* was dangerous in Athens; nothing has been said about honesty in *business*. But, in our context, politics is by far the more important, as appears from the fact that it is described by five substantives, economic activities only by two.

c3 **μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι**: the use of ὄφελος as predicate, although relatively common in poetry (e.g. N 235-236 ταῦτα δ' ἅμα χρὴ (scil. ἡμᾶς) σπεύδειν, αἴ κ' ὄφελός τι γενώμεθα καὶ δύ' ἐόντε), seems to be exceptional in classical prose; it is, however, found *Rep.* ii 365b5-6; vi 505a7; viii 552b7; *Epin.* 989b4. 991d7. The usual construction with the genitive, as *Apol.* 28b7, is found some 25 times in Plato.

c4 **ὡς ἐγώ φημι**, 'as I affirm' (Burnet), see note on 33c4; cf. also on 24d5 ὡς φήις.

c6-7 **ὅπως ... ἔσοιτο**: the future optative is rare in an object clause depending on a verb of striving in a secondary tense: usually the future indicative is retained (Goodwin §§ 339-340). The optative marks indirect speech, implied in πείθειν (this explains the optative after πρίν above).

c7 **τῶν τῆς πόλεως**, 'the possessions of the city'. Here Socrates thinks of such public works as mentioned *Gorg.* 455d8-e1 τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευή (cf. b6-7. 517c2. 519a2-3). — Although Socrates always tries to win others over to his own views about the true good through private conversations (36c3 ἰδίαι), the object of his activity is not restricted to private life, but concerns the city as well as the individual; cf. 30b4 καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι.

c8 **αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως**: here, too, we should understand ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη καὶ φρονιμωτάτη ἔσοιτο. This is the Socratic way of saying that the city should above all care for εὐνομία. Since we saw (Chapter X 187-188) that ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτοῦ does not really differ from ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, we may guess that as, in man, the ψυχή is the structural and organising principle that regulates the operations of all the members and organs of the body, so, in the city, there should be a similar principle that coordinates the activities of all members of the community. This principle could be its πολιτεία or constitution. It is remarkable, however, that Plato never speaks of the constitution as 'the soul of the state', whereas the phrase is found in Isocrates: ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία τοσαύτην ἔχουσα δύναμιν ὅπερ ἐν σώματι φρόνησις· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ διαφυλάττουσα, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς διαφεύγουσα (vii 14; some fifteen years later the author repeated the same idea in nearly identical terms in xii 138). — Contrary to Meyer (101-102), it is necessary to insist on the fact that here αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις has

nothing to do with the theory of forms. According to Meyer, in this passage Plato opposes the unity of the αὐτό, the ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτόν, the ἔχον μίαν ἰδέαν, the εἶδος, to the multiplicity of perceptible realities. The context, however, is conditioned by the idea of the hierarchy according to which we should take more care of some objects than of others (Chapter X 187-188): it is not concerned with the epistemological and ontological problem of the ἕν and the πολλά.

d4 **εὐεργέτηι**: Burnet is probably right in saying that the title εὐεργέτης was not officialy granted to native citizens in classical times; cf. Busolt - Swoboda ii 1246-1247; R. Meiggs - D. Lewis *A selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1969 and repr.) 305 (index *s.v.* εὐεργέτης); M.N. Tod *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, ii. From 403 to 323 B.C. (Oxford 1948) 338 (id.). The Orators, however, speak freely of born citizens as τῆς πόλεως εὐεργέται not only in the case of men of the past, as Aesch. i 132. 140 (twice about Harmodius and Aristogiton); iii 257-259 (Solon, Aristides, Themistocles), but also of contemporaries, as Dem. xx 67; xix 280; Ps.-Dem. lix 93; Hyper. *In Phil.* 5; Lyc. *Leocr.* 51.

d6 **μᾶλλον ... [οὕτως]**: I do not think that μᾶλλον and οὕτως can both stand at so short a distance. The position of the vocative ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι shows that Mudge and Croiset are mistaken in bracketing μᾶλλον; it is οὕτως that should be deleted (so Adam), as a gloss explaining the irregular, though not exceptional correlation μᾶλλον ... ὡς.

d7 **ἐν Πρυτανείωι**: on this building, which stood outside of the Agora, close to the north side of the Acropolis, see Thompson - Wycherley *The Agora of Athens* 46-47. It is perhaps useful to say that the Prytaneum was not the same building as the Tholos, on which see the note on 32c5, although they are sometimes confused, e.g. by E. Saglio, art. *Sitesis* in Daremberg - Saglio *Dictionnaire des antiquité des antiquités grecques et romaines* iv 1357. Nor is it correct to call the Tholos 'the second Prytaneum of Athens', as does G. Gruben in the *Lexicon der alten Welt* (Zürich 1965) art. *Prytaneion* col. 2465, and art. *Tholos* col. 3071. Cf. Rhodes on Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 3,5 and 24,3. The prytaneis dined in the Tholos, men honoured by the state in the Prytaneum.

σιτεῖσθαι: the present infinitive suggests that the maintenance should be continued indefinitely.

e2 **κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον** should be taken, not with τιμᾶσθαι (if so, τῆς ἀξίας would be redundant), but with δεῖ: 'if, therefore, as justice demands, I am to make a proposal in accordance with my deserts', etc.

37a2-3 **παραπλησίως ... ὥσπερ**: as παραπλήσιος has the same construction as ὅμοιος, so do the corresponding adverbs; cf. 27d10-e1 ὁμοίως ... ὥσπερ.

a4 **τὸ δέ**, 'but actually'; with this sense, τὸ δέ is in most cases an adverbial accusative, but here and 39c7 τό is the subject; see further Burnet's note on *Phaed.* 87c6.

a5 **μηδένα**: after verbs like οἴομαι, ἡγέομαι, νομίζω, etc., the negative with the infinitive is normally οὐ, but sometimes μή (K.-G. ii 193-196); since πέπεισμαι expresses a stronger persuasion than νομίζω, the use of μή (here and b2-3) is not surprising (see Burnet *in loc.*). Likewise μή is found after πιστεύω in Thuc. v 104. 106. Plato sometimes uses μή even after νομίζω (*Soph.* 230c5) and ἡγέομαι (*Men.* 84c6).

ἀδικεῖν, here and b3, has the meaning of the perfect; see K.-G. i 136-137.

a6 **ὀλίγον ... χρόνον**: because the issues involved in a lawsuit like the one against Socrates are so fundamental, it is impossible, in such a short time, to convey to an audience untrained in philosophical discussion any real insight into the truth about the matters at issue (see Chapter I 14 and n.21; Chapter II 35 and n.26); cf. *Gorg.* 455a2-6 οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πειστικὸς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγωι χρόνωι διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα with Dodds' note on 455a5, in which he refers to *Theaet.* 201a7-b6 and *Laws* vi 766d8-e3; *Gorg.* 513c7-d1 (Socrates explains why he cannot succeed in persuading Callicles) ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι τῆι σῆι ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις βέλτιον ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει.

a7 **διειλέγμεθα**: Socrates claims that his defence is not a speech composed in accordance with the rules of rhetoric (cf. 17b7-c5; 18a1-3) but a simple and informal talk in which he often addresses one listener, whom he supposes to have difficulties in accepting what he said; cf. Chapter II 38-39.

εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος κτέ.: the outcome of Socrates' trial induced Plato in his old age to prescribe in his penal code that, in suits about capital offences (θανάτου πέρι *Laws* ix 855c6), three consecutive days shall be provided for the examination of the case; 855e1-856a8: μετὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους τούτους (the speeches of the accuser and the defendant) ἄρχεσθαι μὲν τὸν γεραίτατον (of the judges) ἀνακρίνοντα, ἰόντα εἰς τὴν τῶν λεχθέντων σκέψιν ἱκανήν, μετὰ δὲ τὸν πρεσβύτατον ἑξῆς ἅπαντας χρὴ διεξελθεῖν ὅ τι ἂν παρ' ἑκατέρου τις τῶν ἀντιδίκων ῥηθὲν ἢ μὴ ῥηθὲν ἐπιποθῆι τινα τρόπον ...· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐπισφραγισαμένους ὅσα ἂν εἶναι καίρια δοκῆι ... θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑστίαν, καὶ πάλιν αὔριον εἰς ταὐτὸν συνελθόντας

ὡσαύτως τε ἀνακρίνοντας διεξελθεῖν τὴν δίκην ...· καὶ τρὶς δράσαντας τοῦτο ... ψῆφον ἱερὰν ἕκαστον φέροντα ... οὕτω τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῆι τοιαύτηι δίκηι; cf. vi 766e1-3.

a8 **ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις**: 'not infrequently, by a kind of inversion, καὶ is attached to the relative where, in strict logic, it should be attached to the demonstrative' (Denn. 295 iii; here there is no demonstrative, but ὑμῖν).

b1 **οὐ ῥάιδιον κτἑ.**: the same idea was expressed in similar terms, both at the end of the Proposition (19a1-5) and at the end of the Refutation of the Old Accusers (24a1-4); by repeating it here, Socrates once again emphasises that he was found guilty not on the grounds of the accusation of Meletus but because of the old slander and the enmity that it arroused; cf. 28a4-8.

b2 **πεπεισμένος δή**: the participle picks up πέπεισμαι (a5); such repeated words are most commonly accompanied by οὖν, but this particle is typically at home in repetitions after some form of anacoluthon (Denn. 428-429,4). The 'resumptive' use of δή is mentioned by Denn. only *in apodosi* (224,12) and in cases where the thought 'is beginning to wander' (225,13). Here, δή is not emphatic but properly connective and 'marks the progression of one idea to a second of which the consideration naturally follows' (Denn. 239).

b3-5 **πολλοῦ δέω ... ἀδικήσειν καὶ ... ἐρεῖν ... καὶ τιμήσεσθαι**: the use of the future infinitive after other verbs than μέλλω and *verba sentiendi* and *declarandi* is exceptional (Goodwin § 113; K.-G. i 184-185); here one could say that πολλοῦ δέω is felt as equivalent to τὸ παράπαν οὐ μέλλω.

b5 **τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω κτἑ.**: compare Xen. *Hell.* i 7,25-26: τί δὲ καὶ δεδιότες σφόδρα οὕτως ἐπείγεσθε; ἦ μὴ οὐχ ὑμεῖς ὃν ἂν βούλησθε ἀποκτείνητε καὶ ('or') ἐλευθερώσητε; As Denn. (283,2) points out, ἦ 'often introduces a suggested answer, couched in interrogative form, to the question just asked'.

b6 **ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι κτἑ.**: cf. 29a4-b9.

b7 **ἀντί τούτου δή**: although emphatic δή is very common after οὗτος, ἐνταῦθα, etc., its function here is connective and equivalent to that of οὖν or τοίνυν· 'Shall I *then* choose ...?'

b8 **πότερον δεσμοῦ**; according to Burnet *in loc.*, 'as a punishment for Athenian citizens, imprisonment was practically unknown, although, if they were in debt to the treasury, they might be imprisoned till the debt was paid'. This, however, is scarcely true, since in Plato and in other authors, imprisonment is mentioned along with other specific punishments as death, exile, disenfranchisement, seizure of property, mulct and corporal punishment. See

Apol. 32c2-3 φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον; *Gorg.* 480c8-d3 ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ἦι, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήισκοντα; *Laws* x 890c4-5 τὸν μὲν δεῖν τεθνάναι, τὸν δέ τινα πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμίαις, ἄλλους δὲ πενίαις κολάζεσθαι καὶ φυγαῖς; Ps.-Andoc. iv 3 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὄμνυτε μηδένα μήτ' ἐξελᾶν μήτε δήσειν μήτε ἀποκτενεῖν ἄκριτον· ..., ἐξὸν κολάζειν χρήμασι καὶ δεσμῶι καὶ θανάτωι; Ps.-Lys. vi 21-22 'Ανδοκίδης ... ἔδησεν ἑαυτὸν τιμησάμενος δεσμοῦ· ... ὃς ῥᾶιον ἡγήσατο δεσμοῦ τιμήσασθαι ἢ ἀργυρίου; Dem. xxiv *passim*: the speaker shows that a law of Solon allowed imprisonment for certain crimes (103. 114-115. 122), that, in an ἀγὼν τιμητός, imprisonment falls within the limits of the general formula τί χρὴ (τὸν καταγνωσθέντα) <u>παθεῖν</u> ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι; (119. 146-148. 151-152), and finally that imprisonment is not only a means to enforce the payment of a fine to the treasury, but also a punishment in its own right (132 καίτοι ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἤδη τινὲς ἐδέθησαν καὶ <u>ἐπὶ κρίσεσιν</u>); Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 67,5 [ἀγώ]νω[ν ὅ]σοις πρόσεστι δεσμ[ὸς ἢ θάνατος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ ἀτ]ιμία ἢ δήμευσις χρημάτων. Cf. Harrison *The Law of Athens* ii 177. — That in our passage lifelong imprisonment is meant appears both from the fact that no term is mentioned (in contrast with c2-3) and from δουλεύοντα τῆι ἀεὶ καθισταμένηι ἀρχῆι, τοῖς ἕνδεκα (c1-2).

c1 **τί με δεῖ ζῆν ... δουλεύοντα κτἑ.**: see Chapter X 192-193.

c1-2 **τῆι ... ἀρχῆι**: see the note on 32d4.

c2 **ἀλλὰ χρημάτων**: ἀλλά introduces an alternative suggestion after a first one has been rejected; cf. Denn. 9 ii. In the Orators, the second alternative is often followed by an objection that opens with ἀλλά too; by thus raising and rejecting suggestions, a figure called ὑποφορά, the speaker can carry on a debate with himself in the presence of the audience and so string a whole series of ἀλλά's, as e.g. Andoc. i 148 τίνα γὰρ καὶ ἀναβιβάσομαι δεησόμενον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ; τὸν πατέρα; ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν. 'Αλλὰ τοὺς ἀδελφούς; ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσίν. 'Αλλὰ τοὺς παῖδας; ἀλλ' οὔπω γεγένηνται; cf. Denn. 10 iv. Likewise here: ἀλλὰ χρημάτων... ; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν ... 'Αλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; However, Plato characteristically avoids a strict conformity with rhetorical figures and introduces variation by substituting ἀλλὰ δή for the third ἀλλά (cf. Denn. 241,4) and by not having a fourth one. More important is that, as so often in the *Apology*, external resemblance to a rhetorical model corresponds to a radical difference in intention: Socrates rejects the easy solutions that the jury wish to suggest to him and sticks firmly to principle and justice.

c4 **ἐκτείσω** is future indicative, not aorist subjunctive; cf. *Gorg*. 486c5 ὁπόθεν δόξεις; *Rep*. iv 445b2-3 ὁπόθεν ἀπαλλαγήσεται καὶ ... κτήσεται; viii 553d3-4 ὁπόθεν ... ἔσται.

c5-6 **πολλὴ μεντἄν με ... ἔχοι**: we should beware of confusing this 'cautious potential' with an irrealis as some translators do (e.g. Schleiermacher, Croiset) and rather say, with Gildersleeve (i § 442), that it is 'most frequently used to indicate moral certainty, and sometimes serves as a climax to the indicative'; cf. e.g. 28b9-c1 φαῦλοι γὰρ ἄν τῶι γε σῶι λόγωι εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι κτέ.

c7-d3 **ὑμεῖς μὲν ... ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα**: in such '*arguments par contraste*', which in fact are arguments *a fortiori*, the second member, which contains ἄρα, not infrequently takes the form of an interrogative sentence and thus creates an anacoluthon; see des Places *Particules* 265-268; Denn. 37,3 (too brief); a good instance is Lys. xii 36, quoted Chapter VII 142.

c8 **ἐγένεσθε** is used as the aorist of εἰμί; see note on 31b9.

d4 **ἐξελθόντι**, 'if I go into exile' (cf. Burnet *in loc.*); for this use see e4 (ἐξελθὼν ζῆν): *Crit.* 45b8. 53a7; *Rep.* ix 575b1; Din. i 102. Similarly ἀπελθών: *Laws* ix 864e5; Lys. xxiv 25; Ps.-Andoc. iv 5. In all these passages, the verb is an aorist participle.

d5 **ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένωι** describes the moment (or moments) at which Socrates, having left one city, takes refuge in another one; καὶ ἐξέλαυνομένωι refers to the moment (or moments) at which he is expelled from that new abode. — The transmitted text is proved correct by *Soph.* 224b1-2 πόλιν ... ἐκ πόλεως ... ἀμείβοντα; no correction (πόλιν Cobet; deletion of πόλεως Wilamowitz *Platon* ii 347) is needed.

d6 **εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι κτέ.**: on this argument see Chapter X 193-196.

d7 **ἀπελαύνω**, 'to drive away', distinct from ἐξελαύνω, 'to expel'.

e1 **πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι**: instead of τε, B has δέ, which Burnet accepts. I do not think he is right, because (a) mistakes about monosyllables, especially particles, are common in B, e.g. 18c7. 21b1. 22b8. 24b5. e10; (b) 'duplicated' δέ is used only under quite definite conditions, well described by Denn. 183,4-185, none of which is present here; (c) 'duplicated' δέ always occupies the earliest possible position in the apodosis.

e3 **σιγῶν δέ**: the 'understood' μέν clause would be something like ὅτι μὲν διαλεγόμενος οἷαπερ εἴωθας οὐ δυνήσει ἐν τῆι ξένηι ζῆν ὁμολογοῦμεν.

ἡσυχίαν ἄγων has here exactly the same force as in 36b6; see the note *in loc.*

e4 **ἡμῖν**: on this ethical dative see Chapter X 199.

e6 **τῶι θεῶι ἀπειθεῖν**: cf. 29b6 ἀπειθεῖν τῶι βελτίονι καὶ θεῶι καὶ ἀνθρώπωι. — Although it was primarily to Athens that Socrates had been assigned by the god in order to help her citizens to mend their ways (30d6-e1. 31a8), his mission is not limited to Athenians (23b2 ὦ ἄνθρωποι; b5-6 καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων; 30a3-4 καὶ ξένωι καὶ ἀστῶι). The divine order will therefore remain in force even if Socrates should be exiled.

38a1 **ὡς εἰρωνευομένωι**: see Chapter X 196-197.

a2 **ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὄν**: on emphatic καὶ see the note on 29a6; on τυγχάνει ... ὄν that on 29a7-8.

a5 **ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος**: cf. 28e5-6 ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους. Socratic examination has two targets; it is directed no less towards the examiner himself than towards his interlocutors; see Chapter VII 134-135. The idea of an examination of oneself is perhaps already present in Heraclitus, 22B101 D.-K. ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν. Plutarch, the oldest witness for this fragment (*adv. Colot.* 20, 1118c), associates it with the Delphic precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν, which of course was of prime importance to Socrates as well, as Plutarch notes.

ὁ ... ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπωι: according to J.A. Coulter 'The Relation of the *Apology of Socrates* to Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* and Plato's Critique of Gorgianic Rhetoric' *HSCPh* 68 (1964) 269-303, especially 294, this formulation of Plato's is 'not only ... modeled on Palamedes' despairing utterance', viz. Gorg. *Palam.* 21 βίος δὲ οὐ βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένωι, 'it is also a challenge and an emendation'. Cf. D.D. Feaver - J.E. Hare 'The *Apology* as an Inverted Parody of Rhetoric' *Arethusa* 14 (1981) 205-216; K. Seeskin 'Is the Apology of Socrates a parody?' *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982) 94-105; Reeve 7-8; Brickhouse - Smith 50 n.7. I cannot agree. Most probably Plato knew Gorgias' epideictic speech, but I do not think that *any* of the similarities which Coulter (partly in the wake of others) finds between that work and the Platonic *Apology* is significant. In the sentence just quoted, Palamedes argues that if he had been a traitor to the Greeks, his life would have been ruined: he could neither take refuge among the Greeks nor among the barbarians for he would be trusted nowhere 'and life is intolerable when one is deprived of (other men's) confidence'. The sentence in the *Apology* means something quite different: it is a concise formulation of the Socratic ἐπιτήδευμα as set out in the whole of the *Apology*. The passage from the

Palamedes is one of the numerous arguments attesting to the defendant's innocence; it has nothing to do with Palamedes' conception of life (if he has such a conception). What makes life intolerable in Plato is the neglect of something which one should personally take care of and which can be achieved by one's own exertions; for Gorgias life is intolerable when it lacks something that only others can ensure. The meaning, the purpose and the context of the two passages are totally different. The expression (ὁ) βίος οὐ βιωτός or (ὁ) βίος ἀβίωτος (or, in the neutre, οὐ βιωτόν ἐστιν, ἀβίωτόν ἐστιν) is by no means unusual, and therefore is not sufficient to establish a link between the two passages. In the *Palamedes* it occurs already in § 20. Next, we find it in Sophocles *Oed. Col.* 1692; in Aristophanes *Plut.* 197; in Demosthenes, xxi 120; Ps.-Dem. lx 28; in Antiphanes, a poet of the Middle Comedy, fr. 190,10 Kock, 188,10 K.-A.; in Philemon, the contemporary and rival of Menander, fr. 90,7-8 and 93,7 Kock, 94,7-8 and 96,7 K.-A. The expression occurs by far the most often in Plato: besides the passage of the *Apology* it is also found *Menex.* 246d6; *Symp.* 216a1; *Rep.* iii 407a5. b1; iv 445a7. b1; *Polit.* 299e8 (quoted Chapter X n.16); *Laws* xi 926b6; *Epist.* vii 340c4; to these we may add the thrice repeated rhetorical question ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν, which is answered by οὐδαμῶς, in *Crit.* 47d9. e3. 6. Cf. *Gorg.* 512a7 (βιωτέον ἐστίν) with Dodds' note. There is no reason to suppose that Plato, when writing the famous sentence in the *Apology*, thought of the passage of Gorgias' *Palamedes*. I have discussed this case in detail because it is the most significant argument in Coulter's paper; all the other 'similarities' are still more superficial and therefore will not be discussed in this commentary.

ἀνεξέταστος: The traditional translation ('unexamined life') implies that the word should be taken only in its passive sense. It means rather 'a life without examination', in which there is place neither for examining nor for being examined. Adjectives formed with an ἀ- privative, the stem of a verb and the suffix -τος have in themselves both active as well as passive force, as appears from ἄπρακτος, ἄφθεγκτος, ἀναγώνιστος, ἄγνωστος, etc. Cf. A. Debrunner *Griechische Wortbildungslehre* (Heidelberg 1917 and repr.) §§ 62. 105. 193; P. Chantraine *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Paris 1933; repr. 1968) 306-307. — Similarly R. Renehan *Greek lexicographical notes*, second series (Göttingen 1982) 27-28 S.R.S.

a6 **ταῦτα δέ**, a typical case of 'apodotic' δέ after a conditional protasis; cf. Denn. 181-182.

a7 **τὰ δὲ ἔχει ... οὕτως ὡς ἐγώ φημι**, 'but in fact things are exactly as I claim them to be'. Burnet puts a comma ofter οὕτως and takes ὡς ἐγώ φημι as a more or less independent comparative clause, with the same meaning as in 36c4, but this reading makes the sentence weaker.

a8 **καὶ ... ἅμα**: on the logical link between this and the preceding sentence, see Chapter X n.23.

b1-2 **ἐτιμησάμην ἄν ...· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην**, 'I would have proposed ...; for I would by that have suffered no loss'. The use of the aorist shows that Socrates uses an *irrealis* referring to the past (cf. Goodwin § 410). He thinks of the moment in the past when he rejected the idea of proposing to pay a fine (37c2-4).

b2 **νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν**: on this elliptical expression (νῦν δέ without a verb and followed by γάρ) see Riddell *Digest* § 149; Denn. 70,3 (especially the end of the paragraph). Another instance where γάρ is not anticipatory in νῦν δέ ... γάρ is *Symp.* 180c6-7 εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε· νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἷς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἑνὸς κτέ.

b8 **αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι**, scil. φασίν, which is implied in κελεύουσιν; cf. K.-G. ii 544, Anm. 1. — Of course, it will not have sufficed that Socrates said so; the four friends themselves must have publicly agreed to guarantee the stipulated amount.

10. *38c1-42a5 Third Speech*

38c2 **τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν**: from the beginning of the fourth century B.C. to the battle of Chaeronea (338) a literary debate was going on about the relative merits of Athens and Sparta for the whole of Greece. Probably the earliest and in any case the most instructive document in this polemic, for the very reason that its view-point is non-partisan, is the work of Thucydides. In the speeches of Isocrates we perceive many echoes of the controversy, so i.a. in iv (as a whole). vi 16-31. 42-43. 81-84. vii 3-12. viii 75-89. 95-103. xii 40-107 (especially 62-69). 200-261. What had happened with Socrates would of course be exploited by the adversaries of Athens; they would point out that Athens' celebrated liberty and tolerance were empty ideals. Plato seems to refer here to such polemics.

c3 **ἄνδρα σοφόν**: an allusion to 20d6-9. 21d6-7. 22c6-8. 23a2-5. 27a1-4. Perhaps Plato is thinking of Heraclitus 22B121 D.-K. ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἑωυτῶν ὀνήϊστον ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ὀνήϊστος ἔστω· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλῃ τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων.

c5 **εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε κτέ.**: with Croiset and des Places *Particules* 48 I prefer οὖν, the reading of BW, to T's γοῦν, printed by Burnet. The particle οὖν here, as often, picks up the main idea (that of c1-2) after the train of thought had wandered away (cf. note on 40e2). It is not easy to see what force γοῦν might have here; certainly not the most common one, that of a 'part proof' (Denn. 451 ii).

c6 **ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δή**: in my opinion, although Denn. 243-244 does not mention this possibility, δή should not be taken with γάρ, but with ὁρᾶτε; see 31b7 and note *in loc.*

c6-7 **πόρρω ... τοῦ βίου**: partitive genitive; cf. K.-G. i 340-341.

d4 **ἑαλωκέναι**: ἁλίσκομαι functions as the passive of αἱρέω (28a6-7 with the note) and like that verb is used as a legal term; cf. LSJ *s.v.* ἁλίσκομαι II 2.

d5 **ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν**: the infinitive with ὥστε often does not differ from a final clause; see Goodwin § 588,3; K.-G. ii 504; cf. below 39a5 ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον.

d8 **ὑμῖν μέν**: the corresponding δέ clause, if expressed, would have been something like ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ᾤμην δεῖν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς. But Socrates becomes incensed at the very idea that some judges, devoid as they are of

all sense of honour, would be pleased to see him abase himself before their eyes. The sentence grows and swells and the δέ clause is given a new and independent construction.

e1 **οἷα δὴ καί**: for the 'inversion' of καί see the note on 37a8.

e5-6 **οὔτε ... ἐν δίκηι οὔτ' ἐν πολέμωι**: cf. *Crit.* 51b8-9 καὶ ἐν πολέμωι καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίωι.

39a2-3 **τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι ... ὅπλα ἀφείς**, as, with a half-innocent, half-cynical irony, Archilochus boasts to have done (fr.5 West):

> Ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνωι
>   ἐντὸς ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων.
> αὐτὸν δ' ἐξεσάωσα· τί μοι μέλει; Ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη
>   ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσομαι οὐ κακίω.

In Plato's criminal code, there is a law regarding this offence (*Laws* xii 944e5-945a2): Ἀνὴρ ὃς ἂν ὄφληι δίκην ὡς αἰσχρῶς ἀποβαλὼν ὅπλα πολεμικά, τούτωι μήτ' οὖν τις στρατηγὸς μήτ' ἄλλος ποτὲ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρχόντων ὡς ἀνδρὶ στρατιώτηι χρήσηται μηδ' εἰς τάξιν κατατάξηι μηδ' ἡντινοῦν. Whoever has thrown away his shield (ῥίψασπις) or other weapons is presumed to have abandoned his post in combat and is liable, in Athens, to a λιποταξίου γραφή.

a6 **τολμᾶι**, 'is so shameless as to ...', a common use of the verb; cf. 38d7 τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦι χαλεπὸν κτέ.: a similar idea is found in *Gorg.* 522e1-3 αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήισκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται; cf. *Rep.* vi 486b1 οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος (scil. ὁ φιλόσοφος, to whom is opposed b3 the δειλὴ καὶ ἀνελεύθερος φύσις); Aesch. ii 181 οὐ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος δεινός, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ὕβρις δεινή (the disgrace of having been found guilty of a capital offence).

b1 **θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ**: the striking alliteration suggests that this is an old proverb, although it is known to us neither from ancient authors nor from the *paroemiographi*. Besides, nothing in the context by itself suggests the idea of a race. Therefore, Socrates must be using a maxim with which the audience was familiar. There seems to be a contamination of two images: (1) one runner is being chased by two enemies, a faster and a slower one — this looks like the image reflected in the proverb; (2) a faster and a slower runner are being chased by one enemy. Socrates starts with (1), in which death is the slower, κακία the faster enemy. After the words θᾶττον ... θανάτου θεῖ, the imagery changes: the slower runner is being chased by

the slower enemy, the faster by the faster: both are overtaken. A variation of the proverb may occur in the *Iliad*, I 502-507:

> καὶ γάρ τε Λιταί εἰσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο
> χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθάλμω·
> αἵ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' Ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιοῦσαι.
> Ἡ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρή τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὕνεκα πάσας
> πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν
> βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἱ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω.

Somewhat related is Agathon's description of Old Age (τὸ γῆρας) as the quick chaser, who at the end catches everyone; Eros is the only one who cannot be overtaken by Old Age (*Symp*. 195a8-b3).

b3 **ὀξεῖς**: in the sense of 'swift', ὀξύς does not seem to occur elsewhere in Attic. When it is opposed to βαρύς, it is with the psychological sense of 'quick', 'keen', opposed to ἄτολμος, ἡσύχιος, ῥάιθυμος (e.g. *Gorg*. 463e2; *Rep*. vii 526b6-7; Thuc. viii 96,5), or with the musical sense ('high' as opposed to 'low'). In our passage, the word seems have been chosen because it combines the swiftness of the racer with, what is its primary point, the *adroitness* of the accusers. Plato habitually contrasts this 'worldly wisdom' with the awkwardness and naïveté of the philosopher who ignores and despises all such 'mundane' skills (see Chapter II n.33).

b4 **καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν κτἑ.**: it is certainly strange that this sentence opens with exactly the same four words as the preceding one (b1). It may be that Plato did not originally mean to present two formulations of the same fundamental idea and that it was his intention to choose one of them, but by an oversight both were retained when the *Apology* was published.

b5 **ὀφλὼν ... ὠφληκότες**: the two tenses are contrasted with one another; for the meaning of this, see Chapter XI 211 and n.22.

οὗτοι here and b6 are not the jurors (referred to by b4 ὑφ' ὑμῶν), but the accusers.

b6 **ἐγὼ ... τῶι τιμήματι ἐμμένω**: just as he recalled, a few moments ago (38d6-e5), his refusal to implore the judges, Socrates now reminds his audience of his τίμησις: he does not regret it. His accusers, on the other hand, are unable to reconsider their attitude (Ps.-Dem. liii 18 — cf. Chapter X n.25 — shows that accusers could modify their τίμησις); this is expressed by the perfect participle ὠφληκότες. Therefore, I cannot agree with Renehan *Criticism* 12-13 that we should correct ἐμμένω to ἐμμενῶ.

b7 **οὕτως ... σχεῖν**, 'things had *to turn out* this way'; the aorist σχεῖν is 'ingressive'; cf. K.-G. i 155-156.

καὶ ἔδει, '*had* to be so'; the emphatic καί belongs to ἔδει; cf. Denn. 320,6 and 321,7 and the note on 34d3.

b8 **μετρίως ἔχειν**: since death is not an evil for a just man; cf. what Socrates tells the 'good jurors', especially 41c9-d7.

c3 **φημὶ γάρ**: the position of these words at the opening of the sentence lends an emphatic and even categorical tone to Socrates' assertion.

c7 **τὸ δέ**: see the note on 37a4.

πολὺ ἐναντίον: ἐναντίος is sometimes treated as a comparative and therefore can be followed by ἤ (ἐναντίος ἤ as μείζων ἤ, e.g. *Rep.* iv 425a4. vi 497e6; *Theaet.* 175d6; Lys. xii 54); likewise, it can be accompanied by πολύ (as in πολὺ μείζων).

d1 **ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾐσθάνεσθε**: scil. κατέχοντός μου αὐτούς.

d7 **ἑαυτόν**: prolepsis of the subject of the object clause introduced by ὅπως; cf. 34c1 (ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ) with the note.

d8-e1 **ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ...· τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις κτἑ.**: this transition might be compared with the way Lysias (xii 95) passes from his somewhat minatory recommendations to the judges of the party 'of the city' (οἱ ἐξ ἄστεως), to his much warmer advice to those who belonged to the party 'of the Piraeus' (οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς): Καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς μὲν (scil. τοὺς ἐξ ἄστεως) ἔτι πολλῶν ὄντων εἰπεῖν τοσαῦτα λέγω. Ὅσοι δ' ἐκ Πειραιῶς ἐστε, πρῶτον μὲν κτἑ.

e1 **τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος**: for the 'pseudo-predicative' position of τουτουί, see the note on 18c2.

e4 **τοσοῦτον χρόνον**, 'just this short while'; τοσοῦτος and τοσόσδε can mark a small quantity (time, etc.) as well as a big one; cf. LSJ *s.v.* τοσοῦτος; likewise below, 41e1.

40a2 **ἐμοὶ γάρ**: γάρ introduces what has been announced (Denn. 59,2); the same use in 40a4 and b7.

ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: apart from Burnet's note on 17a1, cf. Chapter II 35.

a4 **ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική**: as we saw above (33c4-7), Socrates thinks that divine messages can be given to humans through a variety of channels, which as a group constitute 'divination', μαντική, e.g. oracles and dreams. Here, we hear for the first time that Socrates' 'divine sign' is included in this group. Xenophon also (*Mem.* i 1,2-4) includes the divine voice in

μαντική, but he does so in a very apologetic way, in order to show that the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον, which had aroused Meletus' suspicion (Chapter VI 95-98), was a quite normal phenomenon that fitted into the traditional categories of Greek religious thought. Plato has no apologetic intention: the trial is over, and Socrates speaks to the jurors who voted for acquittal. Therefore, this passage is better testimony than the one from Xenophon as to the context in which the 'divine sign' must be understood.

ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου: as Burnet says, these words may be an interpolation 'dating from the time when the δαιμόνιον was regarded as a sort of familiar spirit'. Still, the use of τὸ θεῖον and τὸ δαιμόνιον to indicate 'divinity', 'heavens', is very common in classical Greek (cf. Chapter VIII n.6). The meaning would then be 'that kind of message from divinity that normally comes to me'. But, as Burnet points out, the expressions τὸ θεῖον and τὸ δαιμόνιον are infrequent in the oblique cases.

a5 **πάνυ πυκνὴ ... πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς**: the repetition of πάνυ (uncommon in Plato) may underscore the colloquial style (cf. 39e1 ἂν διαλεχθείην. e5 διαμυθολογῆσαι), as may also the double -ί in a7. But perhaps there is more to it than that: Plato may have wished to stress the double opposition (frequent: absent, trivial: all-important) on which his argument rests. For the word order in πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς, cf. *Euthyd.* 305c9 πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς; 305e1 πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου; H. Thesleff *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek* (Helsingfors 1954) 70.

ἦν ... ἐναντιουμένη: when of two coordinated predicates the first contains a copula plus noun, the second not infrequently has periphrasis by means of the participle, e.g. *Phaedo* 82a10-11 εὐδαιμονέστατοι ... εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες (instead of ἴασιν). In such instances, the author prefers not to abandon the nominal construction. Examples are collected by W.J. Alexander *AJPh* 6 (1885) 295. 298. 301. 303.

a6 **εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν**: cf. b3 μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν: apparently πράξειν is here to be understood in its broadest possible sense (including speaking, cf. ad b5). The behaviour of the δαιμόνιον elsewhere shows that by μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν Socrates does not mean morally incorrect action but doing something that will turn out to be disadvantageous (Chapter VIII 153-154; cf. Gundert 'Platon und das Daimonion des Sokrates' 57-58). In itself, ὀρθῶς πράττειν means 'to do the right thing', according to either ethical standards (e.g. *Men.* 97c1; *Gorg.* 488a2) or the rules of a τέχνη (e.g. *Charm.* 171b9. e4; *Euthyd.* 280a8. 291c10. 301d2); it sometimes carries the association of accomplishment and success (*Euthyd.* 280a7-8 ἀνάγκη (scil. τὴν σοφίαν) ὀρθῶς πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν, cf. a6 εὐτυχεῖν; *Prot.* 332a6-7 ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ... b1-2 οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς

πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν). Rightly Burnet: "'if I were going to do something amiss', i.e. something unlucky".

a7 **ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται**: καὶ connects, as so often, two clauses, the second of which is the logical consequence of the first: "what might reasonably be thought and what is in fact considered". Cf. S. Trenkner *Le style kai dans le récit attique oral* (Assen 1960), 36f. Although Socrates rejects the idea that death is an evil, he understands and is even able to identify (note on 40c1) with those who think so. — οἴομαι is used of an opinion formed in a specific situation, νομίζω refers to a conviction; cf. *Rep.* ix 584d3-7 νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῆι φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω τὸ δὲ μέσον; — ἔγωγε. — οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἄνω φέρεσθαι; cf. 581d10-e1.

b1-6 **ἠναντιώθη ... ἠναντίωται**: the aorist refers to a single event that did (not) take place on a specific occasion; the perfect is used because the event has not taken place at all during a period of time extending to the present moment. T's ἠναντιώθη at b6 is an attempt at regularisation or an error due to perseveration.

b2 **ἀνέβαινον**: 'I appeared (before the court)', cf. Burnet on 17d2; *Euthyd.* 305c2; Andoc. i 23. Cicero's *illud suggestum in quo causam dixerat ascendenti* (*Div.* i 54,124) translates the etymology rather than the meaning.

b4 **πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ**: this statement is not borne out by other passages from Plato: the δαιμόνιον prevents actions not words (cf. *Phaedr.* 242b8-c3, where it does not let Socrates cross the river until he has made an expiatory speech: in theory, it could have hindered Socrates' saying what he said about Eros). But it is not easy to imagine how, at any rate in a 'dramatic' dialogue, Plato could have portrayed Socrates being stopped by his δαιμόνιον in the middle of a speech.

b4-6 **νῦν δὲ ... ἠναντίωταί μοι**: this sentence restates, after an intervening adversative sentence (b3-4), what has already been said in b1-3 ('ABA structure'). Cf. Dodds ad *Gorg.* 452e6 (and Index s.v. *aba* structure).

b5 **πρᾶξιν**: this word covers the following ἔργον and λόγος.

b6 **τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;**: it is quite wrong to say that Socrates 'mit Hilfe des Logos, auf die rational fassbaren Ursachen der Stimme reflektiert' (Th. Meyer 74; cf. 158). Socrates does not speculate about what motivated the anonymous divine power which sends the σημεῖον, but tries to understand the meaning of its absence during the trial. Like αἰτία, αἴτιον is not exactly a 'cause' that produces an effect distinct from itself, but more

generally an explanation. Cf. *Rep.* 508e3-4: the Idea of the Good is αἰτία ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἀληθείας; E. de Strycker *AC* 39 (1970) 454-455.

b6-8 **ὑπολαμβάνω ... ὑπολαμβάνομεν**: the same word is used to refer to two different hypotheses within two lines. I think that no special effect is intended; maybe Plato used the verb in the second passage as a synonym for οἰόμεθα, which is used in the following relative clause (cf. note on 28e4).

b7 **κινδυνεύει**: Socrates' ignorance is the fundamental trait of his character, hence this modification of a plain statement. Contrast b8 οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως: death is probably good and certainly not evil. See on 40c3.

b8-c1 **ἡμεῖς ... ὅσοι οἰόμεθα**: the expression seems to be framed carefully so as to admit two different interpretations: 'we all, who think that death is an evil' (including Socrates) and 'those of us who think ...' (not necessarily including Socrates). At 29b7-9 Socrates has said that death may very possibly be a good rather than a bad thing: at 30d2-4 he has denied that it is a great evil. It is clear, therefore, that Socrates is not included in the group. But the ambiguity is desirable here inasmuch as it allows Socrates to appear to identify with the 'good jurors'.

c1 **τεκμήριον**: not 'proof', which would contradict κινδυνεύει, but 'indication', cf. Vlastos *Socrates* 283 n.147. See note on 32a4.

c2 **τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον**: cf. *Euthyd.* 272e3-4 τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον; *Phaedr.* 242b8-c1 τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι (cf. De Vries *in loc.*).

c3 **τι ... ἀγαθὸν πράξειν**: not simply equivalent to εὖ πράξειν (*pace* Burnet) but 'to incur something good', picked up by ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι in the next sentence. Cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 215; *Plut.* 341. Without the article, ἀγαθόν is rarely found as object of πράττειν in the Platonic corpus and ἀγαθά never; here and *Alc. II* 141d2-4 τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ... ὡς ἀγαθόν τι πράξαντες, ἀγαθὸν πράττειν means 'to incur something good', *Symp.* 181b6-8 'to do something good', which is normally τἀγαθὰ πράττειν (*Charm.* 163e4; *Prot.* 355b2; *Gorg.* 468a5-6. 500a3; τὸ ἀγαθὸν πράττειν *Gorg.* 506c8.) Compare εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν (a6); my examination of that clause showed that it amounts to roughly the same thing as εὐτυχεῖν. With τι ... ἀγαθόν Socrates means death. Now he says openly what may have been implied in 35d7-8, that death is a good thing, at any rate for him.

c4 **ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς**: 'Let us consider the thesis that ... also in this way'. Cf. *Laws* v 742c6-d1 ταῦτα δ' <u>ὅτι</u> βέλτιστ' ἐστὶν πόλει ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπιτηδεύειν, <u>ὧδε</u> ἄν τις <u>σκοπῶν</u> ὀρθῶς ἂν αὐτὰ διακρίνοι. Cf. in a

similar situation (the transition from μῦθος to λόγος) *Prot.* 324d7 ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον.

c5 **τὸ τεθνάναι**: when the subject of a clause is entirely predictable, it is normally put at the end of it; at times one may ask if we do not rather have to do with an apposition to the unexpressed subject, added as an afterthought. Here, τὸ τεθνάναι was mentioned c1 and referred to by αὐτό in the previous sentence. The same goes for τὸν τεθνεῶτα in the next sentence and ὁ θάνατος in d2. Cf. 20d1-2 ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων (ὁ λέγων inferable from 20c4 ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν); 21a3 καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν (Chaerephon is the subject of all three predicates of the preceding sentence), perhaps an apposition: 'you know what sort of man he was, Chaerephon'; 27d4-5 εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι ... εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες (cf. 27c10-d1 τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας;); 36a2-3 τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, if it is not an interpolation (cf. *in loc.*); 38c3-4 φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι ... οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν (cf. c2 ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν), almost certainly an apposition.

c5-7 **ἢ γάρ ... τὸν τεθνεῶτα**: the subject is τὸ τεθνάναι from the preceding sentence, cf. e2 εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν. Statements about being dead tend to concentrate on what death is for the dead person, in other words for the subject of τὸ τεθνάναι, and the second infinitive has this subject expressed for the sake of clarity. Literally: '[to be dead is,] as it were, to be nothing and [it is] for the dead man to have no awareness of anything'.

c6 **οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ ... ἔχειν**: the most plausible explanation of οἷον is that it means 'like' (or perhaps better: 'as it were'), as d1. e4 below. If so, οἷον does not extend its influence to the second infinitive clause: 'to be nothing' is an approximation of 'to be dead', but 'to have no awareness' a precise description. Indeed, I can think of no interpretation of οἷον which does make it govern the second infinitive: the well-known construction οἷος plus infinitive 'of such a nature as to' (hence often, but by no means always, 'fit to'; so, misleadingly, LSJ *s.v.* οἷος III 1 a — better K.-G. ii 509-511) does not help here, because the subject of the infinitive has to be identical to the subject of the governing clause in this construction, e.g. Xen. *Hell.* ii 3,45 ἐγὼ εἰμι οἷος ἀεί ποτε μεταβάλλεσθαι ('*I* am of such a nature that *I* am always changing'). But τὸ τεθνάναι is not the subject of μηδέ ... ἔχειν: τὸν τεθνεῶτα is. In both uses of the infinitive, μή is the regular negative.

c7 **τὰ λεγόμενα**: Burnet (note on 40c7; *Comm. Phaed.* 1 n.1) thinks that the λεγόμενα of 40c7. e6. 41c7 refer to 'Orphic' doctrine: 'in the language of the mysteries τὰ λεγόμενα are contrasted with τὰ δρώμενα' (so also K. Alt 'Diesseits und Jenseits' 285 and n.40). The only evidence I have found is

Galen *De usu part.* vii 14, i 418,20-22 Helmreich εἴ ποτε μυούμενος Ἐλευσίνια καὶ Σαμοθράικια καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ τελετὴν ἁγίαν ὅλος ἦσθα πρὸς τοῖς δρωμένοις τε καὶ λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἱεροφαντῶν. This passage certainly does not suggest that τὰ λεγόμενα was a technical term of the mystery cults (and even if it did, it is not evidence for Plato's day and age). In Plato, τὰ λεγόμενα means (apart from 'that which is said in a certain situation') 'popular opinion': cf. *Parm.* 127e9-10 διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά ('to establish by force, against what all people think, that plurality does not exist'); *Rep.* ii 365b4-5. vi 495c7 — see also *Laws* vi 782d2 σφόδρα λεγόμενα 'widely held opinions'. See note on 27d9.

c7-8 **μεταβολή τις ... καὶ μετοίκησις**: 'a sort of change, namely a migration'. μεταβολή can refer to any kind of change, in substance or in circumstances, occasionally even in location (cf. LSJ *s.v.* II 4); the sense is clarified by μετοίκησις, added to it by means of 'explanatory' καί.

c8 **μετοίκησις**: cf. *Phaed.* 117c2 τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε. There is no reason to think that μετοίκησις was a technical term for 'migration of the soul' (Burnet): it is used for 'metempsychosis' (which is not meant here), and only in late writers (Aelian. *Nat. Hist.* xii 7, quoting Empedocles 31B127 D.-K., but the noun is not part of the quotation; Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 85, p.50,2 Deubner). μετοικέω normally means 'to live as a resident alien', rarely (mostly poetic) 'to migrate'; it is found as a metaphor for death Eur. *Hipp.* 836-837 τὸ κατὰ γᾶς θέλω, τὸ κατὰ γᾶς κνέφας μετοικεῖν σκότωι θανὼν ὁ τλάμων (cf. Barrett's note).

τοῦ τόπου: this can hardly be a genitive of separation with μετοίκησις (the separative genitive is found adnominally mainly with nouns meaning 'separation, liberation, protection', cf. Schwyzer - Debrunner 95-96). The likeliest explanation is that the expression is a contamination of the objective genitive dependent on μεταβολή (μεταβάλλειν τὸν τόπον, cf. μεταβολήν ... βίου *Laws* vi 775c1) with μετοίκησις ἐνθένδε (cf. *Phaed.* as quoted in the previous note). To avoid the juxtaposition of subjective and objective genitives, the dative is used instead of the former, cf. *Laws* vii 820e8-9 ἄστρων ... τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις.

τοῦ ἐνθένδε: with the well-known assimilation from the predicate instead of τοῦ ἐνθάδε, cf. 32b3 with Burnet's note; K.-G. i 546-547.

c9 **καὶ εἴτε**: there is no second εἴτε because after the long explanatory sentence d2 ἐγὼ γὰρ — e1-2 ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας the first alternative has to be restated (e2 εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν); the second follows in the form εἰ δ' αὖ at e4. Cf. 33d1-4; Denn. 506-507, ii.

εἴτε [δή]: this collocation is very rare in Plato. Twice it is used, like εἴτ' οὖν, when there is little to choose between the two alternatives: *Epist.* viii 353b4-8 καὶ εἴτε δὴ θείαν τις ἡγεῖσθαι βούλεται τύχην καὶ θεὸν εἴτε τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀρετὴν εἴτε καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον μετὰ τῶν τότε πολιτῶν τῆς σωτηρίας αἰτίαν συμβῆναι γενομένην, ἔστω ταύτηι ὅπηι τις ὑπολαμβάνει· σωτηρία δ' οὖν ('in any case') οὕτως συνέβη τοῖς τότε γενομένοις; *Tim.* 21b7. This is how the collocation is used in the rare instances in Attic prose outside Plato (Dem. xxiii 156; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iii 5, 1114b16; x 7 1177a13; *Insomn.* 458b29) and in Herodotus, the only author to use it with any frequency at all. Once, δή is put with the most relevant alternative: *Rep.* vi 493c10-d3 ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν συνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῆι εἴτ' ἐν μουσικῆι εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῆι. Although the use in our passage is related to the former, neither fits very well, and I am tempted to think we have to follow BW and regard δή as an interpolation of T. δή is likewise interpolated in 39b4 καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι (νῦν BW, νῦν δὴ T).

μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος: unless one is prepared to accept a rather harsh zeugma, ἐστιν is the substantive verb, not the copula (with 'to be dead' as implied subject — this would fit οἷον ὕπνος but not μηδεμία αἴσθησις): 'if there is no awareness but ...' The following ἐπειδάν clause is a restrictive qualifier, 'the kind of sleep when ...'

d1 **μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾶι**: 'does not even *dream* at all' (much less suffer more serious disturbances), not '... have one single dream', which would have been μηδὲ ἓν ὄναρ.

d2 **κέρδος**: this word is typically used with reference to the 'lower' values. Cf. *Rep.* 345a3. a7 injustice is κερδαλεώτερον than justice; 366a2 τὰ ... ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη; *Laws* ii 662c1-2 λυσιτελοῦντα μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ καὶ κερδαλέα, δικαιότερα δὲ ἄλλα; ix 862c6. If death is one of the lesser goods, it will not be a gain for the soul. Socrates employs an *ad hominem* argument based on the popular conception of the good (d6 ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον). See Chapter XI 230-231.

d2-7 **ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι ... οἶμαι ἄν**: because of the length of the εἰ clause, the main clause predicate has to be repeated; within the εἰ clause, there are two participles and a relative clause; this expansion necessitates the repetition of the predicate δέοι as well (d3. d5). The double anacoluthon results partly from Socrates' repetitive style: d3 ταύτην τὴν νύκτα; d4 τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας; d5 ταύτηι τῆι νυκτί; d6-7 ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας; d7 ταύτης τῆς νυκτός; and also d5 τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ; d7 ἐν τῶι ἑαυτοῦ βίωι.

d3 **ταύτην τὴν νύκτα**: Socrates assumes throughout that there is only one such night in any one person's life (d5 ταύτηι τῆι νυκτί; d7 ταύτης τῆς νυκτός).

This assumption is of course prompted by the comparison of eternity without awareness with one single dreamless night (e3-4).

d3 **οὕτω κατέδαρθεν**: 'he fell asleep and slept in such a way'; cf. *Symp*. 223c1 καταδαρθεῖν πάνυ πολύ.

d6 **ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον**: The juxtaposition of these two words suggests, as very often in Plato, a flaw in the argument. Socrates cannot show that on this hypothesis death is an ἀγαθόν. The identity of the two concepts is used in an argument which is equally *ad hominem* in *Prot*. 351b6-c1 τί δ' εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν; οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; — ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. — τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν. The identity of ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν (495a3) is defended by Callicles in the *Gorgias*, but he is refuted. Socrates' own evaluation appears in a passage from the *Crito*: 48b8-9 τὸ δὲ εὖ (sc. ζῆν) καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

d8 **μὴ ὅτι**: like English *never mind* when used as a sentence adverb, this phrase corresponds to 'not only' or 'not only not' in the first member of a climax, or to 'let alone' in the second (the reading οὐχὶ for μὴ ὅτι in Euseb. *Praep. Evang*. xiii 10,10, ii 188 Mras - des Places, is clearly a trivialisation). μὴ ὅτι relatively often leads to an anacoluthon, cf. *Phdr*. 240d7-e2 ἃ καὶ λόγωι ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἔργωι ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι; *Symp*. 207e4-208a3; *Epist*. vii 329 e2-6. Here, it introduces a specification of the original subject τινα (d2), causing it to be restated as αὐτόν in e1. With Burnet, I believe it is wrong to take αὐτόν as 'himself', connected with τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα: this reading yields a highly rhetorical hyperbaton, which would be completely out of tune with both the tone and the style of this passage.

τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα: the proverbial epitome of εὐδαιμονία, as *Gorg*. 470e4-5 δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα (cf. Dodds' note *in loc*.); *Euthyd*. 274a6-7. Comparison with the sequel of the passage from the *Gorgias* (e6-9) shows that Socrates is here once again arguing from the popular conception of values: ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. — ΠΩ. τί δέ; ἐν τούτωι ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; — ΣΩ. Ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε. A passage from the *Sophist* supports and clarifies the one from the *Gorgias*: 230d8-e3 καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνηι <u>βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας</u> ὤν, <u>τὰ μέγιστα</u> ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, <u>ἀπαίδευτόν</u> τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε <u>τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα</u> εἶναι. It is significant that in our passage the word εὐδαιμονία is used only in connection with the second alternative (41c4; cf. c5), not with the first.

e1 **ταύτας** refers to the days and nights during which a person has had it better than in the (on Socrates' assumption: single) dreamless night. Socrates does not say that the single dreamless night is the most pleasant period in any man's existence, but that any man will have very few days and nights which are more pleasant than the dreamless night.

e2 **οὖν**: marks the reiteration of the first alternative after the digression d2-e2; this use is related to the resumptive, discussed in the note on 19d4, although d2-e2 is not a parenthesis (Burnet's dashes should have been colons). Compare 36b5 τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν κτἑ. ... d1 τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν; cf. note on 34c7; des Places *Particules* 47-52. This use of οὖν is a sub-class of connective οὖν, marking that the speaker is coming to or returning to the point (cf. note on 38c5). A good example is 20e6-8 'Apollo will be a witness for my σοφία'; there follows the story of Chaerephon and the oracle; 21a6 ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι; 28d10 (after the general statement that one must not abandon one's post) ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴη εἰργασμένος κτἑ. This use is to be distinguished from the purely transitional (introducing an entirely new point) and the purely inferential (introducing a new step in a logical process). From the *Apology*, other instances of οὖν 'coming to the point' are 17d4. 18d7. 20a6. 21e6. 23c8. d9. 29b7. 31a2. 35a2. c7. 36e2. 38b5.

e3 **ὁ πᾶς χρόνος**: eternity, cf. *Phaed.* 107c2-4 ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ὧι καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; *Men.* 86a9; *Laws* iv 721c3; ὁ ἅπας χρόνος *Rep.* ii 363c6; viii 546a3; *Tim.* 38c2; ὁ σύμπας χρόνος *Tim.* 36e5; *Laws* ii 661c2. By contrast, πᾶς ὁ χρόνος refers to an entire stretch of time as defined by the context, e.g. above 40a4-5 ἐν μὲν τῶι πρόσθεν χρόνωι παντί. Only in the *Laws* is ὁ πᾶς χρόνος used interchangeably with πᾶς ὁ χρόνος, e.g. iii 677c8.

οὕτω δή: 'on this assumption'. Nowhere else in Plato is this phrase found in the middle of a clause or sentence: it is separated from the beginning by one word at most (normally καί). δή indicates, if not irony, at any rate a certain reservation; see the note on 31c4 ὅτι δή.

e4 **μία νύξ**: to wit, a dreamless night.

ἀποδημῆσαι: this verb is used of leaving one's country, normally temporarily (cf. *Crito* 52b4-7 οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες ... οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω). But, since μετοικέω normally denotes the status of alien and seems to have poetic overtones when it refers to travel abroad (cf. note on c8), ἀποδημέω suits Socrates' style better when the emphasis is on the journey, cf. 41a5.

e6 **ἄρα**: the 'referential' use (cf. Denn. 38,2), underscoring the fact that the speaker is reporting views not necessarily his own. Cf. 26c2. 37d3; my *Comm. Clit.* 335.

τί μεῖζον ἀγαθόν: death would truly be a good thing for everyone, in the full sense of the word 'good', that is to say, according to Socrates' scale of values (contrast d6 ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον), because (cf. e7 γάρ) meeting truly just and wise men would enable everyone to take better care of their souls. The judges are mentioned first because of what has happened to Socrates (cf. ἀπαλλαγεὶς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι), but the words ἐπὶ πόσωι ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν (41a7) indicate that the statement is intended as a general truth. Only from 41a8 ἐπεί onwards does Socrates begin to work out what this alternative means for him.

41a1 **ἀπαλλαγείς**: the participle is coincident with ἀφικόμενος: arriving in Hades (i.e. dying) entails automatically having got rid of everyone on earth.

a2 **εὑρήσει**: the basic value of the future indicative in conditional clauses is modal neutrality: it allows the speaker to refrain from indicating the degree of probability of the condition being fulfilled, as opposed to the subjunctive (realisation probable), optative (realisation possible) and past indicative (realisation impossible). This explains why the future indicative is hardly ever used in temporal clauses (Stahl lists only four occurrences from Homer to Plato, 450,2): a temporal clause presupposes the reality of its content, hence a reservation as to its probability would be contradictory. The various 'minatory' and 'monitory' values recorded in some grammatical handbooks (cf. note on 29c4-5, but also on 29c8) are the result of interpretation of this value of the future indicative in combination with various other data in the specific contexts. In this case, ἐὰν ... εὕρηι would indicate confidence in the realisation of the second alternative, a confidence that is out of character for Socrates; εἰ ... εὕροι would mark it as possible, which in this context would perhaps come down to 'just possible' and thereby indicate doubt, which would equally be unsuitable. — Note that all relevant main clause predicates in this description are in the potential optative (a5 ἂν εἴη; a7 δέξαιτ' ἄν; b1 ἂν εἴη; b5 ἄν ... εἴη; b7-8 ἄν ... δέξαιτο) until the ironical remark in c4-7, in which present indicatives are used (c5 ἀποκτείνουσι; ibid. εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν; c6 ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν).

οἵπερ καί: 'who, besides'. They had proved to be true judges during their earthly lives and are also said to be judges in the underworld. Plato circumvents the question whether there is a judgment of the dead, cf. Chapter XI 227.

a3-4 **Μίνως ... ἄλλοι**: if a relative clause is followed by an apposition to its antecedent, the apposition is in the case of the relative pronoun (οἵπερ), not

of the antecedent (τοὺς δικαστάς). Cf. *Hipp. Mai.* 281c4-5 οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίαι, Πιττακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος κτέ.; K.-G. ii 419-420, who wrongly claim that in such cases the apposition is part of the relative clause — this is possible only in tragedy; R.J.A. Lagas *Syntactische Perseveratie- en Anticipatie-Verschijnselen bij oudere Griekse dichters* (Amsterdam 1941), 127-141. — On the roles of the four judges mentioned in Greek myth, see Chapter XI 227-228.

a4 **τῶν ἡμιθέων**: cf. note on 28c1. Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus are technically demigods; for the various parents of Triptolemos cf. F. Schwenn *RE s.v.* 229-230. The 'other demigods who proved just in their lives' may include Achilles, who considered death unimportant in comparison to *justice* (28b8-9 πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει).

a6-7 **ἢ αὖ ... ὑμῶν**: note how the structure of this sentence is parallel to the previous one: four proper names followed by a rhetorical question with the potential optative (on which, cf. note on a2).

Ὀρφεῖ ... καὶ Μουσαίωι καὶ Ἡσιόδωι καὶ Ὁμήρωι: for the function of these poets and the order of the list, cf. Chapter XI 228 and n.82.

a7 **ἐπὶ πόσωι**: this rare phrase (below, b7; *Alc. I* 115d5; Xen. *Cyrop.* iii 1,43; Lys. x 18; Dem. xxix 60) seems to be used as an equivalent of πόσου (20b8) in contexts where the latter would not be clear enough. As a rule, the genitive of price is used only when it is accompanied by a word for selling, buying, estimating and the like, or when the genitive itself is a word denoting an amount of money. Whereas one can say τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τἀγάθ' οἱ θεοί, it is doubtful that one can say τῶν πόνων διδόασιν ἡμῖν κτέ., or in our passage πόσου ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν.

ἄν ... ἄν: normally in prose, there can be more than one ἄν with the same predicate under certain conditions involving the syntactic complexity of the sentence: (1) two parts of a clause are split by a subordinate clause or a participle (17d4-5; 34c7-8), (2) the clause is introduced by a participle (both conditions obtain at 31a3-6), (3) a modal infinitive is preceded by a governing present indicative (this and (1) account for 40d1-e1), (4) two or more constituents are coordinated (31d8-e1), (5) one constituent is modified by adverbial καί or οὐδέ (relatively seldom in Plato, e.g. *Rep.* ix 589e2-3), (6) the clause is preceded or followed by ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ (27e1). Cf. K.-G. i 246-247; Goodwin as quoted in the note on 31a4. Other instances of double ἄν are as rare in prose as they are common in tragedy (except Aeschylus) and Old Comedy (for statistics, cf. *ZPE* 80 (1990) 11-12): five times in the Orators (Lys. xx 9. 16 — Lysias' first preserved speech; Isaeus iii 27. xii 4; Aeschin. iii 221). Given the fact that 'irregular' double ἄν occurs so much more often — relatively speaking — in drama than in prose, one would

have expected it to occur most often in what we regard as the most dramatic Greek prose, to wit Plato's early dialogues. The reverse is true. Of the dialogues which modern scholarship agrees in dating before the *Republic*, only four contain an instance of double ἄν not covered by rules (1) — (6): *Apology* (our place), *Laches* (190b9-c1 τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθ' ἂν ὁτωιοῦν), *Lysis* (216e4 οὐ γὰρ ἄν που τῶι κακῶι φίλον ἄν τι γένοιτο), *Meno* (93d9-10 οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑέος αὐτοῦ ᾐτιάσατ' ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν). Double ἄν does not occur in the *Republic*, but twenty-two times in the dialogues written after the *Republic*. Given these facts it seems impossible to interpret the looser use of double ἄν in Plato as a colloquial idiom, avoided in more formal prose. Rather, it looks as if the older Plato consciously revived a way of expressing modality that was already becoming obsolete in educated Attic in his own childhood (witness the scarcity of double ἄν in the latest plays of Euripides). It will be observed that of the four pre-*Republic* passages, two contain a negative, two a question word. These conditions also obtain in the majority of instances of double ἄν in drama. Cf. my paper 'Written and Spoken Language' 102-105.

γάρ: indirect causal: 'I say "you", for I for my part (ἐγὼ μέν, Denn. 381 ii) ...' Cf. note on 19e1.

b1 **αὐτόθι**: adverbial αὐτοῦ is never used as an attribute in Plato.

ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι: not to be connected directly with θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη: Socrates' sojourn would not be marvelous only at the moments when he would meet Palamedes and Ajax and others who died because of an unjust verdict. But to take the ὁπότε clause as a qualifier of ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι strains the word order. There is, I think, a contamination of two regular expressions: 'My stay would be marvelous if I were able to exchange notes with P. and A., whenever I met them' and 'It would be wonderful, whenever I would meet P. and A., to compare my lot with theirs'. The optative replaces what, after a primary tense in the main clause, would have been a general and/or futural subjunctive: 'my stay will be wonderful ὁπόταν ἐντύχω κτἑ'. Since the statement is not about the future but about a potential reality, the subjunctive is replaced by the optative: in such cases the subjunctive can, as a rule, be retained only if it precedes the potential optative in the main clause. Similarly, a deliberative subjunctive has to become an optative *Crito* 44b8 οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ... ὅτι χρῶιο σαυτῶι. Cf. Goodwin § 177-178. 186; K.-G. i 255-259.

b2 **Παλαμήδει**: On the supposed relationship of the *Apology* with Gorgias' *Apology of Palamedes* see the note on 38a5.

εἴ τις ἄλλος: 'anyone else who', cf. *Symp.* 218b5-7 οἱ δὲ οἰκέται, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν βέβηλός τε καὶ ἄγροικος, πύλας πάνυ μεγάλας τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐπίθεσθε; *Euthyphro* 8b4; *Symp.* 213c3; *Phaedr.* 278c1. c2; *Euthyd.* 305b1; *Gorg.* 525e2; *Laws* v 739b4. It is often claimed that εἴ τις equalling ὅστις (cf. Latin *si quis*) is post-classical Greek, e.g. D. Tabachovitz *Eranos* 30 (1932) 122-124; Blass - Debrunner (older editions) § 376 (quoting *Matth.* 18:28 ἀπόδος εἴ τι ὀφείλεις, where the context shows that the addressee *does* owe the speaker) — this is withdrawn in Blass - Debrunner - Rehkopf, but cf. § 372,2c. But there are quite a few parallels from classical Greek, cf. Xen. *Anab.* i 10,18 καταλαμβάνουσι ... διηρπασμένα ... εἴ τι σιτίον καὶ ποτὸν ἦν; iv 1,14; Soph. *Phil.* 44. 469; fr. 189,3 Radt; Thuc. i 10,1. 18,3. 67,3; Isoc. xv 128 χρὴ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν ... νομίζειν οὐκ εἴ τις ... ἀλλ' ὅστις ...; xix 33 οὐκ εἴ τινες ... ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅσοι ...; Dem. xviii 277 εἴ τις ἐλύπησέ τι τοῦτον ἢ προσέκρουσέ που, κατὰ τούτων ('against all those who'); ii 18; *IG* V 2,6 (Tegea, fourth century), lines 17. 27. 32 κατ' εἰ δέ τι(να τρόπον) = καθ' ὅντινα δὴ τρόπον. This idiom is confused with various others by K.-G. ii 573-574.

b5-6 **καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον ... διάγειν**: what starts as an apposition to the last, crucial clause triggers an anacoluthic infinitive: διάγειν is construed as if τὸ μέγιστον were a subject; it repeats b1 ἡ διατριβή. Similarly, *Crito* 45e1-46a1 αἰσχύνομαι μὴ <u>δόξηι</u> ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ... ἀνανδρίαι τινί ... πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης ... ὡς εἰσῆλθε ... καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν ... ὡς ἐγένετο, <u>καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί</u>, ... διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς <u>δοκεῖν</u> (Burnet's explanation of δοκεῖν as exclamatory, *in loc.*, is untenable: this would have required τό ... δοκεῖν). This type of anacoluthon is closely related to the familiar parenthesis of ὡς plus verb of saying or thinking followed by an (accusative and) infinitive instead of an indicative, e.g. *Phil.* 20d7-8 τόδε γε μὴν ὡς οἶμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον <u>εἶναι</u> λέγειν; Reinhard *Anakoluthe* 11-12; K.-G. ii 581. — Burnet deserves full credit for establishing the structure of the whole sentence. Of the various attempts to regularise the syntax, only Wilamowitz' ἀντιπαραβάλλειν τε for ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι (printing a full stop after τέθνηκεν) merits mention (*Platon* ii 347-348); it creates a new sentence, with οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη as predicate. But τε connecting sentences is very rare in Plato, and is found only in his later works (from the *Republic* onwards; cf. Denn. 499).

b7 **τις**: not τις ὑμῶν as in the parallel clause a7, since Socrates is speaking of his own activities and the εὐδαιμονία they would bring him. There is of course a certain humour in the assumption that other people would relish the prospect of examining Agamemnon, Odysseus and Sisyphus as much as Socrates would, but τις ὑμῶν would, I think, make the humour too obvious. τις here equals English *one*, French *on*.

b8 **τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν**: it is obvious why Odysseus (the πολυτροπώτατος of the Greeks in the Trojan war, *Hipp. min.* 364c6-7. e2) and Sisyphus are thought to be (possibly) guilty of the conceit of knowledge, but why Agamemnon? And why is Agamemnon referred to in this oblique way? Maybe Plato has in mind an opinion voiced occasionally that Agamemnon became the leader of the army not because of his strategic talent but for other reasons, cf. Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 337-342; Thuc. i 9,3; Isocr. xii 76.

ἄγοντα (BW, ἀγαγόντα T): a present participle used as a substantive may refer to a past action when the action has become characteristic of the person in question — the action is, as it were, made permanent. Examples from Thucydides are listed by Classen - Steup in their note on ii 2,4. In the Orators, one finds ὁ τιθεὶς τὸν νόμον side by side with, and with about the same frequency as, ὁ θεὶς τὸν νόμον. In the New Testament, Judas is called ὁ παραδιδούς. The reading of BW, the *lectio difficilior*, is probably preferable.

c1 **ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι**: to the parallels given by Burnet, add (with Reinhard *Anakoluthe* 75) *Laws* xii 944b2 ἢ μυρί' ἂν ἔχοι τις τοιαῦτα παραμυθούμενος ἐπάιδειν.

c2 **καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας**: in the *Apology*, Socrates does not mention any women as his interlocutors during his past philosophical career, but this is hardly surprising given the secluded life most Athenian women led. It should be noted, however, that in his eulogy of Socrates, Alcibiades states explicitly that women listened to Socratic λόγοι or reports of them: *Symp.* 215d3-6 ἐπειδὰν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος ..., ἐάντε γυνὴ ἀκούῃ ἐάντε ἀνὴρ ἐάντε μειράκιον, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα. Occasionally, Socratic writers do portray Socrates in conversation with women, if not free-born Athenian women, cf. Diotima in the *Symp.*, the *Aspasia* of Aeschines of Sphettos and Theodote in Xen. *Mem.* iii 11. And Socrates says in so many words that, in the two states whose εὐνομία he values most, Sparta and Crete (cf. Chapter VI 93 and n.49), not only men but also women take great pride in their παίδευσις (*Prot.* 342d2-4). But he is thinking here of well-known wise women of the past, whose names he could mention (ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι), for example Sappho, who is included (*Phaedr.* 235b7-8. c3) among the παλαιοί ... καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες who spoke and wrote about erotic matters, or the priestesses who preach the immortality of the soul and are wise περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα (*Meno* 81a5-b1). This is not to deny, of course, that Plato's Socrates shows many truly misogynic traits. See note on 35b3.

c3-4 **ἀμήχανον ... εὐδαιμονίας**: Burnet is probably mistaken in comparing this genitive to the (causal) genitive governed by verbs of admiring and related

idioms: it is more likely to be a partitive genitive after ἀμήχανον, 'an unmanageable amount of' (so K.-G. i 278 b; cf. ἀμήχανον ὅσον). The phrase looks like a *recherché* variant of ἀμήχανος εὐδαιμονία (cf. ἀμήχανον κάλλος, *Symp*. 218e2; *Rep*. vi 509a6), just as *Rep*. ix 579b1 ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη (for κακῶι).

c4 **τούτου γε ἕνεκα**: γε is not limitative ('people there don't kill you for *that*') but seems to mark τούτου ἕνεκα as an emphatic starting-point for the rest of the sentence ('*that* is no reason for people there to kill you').

c5-6 **τά τε ... ἄλλα ... καί**: cf. note on 36a2.

c6 **ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον**: ἤδη marks the beginning of the period of time denoted by λοιπός, cf. *Phaed*. 61c10-d2 καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο; 90d5-6 (he would blame his own misfortune on philosophical arguments) καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ; *Phaedr*. 256c5-6. 'Henceforth (from the moment of their death), they are immortal for the rest of (all) time'. Cf. Anonymus Iamblichi 5,1 (quoted in full on 35a6) ἀθανάτωι τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον.

c9 **ἕν τι τοῦτο ... ἀληθές**: 'one single truth, namely this'. Cf. *Rep*. x 601d1-2 περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; *Laws* xi 916d6-8 κιβδηλείαν ... χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα διανοηθῆναι καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀπάτην ὡς ἕν τι γένος ὂν τοῦτο ὧι τὴν φήμην ἐπιφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ πολλοί (no comma after ὄν necessary); without a numeral, above 21d6 σμικρῶι τινι αὐτῶι τούτωι ('just this one little thing', Burnet); *Parm*. 149e8-9 οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ τινε τούτω εἴδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης. οὗτος normally points forward in this idiom, but not invariably, cf. *Gorg*. 472c3 οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου 'this particular type of proof'. I doubt that Burnet is right in translating ἀληθές by 'as a truth': when the same noun is qualified by οὗτος and τις it never takes the article in Plato. And if τοῦτο τὸ ἀληθές is not possible here, there is no good reason to take ἀληθές as predicative. I append further references: *Theaet*. 144c2; *Phileb*. 18b7-8; *Phaedr*. 265c9; *Rep*. vi 487c2-3; x 597b5; *Laws* iii 683a7. 685e3-4; iv 722c8-9. But the author of the *Epinomis* does use the article in this case, cf. 974b2.

d1 **οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῶι κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι**: note the 'crescendo' structure: each subsequent constituent contains more information and carries more emphasis than the last, till we come to the corresponsive οὔτε ... οὔτε. This crescendo order is very frequent in clauses containing 'substantive' ἐστί 'there is'. Cf. my paper 'Written and Spoken Language' 99 n.19. In addition, the structure makes it possible for Plato to juxtapose ἀγαθῶι and κακόν.

d2 **ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα**: for the expression, cf. *Laws* x 900b1-3 εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς (the gods), τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων; x 886d8-e1 οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν; x 899d5-6; xi 927a3.

d3 **τὰ ἐμά**: sc. πράγματα, 'the things that have happened to me'. The noun has to be supplied from the previous clause, where it has a different meaning.

d4 **ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων**: since death is a good thing for Socrates, more precisely a minor good according to his scale of values, there is no reason why we should deny, with Burnet, that πράγματα refers to the troubles of old age, which are a minor evil. It seems entirely wrong to me to explain πράγματα as a reference to the constant exertions demanded by the divine mission: by examining others Socrates is also examining himself and therefore taking care of his soul — to be rid of that trouble is not better for him in any way. The phrase recurs *Rep.* iii 406e3, where it is also used for someone who gets rid of illness by dying (τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγη). Burnet mistakenly claims that the phrase is colloquial: it occurs quite frequently in comedy, but also in the Orators (Lys. xxv 12. xxix 10. xxxii 23; Dem. i 8. iv 13. xxxvi 2. xlvii 5; four times in the other Orators).

d5 **διὰ τοῦτο καί**: καί after expressions meaning 'therefore' indicates that the previous statement accounts for a fact that was already mentioned earlier or is presumed to be well-known (often preceded by δή, which appeals to the reader's knowledge or insight). There is sometimes a nuance of addition, as here: 'that is also the reason why ...'. But more often this nuance is absent and καί is emphatic: 'it is for that very reason that ...' Cf. Denn. 307-308; my *Comm. Clit.* 302. 379.

d8 **κατεψηφίζοντο ... κατηγόρουν**: the imperfect is used because Socrates focuses on the intentions that his accusers and those who had voted for the death-penalty had while they were voting and accusing. An interesting parallel is Eur. *Her.* 284-286 ἡμᾶς δ', ἐπειδὴ δεῖ <u>θανεῖν</u>, <u>θνῄσκειν</u> χρεὼν μὴ πυρὶ καταξανθέντας, ἐχθροῖσιν γέλων διδόντας, οὑμοὶ τοῦ <u>θανεῖν</u> μεῖζον κακόν. (A different explanation of the *Her.* passus is given by C.M.J. Sicking *Glotta* 69 (1991) 28-31.) For κατηγόρουν, see also the note on 24b3.

e1 **τοσόνδε**: 'only this', 'this small thing', cf. note on 39e4.

e1-2 **αὐτῶν ... τιμωρήσασθε**: the switch from third to second person plural suggests that, from τοὺς ὑεῖς on, Socrates is addressing the whole body of jurors (not, I think, only those who had voted for the death-penalty) as well as his accusers. Hence ὦ ἄνδρες, not ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί is the form of address, in order to smooth the transition. Throughout the *Apology*, Socrates

had used ὦ ἄνδρες as a variant of ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, but after the first ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, he had stopped using ὦ ἄνδρες. The oldest generation of Orators (Antiphon, Andocides) and some later ones (Isaeus, Dinarchus, Lycurgus) use ὦ ἄνδρες almost exclusively (as does Lysias in i, but not in his other speeches); the others use it as an occasional variant of ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί or ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

e2-7 **τοὺς ὑεῖς μου ... οὐδένος ἄξιοι**: the traditional punctuation makes the first ἐάν clause dependent on τιμωρήσασθε and the second on ὀνειδίζετε. This interpretation is illogical because the ὅτι clause governed by ὀνειδίζετε covers the content of both ἐάν clauses: 'punish them if they care about the wrong things, and if they think they are something reproach them that they care about the wrong things and think they are something'. It seems better to assume a second asyndeton within the sentence (which itself started with an asyndeton), to wit after e5 ὄντες (where a colon should replace the comma). Such an asyndeton would, in this context, be explanatory, and this seems appropriate enough: ὀνειδίζετε thus becomes an explanation or specification of τιμωρήσασθε ... λυποῦντες. Alternatively, one may suppose that this is another instance of a sentence with two predicates, cf. on 32b5.

e3 **λυποῦντες ... ἐλύπουν**: continuous activities, hence the present and imperfect.

e5 **καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι**: since the verb has a different meaning and a different construction than in e3-4 ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν, the conjunction is repeated for the sake of clarity.

42a1 **δίκαια πεπονθὼς ... ἔσομαι**: as Burnet notes, this expression means, more specifically, 'to get one's just deserts', cf. *Euthyd.* 301a2-3 καὶ ἡγούμην δίκαια πεπονθέναι ὅτι ἔγρυξα; *Gorg.* 476e2-3 οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει; The future perfect is necessary because Socrates will be long dead by the time his sons are treated this way.

αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς: 'together with my sons'. A parallel passage tells us that this is an expression worth noting as such: *Euthyd.* 307c3-4 θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παιδία. Cf. also *Rep.* ii 372b6. It may be legal language: cf. the regular formula αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας (ἐκγόνους) in honorary decrees.

a2 **ἀλλὰ γάρ** breaking off (Denn. 103,2 ii), sounds very colloquial at the end of a formal speech; it is never so used in the Orators.

a4 **ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα**: for the meaning of πρᾶγμα, cf. note on 20c5. Cf. the Tettichos epitaph (ca. 550; *IG* I^2 976, *CEG* 13, v.4) ταῦτ' ἀποδυράμενοι νεῖσθ' ἐπὶ πρᾶγμ' ἀγαθόν.

πλὴν ἤ, not πλὴν εἰ, seems the better reading. When πλήν is followed by a single phrase which cannot be put in the genitive, πλὴν ἤ is used unless the phrase contains the pronoun τις. But there are only three instances of either usage in the whole of Attic prose (not including Aristotle) and comedy: (ἤ) Aristoph. *Clouds* 361. 734; Isocr. xii 258 (εἰ some codd.); (εἰ) Aristoph. *Birds* 601; Pl. *Polit.* 286d5-6; Xen. *Hell.* iv 2,21.

a5 **τῶι θεῶι**: Plato pays special attention to the very last words of a text (cf. *Phaed.* 118a17 φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου; *Rep.* x 621d2-3 εὖ πράττωμεν; *Phaedr.* 279c8 ἴωμεν). No doubt the readers are here reminded of Socrates' divine mission and his belief in divine providence.

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